by Tim Saunders
Once the KOSB were in their objective, 44 Lowland Brigade had a continuous bridgehead and the business of pushing outwards began. Captain Fargus recalled that, ‘At 0700 hours, 24 March the Brigade Commander crossed the river and saw all his battalion commanders in turn. Progress was satisfactory everywhere’.
227 Highland Brigade – Codeword NAP
The Highland Brigade was to cross the Rhine, capture and hold the area of Haffen and Mehr. Brigadier Colville held his final coordinating conference on 22 March, to confirm the written orders issued on 18 March. His plan was to assault with two battalions, 10 Highland Light Infantry (10 HLI) on the right and 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (2 A&SH) to the left. 2 Gordon was initially in reserve, and was to cross on orders of Brigade HQ, when Overkamp and Lohr were reported clear, relieving 10 HLI and 2 A&SH respectively; the latter battalions were then to exploit to Bellinguoven and Wisshof. Once established in their bridgeheads, the two assault brigades would close the gap between them, up to their mutual boundary, while 227 Brigade would be responsible for linking up with 52 Highland Division near Rees.
According to 10 HLI’s plan made by Lieutenant Colonel Bramwell Davis:
... the right-hand company of the HLI, C, was to clear Wolffskath and then advance inland along the bund to Overkamp, while A Company on the left was to clear westward along the other bund that runs parallel to the river close to its edge. When A Company had reached the junction point with the Argylls it was to have pushed inland and cleared Ree, where it would have found itself abreast of C Company in Overkamp.
Infantry climbing aboard a Buffalo of the East Riding Yeomanry.
The crossing of 227 Highland Brigade, however, did not go nearly as well as that of 44 Brigade. The leading companies of 10 HLI crossed without casualties, but were landed several hundred yards to the right, missing C Company’s objective at Wolffskath, causing some confusion in the darkness and opening a wide gap between the two assault battalions. The HLI found the dyke strongly held by three companies of 1/21 Fallschirmjäger Regiment, with a strongpoint at Wolffskath, and A Company suffered numerous casualties, including all their Company’s officers while clearing it. CSM Wright took command of the Company and was justifiably awarded the DCM for his ‘cool handling of the company’. According to the divisional historian:
C Company had also pushed down-stream to Wolffskath, where it was promptly pinned by 20-mm. and LMG fire, losing all its officers but one. Most of the tracer was coming from the houses at Bettenhof [on the outskirts of Overkamp], about a thousand yards inland from Wolffskath: clearly, Bettenhof had to be cleared. The FOO’s wireless was ′out,’ but C Company’s 18-set was still working and it passed the FOO’s call for fire on Bettenhof.
The view from the German held river dyke down onto the ground that the leading waves of infantry had to cross.
Meanwhile, B and D Companies in the second flight of the East Riding Yeomanry’s LVTs, had also been landed incorrectly, resulting in ‘a highly confused situation’. In the ‘plan’ that finally emerged from the chaos, B Company took on completing the clearance of the riverside bund and while believing that the bund had already been cleared, D Company formed up behind C to the east of the north-south bund that led to Overkamp. Matters were not helped by the absence of Battalion HQ , which had been landed too far to the right and advancing inland, was temporarily stranded in no-man’s-land, where it was attacked and ‘only extricated at 0500 hours with some difficulty’. That ‘difficulty’ included ‘... the complete OP party of the 131st Field Regiment, R.A., being ambushed and wiped out’.
However, the guns of the artillery finally answered the call for fire on Bettenhof:
Down came the concentration exactly where it was wanted, whereupon C and D Companies – totalling together much less than one company’s strength – went in, in open order. They took Bettenhof together with forty-four prisoners, and there in the southern portion of Overkamp they dug in.
By dawn, D and C Companies were secure in the outskirts of Overkamp. At this point, the third flight of LVTs, containing most of Support Company and essential vehicles was ordered across the Rhine. Meanwhile B Company had cleared the riverside bund as far as the battalion boundary. The divisional historian recounted:
In front of B there were, it turned out, no less than twelve Spandau positions manned by paratroopers who meant to fight. Steadily and methodically B Company, under Major Beatson-Hird, who had commanded it in every action since D Day, dealt with each position in turn. Lieutenant Farmer and Sergeant Scanlon were afterwards decorated for the parts they played in this series of very gallant actions. At the sluice-gate on the riverside bund B Company linked up at last with the Argylls, who had cleared their section of the bund up to the sluice-gates...
10 HLI made contact with 2 A&SH at 1200 hours. In summary:
In this bitter fight, in which they had met and worsted a complete parachute battalion which was fighting with all its accustomed courage, the H.L.I. had lost three officers killed and four wounded, fourteen other ranks killed and seventy wounded. They had good reason to look back with pride on their Rhine crossing.
Clearing an enemy position built into a dyke.
The view inland from the dyke east towards Overkamp.
See map on page 160
Also crossing at 0200 hours, 2nd Argylls had considerable difficulty in getting their Buffaloes ashore due to sand and mud banks obstructing the proposed exits from the river. Their initial crossings, with D, B and A Companies in the first flight, were timed by their CO, Lieutenant Colonel Morgan, as taking twelve minutes rather than the two and a half where things had gone to plan.
In the battalion plan, D Company was to have landed on the east side of the Hübsch inlet and to have gone straight for Hübsch and Lohr, where they would have been in touch with the HLI in Ree. Meanwhile, B and A Companies were to have landed west of the inlet and to have pushed north, astride the bund, towards Wayerhof, in preparation for an attack on Haffen from the west.
Rosenhof Farm, the largest collection of buildings in Hübsch.
In the event, five out of D Company’s six Buffaloes, found it impossible to land at the eastern corner of the inlet as planned, so they climbed ashore on the west side. ‘Thus D Company had a mile’s march round the inlet before they could tackle Hübsch, so all hope of surprise was lost.’ Worse than that, the Company had lost its commander and one platoon was missing for some time. Outside Hübsch they were engaged in some nasty close quarter fighting with Fallschirmjäger, who were positioned in strength along the reverse side of the bund and in the scrub to the southward. By first light, however, the Argyll’s C Company had joined them, having crossed in the second flight of Buffaloes. D and C Companies together then cleared Hübsch, losing many men.
There was considerable resistance centred on the houses at Hübsch, but after a sharp encounter this was cleared by D Company by first light. A patrol to the east along the bund, failed to contact 10 HLI as pre-arranged, and while on its way back, came under fire from Spandaus that had come to life after the artillery concentration lifted.
Meanwhile, on the Argyll’s left, B and A Companies who landed without casualties had pushed north without waiting for Hübsch to be cleared.
After a stiff fight, A Company took Hoverhof, north-west of Haffen. B Company, farther east, beat off a two-company Fallschirmjäger counter-attack with the help of most effective defensive fire put down by the FOO, and took ninety prisoners. Thus, dawn found B and A Companies closely engaged with the enemy and separated by some two thousand five hundred yards from D and C in Hübsch. Battalion Headquarters was betwixt and between at Dornemardt.
A and B Companies had marched north to reach their objectives around Wayerhof, known as Area X. In the process, they took some prisoners against patchy resistance, and encountering a few schumines. An attempt to capture Roperhof, however, failed and daylight revealed it as a strongpoint firmly held by the Fallschirmjäger. In carrying out this march, the Argylls had
closed up to the right flank of 51st Highland Division in the form of 5/7 Gordons who were on the island formed by the old course of the Rhine. A physical link up was not, however, made until p.m. 26 March.
At 0615 hours, 227 Brigade’s reserve battalion, 2 Gordons, were ordered to send a company across the river, making this no less than three battalions of the same regiment taking part in the initial stages of the operation. As with all of the reserve battalions, the crossing was to be made in storm boats.
A Company who were ready to move, had been expecting to support 10 HLI but now found themselves cruising a mile down stream to land at Hübsch to join the Argylls. In doing so, they lost an officer and three other ranks killed and ten wounded to small arms fire from isolated enemy posts along the riverbank. B Company were ordered to cross but A Company’s cruise in daylight, had alerted the enemy who mortared B Company very badly in their assembly area and with the loss of boats being a factor, temporarily abandoned the attempt. The presence of these isolated posts caused a significant delay in 15th Scottish Division’s build-up during the morning of 24 March.
A Company joined the Argyll’s D Company in advancing east, astride the road to Lohr at 0815 hours, while C Company (2 A&SH) went on to attack Riswickhof, a farm complex several hundred yards to the south. By the time the attack got going, the artillery check fire had been imposed, while air attacks prior to the airborne operation were launched. 1 Middlesex’s medium machine guns, however, were available in quantity. The enemy put up significant resistance and it took the Scots infantry some time to break into the farms of Hangenshof and Riswickhof and it wasn’t until 1330 hours that Lohr, five hundred yards further on, was clear. However, during the consolidation phase the Gordon’s A Company lost their three remaining officers to a mortar barrage that struck while they were at an orders group.
A British infantryman complete with his assault equipment.
Meanwhile, starting at 1030 hours, the remainder of 2 Gordons had crossed the river. Their historian wrote:
... the Battalion crossed to reinforce the Argyll. There were some minor troubles. The boat conveying the commanding officer and the adjutant ran out of petrol in mid-stream and was paddled until the sapper in charge produced a reserve tin.
Their task was to follow elements of the Argylls around the left flank to attack Haffen and secure the eastern part of Area X. This area in the centre of the ‘Bend’ formed a large area of houses, fields and orchards, and was a natural place for the Germans to defend. And so it proved, being firmly held by 18 Fallschirmjäger Regiment. This large area was clearly too big for a single battalion to take and clear and, consequently, Divisional HQ needed to coordinate an attack on the eastern portion of the village by elements of 227 Highland Brigade. While this was coordinated, there would be another pause in operations.
Divisional Reserve 46 Highland Brigade – Codeword WHIST
See map on page 146
Supported initially by the two DD squadrons and subsequently by the ordinary gun tanks, the highlanders of 46 Brigade, in a flexible plan, were responsible for expanding the bridgehead including clearing the woods overlooking Haldern. This brigade would also be responsible for forming the mobile striking force. First to cross, were 44 RTR and 7 Seaforth.
Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson, Commanding Officer of 44 RTR, whose unit had been on radio silence for the assembly and march down to the river, described his crossing operations, in 44 Lowland Brigade’s area near Bislich:
From then on we were ′on the air’, as our far-bank reconnaissance and working parties, in two troops of Buffaloes, accompanied the assaulting infantry battalions across the Rhine. Their task was to prepare the two exits from the river, mark them, and exercise traffic control during the crossing.
At last light all tanks had been pulled out of the leaguer on to the road and pointed in the right direction. Tea and rum was served at 0330 hours, and at 0400 the party moved off winding its way through the gun lines, some of which had to be silenced as we passed so as not to blow tank commanders’ heads off. Slowly the column moved on down the hill through Xanten towards the ′inflation’ area to the east of it.
Sherman DDs on the east bank of the Rhine, shrouded with smoke.
On the other side of the river, the far bank reconnaissance parties had met with varying success. The right hand one was acting according to plan, but the left party had had a bit of trouble, and several casualties. It had been spandaued, mortared and shelled: however, it reported that it would be ready to receive the tanks on time.
By 0515 the unit was complete in the ′inflation’ area, ready for the tricky operation of making the crossing. Luckily the enemy shelling was sporadic and not very accurate as far as we were concerned – not that it had to be, when all that was required was for one exhausted splinter to tear apart one’s canvas. However, only two tanks were punctured and as dawn broke the unit started to move down to the water’s edge. The crossing was made on a two-squadron front, A Squadron right, C Squadron left; R.H.Q. followed A Squadron, and B Squadron was held back ready to cross by either route. On the far bank both exits had by then been completed, and soon the river was full of tanks, looking rather like floating baths drifting downstream. Over half of A Squadron was waterborne when the enemy started shelling the tanks. One tank was hit and sank like a stone; the crew luckily all abandoned ship and made the shore safely. R.H.Q. nipped in whilst the enemy was adjusting for range, and, except for a few splashes in midstream, had no trouble.
Meantime, C Squadron had got nine tanks waterborne, then the entrance started to collapse, so it was ordered to ′about face’ the rest of the squadron and to follow on behind B Squadron, who were by now using the right-hand crossing. Tanks were now scrambling out of the exits in fine style, an alternative having been found for the left-hand exit. Reconnaissance officers had started to lead tanks away to the concentration area inland under the dyke. Here a certain amount of bogging took place in the thick clay belt on the far bank.
By now, 0815, the whole unit was across and concentrated, only half an hour above our estimate: contact had been established with an infantry battalion, 7th Seaforth, and we were ready to go.
Having assembled on the flood plain behind 8 Royal Scots, the 44 RTR and Seaforth battle group awaited orders. By about 0900 hours the Divisional Commander was across the river and with his agreement, thirty minutes later, Brigadier Villers tasked A Company 7 Seaforth supported by the DD tanks to clear the bund and capture the area Sandenhof, (just north of Lohr) and if necessary assist 2 A&SH of 227 Brigade into Lohr. Forty-six prisoners from 1052 Grenadier Regiment (84th Division) were captured in the area Vissel – Treudekath and a further four prisoners from 21 Fallschirmjäger Regiment at Wolffskath. This simple information confirmed the location of the German divisional boundary for the intelligence staff. The remainder of 7 Seaforth followed along the bund to Wolffskath. Here the battalion turned north, and, at 1300 hours, with some luck, infantrymen clinging to the Shermans of 44 RTR, began to pass through 10 HLI, with the object of seizing Mehr.
See map on page 173
Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson wrote:
Just after 1000 hours, we got definite orders that we and 7 Seaforth were to move north and link up the two bridgeheads. With B Squadron in the lead, we were soon in Vah on the right, where the bridge over the dyke was blown, and also in Wolffskath on the left near the Rhine bank. The enemy was still about and needed digging out of every building. He displayed his usual reluctance to surrender to tanks alone, so we kept infantry on our backs as long as possible in order to quicken things up. B Squadron now turned east, and joined up with 227 Brigade. C Squadron took up the chase and headed for Mehr. Apart from the bad going and a few snipers, no trouble was experienced in getting there. Meantime, A Squadron moved up on the left and got into Haffen, where it had a lot of fun with some good targets, while B Squadron, back from its ′swan’ to 227th Brigade, stayed in the area of Overkamp to look after the tail end of the proceeding.
The enemy had obviously intended to hold Mehr, as it was fortified and all roads and tracks were blocked and mined. In addition, the fire of enemy self-propelled guns covered all the roads and ‘a brisk artillery duel was soon in progress’. Brigadier Villers, commander 46 Brigade, at this stage, however, called a halt to allow the rest of the brigade catch-up. To make use of the time, patrols were dispatched to recce bridges and get a better idea of the opposition’s positions. The Fallschirmjäger, however, dispatched their own fighting patrols that followed the Scottish infantry, giving rise to alarm that they were launching a counter-attack. Whatever their intention, they were beaten off by C Squadron and elements of 7 Seaforth, supported by artillery. During these patrol actions the Seaforth were able to establish that the Germans were, predictably, holding the vital bridge across the old course of the Rhine in some strength.
46 Brigade’s reorganisation included bringing up A Company 7 Seaforth from the Lohr area, which had just fallen to 2 A&SH. Once they had rejoined the battalion’s main body, they followed up as battalion reserve into Mehr, which was reached at about 1530 hours but was not cleared by 1745 hours, yielding another sixty-eight prisoners. Opposition to the advance had come from spandau fire and some self-propelled guns. Mobility for the 44 RTR became a problem, when some bad going was encountered by the Shermans, with three tanks becoming bogged. The RTR were, none the less able to support the infantry’s clearance of Mehr and drive off the enemy armour by sheer weight of numbers. Former RAF technician and Englishman, Ron James, found himself with the Seaforth Highlanders’ B Company:
