by Tim Saunders
My first battle was at Mehr. The village was a mess having been smashed up by our artillery and it was very difficult to spot the enemy in the confusion of blown down trees and rubble. Their game was to shoot as we advanced and then go into cover and try to escape and repeat the process over again. The paratroopers fought well but if they didn’t have an officer or NCO with them they surrendered pretty quickly, especially when we got close or we had cut them off.
Up to this point, casualties in the battalion had been three officers and eighteen other ranks killed and wounded, and in 44 RTR one officer and five other ranks had been hit.
The Attack on Haffen
See map on page 173
Meanwhile, owing to the difficulty 227 Brigade had in clearing the river bend and reaching their objectives, the crossing of the remaining battalions of 46 Brigade had been badly delayed. 9 Cameronians began crossing by storm boat ferry at 1430 hours and was directed to join operations in the south eastern part of Haffen, which it will be recalled, was the largest area of houses, fields and orchards in the Bend area and, as was already apparent, was well defended by 18 Fallschirmjäger Regiment. Divisional HQ coordinated a quick attack on Haffen by 2 Gordons of 227 Highland Brigade who were to clear the western portion of the village, while 9 Cameronians, supported by the Shermans of A Squadron 44 RTR, would approach from the south and southeast. Both battalions were conscious of the possibility of a blue and blue clash and as recalled by 2 Gordons, ‘A certain amount of confusion was caused when some of our tanks were, erroneously, reported to be entering the village from the east’. This resulted in a ‘check fire’ being imposed on the artillery fire plan and the Scots attacking without the usual numbing deluge of shells. The difficulties, in mid-battle, of coordinating a quick attack from tactical headquarters, some of which were relying on man-pack sets, are easy to envisage.
The Gordons’ B and C Companies advanced through B Company 2 A&SH at 1715 hours across flat fields and orchards into the western portion of the straggling village. Lieutenant Telfer was wounded in the fight to clear Haffen. Meanwhile, 9 Cameronian and A Squadron 44 RTR attacked Haffen from the south east. The squadron provided covering fire for the attack from the south and eventually the retreating enemy presented ‘A Squadron with some excellent shooting’. By 1750 hours, the Cameronians had driven most of the Fallschirmjäger out and occupied the south eastern part of Haffen and the Gordons the western part. Despite seventy-one prisoners falling into the hands of the Gordons, the area was far from clear and indeed would not be considered a safe place until the following day.
Medium guns in the Army Group Royal Artillery should have added weight to the fire plan for the attack on Haffen.
See map on page 173
With Haffen and Mehr taken, the enemy was now holding the water obstacle of the Lange Renne and Hagener Meer, east and north east of Mehr, and 7 Seaforth was unable to advance further, not least because of the difficulties of armoured manoeuvre. Consequently, the Germans were able to hold an important bridge, which they eventually blew. The Seaforth went into positions holding the northern and northeastern outskirts of Mehr, which was now under enemy shellfire.
The Cameronians, even though detailed clearance of Haffen was still occupying their main attention, pushed several patrols north across the open ground, nearly as far as the line of the road Bruckshof – Holtershof where they were held up by spandau fire. During the afternoon’s operations, 9 Cameronians suffered three officer and forty other rank casualties and took fifty prisoners.
2 Glasgow Highlanders eventually crossed the Rhine at 1645 hours and moved from the Forward Assembly Area to occupy a position between the Cameronians in Haffen and the Seaforth in Mehr, which was reached at 2300 hours, without opposition. This last move brought the majority of 15th Scottish into a solid position, although 227 Brigade, mainly due to delays in their crossing, had been halted short of Area ‘Y’ in the face of determined resistance by the Fallschirmjäger.
44 Lowland Brigade
We left this brigade on the Division’s right flank, shortly after dawn, having occupied its initial objectives against slight opposition from the battered infantrymen of 84th Division. At 0700 hours, Brigadier Cumming-Bruce visited all his battalions in their initial positions and reported to General Barber that ‘Progress was satisfactory’ and that he was ordering his battalions forward to their final objectives.
The strain of battle is etched on the faces of these German soldiers.
This involved clearing hamlets and farms of the few members of 84th Division who were prepared to put up a fight and rounding up Germans who had gone to ground while the battle progressed. In the centre of the Brigade area, C and D Companies 6 KOSB cleared the straggling hamlet of Muhlenfeld by 1000 hours.
8 Royal Scots’ next objectives were Vissel and Jockern, which the enemy still held. At 0945 hours, an attack was laid on to capture both these hamlets. B Company was directed on the Vissel, while D Company, commanded by Major J. N. Cadzow, attacked Jockern Incidental support was provided by B Squadron of 44 RTR, who at the crucial time was following 7 Seaforth (227 Highland Brigade) to the northwest and was able to engage targets in support of 8 RS. ‘The two operations were entirely successful and numerous prisoners were taken in each of the hamlets.’ However, coinciding with the arrival of the airborne armada overhead, there had been a noticeable slackening of resistance by the enemy infantry, who with the prospect of Allied paratroopers to their rear were increasingly reluctant to stand and fight. This, as we have seen, was in contrast with the experience of 227 Brigade, to the north west, who were facing the Fallschirmjäger all day.
Meanwhile, 6 RSF at the southern end of the Brigade’s lodgement were to push forward from their initial objectives in Bislich/Marwick to Loh and thence patrol onward to the southern extension of the Dierfordterwald where they should make contact with elements of 17th US Airborne Division.
D Company on the right, were, according to Major Bokenham ‘... dug-in and alert, with some of the company relaxed a little to brew some tea’. This happy state of affairs was not, however, to last long. He continued:
Orders were received to move further right to extend the bridgehead, and Captain Mann set off with Sergeant Curran’s platoon to clear the route and captured a small harbour and several farmhouses, while a few men in the company remained to hold a firm base. Using fire and movement to perfection, Captain Mann’s men routed a spandau post on the way to their objective, succeeded in clearing the target without loss, and took another fifty-three prisoners. The rest of the company joined them and dug in on its final objective. Patrols went out and a further nineteen prisoners were gathered without loss. The night was spent safely in this position, but there was some unpleasantness from fire on our own side of the Rhine at mines in the river, as well as from a machine-gunning dive attack by an enemy jet aircraft.
As indicated by Major Bokenham’s account, patrols had been dispatched by all three of 44 Brigade’s battalions across a mile or more of open ground to the Diesrfordterwald. The landing of the Airborne Corps had completed the total disruption of the 84th Divisions defence and the patrols were able to reach the wood. 6 KOSB, being the nearest, contacted 507 Parachute Infantry Regiment in the village of Diesrfordter at 1400 hours and further south, 6 RSF joined the Americans at 1510. Yellow celanese triangles were carried by all ranks of the assault brigades and contact frequencies were allocated to reduce the likelihood of ‘blue on blue’ contact. 8 RS reached 6th British Airborne Division near Bergen at 1515, having secured Bridge A en route. The important link up had occurred. This would enable the Airborne troops to concentrate on facing east across the River Issel and for 15th Scottish Division to place their main effort further north with the aim of extending the bridgehead and closing up to the Issel.
XII Corps Evening Situation Report
The Corps had every right to be pleased with its achievements against an enemy that had already proved to be resolute in the defence of his Fatherland during
the battles in the Reichswald, Cleve, Goch, etc. during Operations VERITABLE and BLOCKBUSTER. XII Corps summed up the enemy position at the end of D Day in the following words:
There were no surprises in the enemy layout opposing us. As expected 84 Inf Div proved to be in control from the LIPPE river to the area of VISSEL with: from left to right the WESEL Garrison, 1052 GR, 1062 (Mt) Regt and 1051 GR. Moreover, if the PoW figures are to be trusted, the division seems to be well in the running for a second destruction within a period of six weeks. Our own total of PoWs must be well over a thousand while the, airborne forces claim 3,504 and a high proportion of both totals must come from the luckless 84 Inf Div. Incidentally, to round off what must have been a black day for the division, its HQ was bombed this morning.
By comparison, 7 Para Div, whose right extends on to our left-hand neighbour’s front (30 Corps), has not fared too badly. Both 19 and 21 Para Regts have been identified, but so far 20 Para Regt does not appear to have been involved.
While 84th Division may have had an extremely ‘black day’ and virtually ceased to exist, 15th Panzergrenadier Division was attempting to fill the vacuum and was still full of fight.
German Counter-Attack
As night fell on 24 March, the pace of operations slackened and soldiers who had only snatched moments of sleep in the See map previous forty-eight hours got what rest they could. Meanwhile, on page with all their offensive efforts in daylight frustrated by British 173 artillery fire, the Fallschirmjäger, now reinforced by 15th Panzer Grenadiers, were planning to counter-attack the Scots.
Initial enemy operations were focused in the east and south eastern sectors of 7 Seaforth positions, but were driven off by accurate shooting of C Squadron 44 RTR and F Battery 4th Royal Horse Artillery. Colonel Hopkinson of 44 RTR had just received orders to regroup his squadrons, for the following day’s operations, when an altogether more serious enemy attack began.
Accordingly A and C Squadrons were pulled back. Just as we were leaving 46 Brigade staked a claim for one squadron to stay right in support of them, so B Squadron moved up behind Mehr. The enemy put in a fairly fierce counter-attack as we left, and employed more artillery on it than at any other time during the battle.
Then at midnight, this ‘considerable counter-attack’ developed from the northeast, and parties of enemy succeeded in infiltrating into 7 Seaforth’s positions, forcing C Company to withdraw. Between 0300 and 0330 hours, ‘after making the awkward decision to use medium artillery’ close to positions defensive artillery fire was called for in the area previously occupied by the company, in the south eastern corner of Mehr, and medium guns of the A.G.R.A. engaged the wooded areas to the east and north-east of the town. The enemy succeeded in infiltrating to Merrbruch, where earlier in the evening another four Shermans of C Squadron 44 RTR had become bogged, while moving to a night leaguer. The crews deployed their pintel mounted Browning machine guns in the ground role. Despite their fire one of the stranded tanks was knocked out by a Panzerfaust, and the remaining three had to be set on fire by their crews, since, for security reasons, the risk of DD tanks falling into enemy hands could not be accepted. Colonel Hopkinson noted that the B Squadron and C Squadron’s crews ‘had a pretty hectic night, in particular the bogged crews who were overrun by an enemy infantry company and spent the rest of the night fighting on their feet ...’.
A panzergrenadier armed with a panzerfaust.
Brigadier Villiers ordered 7 Seaforth to hold its positions and 2 Glasgow Highlanders were warned to assist if required. Between 0430 hours and 0630 hours 25 March, the right of the Glasgow Highlanders’ positions was also attacked and C Company was temporarily pinned down in its trenches, finally making a successful withdrawal covered by smoke.
According to the British Army of the Rhine’s historian, writing in 1947:
The position in 7 Seaforth’s sector was stabilised by 0500 hours, the enemy withdrawing slowly, he was finally ejected from the town by 0700 hours, and companies were able to reoccupy their former positions. One officer and twenty-one other ranks of 7 Seaforth had become casualties, and the enemy lost over thirty prisoners and a number of dead and wounded.
Most of the Seaforth taken prisoner by the Fallschirmjäger escaped during the subsequent chaotic days. The counter-attack had been held but was to impose a delay on opening the next phase of the battle.
CHAPTER 7
Operation VARSITY
EVEN THOUGH the British and Canadian element of the airborne assault, Operation VARSITY, will be covered in a separate Battleground volume, it was an important component of the overarching operation to cross the Rhine, Operation PLUNDER VARSITY cannot, therefore, be entirely put to one side. Consequently, this chapter is an outline only of the main action.
As the Scottish infantry and commandos fought their way east of the Rhine, XVIII US Airborne Corps prepared to leave its transit camps on the morning of 24 March 1945. The two component divisions were in separate countries, 6th British Airborne Division was back in southern England while 17th US were based around Paris.
On a bright and clear morning, the aircraft bearing 6th Airborne Division took off from eleven air bases around East Anglia. First away, from 0700 hours, were the two parachute brigades, whose Dakota aircraft led the stream of aircraft to the Rhine. Meanwhile, the Airlanding Brigade moved to their three departure airfields where their heavily laden gliders waited on the runways.
The Dakota parachute aircraft, were followed by the Stirling, Halifax and Dakota tug aircraft of Number 38 and 46 Groups, with the gliders of the Glider Pilot Regiment bearing 6 Airlanding Brigade. They flew south and crossed the coast near Hastings but, however, they had the usual towing problems. For instance, 12 Devons, being towed by Stirling tugs, lost five gliders and some important men and equipment.
General Lewis Bereton Commander of the First Allied Air Army.
The British aircraft flew to a point south of Brussels, where they met the stream of aircraft carrying 17th US Airborne Division. The total number of aircraft was in excess of 1,500 parachute aircraft and 1,300 tug/glider combinations, bearing nearly 17,000 men, 600 tons of ammunition and 800 vehicles and guns.
The two streams of XVIII US Airborne Corps’ aircraft headed east towards the Rhine.
Lieutenant Colonel Hewson of 8 Para recalled that:
The flight was uneventful. It was a sunny clear day, and occasionally during the flight, I looked through the door and saw the most impressive stream of aircraft. Over the Continent, we passed under the glider stream, which would be released half-an-hour after the parachutists.
Gliderborne infantry training prior to the operation.
Enemy Forces
In his post war interrogation, Major General Fiebig who commanded 84th Volksgrenadier Division:
... claimed that the Germans were not unaware of our preparations for an airborne operation in support of the Rhine crossings and appreciated that no fewer than four allied airborne divisions were available, although he confessed he had been badly surprised by the sudden advent of two complete divisions in this particular area, and throughout the interrogation reiterated the shattering effect of such immensely superior forces on his already badly depleted troops, which did not number more than 4,000 in all.
General Fiebig had no exact advance information about landing and dropping zones, or times, although he had fully appreciated the likelihood of a landing somewhere in his area. He rather expected the landing farther from the Rhine, in the area east of the River Issel and thought it would take place either at dusk before the land assault or else simultaneously with it.
The Airborne Plan
General Sir Miles Dempsey considered it ‘absolutely essential to have airborne assistance in crossing the Rhine’. The airborne mission was to be twofold:
(1) Seize the commanding ground from which artillery fire controlled the whole area.
(2) Block possible arrival of enemy reinforcements ... According to Montgomery, it was decided to drop XVIII Airbo
rne Corps east of the Rhine after 21st Army Group’s main assault for:
Two main reasons ... daylight was desirable for the employment of airborne troops and, secondly, it would be impossible to make full use of our artillery for the ground assault if airborne troops were dropped in the target area before we had crossed the river.
The risks of dropping on top of the enemy were considerable, as the airborne would be at their most vulnerable when landing but the two divisions of the Corps were planned to land well concentrated, after a heavy bombardment.
General Ridgeway who had to execute Dempsey’s Plan.
Corps Plan
Ridgeway’s XVIII US Airborne Corps was to land, with a P Hour of 1000 hours on 24 March, three to six miles east of the Rhine, in order to dislocate the enemy defences, seize vital ground, and take the Issel bridges, which were necessary for the breakout onto the North German Plain. The bridges once captured, were to be held but prepared for demolition in case they should fall into the hands of the German XLVII Panzer Corps, who would themselves need the bridges for their counter-attack against XII Corps bridgehead.
