by Tim Saunders
The entire Corps would be flown in a single lift and would be dropped on its objectives, within range of medium artillery west of the Rhine. It was planned that 15th Scottish Division and US infantry would link-up with the airborne troops on the first day of the battle.
Shoulder flash of XVIII US Airborne Corps HQ.
6th Airborne Division’s Plan
Major General Bols’s plan was to drop and land in front of XII Corps, with the tasks of seizing the wooded high ground of the Dierfordterwald, the large village of Hamminkeln and three bridges over the River Issel. Linking up with 17th US Airborne Division and forming a defensive northern flank were also important considerations.
In detail, 3 Parachute Brigade was to lead the operation by dropping on DZ A at the north west corner of the Dierfordterwald, then to clear the forest, overlooking XII Corps’ routes. Meanwhile, on DZ B to the north of Hamminkeln, 5 Parachute Brigade would drop, clear and secure the area. While patrolling westwards, the Brigade was to hold the area to the east of the railway line.
The Airlanding Brigade, coming in after the two parachute brigades was to land in company groups as close as possible to their objectives. 2 Ox and Bucks LI and 1 RUR were to mount coups de main on the Issel bridges. Intelligence, however, revealed that there were numerous flak positions in the area of their LZs. Following 6th Airlanding Brigade, Divisional HQ and the Airborne Division’s artillery group would land by glider on LZ P.
A divisional reserve was to be provided by eight Locust tanks from the Armoured Recce Regiment. They were to fly into LZ P, with one 7-ton tank per Hamilcar glider, along with guns of the Anti-Tank Regiment, who would be deployed, as needed, to blunt German counter-attacks.
The Parachute Drop – 3 Para Brigade
Seven minutes early, the first Dakota aircraft carrying Brigadier James Hill’s 3 Parachute Brigade was flying in over the Rhine. ‘Enemy anti-aircraft fire was moderate when the leading aircraft arrived, but became more intense for successive waves, as the enemy began to recover from the anti-flak bombardment, and the gun positions had not yet been overrun.’
Approaching DZ A, Colonel Hewson recalled the final minutes of the flight:
At 0946 hours, we were given the order ′Five minutes to go’. I remember feeling very apprehensive about this as according to the time given this would mean dropping on the wrong side of the RHINE. However, at 0951 hours we crossed the RHINE with the usual sinking feeling of impending ′baling out’. I remember looking forward from the door and seeing the fog of battle on the ground, the aftermath of the terrific pounding from our massed artillery. Red light – green light – out – parachute open – ground fairly hard – sigh of relief!
The Pegasus badge, symbol of British Airborne Forces.
Allied paratroopers drop east of the Rhine.
The drop was well concentrated with only a few sticks going astray.
Once on the ground, the battalions set about completing their initial tasks. 8 Para secured the DZ and was then to hold the northern part of the Dierfordterwald; 9 Para set out to seize the south eastern part of the wood including the Schnappenburg feature, while 1 Canadian Para advanced through the trees to occupy the central area of the forest.
Dropping on top of the enemy meant that the paratroopers were immediately embroiled in some serious close quarter fighting. Casualties on the DZ were to be expected but were heavy. The CO of 1 Canadian Para was killed while hung up in a tree and Corporal Topham, from the same battalion, received a VC for his part in clearing casualties from the DZ under fire. Once off the DZ, the three parachute battalions moved to occupy positions in the Dierfordterwald, fighting small but sharp engagements with groups of enemy in the woods and around gun positions. Casualties continued to be significant but by early afternoon the Brigade’s objectives were secure.
5 Para Brigade
Arriving on DZ B, fifteen minutes behind the leading elements, Brigadier Poett’s 5 Para Brigade was met by increasing enemy flak. Having dropped their paratroopers, the Dakotas turned north and in doing so, they caught even heavier fire. Seventy aircraft were hit and damaged; ten being shot down, with a further seven coming down before reaching their bases.
Brigade HQ jumped at 1010, followed by 13, 12 and 7 Para. The Brigade’s signallers had jumped with the new more powerful rear link No. 52 sets in their kit bags. The communications lessons of Arnhem had been learned and opening radio frequencies had been ‘netted by pre-checked crystal wave meters, and the dials locked and sealed before loading’. New radios were complemented by better liaison between Second Army and XVIII Airborne Corps and the parachute elements of the Artillery Forward Observation Unit (FOU) were soon speaking to FOU liaison officers west of the Rhine.
Brigadier James Hill visiting the Canadian Para battalion during VARSITY.
Corporal Topham VC.
About an hour after the drop, 5 Para Brigade’s three battalions were sufficiently complete in their RVs to be able to report that they were ready to start on the second phase of the plan: the securing and consolidating of the brigade objectives. 5 Para Brigade was to protect the northern front of the Corps area. 7 Para were to secure the DZ and cover the northeasterly approach into the divisional area until 15th Scottish Division arrived. 12 and 13 Para were to both hold key counter-attack routes into the divisional area.
Having suffered heavier casualties during their drop and in the early stages of the battle, the paratroopers, in more exposed positions, were subjected to sharp counter-attacks but they held their ground.
Later Action
Having taken and secured their objectives between midday and 1300 hours, the plan for the two parachute brigades was to dominate the ground with aggressive patrols, to cover gaps and to identify enemy attempting to advance or infiltrating through their part of the Divisional area.
In some places, they rounded up stray Germans, while in others, they were ambushing and being ambushed or fighting-off organised groups of up to platoon strength. Meanwhile, the brigades’ support elements and supplies were dropped in, suffering casualties both in the air and on the ground.
Paratroops hastily dug in before the counter-attacks began.
The link up with the leading elements of 15th Scottish Division was made at 1515 hours on 24 March, at a small bridge to the west of the Dierfordterwald Bridge A. As already recorded, first to reach the 3 Para Brigade was 8 Royal Scots, with patrols from 6 Kings Own Scottish Borderers contacting 9 Para a little further south. Radio contact had also been established to manage the approach of two friendly forces during the height of a battle. At 1545 hours, Commander 44 Infantry Brigade and the Commanding Officer of 8 Royal Scots arrived at HQ 3 Para Brigade and ‘were given a rousing reception by the parachutists’.
6 Air Landing Brigade
Following the two parachute brigades was the Airlanding Brigade, aboard 196 Horsa gliders. The task given to them was to seize three crossings of the River Issel, for both offensive and defensive purposes, and to take important road junctions and villages. Ultimately, the Airlanding Brigade was to hold approaches into the divisional area from the east against armoured counter-attacks that could be expected two hours after landing.
With the German anti-aircraft gunners having recovered from the bombardment, they switched their fire from the Dakotas to the incoming gliders. The gliders cast off from their tugs at 2,500 feet, at 1015 hours were sweeping down towards their LZs. The Airlanding Brigade suffered cruelly from flak and other ground fire, which they had been briefed would be well suppressed. Some German prisoners taken during VARSITY, later claimed they knew the gliders were coming and that in fact they were late.
Enemy fire was only one of the problems facing the glider pilots. Ground obscuration was another problem, as Harry Clark recalled:
As we crossed over the Rhine at an altitude of some 5000 feet, the river appeared as a narrow twisting silvery ribbon. The Horsa cast off from its tug aircraft about two miles over the enemy side of the river. We could see a dense wal
l of smoke drifting across the battlefield from the direction of Wesel and one of the pilots shouted out that the LZ was obscured by the haze and smoke. Anti-aircraft fire began to intensify as we rapidly lost altitude. We plunged into the smoke. Most of the men in the Horsa sat silently in their seats, waiting for the certain impact of the crash landing that would shortly occur. Our glider hit the ground at approx 90mph losing the wheels on impact. Pieces of wings were torn off as we went through a series of ditches and hedges. We came to a halt and swiftly removed ourselves from the battered wreckage.
The Brigade’s leading gliders were heading for coup de main attacks on three bridges across the Issel. The bridge carrying the Hamminkeln road east was to be captured by 1 RUR and a pair of bridges, further north, were to be seized by 2 Ox & Bucks LI. (the same).
The Landing Zone
The landings on LZs U and O were chaotic, as not only was the brigade landing through thick haze and smoke but also in the presence of enemy anti-aircraft guns. To make matters worse, as landings began Kampfgruppe Krafft, an armoured battle group in the anti-airborne role was approaching the LZs. Their tactical doctrine was to drive into the teeth of an airborne landing, before the force could form up.
In the confusion about half of B Company of the 12 Devons, as noted by Lieutenant Allinson, ‘advanced in what we thought to be the right direction but after finding our position from a civilian, we returned to our original area and advanced on Hamminkeln’. Small, disconnected actions were taking place all over the battlefield preventing men from concentrating on their objectives. Brigadier Bellamy wrote that ‘... ground opposition was stronger than anticipated, every farmhouse was a strong point and there was a considerable number of enemy SP guns and half tracks milling around the Brigade area’. In many cases only a small fraction of men planed were able to attack their targets but as Brigadier Bellamy continued:
... sufficient troops of each battalion were landed in the correct places, and most important of all, a percentage of the coup-demain parties landed by the bridges. All-important objectives were either in our hands or neutralised and ready for plucking by 1130 hours.
A wrecked Horsa which brought in the Devons. Behind is Hamminkeln Church.
1 RUR reported that they were, in position southeast of Hamminkeln, and the Ox and Bucks were reporting that although they were at their objective, they numbered only two hundred men and were under mounting pressure. However, 12 Devon’s clearance of the village of Hamminkeln would take longer.
Hamminkeln
Hamminkeln is a large village in the centre of the divisional area, which, if held by the enemy, could dominate a large area of ground and deny an important road hub. Failure to capture it promptly would mean a protracted battle and require numerous troops to overcome. This made Hamminkeln the Brigade’s most important objective but the Devons were scattered and it took Lieutenant Colonel Gleadell some time to collect enough men to establish a thin cordon around Hamminkeln and to mount an attack. Colonel Gleadell recalled:
... I myself joined up with a platoon of D Company and we concentrated about the road junction north of the village and, after encountering some resistance, reached the northern edge of Hamminkeln.
Corporal Anderson’s version of these events is, however, more revealing:
By the time we were ready to move, more men had joined us, and we now mustered nearly fifty, to capture the town of Hamminkeln ... An undertaking for which our planners had allocated five hundred men ... The Germans had snipers covering almost every section of the elevated roadway. However, there were houses that might offer cover at intervals of about two hundred yards or so along the road. So the Colonel told us to leap-frog from one to another, spacing ourselves from five to ten yards apart, running like hares and only regrouping when we arrived at the outskirts of the town.
Reaching the first house, the Devons kicked the doors in ‘hoping to God the Jerries have only got small arms and that there aren’t any tanks or artillery to shell the houses’. Colonel Gleadell commented that ‘The capture of Hamminkeln was to begin at 1135 hours. The companies duly assaulted the village and the objective was taken by midday.’
The task was not, however, as easy as it sounds. Under fire from unseen riflemen in the houses of Hamminkeln, fitness counted. Corporal Anderson dived through a gap in a hedge, wriggled on his stomach to the door and moved quickly inside. Having cleared the house they were preparing for their next dash:
The colonel was already knocking out the window frame on the opposite side of the house. Through the window he climbed and was off on the next lap of his mad journey. The batman and I followed. Behind me I could hear footsteps and hoped that the rest of the platoon were still coming on, but there was no time even to turn my head to see as it was a good two hundred yards, probably more, to the next house ... the German snipers had realized that ...their best opportunity was to concentrate their fire about ten yards from the house. The colonel made it safely, but his batman went down about ten yards from safety.
The battle became confused and the house clearing drills learned in the abandoned villages of Salisbury Plain, came into play. Corporal Anderson recounted:
The colonel advanced to the first doorway, while my men and I, with our backs to the wall on the other side of the road, covered every doorway and window on his side. When he was safely in position, it was our turn to advance, while he covered us. So, doorway by doorway, house by house, we crept forward.
Suddenly, machine-gun fire spurted from an upstairs window just ahead. I burst open the front door of the next house on our side, closely followed by two men. They ran upstairs and I began firing at the house from which the firing had come... Keeping close to the wall, the Colonel inched along with his back to the wall. When they arrived at the manned house, they tossed grenades through the front door... As soon as the grenades had exploded, the three men ran into the house. I heard a rattle of gunfire from inside and then the men emerged, covered with dust but unhurt ...
Presently Anderson and the Devons reached the main square of Hamminkeln, which was dominated by a large building over which a swastika was flying that proved to be the local anti-aircraft headquarters. He was ordered by the Colonel to take his ‘section and clear it while I carry on through the town’. With the Devons fanning out around the town, the last resistance was quickly mopped up, which ‘was vigorously carried out in anticipation of the expected counter-attack and to eliminate the remaining flak positions’.
A high priority was placed on radio communications from the Rhine crossing.
Corporal Dudley Anderson.
Conclusion
As dusk fell on 24 March, despite 6th Airborne’s patrols combing the woods, farms and villages the enemy, many of whom had been lying-up until dark, became more active, either with aggressive intent or simply trying to exfiltrate to their own lines under the cover of darkness.
With paratroopers and glider infantry dropping behind them, the already weakened 84th Division dissolved before 15th Scottish Division. Though costly in terms of casualties, the drop had dislocated the enemy and secured the crossings of the Issel, which almost certainly would have been firmly held by XLVII Panzer Korps by the time XII Corps arrived.
CHAPTER EIGHT
The Capture of Rees
WE LEFT XXX CORPS’ Operation TURNSCREW in Chapter 4, with 51st Highland Division firmly ashore on the east bank of the Rhine, and all three of its brigades across the river. 154 Brigade on the left flank had faced some stiff opposition from the Fallschirmjäger in Esserden and had been forced to withdraw from Speldrop, by a vigorous and well coordinated German counter-attack. Meanwhile, 153 Brigade had crossed the Rhine astride Rees to form a bridgehead and 1 Gordons were attacking the outskirts of Rees from the west. With the crossing going well, the divisional reserve, 152 Brigade, had assembled two battalions on the far bank of the Rhine. 2 Seaforth had successfully advanced across some difficult country to seal off Rees from the north by establishing themselves in a factory co
mplex. However, the Seaforth were in an exposed position, as 5 Cameronian were unable to cross the Millinger Meer to come into the line on their left. The divisional reserve consisted of a single battalion of 152 Brigade; 5 Seaforth, who would be ferried across the Rhine during the course of the morning.
The town of Rees viewed from the west bank at the time of the attack.
Overall, 51st Highland Division’s situation was favourable despite growing enemy reaction in the form of determined counter-attacks that included armour from 15th Panzer Grenadiers. However, the two DD squadrons of the Sherwood Rangers were now ready for action and the Highland Light Infantry of Canada (HLI of C) were crossing and would support 154 Brigade in Speldrop and Bienen.
The picture was not entirely rosy, as the inspirational and popular divisional commander, Major General Rennie, had been killed by mortar fire. This increased the pressure on the brigade commanders, as for some time they came more immediately under XXX Corps’ command and received the personal attention of General Horrocks. It was, of course, impractical to extricate a brigade commander in mid battle. However, Brigadier Oliver temporarily took over before an Argyll officer known to the division, Major General MacMillan, (nicknamed ‘Babe’) took command of this most ‘tribal and temperamental of British divisions’. The new commander arrived from the 49th Division on the morning of 25 March.
