Modern Military Strategy

by Elinor C Sloan

  The Bush administration’s New Triad represented a long-overdue departure in strategic thinking about deterrence and the role and place of nuclear weapons in US deterrence policy. ‘As a result of [the NPR]’, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in the forward to the report, ‘the U.S. will no longer plan, size or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union’.15 The NPR thus marked the official abandonment of mutual assured destruction as the core element of US nuclear policy. In place of an old triad of systems designed to pose a massive response to nuclear attack, the New Triad sought means of tailoring responses to particular circumstances and therefore to increase the credibility of deterrence – much as massive retaliation had been abandoned two generations earlier in favour of a more flexible approach. But the NPR also overwrote Flexible Response, revealing a belief that rather than acting as the lower rung of an escalation ladder that culminated in a nuclear response, conventional forces themselves could act as a strategic deterrent. Finally, by including defence in its strategic doctrine, as well as potential counterforce capabilities, the NPR signalled a conceptual shift from a primarily ‘deterrence by punishment’ orientation to a more prominent focus on ‘deterrence by denial’. Many of these new elements sparked interest and debate in the 2000s, which only served to push forward the boundaries of strategic thought on nuclear power and deterrence.

  Conventional deterrence

  One aspect of the New Triad that sparked debate was placing nuclear and conventional forces into the same leg of a strategic force posture. The views of scholar Stephen Cimbala are representative of the concerns this raised. ‘The commingling of conventional, long range precision strike with intercontinental nuclear weapons’, he argued in a 2005 work, ‘might erode the firebreak between nuclear and conventional operations’. For Cimbala, the new conceptual approach implied that nuclear weapons would no longer be treated as a separate form of warfare, reserved for deterrent missions only. Dangerously, ‘nuclear weapons were part of a new military synergy and no longer a door opener to world war’, with the implication that they were therefore more likely to be used.16

  Proponents countered that integrating the Cold War triad with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities was intended for precisely the opposite reason: to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. The 2001 NPR expresses a Pentagon view that a strategic posture that relies solely on offensive nuclear forces would be inappropriate – that is, not credible – for deterring the full range of twenty-first-century threats. During the Cold War US nuclear threats against the Soviet Union were deemed credible because US survival was at stake. But in the contemporary period, in those regional contingencies where the stakes at risk for the US do not involve survival or the survival of allies, some may view US nuclear deterrent threats as not credible. Writing in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, which first revealed America’s dramatic advancements in conventional long-range precision strike, William Perry (later US Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration) pointed out: ‘This new conventional military capability adds a powerful dimension to the ability of the United States to deter war. While it is certainly not as powerful as nuclear weapons, it is a more credible deterrent, particularly in regional conflicts vital to U.S. national interests.’17

  Conventional long-range precision strike capabilities were seen to enhance the credibility of deterrence for two basic reasons. First, it was felt that conventional capabilities had become so powerful and precise that they could now impose unacceptable costs, such as destroying an adversary’s strategic and high-value targets, and thereby be employed for missions once reserved for nuclear forces. Second, they were more ‘usable’ because whereas limited nuclear war was an oxymoron, limited conventional war was clearly possible. In its 1998 Strategic Defence Review, for example, Britain argued deterrence involves several capabilities in addition to nuclear weapons, and that it was especially advantageous to employ ‘conventional weapons with a capacity for precision and penetration so as to minimize incidental damage’.18 Ever more precise yet powerful precision weapons fit well with the Western world’s growing aversion to causing ‘collateral’ damage. Moreover, history suggests non-nuclear nations are not intimidated by a country’s nuclear capabilities (e.g. Vietnam by the United States or Argentina by Britain in the Falklands War), but many view US conventional capabilities as credible because of its demonstrated ability to use them.

  Others are careful to stress that however powerful, precise and ‘usable’ conventional weapons are, they cannot replace nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence. ‘It is illusory and dangerous to claim that such technologies could have the effect of preventing war as nuclear weapons do’, France argued in its defence White Paper of 1994. ‘Far from substituting for nuclear deterrence, a so-called conventional deterrent could only compliment it.’19 Anecdotal evidence on North Korea seems to support this claim: US congressmen report that during a visit to North Korea in 2005 the only US weapon system that North Korea was truly interested in was the nuclear-armed ‘bunker buster’ (see below), despite the range of powerful precision force options the United States has available. Payne underscores that US nuclear threats have deterred past opponents who otherwise would have been resistant to US non-nuclear threats, and that this could be because a challenger may believe it can withstand even ‘the most devastating conventional punishment’ for an extended period.20 Moreover, deterring regional conflict or aggression is not the same as deterring nuclear attack. After the 1991 Gulf War Perry pointed out that while the advanced conventional systems revealed by the war ‘will add a new dimension to deterrence, it also has significant limitations. It will not add to the ability of the United States to deter a nuclear attack; for the foreseeable future that [form of] deterrence will depend on the strength of U.S. nuclear forces.’21

  These differing perspectives on the value of conventional weapons for strategic deterrence focus primarily on their use for deterrence by punishment. Others argue their utility lies in deterrence by denial, and in particular in the ability of advanced conventional weapons to deny an adversary its best chance of success on the battlefield, a fait accompli. This refers to an enemy striking quickly and achieving battlefield objectives (such as seizing territory) before the opponent has time to act. Payne notes that a challenger’s expectation of achieving a fait accompli is considered a primary factor behind conventional deterrence failure. The role of conventional forces in denying battlefield objectives is one that was first examined in detail by scholar John Mearsheimer during the Cold War, who determined that conventional deterrence is more likely to be successful in circumstances where the aggressor cannot achieve a quick and decisive victory.22

  Dissuading a fait accompli attempt can depend on particular types of military capability. For example, in his 1996 work Payne stressed the value of rapid, decisive force projection using highly mobile expeditionary forces – the kinds of units being developed as part of what was called the Revolution in Military Affairs at the time (see Chapter 7) – for dispelling adversary beliefs that a fait accompli is obtainable. In the years since, the US military has continued to emphasize these capabilities, now in the context of a Prompt Global Strike mission which seeks to develop conventional capabilities that can strike targets anywhere in the world within one hour (just as nuclear-armed ICBMs can). The JOC includes force projection, or ‘[t]he capability to project U.S. military power globally and conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances’, as a direct means for influencing an adversary’s decision calculus.23 It highlights highly valued adversary assets like WMD production, storage and delivery systems, adversary decision makers, leadership power bases and command and control facilities as especially important targets for global strike. For some analysts, the pursuit of a Prompt Global Strike capability ‘demonstrates how hard the United States is working to preclude having to use nuclear weapons in any contingency short of a response to a nuclear attack’.24 />
  Strategic thinking in this area has also progressed beyond rapidly deployable forces and long-range ‘smart’ weapons to include forward-deployed combat power that can all but guarantee substantial US forces are able to quickly arrive in theatre. The JOC speaks of ‘forward presence’ – that is, ‘forward-stationed and forward-deployed multipurpose combat and expeditionary forces’ – as a key enabler for deterrence (by denial).25 It also stresses the imperative of security cooperation with allies. By providing basing for US forces or even their own extensive ground forces, partner nations can reduce the potential benefits to be reaped from a surprise adversary attack before US forces are fully deployed in theatre. Still, some adversaries, should they deem the stakes critical enough to their national security, will not be deterred by removing the fait accompli option. In these circumstances, rather than denying the prospect of a quick victory the United States must be able to credibly threaten defeat – something for which forward deployed forces will also be well suited.

  Nuclear deterrence

  Nuclear deterrence also figured centrally in the first leg of the NPR New Triad, as would be expected, but its particular form provoked debate. It was the then US Defense Secretary Les Aspin who, in 1993, first set out the demands of a deterrence by denial strategy should it be pursued by the Clinton administration. These included: the ability to locate and target hardened and deeply buried underground (nuclear) sites, particularly with reference to North Korea; to do the same with respect to mobile missiles armed with WMDs; and to defend against, i.e. shoot down, any enemy missiles that should survive a counterforce attack.26 BMD will be discussed below. What is useful to consider here is the contribution of nuclear counterforce to deterrence. As one scholar has put it, ‘There is little disagreement that the United States should deter nuclear attacks by threatening to inflict unacceptably high costs with nuclear retaliation. But should it also plan to destroy with nuclear weapons an adversary’s nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and related facilities?’27

  Although classified, leaked portions of the NPR indicate it included within its pages the need to be able to ‘hold at risk’, i.e. directly target, hard and deeply buried underground sites containing WMDs or command and control facilities. The reasoning behind this approach can best be understood by considering the views of Payne and of another notable strategic theorist of deterrence, Colin Gray. In his 1999 book The Second Nuclear Age, Gray points out that in contrast to the first nuclear age of bipolar rivalry, the second nuclear age is characterized by a number of regional foes that are less risk-averse than was the Soviet Union. As a result, deterrence is likely to fail – or fail to apply – more often in the second nuclear age than the first. This is a theme that was picked up by the George W. Bush administration in its 2002 National Security Strategy (see Box 4.1).

  Box 4.1 Deterrence and the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States

  • The first post-9/11 National Security Strategy of the United States was released in September 2002, a year after the terrorist attacks.

  • The strategy argued the nature of the threat had changed, to include rogue states and terrorists, and that as a result deterrence was no longer a workable option.

  • It pointed out three ways in which the new security environment directly affected the relevancy of deterrence:

  1 ‘In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people.’

  2 ‘In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice … as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.’

  3 ‘Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.’

  • In lieu of deterrence, the strategy stated: ‘The United States will, if necessary, act preemptively … To forestall or prevent … hostile acts by our adversaries.’

  See: The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 15.

  For Gray, in the face of rogue states intent on acquiring WMDs ‘there are measures states can take, especially with respect to the provision of robustly layered offensive and defensive counterforce capabilities’ that could well address the threat.28 As regards offensive counterforce, he does not ‘shy away’ from incorporating general warfighting roles and the military uses of nuclear weapons into strategic thought on nuclear power. During the Cold War there was no realistic possibility of either superpower being able to disarm the other of its nuclear arsenal. But when it comes to the NBC arsenals of regional enemies, Gray stated in 1999, ‘in a phrase, the job generally is doable’.29 Counterforce has become feasible. A decade later he echoed these themes, arguing a contemporary application of the theory of deterrence should involve deterring and coercing those who we can and defeating those who remain irreconcilable. ‘The default option for strategy today vis-à-vis [rogue states] with nuclear weapons should not be to seek a stable condition of mutual deterrence. Instead, we can plan and attempt actually to defeat … by brute force … a state that has few WMD.’30 In terms of actual capabilities, Gray finds that one strategic mission of US nuclear forces should accordingly be to ‘[p]rovide “niche” war fighting denial options against very hard, elusive, or dispersed targets’. Gray suggests the use of offensive conventional strikes and nuclear forces tailored ‘to effect the kind of damage to targets that other U.S. forces cannot impose reliably’. Moreover, to address America’s casualty concerns, such nuclear strike capabilities would have to be as precise and discriminating as possible.31

  Payne arrives at a similar conclusion – the need to develop low-yield, accurate, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons – albeit through a different logic process. The centrepiece is the credibility of deterrence. To the extent that the United States can hope to apply the logic of deterrence to rogue-state decision makers, it must be able to credibly threaten those assets most valued by the opponent, including WMD sites in buried and hardened bunkers. To convince adversaries that they cannot ‘ride out’ a US retaliatory strike by going underground, the requirement is for a weapon that can target and destroy these sites. Moreover, because opponents are well aware of the West’s extreme reluctance to cause high levels of civil destruction, the weapon also had to be discriminate enough to address America’s concern for collateral damage. ‘In the post-Cold War era’, he argued, when national survival is not at stake, ‘the credibility of the U.S. deterrent may rest not on how much damage to the opponent’s society is threatened but rather on how little’.32 Payne, a principal architect of the 2001 NPR, argued in favour of the robust nuclear earth penetrator, soon dubbed the ‘bunker buster’, which was pursued for several years by the Bush administration but ultimately failed to secure congressional funding.

  A central critique of the bunker buster was that its pursuit appeared to connote a rejection of deterrence in favour of warfighting, counterforce roles (perhaps along the lines envisaged by Gray). Thus Cimbala, who raised a general concern about integrating nuclear and conventional forces into one leg of the strategic triad (noted above), is doubly concerned about the creation of accurate, low-yield nuclear weapons because such advances could lower the nuclear threshold by making nuclear weapons more attractive to a US President. But for Payne, such arguments reflect a basic confusion between ensuring the credibility of a threat in the eyes of an opponent, and a US President’s actual willingness to use a nuclear weapon. Low-yield tactical nuclear weapons were part of the Cold War la
ndscape, and occupied several rungs on the escalation ladder of Flexible Response, but this effort to increase the credibility of deterrence did not translate into a lower nuclear threshold on the part of the US President. That is to say, weapons that can hold enemy sanctuaries at risk with minimal unintended damage may make deterrent threats more credible from an opponent’s perspective (recall the North Korean interest in the bunker buster, noted above), but their availability would not simplify or increase the likelihood of nuclear employment decisions. A President’s decision calculus is impacted by a far greater range of factors – including the severity of the circumstances, the nature of the provocation, broader US goals, allied considerations, and foreign, domestic and moral considerations – than the specific capability of a weapon system.