Sin-A-Gogue

by David Bashevkin

  155. See Rabbi Hershel Schachter’s B-Ikvei Ha-Tzon (Jerusalem: 1997), 3, in which he explains that proper intent when committing a legally justified violation is absolutely required. If the violation is committed even when justified without the proper intent, the mitigating factors are disqualified. This logic may also be at play in Rabbi Feinstein’s conclusion, namely, that the person will not have the necessary motivation that may have justified the removal of the yarmulke. For more, see my B-Rogez Rahem Tizkor, 84–85, as well as my discussion in the next chapter.

  156. See Akeidat Yitzhak, Va-Yera 20.

  157. This tale can be found in Rabbi Avraham Michaelson’s Shemen ha-Tov (Petrokov, 1905), 60a–b. This story was brought to my attention by Marc Shapiro in “Further Comments,” The Seforim Blog (blog), May 6, 2010, http://seforim.blogspot.com/2010/05/marc-shapiro-further-comments.html.

  158. See Sanhedrin 74a–b as well as Yoma 82a—where the source for this exception is derived.

  159. See comments of the Rama to Shulkhan Arukh: Yoreh Deah 157:1.

  160. See Shevut Yaakov 2:117.

  161. Nodeh B-Yehudah, Yoreh Deah (Mahadura Tanina) 161. For more on the unique Halakhic status of saving the entire Jewish people, see Yosef Aryeh Lorentz, Mishnat Pikuach Nefesh 63, where he cites an intriguing explanation from Rabbi Yitzhak Hutner. For Rabbi Hutner’s reasoning behind this distinction, see Dovid Lichtenstein, “Seducing the Enemy,” in Headlines 2: Halachic Debates of Current Events (New York: OU Press, 2017), 329–342.

  162. See Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Ha-Kohen Kook, Mishpat Kohen 144, as well as Rabbi Ari Yitzhak Shvat, “Gilui Arayot li-ma’an Bitahon ha-Medinah,” Techumim 30 (2010): 68–81.

  163. See Gavri Butler, “The Honeytrap: Seduction for National Defense in the State of Israel: A Theoretical Approach,” in Essays for a Jewish Lifetime: Burton D. Morris Jubilee Volume, eds. Menachem Butler and Marian E. Frankston (New York: Hakirah Press, forthcoming in 2018). Compare Michal Shmulovich, “What the Mossad’s female agents do—and don’t do—for the sake of Israel,” Times of Israel, September 15, 2012, https://www.timesofisrael.com/what-the-mossads-female-agents-do-and-dont-do-for-the-sake-of-israel/.

  164. See Yalkut Shimoni 9 on Joshua.

  165. Yuval Blankovsky, Het l-Shem Shamayim (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2017).

  166. Blankovsky, Het l-Shem Shamayim, 6, citing Tzvi Heber, “Aveirah l-Shem Shamayim,” Ma’aliot 21, no. 5759/1999: 205–228.

  167. See Blankovsky, Het l-Shem Shamayim, 6n33, which cites several sources that align with this view, including the comment of Maharik in shoresh 167, Netziv on Gen. 27:9, and Rabbi Kook in Mishpat Kohen at 143–144.

  168. For what proceeds, see Rabbi Hershel Schachter, B-Ikvei Ha-Tzon, 3:14–18.

  169. See Shabbat 4a and Tosafot there s.v. “Ve-Ki.”

  170. For more on the need for repentance on an aveirah l-shmah, see Rabbi Zadok of Lublin’s Tzidkat Ha-Tzadik,128, as well as his Mahshavat Harutz 20:29.

  171. See Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s Igrot Moshe, vol. 4, at Orah Hayyim 2:95 where Rabbi Feinstein was asked about removing a yarmulke before entering an inappropriate place. His response, insisting that in order to permit such an action you would need to have proper intentions while removing a head covering, may be in line with the logic posited by Rabbi Schachter.

  172. See, however, Jerry Rabow, 50 Jewish Messiahs (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 2002), 131–32, in which he considers Eve Frank, the daughter of Jacob Frank, to be a Jewish female false messiah.

  173. See Gershom Scholem, Kabbalah (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1974), 259, which mentions five factors that “contributed to the overwhelming success of the messianic awakening.”

  174. See Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter, When Prophecy Fails (London: Pinter and Martin Ltd., 2008), 9–13, where he bases much of his renowned theory of cognitive dissonance on the story of Shabbtai Zevi, particularly the continued allegiance of his followers even following his apostasy and death.

  175. Gershom Scholem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism: And Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality (New York: Schocken, 1995), 110.

  176. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hil. Malakhim U-Milhamoteihem, chapter 11.

  177. See Nazir 23a.

  178. Gershom Scholem, Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 813. See also Nehemia Polen, “Dark Ladies and Redemptive Compassion: Ruth and the Messianic Lineage in Judaism,” in Scrolls of Love: Ruth and the Song of Songs, ed. Peter S. Hawkins (New York: Fordham University, 2006), 59–74.

  179. See Isaiah Tishby, Messianic Mysticism: Moshe Hayim Luzzato and the Padua School (Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2014), 248–253. For more on this see also Ruth Kara-Ivanov Kaniel, “‘Gedolah Aveirah Lishmah’: Mothers of the Davidic Dynasty, Feminine Seduction and the Development of Messianic Thought, From Rabbinic Literature to Rabbi Moses Haim Luzzato,” Nashim: A Journal of Jewish Women’s Studies and Gender Issues 24 (2013): 27–52.

  180. See Mordechai L. Wilensky, “Hasidic-Mitnaggedic Polemics in the Jewish Communities of Eastern Europe: The Hostile Phase,” in Essential Papers on Hasidism: Origins to Present, ed. Gershon David Hundert (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 259–261.

  181. See Elijah Schochet, The Hasidic Movement and the Gaon of Vilna (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1993), 52.

  182. See Shaul Magid, “Deconstructing the Mystical: The Anti-Mystical Kabbalism in Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin’s Nefesh Ha-Hayyim,” The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 9 (2000): 21–67. Note also Avinoam Fraenkel, Nefesh HaTzimtzum, Vol. 1: Rabbi Chaim Volozhin’s Nefesh HaChaim with Translation and Commentary (Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2015), 46. For another commendable translation of Nefesh ha-Hayyim see Eliezer Lipa (Leonard) Moskowitz’s The Soul of Life: The Complete Neffesh Ha-Chayyim (Teaneck, NJ: New Davar Publications, 2014).

  183. Nefesh ha-Hayyim in Shaar 3.

  184. Many point out the difficulty in Rabbi Hayyim’s hypothesis, since the entire concept of aveirah l-shmah originates from the story of Yael which follows the Sinai revelation. See Rabbi Hershel Schachter, B-Ikvei Ha-Tzon 3 and my B-Rogez Rahem Tizkor, chapter 10.

  185. Yehoshua Mondshine, “The Fluidity of Categories in Hasidism,” in Hasidism Reappraised, ed. Ada Rapoport-Albert (Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1996), 315.

  186. Ibid., 313.

  187. Richard Pindell, “Somebody’s Son,” in Choices, ed. Burton Goodman (New York: Glencoe McGraw-Hill, 2002), 142. “Somebody’s Son” was originally published in American Girl (August 1966): 28–47.

  188. Pindell, “Somebody’s Son,” 145.

  189. See the comment of Tosafot on Shavuot 9a, s.v. “Se’ir”.

  190. See Dov Weiss, Pious Irreverance: Confronting God in Rabbinic Judaism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 180–181, for a discussion of the story in Hullin. See also ibid.n76 for a concise presentation of some of the rabbinic apologetics to this story. For more on the ease in which this passage can be misunderstood see Rabbi Yehudah Loew’s Gur Aryeh to Numbers 28:15 as well as his Be’er ha-Golah 4, which describes people “astonished and bewildered” when reading this passage.

  191. Weiss, Pious Irreverance, 20.

  192. Ibid., 110–113.

  193. Ibid., 113.

  194. Ibid., 111.

  195. Ibid., 184.

  196. Ibid.

  197. Ibid., 188n9.

  198. Nehemia Polen, The Holy Fire (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 94–105. In particular see his interpretation of Sarah’s death following Yitzhak’s sacrifice at ibid., 96–97. See also Erin Leib, “God in the Years of Fury: Theodicy and Anti-Theodicy in the Holocaust Writings of Rabbi Kalonymus Kalman Shapira” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2014), 37–40.

  199. Polen, The Holy Fire, 155.

  200. See Pesikta Rabbati 33; Weiss, Pious Irreverance, 157–159.

  201. Genesis Rabbah 55:3; Weiss, Pious Irreverance, 159
–160.

  202. Berakhot 6a.

  203. Jerusalem Talmud Rosh Hashanah 1:2.

  204. Weiss uses some of these sorts of examples to challenge the notion that the rabbinic conception of God was perfect. I find his thesis in this regard quite radical. Readers can draw their own conclusions. I, however, have opted to provide a different approach to this question.

  205. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983), 107.

  206. See Weiss, Pious Irreverence, 34 on the concept of hurling words heavenward (metiakh devarim kelapei ma’alah).

  207. See Pri Tzadik, Va-Yelekh 16.

  208. For more on the repentance of God, see chapter 8 of my B-Rogez Rahem Tizkor.

  209. For a remarkable consideration of analogies as a sign of humanity see Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander, Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

  210. W. Granger Blair, “Monk Sues in High Court in Israel for Right to Settle as a Jew,” New York Times, November 20, 1962.

  211. The Law of Return was enacted by Israel’s Knesset on July 5, 1950.

  212. Baruch Litvin, Jewish Identity: Modern Responsa and Opinions, ed. Sidney B. Hoenig (New York: Shulsinger Bros. Inc., 1965).

  213. See Arukh s.v. “shemad” and Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-Pshutah, vol. 2 (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary Press, 2012), 402n45.

  214. See Talmud Hullin 4b–5a.

  215. Louis Jacobs, “Attitudes Towards Christianity in the Halakhah,” in Judaism and Theology: Essays on the Jewish Religion (Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 2005), 102–116.

  216. Regarding conversion to Islam in Medieval Halakhic literature, see the incisive but contentious analysis of Haym Soloveitchik, “Maimonides’ Iggeret ha-Shemad: Law and Rhetoric,” in Collected Essays vol. II (Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2014), 288–330.

  217. For a full overview on the varied rabbinic opinions on this issue, see Ephraim Kanarfogel, “Returning to the Jewish Community in Medieval Ashkenaz: History and Halacha,” in Tumim: Studies in Jewish History and Literature—Presented to Dr. Bernard Lander Volume One ed. Michael A. Shmidman (Jersey City, NJ: Ktav Publishing, 2007), 69–97.

  218. See Yoreh Deah 268.

  219. See, for example, Hagaot Ashrei, Moed Katan 3:59.

  220. See Rabbi Shlomo Kluger’s Teshuvot Tuv Ta’am va-Da’at (Mahadura Telitai) 2:232.

  221. Teshuvot Hatam Sofer 326.

  222. Teshuvot Rashi 168–175.

  223. See the comment of Mordekhai to Yevamot 29. See Deut. 25:5, which mentions the term ahim, brothers, to introduce the law of levirate marriage. Based on this term, some insist that the laws of levirate marriage have a higher standard of brotherhood that would exclude an apostate, even if for other considerations the apostate would be considered a Jew.

  224. There was a minority Geonic opinion that someone who converts is no longer considered a Jew. See Tur Even ha-Ezer 44.

  225. Sanhedrin 44a.

  226. Jacob Katz, Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish-Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).

  227. Ibid., 71.

  228. See de Medina’s discussion of Bekhorot 36a and Yevamot 46b, in which he marshals further proof for an apostate’s loss of Jewish identity.

  229. Israel Shenker, “Responsa: The Law As Seen By Rabbis for 1,000 Years,” New York Times, May 5, 1975.

  230. Aside from the example to follow, there are several other instances where Rabbi Feinstein was adamant regarding the immutability of Jewish identity. See Dibrot Moshe to Yevamot 89, where he discredits a rabbinic opinion that Jewish identity can be legally dissolved.

  231. Igrot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer 4:83.

  232. Dan Harris, Eric Johnson, and Mary Flynn, “Atheists Break Out New Ritual Tool: The Blow-Dryer,” ABC News, July 16, 2010, https://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/atheists-conduct-de-baptisms/story?id=11109379.

  233. There is some discussion in Jewish law whether converting to another religion is preferred to atheism. This question has practical ramifications in the laws of yibum. When a woman’s husband dies without children, the Torah asks that she either marry one of his brothers or, more common today, perform a ceremony known as halitzah, which allows her to marry whomever she wants. In a situation where one brother has converted to another religion and another brother is an atheist, contemporary Halakhic authorities debate which is preferable. See Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg’s Responsa S’reidi Eish, Even ha-Ezer, 1:114–115. His animated disagreement with Rabbi Yosef Rosen, known as the Rogatchover Gaon, is fascinating.

  234. “Excerpts from Israeli Court Opinion in Monk’s Case,” New York Times, December 7, 1962.

  235. Ibid.

  236. This point is an important consideration when considering racial identity. The 2015 controversy surrounding Rachel Dolezal, a white woman who self-identified as black, has many parallels with the role of the Jewish community in shaping Jewish identity. See “Beyond the Jewfro: Rachel Dolezal Story Touches Historic Nerve for Jews,” Haaretz, June 15, 2015. See also Avraham Osipov-Gipsh, “Am I Like Rachel Dolezal?” Tablet, June 19, 2015, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/191559/rachel-dolezal, which questionably advocates that communities should have no say over the boundaries for those who want to identify with them.

  237. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Brother Daniel and the Jewish Fraternity,” Judaism 12, no. 3 (Summer 1963).

  238. Pri Tzadik, Tetzaveh 12.

  239. See Hokhmah U-Mussar 1:53.

  240. “Excerpts from Israeli Court Opinion in Monk’s Case,” New York Times, December 7, 1962.

  241. As told to the author by Rabbi Yossel “Joe” Kanofsky. I am indebted to him for introducing me to this short story.

  242. See Lev. 4:22. See the comments of Rashi and Seforno ad loc.

  243. For more on the inevitability of failure in the context of leadership see Rabbi Jonathan Sack’s essay, “The Sins of a Leader,” in his Covenant and Conversation—Leviticus: The Book of Holiness (Jerusalem: Koren Publishers, 2015). For a Halakhic discussion of the parameters of sin as a disqualification from leadership see Nahum Rakover, “Should Transgression Disqualify One from Public Office,” in Jewish Law Association Studies XII: The Zutphen Conference Volume, ed. Hillel Gamoran (Binghamton: Binghamton University, 2002), 141–157.

  244. Jacob J. Schacter, “On the Morality of the Patriarchs: Must Biblical Heroes Be Perfect?” in Jewish Education in Tradition: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Jewish Education, ed. Zvi Grumet (Teaneck, NJ: Ben Yehuda Press, 2007), 1–9. For a thorough discussion on the unreliability of rabbinic biography in general, particularly in evaluating sin, see Alon Goshen-Gottstein, The Sinner and the Amnesiac: The Rabbinic Invention of Elisha ben Abuya and Eleazar ben Arach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

  245. Zev Eleff, “Psychohistory and the Imaginary Couch: Diagnosing Historical Biblical Figures,” Journal of The American Academy of Religion 80, no. 1 (March 2012): 94–136.

  246. See Moed Katan 17a.

  247. See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 4:1; Shulkhan Arukh: Yoreh Deah, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 246:8. There have been a few exhaustive reviews of the laws regarding learning from a disgraced rabbi in contemporary Jewish law. For example, see Yaakov Shmuel Spiegel, “How is Elisha b. Avuya Mentioned in the Mishnah and Learning from Works Whose Authors Went to Bad Environs,” in M-Orot L-Yehudah: Pirkei Hagut v-Hinukh, ed. Moshe Rachimi (Elkanah-Rehovot: Mikhlelet Orot Yisrael, 2012; Hebrew). See also Dovid Lichtenstein, “The Disgraced Rabbi,” in Headlines 2: Halachic Debates of Current Events (New York: OU Press, 2017), 95–120.

  248. See Rabbi Yehudah Loew’s (Maharal) Tiferes Yisrael, chapter 12.

  249. See the comment of Rabbi Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenburg in his Ha-Ketav Ve-HaKabbalah on Numbers 22:5.

  250. For more on the angelic capacity for free will, see
Marc Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised (Portland, OR: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2011), 78–86.

  251. See Maharal, Netivot Olam: Netiv Ha-Torah, chapter 14. For more on these and other distinctions and considerations, see Lichtenstein, Headlines 2, 95–120.

  252. See Hagigah 14b. It is unclear whether the exception allotted to Rabbi Meir, namely that his greatness afforded him the right to learn directly from a disgraced rabbi, is accepted in Jewish law. See the comment of Siftei Kohen on Yoreh Deah 246. See also Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Yabia Omer 7:19.

  253. See Norman K. Swazo, “Rabbi Elisha Ben Abuyah ‘At the Mind’s Limit’: Between Theodicy and Fate.” Philosophy and Literature 38, no. 1 (2014): 153–168, who has a long analysis of Steinberg’s work. He concludes that Steinberg, in effect attempted to redeem Aher himself. In the closing paragraph of his article he writes, “Situating us as witnesses in a modern court of reason, Steinberg, I submit, rules on the question of Elisha’s salvation.”

  254. See Gedaliahu G. Stroumsa, “Aher: A Gnostic,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, volume 2, ed. Bentley Layton (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 1997), 808.

  255. See also the Tosefta on Hagigah 2:3–4.

  256. See Jay Rovner, “Structure and Ideology in the Aher Narrative (bHag 15a and b),” JSIJ 10 (2012): 1–73.

  257. Jeffrey L. Rubinstein, “Elisha ben Abuya: Torah and the Sinful Sage,” The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 7 (1998): 142n7 does point out that in some manuscripts Aher is identified as Elisha in this passage. The ambiguity of his name in this passage may relate, as we will discuss, to the very ambiguity of his fate.

  258. Hagigah 15a.

  259. Jerusalem Talmud Hagigah 2:1.

  260. Rubinstein, “Elisha ben Abuya,” 172.

  261. See Hagigah 15a–b.

  262. See Rubinstein, “Elisha ben Abuya,” 200n128, for a fascinating explanation for the differing narratives based on the Aristotelian theory of tragedy.