General ‘Boy': The Life of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning

by Richard Mead

  Boy himself never expressed an opinion for public consumption, but he did so privately, on the first occasion in a letter to Hollinghurst, who was about to hand over command of 38 Group RAF, written on 8 October, shortly before leaving Holland. He wrote:

  I think everyone, from the Supreme Commander downwards, has been caught out and surprised at the way the German has recovered now that he is right back and fighting on his own doorstep. He fights just as well as he ever did and appears to have collected quite a formidable party … . The way he keeps going, when he must be stretched beyond the normal limit, and has been completely cut in half in this area, does warrant considerable admiration.

  Thank you for your remarks about the efforts of the 1st Division. In my private opinion there are certain points which have emerged now that we have had time to think them over, which caused the failure of one-third of the Airborne operation. I repeat ‘one-third’ because, whatever we may think of the terrific battle put up by the 1st Division, their part was only one-third of the whole show. These points are:

  1. Owing to the formation of Corps Signals a bare three weeks before operating in the Field, communications with the 1st Division from the start were precarious and continually breaking down. In fact we were always 36 to 48 hours behind in our information. As you know, fighting a battle under this disadvantage is almost impossible. If we had known accurate and up-to-date information of their situation, I believe still that their efforts would not have been in vain.

  2. The leading group of the Guards Armoured Division was unfortunately held up at the Escaut canal when breaking out up the corridor. This was a very difficult operation, and the toss of a coin might have slipped them through that vital 18 hours earlier. The capture of the Nijmegen bridge would have been effected just that number of hours earlier and (in view of the information we now have) we should have beaten the Bosche [sic] to it quite easily.

  3. The unfortunate failure of the weather in England (not this end) prevented the landing of (a) the Divisional second lift early on D+1 and (b) the landing of 325 Glider Regiment of 82 Airborne Division on D+2, which proved to be even more serious. The latter did not arrive until D+6. The Poles also failed to land concentrated, up to time and in the right place.

  The failure of 325 was the most acute as, owing to the pressure against my southern and eastern flanks, and the German attacks on both sides of the corridor, it was impossible to release enough infantry to back up the Guards Armour fighting to break through north of Nijmegen and join up with the 1st Division. Again I am convinced that if this Glider Regiment had been available to release a brigade of 43 Division from holding the north end of the corridor around Grave, it would completely have turned the scale.

  4. The cutting of the life-line along the corridor was an accepted risk. It happened twice and entailed a major operation each time to clear it. This was only a contributory factor and would not, in my opinion, have been deciding.

  5. The misapprehension, as I have already mentioned above, on everyone’s part of the recovery powers of the Bosche meant that he had more people at Arnhem than we had expected, and he fought with much greater determination than was ever thought possible.16

  Explanations for failure came first, but the apportionment of blame to individuals was to follow.

  Chapter 21

  Verdict (10–26 September 1944)

  Whilst the senior commanders, other than Montgomery in his criticism of Eisenhower, tended to avoid becoming personal, apportioning the blame for the debacle to individuals has become an abiding passion both for historians and for some of those who fought at Arnhem. Eisenhower certainly failed to honour the undertakings he apparently gave on 13 September, depriving Second Army of its anticipated transport and supplies and denying it valuable support on its right flank. Montgomery was the chief architect of the plan as a whole and failed to force through changes which would remedy its major deficiency, the spreading of the drops and landings over three days. He also never exercised the sort of grip on the operation itself which had been so characteristic of his earlier campaigns. Brereton lacked airborne experience and allowed too much influence to the senior airmen on the timing of the lifts and the locations of the drop and landing zones. He was away in Holland, where he could make no real contribution to the battle, and then in Paris, for the first four days of ‘Market Garden’, putting himself effectively out of touch during the most important part of this, his first major operation as Commanding General of FAAA. Dempsey, like Montgomery, seemed distant from events at the front and slow to react to problems. Horrocks did not push on Adair and Guards Armoured on the first day at Valkenswaard and adopted a head-on approach rather than a flanking tactic north of Nijmegen. All the senior commanders, from Eisenhower downwards but particularly the British, grossly underestimated the Germans.

  However, and particularly more recently, it is Boy who has attracted the most criticism, not only from historians but also from Arnhem veterans, who have increasingly laid the blame for the destruction of their division at his feet. The following charges against him are serious ones and each needs to be looked at individually before arriving at a balanced assessment of his overall involvement.

  1. That he was instrumental in sacking an experienced airborne commander from 1 Airborne Division and having someone with no such experience appointed in his stead

  A number of historians have alleged that Boy had Eric Down sacked in December 1943 and installed Roy Urquhart in the expectation that he would be more compliant. There is no doubt that Down was an abrasive man and Boy was aware that he was not a popular choice with his brigadiers when he was appointed to command 1 Airborne Division in the wake of Hopkinson’s death in September 1943. Notwithstanding this, in terms of both experience and temperament and in the knowledge that 1 Airborne was returning from the Mediterranean and would not be required for active service for at least six months, Down was the best choice for the command of what in the autumn of 1943 was seen by the newly arrived Mountbatten as the precursor of a very large airborne force of no less than four divisions, to be used in India or Burma during the dry weather of 1944/45. This was potentially a big opportunity for him and his selection was, if anything, an accolade. He was in no way sacked from his previous appointment by Boy or anyone else.

  The only firm evidence of Boy’s role in the change of commanders comes from Urquhart himself. ‘I learned long afterwards’, he wrote in his book on Arnhem, ‘that Boy Browning had contested this posting only to be overruled by the War Office.’1 This may well have been the case, because what the critics have always failed to appreciate is that the appointment of GOC 1 Airborne was not in Boy’s gift. The decision to change commanders was made in the latter half of November 1943, and as previously mentioned the choice had originally fallen on Brigadier ‘Swifty’ Howlett, who was killed in action on 30 November. At the time Boy was still Major General Airborne Forces and would not become Commander Airborne Troops, with responsibility for the two airborne divisions, for another eight days. He was evidently consulted, but particularly as 1 Airborne was under direct War Office control at the time, the decision would have been taken in Whitehall on the recommendation of the Military Secretary, and approved by the commander of the superior formation under which the division would serve, General Paget at 21st Army Group. As far as can be determined, Boy knew neither Howlett nor Urquhart and his only stipulation was that the officer concerned should be ‘hot from battle’.

  Much of the criticism arises from the assertion that Urquhart was less experienced than Down in airborne warfare. It must be remembered, however, that Down, whilst he had been one of the early pioneers of the airborne forces, had never gone into combat by parachute or glider and had only seen action at all in a ground role and then for a very short time. Urquhart, with an outstanding record in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, was much more experienced in battle. Moreover, he had over eight months between taking up his appointment and ‘Market Garden’, more than enough time to gain what
ever knowledge he needed even if, exactly like Down, he had never previously flown into action. The last comment could also be made of Gale, the most widely admired airborne commander, when he landed in Normandy on D-Day.

  Actual airborne experience continued, rightly or wrongly, not to be greatly valued by the War Office in the appointment of airborne division commanders. When Gale was promoted out of 6 Airborne in December 1944, his successor was Eric Bols, an infantry brigadier recommended by Montgomery, and one who had no experience at all of airborne warfare. This did not prevent him from leading the division successfully in the Rhine crossing in March 1945.

  Verdict: Not Guilty. The evidence, if anything, points in exactly the opposite direction.

  2. That he failed to challenge the plan in respect of the timing of lifts and the location of drop and landing zones

  Commentators on ‘Market Garden’ are divided between a small minority who believe that it was a good plan, poorly executed, and the majority who think that it was a bad plan which very nearly worked because of a stroke of luck, the failure of the Germans to blow the Nijmegen road bridge. It was in fact a bad plan for two reasons above all others, that the lifts were spread out over three days and that the drop and landing zones at Arnhem, and to some extent at Nijmegen, were too far from the bridges.

  Boy was clearly aware on 10 September that there were insufficient aircraft to bring the whole force in on a single lift, to which factor Walch attributed his ‘bridge too far’ statement. This constraint was not a new one, but it had been exacerbated by the requirement for the Allies’ air transport to be ever more heavily utilized in supplying their armies, the further these moved from the available ports. ‘Transfigure’, ‘Linnet’, ‘Linnet II’ and ‘Comet’ would also have required multiple lifts, but in each case the large majority of the troops and equipment would have been carried out on the first day. It was reasonable for Boy to suppose that the same would happen again. It was certainly the presumption at 21st Army Group, as evidenced by Montgomery’s subsequent reaction.

  Hollinghurst, who would have provided the majority of the planes for ‘Comet’ was agreeable once again to two lifts on the first day. Williams at IX Troop Carrier Command was not, for reasons of crew fatigue and aircraft maintenance and Brereton supported him, even turning down Montgomery’s request for this to be changed. The doctrine of primacy of the air force over the army, when applied to air operations, held firm.

  The same was to happen in the matter of the drop and landing zones and here it was Hollinghurst who was obdurate. The area to the south of the Arnhem Bridge was considered unsuitable, being low-lying polder, criss-crossed by ditches and surrounded by embankments, and too close to the anti-aircraft guns reported there by Bomber Command. The danger of flak also applied to Deelen airfield, over which planes dropping paratroops close to the bridge or at a possible drop zone north of the town would have to turn. It subsequently turned out that these fears had been greatly exaggerated.

  Boy was concerned about the decisions on both the lift timings and the landing and drop zones, but he was on shaky ground in challenging them, given Brereton’s rigid adherence to the air plan. His only weapon was resignation, but he had tried this little more than a week previously and he knew what would happen: the resignation would be accepted and Ridgway, who in the American tradition would do what he was ordered without question, would step in to the role he believed should have been his anyway. Boy did consult Gale, who said that he would have insisted on a parachute brigade landing near the bridge in a coup de main operation and would have resigned rather accept the plan. Montgomery would not have tolerated such a stance, which would probably have meant the end to Gale’s career.

  Verdict. Guilty, but to have persisted would have made no difference. Brereton, the main culprit, supported Williams and Hollinghurst against any attempts to change the plan and would have brought in Ridgway to replace Boy if there was any danger of it being thwarted.

  3. That he ignored, and possibly wilfully concealed, the presence of 9 & 10 SS Panzer Divisions in the Arnhem area

  The presence of the two German panzer divisions within striking distance of Arnhem was critical to the failure of the operation, but it was more widely known than often suggested, whilst the strength of the divisions has been frequently exaggerated. These were divisions in name only. They were each at about 20 per cent of their full establishment of men and were poorly equipped in tanks, although they had other armoured vehicles. Boy told Urquhart that he was unlikely to encounter anything more than a weak brigade group supported by a few tanks and, in respect of the panzer divisions alone, this was not far from the truth. On 17 September 9 SS Panzer Division had a strength of 2,500 men and no tanks, whilst 10 SS Panzer Division had less than 3,000 men and a few Panzer Mark IV tanks. The Division von Tettau, put together hastily after the landings, had to rely on old French tanks, brought up from elsewhere in the Netherlands on D+1.

  Whilst highly significant to the eventual outcome, the German divisions per se did not necessarily constitute an insuperable threat, as the failure of 9 SS Panzer and von Tettau to snuff out 1 Airborne in a nine-day battle demonstrated. However, there were other factors at work which made 1 Airborne’s task impossible. First, the quality of the troops in the SS panzer divisions was of the very highest. They were hardened veterans of Russia and Normandy; moreover, they had been trained specifically in counter-airborne tactics. Secondly, there were a large number of other units north of the Lower Rhine, most of them too insignificant to feature in any intelligence, which could be formed into highly effective Kampfgruppen and brought into action very quickly. The most significant of these was SS Panzer-Grenadier Training and Replacement Battalion 16, based in Oosterbeek under SS Captain Krafft, which numbered only 400 officers and men, but managed to create very quickly a blocking line to prevent much of 1 Airborne moving towards Arnhem on D-Day, buying precious time for SS Lieutenant Colonel Spindler, 9 SS Panzer Division’s artillery commander, to create a more substantial line north of Oosterbeek. Thirdly, there were excellent road and rail communications from Arnhem into the heart of the Reich, along which reinforcements and equipment, including tanks, could be very rapidly transported. By D+1 the first Tiger tanks had arrived to reinforce the older models at the bridge, whilst a brigade of assault guns was brought in to block any attacks from the west. More of the same were added as the days went by.

  As far as the distribution of the intelligence was concerned, this was much more widespread than often stated, although the Second Army intelligence summaries made only a passing reference to the two divisions and did not finally acknowledge their presence in the area until after the operation had begun. Tony Hibbert, the Brigade Major of 1 Parachute Brigade, has confirmed that Brian Urquhart told him and his fellow brigade majors that he had received convincing information from the Dutch Resistance of the presence of the two panzer divisions between Arnhem and Zutphen. Hibbert was also shown the aerial reconnaissance photos. The fact that this knowledge was not reflected by Second Army was probably because there was a strong belief amongst its staff that the Dutch Resistance was unreliable.

  There is no evidence that Boy or anyone else wilfully concealed intelligence. There is considerable evidence that both Montgomery and Boy downplayed it, the former in dismissing the delegation sent to him by Eisenhower and the latter, among other things, by suggesting that the tanks revealed by Brian Urquhart’s photos were non-operational. Montgomery was determined and Boy scarcely less so, that the operation was to go ahead, and both put the most favourable interpretation on what intelligence had been received. This was not the product of any attempt to mislead but, in Montgomery’s case, of his determination to execute his favoured strategy, the ‘Northern Thrust’, for which this might represent the only opportunity, whilst Boy was more motivated by his concern to lead his force into the field before morale disintegrated. Both were genuinely convinced that the Germans were in disarray.

  Verdict. Not guilty of wilful con
cealment of intelligence. Guilty of placing a selective and grossly overoptimistic interpretation on what had been received.

  4. That his decision to take his Corps HQ to Nijmegen was a serious error of judgement, which deprived 1 Airlanding Brigade of 38 gliders and was the key to his failure to communicate with and therefore assist 1 Airborne Division

  Almost everyone writing on ‘Market Garden’ alleges that it was Boy’s decision to take his Advance HQ to Nijmegen in the first lift. This is highly improbable. Corps commanders in the British Army just did not have the authority to make such decisions other than on a local and tactical level, the general location of their HQs being decided on by the superior formation, in this case Second Army. It is unthinkable that Montgomery or Dempsey would have permitted any of their corps commanders to run a battle from hundreds of miles away in another country. Montgomery himself always insisted that every formation’s Tac HQ should be as close as possible to the front, demonstrated by the fact that the corps commanders for the landings in Sicily and Normandy were all ashore as soon as a firm lodgement had been secured, and in some cases by the end of D-Day itself. Prior to landing they had been in command ships offshore. It is possible that Boy would have been allowed to go in on the second lift if it was to take place on the first day – this was the plan for ‘Comet’ – but no later than that.

  There is a still more significant argument. Historians and other commentators have always looked at this decision with the benefit of hindsight, considering only the battle that was fought and not the battle that was planned. The latter would have looked very different. It envisaged XXX Corps passing very rapidly up the corridor, reaching Arnhem if possible within forty-eight hours, seizing and dominating the area between Arnhem and Nunspeet and exploiting from there to the Ijsselmeer. Guards Armoured Division was given Apeldoorn as its objective, whilst 43 Division was to secure the high ground between Arnhem and Apeldoorn and either seize the bridges at Zutphen and Deventer or carry out assault crossings over the River Ijssel. 50 Division was to capture the bridge at Doesburg, between Arnhem and Zutphen. Horrocks would concentrate always on the battle ahead, not on his lines of communication, although in the first phase he would have 101 Airborne Division under command.