Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  In addition to the purely military aspects of the campaign, attention is also given to the military supply systems of the period. The phrase “an army marches on its stomach” was never truer than in this period. It was the source of victory and defeat for many armies. It was the driving force and principal consideration for many of the military decisions made. In this campaign, supply was one of the principal causes of Napoleon's eventual defeat, and supply cannot be ignored if justice is to be given to its significance.

  With the intention of doing a thorough examination of the campaign, this volume traces its roots back to 1806, where the initial steps that eventually lead to the invasion are first found. The first chapter on the Continental System is not intended as a detailed discussion of the topic. Rather it is provided with the intention of explaining in broad terms the economic and political factors that lead to the eventual breaking of relations between Napoleon and Czar Alexander. It was this political rupture that lead to the 1812 campaign.

  The causes of the 1812 campaign can be said to have had their roots in the military rivalry between France and Russia and the economic rivalry between France and England, but the first shots of this campaign are found in a series of decrees issued in 1806 that gave birth to what was known as the “Continental System.” England and France were fighting for the economic domination of Europe.

  The term “Continental System” was coined by Napoleon to describe the system by which he intended to defeat England after his efforts to defeat the British navy on the high seas had failed. England was not a self-sufficient country and depended on both its imports of raw materials and its continental markets for its existence. Napoleon hoped that by cutting off these markets he could ruin the British economy and force the British to submit to his will. In addition, Napoleon had the second goal of forcing the Continental states into a total economic dependence on the industrial exports of France, which would give him an economical dominance to match his military dominance of Europe.

  Napoleon hoped that he could pursue these goals with the cooperation and approval of his Continental allies. He spent much time condemning Britain's maritime policies, such as the exclusion of non-British products from Britain's colonies and Britain's seizure of the colonies of many of the Continental states. Napoleon postured and posed as the defender of the Continental interests against an unprincipled Britain.

  The institution of the Continental System began with the British declaration that the entire coast of the Continent from Brest to the Elbe was in a state of blockade. This was instituted on 16 May 1806. In retaliation. Napoleon closed the entire north German coast of Friesland to British goods.

  This situation remained unchanged until late 1806, when the Prussians were beaten by Napoleon. When Prussia ceased to be a military threat to Napoleon, he proceeded to seal off the major commercial cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck. This provided a “hermetic seal” against British goods on the Atlantic coast of Germany. He also began the process of seizing all of the British goods that were to be found in those territories. The significance of this move was great because those cities were the principal conduits by which Britain shipped her goods into Europe.

  The immediate result of these orders was the seizure of massive quantities of British goods and the enrichment of Napoleon's war treasury. Napoleon's next step was the issuance of the famous Berlin Decrees on 12 November 1806. The preamble of the decree denounced the British blockade of 16 May as a violation of recognized international law. The text of the decree stated that the British Isles were, themselves, in a state of blockade, forbade all trade in British goods, ordered the arrest of all British subjects in allied states, made all British goods liable to seizure, and refused port access to any vessel coming directly from Britain or any of her colonies, or that had called on one of those ports since the issuance of the decree.

  The decree applied to all of France's allies and, in theory, formed a counterblockade against British financial incursion extending from north-em Germany to Italy, excluding Portugal. Lacking a fleet, Napoleon was unable to actually enforce his blockade of Britain, so the results of this decree were felt principally by the neutrals engaged in commerce, who ran the risk of capture by French privateers.

  Those Continental states that were not allies also felt pressure to comply with the decree. Napoleon's victorious armies provided a strong incentive, often stronger than the state's desire for British trade.

  Napoleon's aim was to expand the economic isolation of Britain by eventually sealing off every Continental state. Napoleon knew this endeavor would result in serious economic privations for France and her allies, but he also knew that the impact would be even greater, fatal he hoped, on Britain.

  Britain's only defense against this decree was to penetrate the blockade with as much commerce as possible. The first British reprisals were the Orders in Council of 7 January 1807. These orders forbade neutrals to trade between the ports of France and her allies, under pain of seizure and the confiscation of ship and cargo. This action, again, was felt primarily by the neutrals like America and Denmark. To these neutrals, these acts were more damaging than the Berlin Decree, as Britain had the navy to enforce its sanction. The impact of these orders on France was minimal.

  Napoleon's seal on Continental trade was not complete. The War of the Fourth Coalition, the 1805-1807 campaigns, was terminated by the Treaty of Tilsit. It had several provisions that related to the Berlin Decree and it closed Prussian and Russian ports to Britain. After the signing of the treaty, only Austria, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and parts of Italy still traded with Britain.

  Of these states, Denmark had special significance. Its geographical location at the mouth of the Baltic forced the British to act quickly. Britain offered Denmark a secret defense alliance. In return for this alliance, the Danes were to turn over their fleet to the British for safekeeping until peace was reestablished. Needless to say, the Danes refused to submit to those humiliating terms. Britain's response was to invade Denmark and seize its fleet on 5 September 1807. This action gave much credence to Napoleon's charges and resulted in the immediate conclusion of a military alliance between Denmark and France. Denmark was now in the Continental System.

  As Napoleon began his plans for the invasion of Portugal, Czar Alexander of Russia declared war on Britain. Russia was unable to actively engage British forces, but chose to make military moves against Sweden, who still traded with Britain. Russia invaded and took Finland, which it had long coveted. The successful conquest of Finland left only Portugal as a major port of entry for British commerce to Europe, and Britain was faced with the need to devise other methods to penetrate the Continent.

  Britain responded with a new set of Orders in Council that were to do to France's commerce what France was doing to Britain's commerce. All ports that were closed to British commerce were declared blockaded and subject to the same restrictions as if a British fleet were actually posted in their roads. All trade articles from states adhering to the Continental System or their colonies were declared lawful prizes, as were the vessels that carried them. This last move further penalized the neutral states.

  However, in an effort to win over the neutrals, Britain permitted direct neutral trade between any British port and any enemy colonial port, other neutral port, or enemy colonial ports not actually blockaded by a British fleet. In addition, trade with Continental ports was permitted, but this could be done only if the neutral vessel put into a British port and paid charges that were essentially equal to the import duties into Britain, before proceeding to the enemy ports.

  This system favored British products, since they did not require a reexport certificate, and especially favored sugar, coffee, and cotton carried in British bottoms. The principal thrust of this plan was to force all goods bound for the Continent through British ports.

  The next move was Napoleon's. On 17 December 1807 he issued the Milan Decree. This declared that all ships that submitted to a search by the British on the
high seas lost their national character, were “denationalized,” and were declared lawful prizes if captured by a French or allied privateer. The decree went on to state that every vessel that put into a British port or a British colonial port was also a lawful prize.

  The Milan Decree was the logical conclusion of the economic war that was building in intensity. It was declared that there were no more neutrals and forced a declaration of alliance by all states.

  As a result, many neutrals now faced economic ruin. In response, the United States of America issued the Embargo Act of 1807. This resulted in so much self-inflicted punishment that it was repealed in March 1809. The Americans replaced it with the Non-Intercourse Act, which prohibited trade only with Britain, France, and their colonies. It was repealed in 1810, and new legislation was written which stated that if either belligerent repealed its decrees against American shipping, the Americans would reinstitute the sanctions of the Non-Intercourse Act against the other belligerent.

  Napoleon's concern now became how to maintain his system's airtight seal against British trade and how to bring those few states outside of the Continental System into it. His next step was to invade Portugal in 1808.

  The year 1808 saw broad advances for Napoleon's Continental System. Portugal was quickly overrun and Austria was forced to break with England and join the System. The Kingdom of Tuscany was annexed, as were Corsica and Elba. In Italy, only the Papal States were outside the System. This was quickly changed by a total occupation of the Italian peninsula by the end of 1808. France also occupied the Adriatic island of Corfu, another point of entry.

  During his negotiations at Tilsit, Napoleon had encouraged Alexander's hopes of taking Wallachia and Moldavia away from the Turks. Negotiations did not result in a ceding of this territory to Russia. Alexander then directed his minister in Paris to demand that France recognize the Russian occupation of those provinces as well as the French evacuation of occupied Prussia. Napoleon refused. This was the first crack in the Franco-Russian alliance. Napoleon stated that his occupation of Prussia was covered by a separate treaty, to which Russia was not privy. He stated that he was willing to recognize the Russian occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia only if they reciprocated by permitting France to receive compensation in Silesia at Prussian expense.

  Accession to these demands would strengthen France's position in central Europe by enlarging the newly created Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Alexander could not countenance this and refused, keeping his troops on the Danube. This act permitted Napoleon to propose various military arrangements to the Turks, while posing as friend to both countries.

  Napoleon realized that he and Alexander had conflicting goals in the east, but Napoleon knew that he could not afford to provoke the Russians until the Spanish problem was resolved. Napoleon felt that once this was accomplished, he could renew discussions regarding the fate of the Turkish Empire.

  In the meantime, he required the active cooperation and support of Russia in his efforts against Britain. Napoleon sought to renew his influence over the czar by another personal interview. To gain time and tantalize the czar, he sent a letter to Caulaincourt, the French ambassador in Saint Petersburg, directing him to propose a joint Franco-Russian action against the Turks. The proposal suggested that after partitioning Turkey, France and Russia should invade India, which Britain had recently conquered.

  These proposals were sufficient to entice Alexander to the interview, but the date was not fixed. Before the final arrangements could be made, Napoleon was obliged by political developments to go to Bayonne and ply his wiles on the Spanish royal family. The outcome of those negotiations was disastrous and led to serious problems in Spain, requiring his full attention. His plans for beguiling Alexander had to wait.

  The Spanish blunder rapidly grew in magnitude. It was eventually to tie down major elements of Napoleon's armies, keeping them in Spain for the next six years, when their presence could have been decisive in central Europe.

  The British government realized that Napoleon's Spanish blunder was a unique opportunity to open the Continent to British goods as well as to harass Napoleon. They immediately gave promises of aid to the Spanish juntas that arose and dispatched a small expeditionary force. This force defeated Junot's army and drove him out of Portugal. At the same time the French suffered another humiliating blow at Baylen, when the Spanish armies, the military joke of Europe, surrounded and captured a complete French division. Humiliation followed humiliation when the captive Spanish division under General La Romana, posted on the Danish coast, was spirited away by the British navy and returned to Spain, where it joined the fight against Napoleon.

  These humiliations shook Napoleon's and France's prestige. This was positive evidence that the French were no longer invincible, encouraging Austria to push its rearming and attracting the attention of Prussia. Napoleon was forced to return his attention to central Europe before he could finish with the Spanish problem. Disturbed by the rising of nationalism in Prussia, Napoleon withdrew some of his troops from Spain and forced a new treaty on Prussia in September 1808. This set Prussia's war indemnity from the 1806 campaign at an impossibly high figure, forced the surrender of several Prussian garrisons on the Oder, and limited the Prussian army to 42,000 men.

  In a small gesture to Alexander, Napoleon withdrew his remaining troops from Prussian territory. The immediate result of this was the convening of the delayed interview with Alexander. The interview was held on 27 September 1808 and lasted until 14 October.

  The existence of friendly relations between France and Russia was critical to the peace in Europe. Napoleon strove to renew the alliance forged at Tilsit. The situation was quite different now. Napoleon was no longer flushed with the moral superiority of Jena-Auerstàdt, and Fried-land. Indeed, French military prowess had been damaged by the reverses in Spain.

  Alexander had made up his mind to curtail his alliance with France. He had begun to recognize that the best foreign policy for Russia lay in an alliance with Austria, which would provide a counterbalance to Napoleon's growing hegemony over western Europe.

  To this end, Alexander employed every diplomatic game he could.

  He realized that if Napoleon were able to subjugate Austria, Russia would be next. Alexander realized that Russia was essential to Napoleon's plan and that he could use this to obtain his way with the Turks. With the possibility of realizing his goals in southern Europe so near at hand, Alexander feared that his plans might be upset by Austria's growing militarism and desire to avenge herself for Austerlitz.

  Alexander directed his ambassador to attempt to persuade the Austri-ans to sit by quietly and allow Spain to sap Napoleon's strength. This effort proved fruitless.

  The actual interview of the two emperors was unusual. Though a timid person, Alexander remained unmoved by Napoleon's entreaties. He avoided accepting any proposal that would engage Russia in a war with Prussia or Austria and other proposals that might require the withdrawal of his troops from the Danube. The interview ended with a superficial renewal of the Treaty of Tilsit.

  Despite his resistance to becoming involved in a war, Alexander did agree that Russian troops would assist France, should she become engaged in war with Austria. At the successful conclusion of such a war, Napoleon promised to recognize Russia's possession of Wallachia and Moldavia in return for the Russian recognition of his conquests in Spain.

  With this modest reassurance, Napoleon lead some 200,000 of his veterans into Spain and began a lightning campaign that smashed every Spanish army he encountered. The British, under Moore, were driven to Corunna, where they barely escaped under the guns of the British navy.

  After Corunna, Napoleon returned to Paris to put down an anti-imperial intrigue. This arose because of rumors of Austria's warlike intentions. The news had reached Paris that the Austrian War Party had won the internal Austrian political struggle and was forcing Emperor Francis into renouncing the humiliating Treaty of Pressburg signed in 1805 after Austerlitz. This resurgenc
e of pride was closely linked to the rising sense of German nationalism that had begun to appear in the German states along with a call for independence from French dominance. This sense of nationalism had, ironically, been spread by the conquering French armies, as the French had been the first Europeans to embrace the sentiment of nationhood.

  An outspoken advocate of national war against France, Count Philip Stadion, was made chancellor of Austria. Archduke Charles, a military hero, was made commander-in-chief of the Austrian army. The Arch-duke's first actions were the institution of several structural reforms in the Austrian army and the firing of nationalistic fervor in the army. The size of the Austrian army was increased to 300,000 standing troops, and an additional 200,000 landwehr, or militia, were raised, drilled, and enrolled as the army's reserve.

  A ferment had begun in Austria, and a report from the French ambassador in Vienna gives a perspective on the intensity of that emotional boil. He stated that “the newspapers contain nothing but tirades against France, and advertisements of patriotic works and accounts of the prowess of Austrian heros.”

  The Austrians knew of the agreement between Alexander and Napoleon vis-à-vis a war with Austria, but they also knew that Alexander would not make much effort to uphold his treaty obligations. The Austrians felt that Napoleon's entanglement in Spain and Alexander's unlikely involvement in a war with Austria would provide them with an opportunity to reclaim the territories they had lost. They began their 1809 military operations in Bavaria.

  Napoleon's reaction was swift and decisive. He withdrew two infantry divisions and the Guard from Spain. This force moved rapidly through France, gathering strength, and headed for the battlefront. Napoleon called up conscripts before their classes were due to be called up and re-combed the previous draft classes for further soldiers.