Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  The Situation Deteriorates

  The political situation continued to deteriorate and on 15 March Napoleon knew that he had no option but the military one. He directed the I Corps to move on the Oder River, taking up positions on Kustrin, Stettin, Bomberg, and in the area between Ancalm and Stettin. Oudinot's II Corps was to advance on the Elbe River, positioning itself between Magdeburg, Brunswick, Helmstadt, Wesel, and Munster. The II Corps moved to Erfurt, Weimar, and Leipzig.

  At the end of March the I Corps was on the Vistula River and encamped on its banks by 15 April. On 21 March II Corps crossed the Elbe River and moved on Brandenburg and Magdeburg. The II Corps was in Leipzig, and the IV Corps was in Dresden and Glogau. The V Corps occupied Prague and Moldin on the 29th and the VI Corps arrived on the Oder River on 30 March. The Saxons began to organize in March and arrived in Kalisch on 14 April. From there they moved towards the Vistula River.

  The Westphalians of the IX Corps crossed the Elbe River on 24 March and moved to Spremberg, arriving in early April. From there they moved to Glogau and Kalisch. The Wurttemberg army joined Ney in Heilbronn.

  The Prussian contingent organized in Kònigsberg, Berlin, and Bres-lau. On 25 March they moved to Breslau while the French Imperial Guard left France and began deploying in Germany. The first elements of the Guard reached Magdeburg on 29 March. The Vistula Legion arrived in Sedan, and four regiments of Young Guard were recalled from Spain.

  Preparations Behind for Home Defense

  Considering how much attention Napoleon gave to the needs and organization of his main army, one might imagine that he neglected other aspects of the French military situation. Perhaps any other commander would have, but Napoleon had an administrative genius that no other military leader of his age could hope to match.

  Mindful of the British landings in the Scheldt estuary in 1809 while he was occupied in Austria, Napoleon had real concerns that this might happen again. He gave special attention, as a result, to his coast defenses. While the army's field artillery forces and the navy's shipboard gunners were highly professional, the coast artillery had become the dumping ground of the poor performer. These men continued to demonstrate their lack of skill by the low level of training in their new positions.

  The coastal defense system was gravely inadequate. In 1811 the coast defense budget amounted to about 3,500,000 francs. Napoleon was ready to double this if he felt it was necessary to provide an adequate defense. “Nothing has been gained from having bad troops manning these defenses,” he said, “and it is a ridiculous economy to charge militia captains with the defense of a coast that might be threatened by highly competent enemy regulars.”

  To remedy this potentially threatening situation, Napoleon deployed four field artillery regiments along the coast to reinforce the coastal units. A major reorganization of the staff and administration occurred. Money, equipment, administration, and training poured into the coast defenses.

  Plans Are Developed

  With his coasts attended to and relatively secure, Napoleon turned eastward once again. He feared a preemptive attack by the Russians and took steps to counter it by the careful disposition of his forces. He also developed his offensive plans. In a letter to General Lariboisiere, dated 14 March 1812, Napoleon outlined his plans for opening the campaign with a siege of Dinaburg and Riga. He requested all the information available to him on those two cities.

  Napoleon also asked him to determine how many boats would be necessary to transport the siege train from Magdeburg. Napoleon stated that he wished to embark this train by 1 April and move it down the Vistula River to Bomberg, where he hoped to have it positioned by 1 May. He stated that he wanted this material in Vilna and ready for siege operations by 1 June. He also directed General Lariboisiere to maintain the target of these operations secret from everyone, including the commanding officer of the engineers.

  Napoleon similarly directed that the Danzig siege train should travel via boat to Memel and on to Tilsit. He stated that he anticipated these two sieges to last only fifteen days: five days for investment, opening of trenches, construction of batteries, and the commencement; followed by ten days of sapping. These plans for sieges, however, do not reinforce the idea that Napoleon was considering the short campaign his twenty-four days' worth of supplies might otherwise have indicated.

  On 25 March 1812, Napoleon wrote a series of instructions in case of a Russian attack before his preparations were complete. Jerome and his Westphalians were to make no move unless the Russians attacked the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. If this occurred Jerome was to take command of the V, VII, and IX Corps. He was to be provided with orders for Poniatowski and Reynier that put them under his command. Jerome was to command the right wing of the French army while Davout took the left wing and began offensive operations against the invading Russians.

  Russian Activity

  The issuance of orders to Jerome and Davout and some juggling of positions by the French completed Napoleon's dispositions. The evidence clearly indicates that at this point Napoleon was committed to war with Russia.

  This is supported by Napoleon's overactive interest in the Russian military preparations and movements. As early as 6 January 1810, Napoleon received reports of major Russian troop redeployments from Finland into Lithuania and south. Since Russia was engaged in a war with the Turks at the time, it was thought that these troops were moving to join the Army of the Danube.

  As time passed, Napoleon's intelligence community increased its efforts and the frequency of its reports. A report dated 30 September 1810 informed Napoleon that major magazines were being formed in lourburg, Dinaburg, Riga, Drouia, Mohilev, Vitebsk, and Orsha.

  In May 1811 Napoleon learned that the divisions of Wittgenstein, Lavrov, Konovnitzin, and Baggovout were located in northern Lithuania. There were also three divisions in central Lithuania, the 7th under Generali ieutenant Kapsevitch, the 9th under Generallieutenant Suvarov, and the 22nd under Generallieutenant Lewis. The 9th and 22nd Divisions were advancing from Podolia through Volhynia and onto Pinsk.

  These seven divisions all had the standard six-regiment organization.

  Napoleon knew that the Russian battalions had an average strength of 700 men, which gave these divisions an average strength of 7,800 men. In addition, a single dragoon regiment of approximately 600 men and a cossack “pulk” were attached to each division, giving each of these divisions an average of 8,900 men. There were two further divisions in Podolia at this time, the Siberian Division under Generallieutenant Arakcheyev and the 18th Division under Generallieutenant Tchervatov. These divisions were weak and it was known that the total strength of both divisions did not exceed 11,100 men.

  Napoleon's espionage system informed him that the Russians had organized three reserve cavalry divisions. The first two were commanded by Generallieutenants Korff and Pahlen. They were posted on the Polish border. Korff's division had a total strength of 9,250 men and consisted of four hussar regiments, four dragoon regiments, and five cossack pulks. Pahlen's division had 6,750 men in four cuirassier regiments, four dragoon regiments, and four uhlan regiments.

  Napoleon knew that the infantry divisions were later reinforced by the activation of the third battalion. Once raised to full strength, the third battalions were to be sent to work on various fortifications. Napoleon's information was incomplete in that he only knew the names and numbers of these battalions, but he never learned of their true strength, which was very very low. He only saw battalions.

  French intelligence located another cavalry division with forty squadrons under the command of the Grand Duke Constantine near Nizyn and another cavalry force under Generalmajor Tchlapitz in the districts of Ostang, Zaslavl, and Zwrachel.

  In May General Docturov was recalled to St. Petersburg and his command was turned over to Kapsevitch. In addition, several other senior officers were recalled to St. Petersburg for consultations.

  News arrived in Paris that magazines were being raised in Dubno, Zaslavl, and Korets. Th
e provinces of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev had each been directed to provide 13,106,200 liters of wheat, 1,654,600 liters of flour, and 19,273,000 liters of oats to support the army.

  Reports surfaced again that 30,000 men had been moved from the Swedish frontier with Finland and that a major magazine was being organized in Bobruisk. This magazine was to hold 14,780,000 liters of wheat and 24,580,000 liters of oats. Another immense magazine was being formed in Samogitia.

  Fortifications Prepared for the Assault

  In Kiev, fortifications were being erected by 3,000 men under the direction of an English colonel named Margrini. On 10 May 1811 it was reported that Dinaburg was being fortified by a Saxon officer named Hackel. Thirty-two battalions of recruits were being used to raise these fortifications, and they were expected to be reinforced during the year. The city was to be defended by 600 guns and surrounded by a trench thirty-six feet deep. It was to have three ranks of galleries and a glacis that was 360 feet long. The ground had been cleared for 9,000 feet around the fortification and a strong bridgehead established on the left bank of the Dvina River. It is little surprise that Napoleon was organizing a massive siege train to deal with this fortress.

  There were also reports of a steady stream of forces being drawn away from the Russian Army of Turkey, and about 50,000 men appear to have been drawn away by April. The French did not consider this to be a significant withdrawal even when the Russians made the detachment of three divisions official. These last three divisions were destined for Slonim, Niesweiz, and Koltiniany.

  In mid-May Napoleon learned that the Russian army was undergoing a major reorganization and that four army corps of about 30,000 men each were being formed. The new 1st Corps was stationed around Slonim, the 2nd Corps was in Vilna and lourburg, the 3rd Corps in Koltiniany, and the 4th Corps in Riga. These corps had a total of 90,000 infantry and 30,000 cavalry, not counting cossacks. It was thought that they had a total of 250 guns.

  General Engelhardt's division was reported to have moved on Orgeyev on 19 May 1811. He and his division had remained in lassy until mid-April. On 23 May Napoleon learned that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions were occupying Courland, Samogitia, and the northern parts of Lithuania. He also learned that the 7th, 9th, and 22nd divisions were in central Lithuania and Ploesie. The nine infantry divisions in Lithuania each had a dragoon regiment and a cossack pulk assigned to them.

  The Siberian Division, commanded by Generallieutenant Arak-cheyev, was in Podolia and still understrength. The 1st Grenadier Division and a reserve division were stationed on the Dvina River to act as a general reserve.

  Word came that the third battalions of the infantry regiments were being used exclusively to construct fortifications and had not been organized into field divisions. More significantly, Napoleon learned that the Russians had raised a number of new jager regiments, the 51st being among them.

  Generals Pahlen and Korff commanded two of the three cavalry divisions in Lithuania, while the commander of the third division had not yet been named. Their forces were kept on the border to watch for any sign of the French advance. To support them, four cossack pulks that were stationed near Pinsk moved forward to join them.

  Between 15 May and 1 June it was learned that Wittgenstein's division had moved from between Riga and St. Petersburg and was now heading towards Mitau. The divisions of Lavrov, Baggovout, and Konovnitzin were still in central and southern Lithuania. Kapsevitch's division was in Volhynia, but was moving towards Lithuania while Suvarov's division had moved from Wallachia through Russian Galacia and into southern Lithuania.

  Arakcheyev's and Tchervatov's weaker divisions remained in Podo-lia. Napoleon learned that each of them had about 5,500 infantry, a dragoon regiment, and a cossack pulk.

  The latest count of the Russian front line forces in Lithuania totaled 74,000 infantry, two cavalry divisions with 18,500 men, and a reserve division of 6,750 men.

  In June Napoleon learned that Engelhardt division was detached from Wallachia and had begun moving north into Lithuania. Another report dated 10 June stated that 10,550 men of Docturov's corps were being concentrated near Lutsk and Jitomir. It was also destined for Lithuania. Napoleon also learned that the nine Russian divisions in Lithuania had assumed positions extending in a line from Rosienne to Vladimir and Kamieniec-Podolski.

  On 23 June Napoleon learned that there were 30,000 infantry near Riga. The report said that the city was fortified with a double wall and sixty heavy-caliber guns. Riga's magazine was known to have a 104.5-million-liter capacity.

  On 21 June the Russians were beginning to fortify Stary-Konstantinov. By 17 June the Russian forces in Moldavia facing the Turks had been reduced to five divisions, and in early July General Lewis moved his division into Bobruisk, where he began to fortify and provision the city.

  By August there were 100,000 men in Lithuania and a further 50,000 near Pinsk. Converged grenadier battalions were formed from the depots of the 4th, 5th, 14th. and 17th Divisions, but the French intelligence reports indicated that these battalions did not exceed 600 men each.

  In August General Essen's corps was formed with the infantry divisions of Generals Lavrov and Konovnitzin. They were joined by Pahlen's cavalry division. In addition, a reserve was formed by the third battalions of the infantry regiments. It was, however, reported that the men in those third battalions were of very low quality and suited only to dig fortifications.

  The Russians Expand Their Army

  The fifth or depot squadrons were stripped out of the cavalry regiments and returned to their depots. Once in the depots these squadrons were organized into the 9th, 10th, and 12th Cavalry Divisions.

  Napoleon was aware that the reserve battalions of the 4th and 14th Divisions had been organized into the 30th Division and that those of the 5th and 7th Divisions had become the 31st Division. He also knew that the 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, and 37th Infantry Divisions and the 9th, 10th, and 12th Cavalry Divisions had been formed, but he was never to learn of their true organization and strength.

  The strength of the new Russian divisions varied tremendously. The 32nd Division, commanded by Generalmajor Hamen, was so weak that it was reorganized into two converged infantry regiments. The reserve battalions of the 11th and 36th Jagers had about 240 men each. The average strength of the depot battalions of the 1st Grenadier Division was 314 men. The depot squadrons of the 1st Cuirassier Division, forming part of the 9th Cavalry Division, averaged about 126 men each. This force was organized into a converged cavalry regiment.

  Russia was pulling together every soldier it could, and Napoleon knew it. The Russians were faced by the hostile Turks to the south and a growing threat from Napoleon in the west.

  By the beginning of August, the Russian army covered the length of the Prussian and Polish borders and extended into Galacia. The Russian right consisted of the 4th Division in Vilna under Baggovout and the 17th Division in Dinaburg under Alexeiev. They were supported by Korff's cavalry division on the Niemen River.

  The Russian center was commanded by Generallieutenant Essen in Slonim. He commanded the 3rd and 11th Divisions supported by Pahlen's cavalry. The Russian left was commanded by General Docturov and consisted of Kapsevitch's 7th Division and the 25th (Siberian) Division. It was supported by a reserve formed by the 1st Grenadier Division on the Dvina. The reserve for the left wing was the 24th Division posted in Kiev.

  By August the French assumed that the reorganization of the Russian army to the standardized six-regiment division was complete. Their sources indicated that the average battalion had no more than 650 men, and when the regiments were joined by the third battalions, the regiments would have no more than 1,600 men. They reevaluated the Russian divisions as having 10,000 men with the addition of the third battalions.

  Russian War Plans

  Russia was also making plans for the coming war. It was decided that if Prussia declared for France, the Russians under Wittgenstein would move against Prussia and Danzig in an effort to knock them out o
f their alliance with France. In case of war with Sweden, which was allied with France, the Russian Guard was to join the 20,000-man corps on the Aaland Islands and along the Finnish frontier.

  In case of war with Austria, General Kutusov was to refrain from any offensive action against the Austrians and assume a defensive position along the Danube. The 9th Division, commanded by Lewis, and the 18th Division were to observe the Austrian movements. In addition, four cuirassier regiments, one dragoon regiment, and two uhlan regiments were to be formed into a supporting cavalry corps.

  In late August Generallieutenant Tuchkov and his three divisions were in Wallachia. General Docturov, with four divisions, joined Tuchkov in operations against the Turks. A force of 13,000 recruits was also moving south to join them, as was part of Tchlapitz's cavalry division.

  It was in September that four cossack pulks were assigned to every cavalry division to provide it with an irregular scouting force. A single pulk was assigned to every infantry division.

  On 14 August 1811 the Russian army was positioned as follows: The 1st Corps (Wittgenstein) was in Samogitia and Courland; the 2nd Corps (Baggovout) was in Vilna, Mohilev, and Plock; the 3rd Corps (Essen) was in Grodno and Minsk; and the 4th Corps (Docturov) was in Vinnitsa and Kiev. The 1st Grenadier Division, the reserve, was in Vilna and on the Dvina; the 24th Division was near Kijov and Bialoces-kiev; a cuirassier division was near Duman and another was near Riga, Revel, and Pilten. The total Russian forces in the Polish provinces was 112,900 men: 87,000 infantry, 16,900 cavalry, and 12,000 cossacks.

  This figure includes the third infantry battalions, which were not normally included in such figures. Without them the infantry strength was 55,000 men.