Napoleon's Invasion of Russia

by George F Nafziger

  Napoleon had expected some offensive Russian action and had moved Macdonald across the Dvina to assist Oudinot. He then ordered Oudinot and St. Cyr to remain on the offensive, to keep Wittgenstein from coming to Barclay's assistance. Napoleon then evolved what is known as the Maneuver of Smolensk, designed to place the Grande Armée in the rear of the Russian army, cut them off from Moscow, and force them into a decisive battle.

  The final plans were not set when Barclay began his advance on Rudnia and Poryeche on the 7th. On 8 August Platov's cossack screen contacted the II Cavalry Corps. General Sebastiani had 3,000 cavalry, including Beurman's 14th Light Cavalry Brigade from III Corps, the 24th Légère Regiment, and the Wurttemberg horse artillery. He was engaged by the Russians near Inkovo and received a severe handling from Platov's forces, losing about 300 men hors de combat and a further 300 prisoners. During the night of 7-8 August, Barclay was misinformed that Eugene had two corps at Poryeche. He immediately suspected a trap and faced half of his army north, directing Bagration to move to Vidra. Platov had continued east, not having received orders since his battle at Inkovo. At long last, however, Barclay realized this, and Platov was recalled to cooperate with him in his proposed attack on Eugene.

  Bagration feared that Davout might maneuver against the Russian left and became more insolent and openly insubordinate. He announced that his troops were sick and starving, then marched to Smolensk despite Barclay's orders. Barclay permitted this without too much argument and arranged his positions to account for Bagration's departure.

  On 11 August Barclay remained stationary as his cavalry ineffectually engaged Murat's outposts. On the 12th he learned that Poryeche had been evacuated and ordered Platov to determine the direction of the French movements. Barclay then realized that 15 August was Napoleon's birthday and feared that it might be celebrated by a major French attack. He responded by retreating his army down the Vitebsk-Smolensk road. He ordered Bagration to send his light troops to Katan and mass the rest of his army behind Barclay's left.

  Fearing a Russian attack, Napoleon's reaction to Inkovo was to stop his preparations for the move on Smolensk. Instead he chose to concentrate his army near Lyosno, around the III Corps, in preparation for battle. By the 10th, Barclay's irresolute actions convinced Napoleon that Barclay was not going to attack. He immediately stopped his concentration and reverted to his original plan of a move on Smolensk.

  Napoleon ordered Davout to cross the Dnieper River at Rosasna, Junot to go to Romanovo, and Murat, Ney, and Eugene to move south, screened by Sebastiani's cavalry. Napoleon moved on instinct, not knowing Barclay's precise position. He intended to form a bataillon carré” with his army and launch it across the Dnieper on a fifteen-mile front, through Orsha and Rosasna, as secretly as possible. There were to be two columns. The Rosasna column under Napoleon's personal command was to consist of Murat's cavalry, the Guard, III Corps, and IV Corps. The second Orsha column, under Davout, was to consist of I, V, and VIII Corps. As a diversion, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry was to attack further down the Dnieper. Once this massive formation crossed the Dnieper it was to advance along the left bank of the Dnieper, eastwards towards the Smolensk-Moscow road, which it was to cut. From there it would drive the remains of the Russian forces to the north.

  In support of these carefully planned operations, Napoleon built up his communications by fortifying Vitebsk and garrisoning it with 3,800 men: the Flanker-Chasseurs, 1/1 st Vistula Regiment, and a Hessian battalion. This garrison eventually grew to 7,000 men as various “bataillons de marche” arrived. Napoleon intended to redirect his operations once

  Barclay realized his maneuver. Napoleon's communications would pass through Orsha and on to Vilna by way of Birisov and Minsk.

  Napoleon began his concentrations for his maneuver. With a deep cavalry screen, his movements remained unknown to Barclay. During the night of 13-14 August, General Elbe erected four pontoon bridges over the Dnieper near Rosasna, and the French began to pour over them. By daylight 175,000 men had crossed and were advancing on Smolensk. The screen was formed by the cavalry of Grouchy, Nansouty, and Montbrun.

  The Battle of Krasnoe

  By 2:30 P.M. the leading elements of the French had reached Krasnoe, where they encountered the first Russian troops. Barclay had stationed Generalmajor Neverovski's 27th Division, some 7,200 infantry, three cossack pulks, the Polish Uhlan Regiment, and the Kharkov Dragoon Regiment, totaling 1,500 cavalry. In addition, Neverovski had a position battery commanded by Colonel Apouchkin. Barclay's decision to post him on the main road to Smolensk proved to be a very wise decision.

  The ground was unequal, but bare and very suitable for cavalry. Murat took possession of the ground, but the bridges to Krasnoe were broken. The French cavalry was forced to move to the left and cross at a bad ford some distance from the main forces. Once the cavalry was across the river they found Neverovski ready to receive them. Realizing the potential for a smashing victory, the French cavalry launched a quick attack. Though they acted hastily and lost time, they immediately dispersed the Russian cavalry.

  Neverovski had detached the 49th Jagers and two guns into Krasnoe and the 50th Jagers and the cossacks at full speed to Korythnia, halfway to Smolensk, where they were to take up position and check any further French advance should they be forced to retreat. Facing Neverovski's nine battalions, the Kharkov Dragoons, and ten guns was all of Murat's cavalry and Ney's infantry.

  The initial French advance was not certain. Grouchy led with Chas-tel's light cavalry and Delahoussaye's dragoons on the left. The light cavalry of I and II Corps, with the 24th Légère Regiment, were personally led by Marshal Ney and formed the center. Montbrun's two cuirassier divisions were on the right with Nansouty's corps behind him.

  The 24th Légère attacked, supported by the entire 10th Division, and carried Krasnoe at about 3:00 P.M., chasing out the 49th Jagers and capturing the two guns posted there. The 9th Polish Uhlan Regiment pursued them over the bridge. They advanced against the Russians in good order. When the Kharkov Dragoons appeared about to charge, the Poles faced them, supported by Bordessoulle's brigade. The Kharkov Dragoons were chased back. Neverovski sent them to the rear, forming his infantry into two dense columns, and began to withdraw.

  The French cavalry rapidly moved over the bridge. As soon as Murat had some squadrons across the Lossmina ravine, he threw them against the Russian rear guard, disordering it and capturing five or six more guns. Neverovski rallied his broken troops and, apparently doubting their steadiness, ordered his young recruits into one large square with some 130 yards on a face and six ranks deep. This massive square of 5,000 men continued withdrawing towards Smolensk.

  As the French cavalry regiments crossed the ravine, they charged individually into the Russian square. These uncoordinated attacks were quite haphazard. Murat seemed to exercise little general control, acting more like a regimental commander than a corps commander. He rode about furiously, directing isolated charges rather than regrouping his entire command for a single, consolidated assault. In one attack the 4th Chasseurs and the 6th Polish Uhlans charged one after the other, each being repulsed in its turn.

  Most of the French artillery remained behind the Lossmina, but a Wurttemberg battery did come into the action, showering them with cannister. Ney's infantry was unable to move up and attack the Russians, because Murat's clumsy handling of the cavalry blocked their advance.

  The Russian fire was at best erratic, but the steadiness of the troops was exceptional. Though the Wurttemberg artillery did manage to take the square under fire, six guns were inadequate to break it.

  During the advance Neverovski had one very critical moment. His column was marching through a field of ripe rye to the left of the main road. His forces suddenly encountered a stout palisade. The retreating square stopped, and being so pressed by the French, had insufficient time to make a gap in it. At this moment a Wurttemberg cavalry regiment penetrated into the square, only to be thrown back out.

  The failur
e of the Wurttembergers gave the Russians time to clear the fence and continue their withdrawal. Neverovski moved towards a defile where Grouchy had been directed in anticipation of this move.

  Murat, however, was deceived by a false report and diverted the bulk of Grouchy's cavalry towards Elnia, leaving him only about 600 horses. Grouchy directed the 8th Chasseur à Cheval Regiment, part of the 11th Light Brigade, to seize the defile, but they were too weak to hold it against Neverovski. The 6th Hussar Regiment charged the column's left, but were wholly unsuccessful. Neverovski retreated like a lion, leaving 1,500 dead and wounded, 800 prisoners, and seven lost guns behind him. The French lost 500 men.

  Neverovski broke away from the French and retreated into Smolensk, where he slammed the gate shut behind him. The French lost their chance to seize Smolensk undefended. In response to Neverovski's pleas for assistance, Bagration sent the 7th Corps under General Raevsky to cover his retreat into Smolensk. Raevsky requested a cuirassier division and more explicit instructions, but after receiving neither, he marched to the southern bank of the Dnieper, near Smolensk, arriving in the early hours of the 15th.

  Move into Smolensk

  Barclay learned of the French offensive of Neverovski, and both he and Bagration began to retrace their steps to Smolensk. Napoleon, in contrast, ordered a surprising twenty-four-hour halt in the French advance.

  Barclay's initial reaction to Napoleon's movement was that it was a retreat. He prepared to advance back to Vitebsk. He suggested to Bagration that he should move south of the Dnieper River. Bagration protested, pointing out that Smolensk, Neverovski, and Raevsky were in great danger. Bagration counterproposed a crossing to the southern bank of the Dnieper at Katan and was given authorization to do so. His actual movements were limited to sending a few cavalry squadrons to make that maneuver.

  Barclay did not wish to take decisive action and limited his movements until Platov had scouted further to the west. Barclay placed the 7th Corps of General of Infantry Docturov at Bagration's disposal, while he warned the governor of Smolensk to evacuate his archives.

  Nansouty and Grouchy, under Murat's direction, halted three miles short of the gates of Smolensk without discovering the presence of Raev-sky's eight regiments and six batteries in Smolensk. Murat hoped for a battle and was keeping his cavalry concentrated rather than allowing them to spread out and scout the countryside for the Russians. Murat neglected to scout the southern bank of the Dnieper as a result. Montbrun received some reports of a Russian bridge near Katan. This was passed to Napoleon, who responded by sending the Guard Lancers to examine the area. Junot had lost his way, taking the wrong road, and wandered about aimlessly. Eugene and Pajol moved north along the Dnieper and made no contact with the Russians.

  The Russians had become convinced that the French would approach Smolensk from the northern bank of the Dnieper and had positioned the greater part of their forces to meet a threat from that direction. The French had, however, arrived before Smolensk via the southern bank. The Russians discovered that they had been turned and hastily repositioned their forces. Czar Alexander had left his army shortly before this and had turned command of the combined armies over to Barclay with orders to defend Smolensk.

  The Battle of Smolensk

  After leaving Loubna, Ney moved on Smolensk and arrived before its suburbs to find a few sections of dragoons and numerous cossack pulks deployed before him. Raevsky's forces had risen to 15,000 troops and 72 guns. Raevsky knew that Barclay and Bagration were quickly closing on Smolensk and that his job was to keep the French out until they arrived. He deployed his twenty-three battalions to the west and south of the city. The 26th Division of Paskevitch was placed in the Krasnoe suburb of the city and in the ditch before the Royal Citadel. Behind the curtain, between two bastions, he positioned the Vilna Infantry Regiment, and in the cemetery to the left he placed the Odessa and Tarnopol Infantry Regiments as well as three regiments of Neverovski's 27th Division. In the Mstislavl suburb he posted eight battalions of the 12th Division. An additional brigade was posted in the Roslavl suburb as a reserve. Raevsky went on to position eighteen guns in the citadel and the remainder of his guns behind the earthen ramparts of the city's defenses. During the night he was reinforced by the arrival of the Lithuanian Uhlan Regiment and the New Russia Dragoons, which gave him twelve more squadrons.

  At about 1:30 P.M. the Russian cavalry was driven back into the suburbs. The first assault on the city was made by the Wurttembergers on the Krasnoe suburb. Raevsky's forces were so thin that a strong attack would have broken through them. In strengthening his troops in the Krasnoe suburb, he had to shift his other forces to meet the Wurttem-berg assault, but they too were threatened by the French. He had only two regiments in reserve when he learned that the French had penetrated the city on his left. He directed his reserve to counter this breakthrough, only to learn after they'd departed that the report was false.

  Ney saw that the Royal Citadel was being denuded of troops and sent a battalion of the 46th Line Regiment to dash forward in the hope of seizing it by a coup de main. They scaled the earthen rampart and penetrated into the interior, where they engaged the garrison in a desperate battle. Raevsky and his reserve responded, driving the French back over the rampart as a second battalion of the French 46th Line arrived. The panic of the first battalion infected the second and both withdrew quickly, leaving the citadel to the Russians.

  The city of Smolensk straddled both sides of the Dnieper. On the southern bank stood the Old City, which was surrounded by a massive, but decayed, wall. This wall was some 6,000 paces long, 10 feet wide and 25 feet tall. It was broken by thirty-six massive bastions that were armed with small batteries. The wall was covered by a deep ditch, a covered way, and a glacis. On the north bank, opposite the Old City, lay the St. Petersburg suburb. It was connected to the Old City by a single bridge, but the Dnieper was not very deep where it passed through the city.

  The French spent the remainder of 16 August in a reconnaissance of the countryside around Smolensk. Ney stayed on the left and moved towards the Dnieper. Davout assumed a central position, and Poniatowski moved to the far right. Murat and the cavalry remained in reserve with the Guard and Eugene's IV Corps. The Westphalians of the VIII Corps were expected shortly, but Junot was still lost and leading them about the countryside.

  During the night of 16-17 August, the Russian 7th Corps was relieved and reinforced by the arrival of the 6th Corps of Docturov, 7th and 24th Divisions, and by the 3rd Division of Konovnitzin. Generalmajor Neverovski's 27th Division and the 6th Jagers of the 12th Division remained in the city. This brought the total Russians in Smolensk to 20,000 men and 180 guns. They were facing 183,000 French and allies equipped with 300 guns.

  At 8:00 A.M. on 17 August the Russians sortied from the Old City and engaged the French in the suburbs. Raevsky's troops had departed during the night, but had returned almost immediately to rejoin Bagration's forces that morning. They assisted Docturov's and Konovnitzin's forces, which were engaged in battle with the French. On the far side of the Dnieper, Barclay's lines remained immobile on the heights of the St. Petersburg suburbs.

  A total of 12,000 Russians were posted in the front lines. On the right was Konovnitzin's 24th Division. One of his brigades was posted in the city, and the other two were in the esplanade between the Malakhov gate and the suburb. The 6th Jager Regiment was positioned to the left of the gate. Generalmajor Neverovski had his 27th Division in the Rat-che vka suburb, and the Guard Jager Regiment was positioned in the city, between the city wall and the Dnieper River.

  Napoleon had gone to sleep the night before with the hope of a major battle in the morning. Smolensk was a major religious and provincial capital. Napoleon was sure that the Russians would make a stand before it.

  At about 4:00 A.M., on the French left flank, the Wurttemberg outposts (three companies of the 2nd Wurttemberg Regiment) before the Stasnaia suburb discommoded the Russians so much that they attacked them. Koch's brigade sent three
companies of the 6th Wurttemberg Regiment at 4:30 and the l/2nd Wurttemberg Line to support them at about 6:00 A.M. Knowing of the battle, Napoleon had directed that three battalions be sent to the left from the center at about 5:00 A.M. The two battalions of the 6th Regiment and Coronnette's battalion were selected.

  This movement was supported by Stockmayer's brigade, which placed the 2nd Jager Battalion to the right of the 2nd Wurttemberg Line Regiment. The remaining two battalions of the brigade were posted behind the line in column to provide support if needed. However, the fighting was inconclusive.

  General of Infantry Docturov had his forces on the left bank of the Dnieper, the 3rd, 7th, and 24th Divisions, the Smolensk Infantry Regiment, the 6th Jager Regiment, and part of the 4th Cavalry Corps. He was engaged in a lively battle with the French at 8:00 A.M. He occupied the suburbs with the 7th and 24th Divisions, supported by cavalry. The latter, placed on the left bank, was later joined by the Guard Jager regiment. Docturov had placed 120 guns on the defenses to support his forces. Some of the guns were placed in the towers on the city walls.

  In the center, about 8:00 A.M., the 4/ and 6/21st Line and 1/127th Line relieved the advanced posts of the 12th Line Regiment. The skirmishing between the Russians and the French was so violent that General Ledere was obliged to engage part of his brigade.

  General Belliard, tired of the uncertainty of the pending battle, led a small cavalry force off to the Dnieper and explored it for fords and Russians. He encountered and drove off a small band of cossacks above the town and discovered that the Russians were not redeploying for a major battle. He immediately informed Napoleon of this.