Gun Control in Nazi Occupied-France

by Stephen P. Halbrook

  Section 1.1 provided that “[t]he possession of firearms of any kind, including hunting guns, ammunition, hand grenades, explosives and other war materials and any parts of such items is prohibited.” Section 1.2 exempted people who carried weapons in an official capacity approved by a German office or who had a German-issued weapons permit. Excluded were unusable weapons with sentimental value and 4.5 mm air rifles.

  Whoever possessed items listed in section 1.1, unless an exemption applied according to section 1.2, “will be subject to the death penalty.” In petty cases, punishment could be jail or prison.

  Section 3 originally included the denunciation provision, but it was deleted from the final draft. It would have provided that whoever knew that another was in illegal possession of items listed in section 1, or knew where such items were hidden with the owner unknown, must immediately report that to the nearest German or French office. Whoever failed to do so would be sentenced to death or prison, or in petty cases, to jail. However, the duty to denounce such people did not apply to spouses, parents, children, or siblings of such people. By rejecting this draconian provision, MBF Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel sought to moderate what was already a deeply resented policy against gun owners that interfered with collaboration.

  What was now the new section 3 provided that whoever possessed arms would not be punished if they were delivered by April 1, 1942, to the closest German headquarters, the mayor, or French police or gendarme office. A provision was deleted that also granted amnesty for failure to denounce others in possession of arms within that time period, since the denunciation provision had been deleted. Finally, whoever discovered arms in his or her possession after the surrender deadline was promised amnesty if the arms were surrendered immediately to the nearest surrendering location.

  Finally, section 4 provided that the decree was effective on its publication date, and that it repealed the provisions of the decree of May 10, 1940, requiring surrender of arms within twenty-four hours and imposing the death penalty for failure to do so. But no one already arrested would get off the hook, as the amnesty did not apply to them.

  The March 5 decree was quite a testament to the tenuous success of almost two years of German gun control in France. Since the decree of May 10, 1940, the French had been threatened with the death penalty for possession of a gun, but countless people ignored the order. More recent amnesties had netted enormous quantities of firearms, but so many irascible French citizens just would not turn in their hunting guns, and members of the Resistance were focused on acquiring more guns with military utility.

  The next day the French delegation to the occupied territory delivered a lengthy missive through Lieutenant Rösch to the Germans. It touted the unity of interest of the German and French authorities to protect the occupiers and the occupied: “If the German authorities want to make sure that the French civilians in occupied territories are without arms to ensure total protection of the German army, the French authorities want to avoid, legitimately so, that public order be disturbed, and want to ensure the protection of administration and civilian population…. In fact, it is about ensuring the protection of the German army, as well as that of the French civilian population, from criminal acts aimed only at creating chaos.”40

  The letter noted that until September 12, 1941, the German authorities punished arms possession with the death penalty only in particularly serious cases. (That was a reference to the MBF’s announcement that date, following shootings of German soldiers, that arms possession would be punished only by execution.41) By the end of 1941, sixty-seven death sentences had occurred in the occupied territories for possession of arms, but in the two months from the beginning of 1942 to the present, thirty-six executions occurred for that offense. Contrary to what the Germans said about the death penalty being applied only in the most serious cases, the ultimate sanction was being applied against people not involved in political activity and with no harmful intent.

  In rural areas reached irregularly by newspapers, the letter continued, farmers ignored both the German decrees and the severe sanctions they would receive if they disobeyed them. In some places, such as Côte d’Or, agreements signed between the prefect and the German authorities counseled a flexible interpretation of the decrees. In others, people in possession of hunting guns were sentenced to light jail terms, as the German authorities did not deem that leniency would compromise the security of their troops. Finally, statistics disproved any direct relationship between severe punishment for arms possession and a reduction of attacks against the German army.

  The French letter next focused on hunting guns, which it said were not offensive or defensive weapons. Owners of hunting guns—it exaggerated somewhat—had no intention of aggression against the German army. The guns had sentimental value to families, and German recognition of the French psychology thereon would demonstrate that the Germans only wished to intervene as necessary to promote security for their troops.

  But a new decree to surrender hunting guns by a fixed deadline, the French missive naively continued, would not be obeyed unless the owners received guarantees that they would be returned at the end of hostilities. Thus, the letter recommended that any new surrender measures be widely advertised in villages through communiques and posters with the announcement that hunting guns would be turned over to a Franco-German agency or cantonal commission, a receipt describing the weapon would be signed by both a French and German member, and the gun would be stored in a safe place.

  The pleas of the French to safeguard surrendered guns and return them when hostilities ended would be nothing but illusions. While the French were not even aware that the Germans had already decided on a decree without these conditions, the MBF’s justice group still had no word on whether the Armistice Commission had decided whether privately owned hunting guns should be considered captured property and therefore confiscated without remuneration.42

  It was not until March 18 that Werner Best at the MBF’s office noted that the decree, which he had approved, was relayed by Jean-Pierre Ingrand to the French government with the order to publish it immediately.43 Specialist (Sonderführer) Vogt of the propaganda division was told to make certain that it was published without delay.44 It was published that day in the MBF’s official journal45 and reprinted in the French newspapers.46 The Decree Concerning the Possession of Arms was dated March 5, 1942:

  By virtue of the powers given to me by the Führer und Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, I order the following:

  § 1.

  1. The possession of any kind of firearms, including hunting arms, ammunition, hand grenades, explosives and any other war equipment, as well as any parts of these items is forbidden.

  2. This interdiction does not apply to:

  a. weapons and ammunition for which a permit has been delivered to the owner by German authority;

  b. weapons and ammunition which have been authorized by German authority by reason of their profession;

  c. any weapons and any other war equipment whose owner was issued a written document certifying that the weapons were left in his possession by the German authority;

  d. inoperable souvenir arms;

  e. 4.5 mm air rifles.

  § 2.

  1. Anyone in possession of any objects listed in section 1, paragraph 1, who does not meet the conditions listed on paragraph 2 of said section, shall be sentenced to death.

  2. In less serious cases the sentence may be forced labor or imprisonment.

  3. The arms shall be confiscated.

  § 3.

  1. Individuals in possession of arms listed in section 1, paragraph 1, who turn them in to the authorities before April 1, 1942, shall not be brought to court. The said turning in must be done to the local German commander, or to French city halls, police, or gendarme stations.

  2. Individuals who, having discovered he or she possessed arms listed in section 1, paragraph 1, after April 1, 1942 shall not be brought to court if he or she turns them in with
out any delay to the nearest above named authority.

  § 4.

  1. This decree shall be enforced as soon as it is posted. On that same date, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the May 10, 1940, decree concerning the possession of arms in occupied territories shall be repealed (VOBIF page 4).

  2. The stipulations contained in this decree do not apply to pending offenses before the police or legal authorities at the date of its posting.

  Under that last provision, while the decree was dated March 5, it was not effective as to pending cases until posted on March 18. Any poor fool who surrendered arms between those dates was subject to the death penalty. The referenced provisions of the decree of May 10, 1940, ordered that all arms be surrendered within twenty-four hours, and that violation was subject to the death penalty or imprisonment. By its terms, that decree expired on May 11, 1940, or twenty-four hours from whenever it was posted!

  The new decree was far more detailed in allowing an effective amnesty from March 18 to April 1, and even allowance to surrender arms at any time if a person discovers that he or she possesses arms. Two years of the iron-fisted approach obviously had not worked, despite the threat and use of the death penalty.

  Acknowledging the collaboration of the French police, the MBF directed that from then on, city halls, police, and small-town police stations were authorized to receive the weapons. And to assure the reluctant that the arms would be returned when peace returned, a receipt would be issued to anyone who requested one.47

  The news that the military authorities in Paris published a new decree threatening the immediate execution of any person found in possession of any kind of arms quickly spread across the Atlantic and was published in the New York Times.48

  The French press went to work admonishing resistance to the latest decree. Le Matin pleaded about the latest gun ban, “What does this mean, other than there are still offenders who resist, and whose ideas, if they ever are even partially carried out, would mean bloody retaliations? When will these mad people understand that we are all in solidarity … ?”49

  Executions No Longer to Be Published

  That was according to script. The justice group had directed the propaganda group to arrange for the French press to educate the French population about the importance of the order. There would be repeated references to it on French radio. It was to be emphasized that this was the last opportunity to surrender arms, including hunting guns, without punishment. “In the future, anybody found to possess weapons illegally will be sentenced to death.” Moreover, until now, the public was informed about death sentences for possession of weapons to remind them of the duty to surrender them. “In the future, there will be no more reminders. Executions will no longer be published.”50

  Without publication of death sentences, the population would be kept wondering about the extent to which violators were being ferreted out and shot. This was a further implementation of the Night and Fog (Nacht und Nebel) policy announced at the end of 1941, under which the disappearance of people with no explanation would terrorize the population into submission.

  This marks a turning point in the history of the disarming of the French citizenry. Press announcements of executions for firearm possession would no longer be routinely reported. After multiple decrees to surrender arms under penalty of death, starting with the May 10, 1940, decree with its twenty-four-hour deadline, and ending with the March 5, 1942, decree—which was not even announced until March 18—with its effective two-week deadline, further decrees were deemed useless. While internal Wehrmacht documents would continue reporting statistics on weapons confiscated and would occasionally report specific cases, the Germans were out of patience with the failure of many French civilians to surrender their firearms. It was time just to shoot those who failed to comply without further notice or fanfare.

  As the end of March neared, the newspapers continued to publicize the order, which the Germans carefully monitored.51 Le Matin warned a week in advance that April 1 was the deadline, noting that the French minister of the interior had just instructed all French services (courthouses, police offices, and gendarmeries) to receive the arms, and warned gun owners to avoid the extreme risks of not surrendering their arms.52

  Some apparently thought little of enforcing the arms prohibition. The Vichy delegation mentioned that the prefect of the department of Côte d’Or and local occupation authorities struck a deal to interpret the decree mildly to implement it in a just manner. The MBF sternly demanded to be informed who entered into such an agreement in violation of orders.53

  Major General Eduard Freiherr von Rotberg of District C in Dijon shot back that neither his office nor the military police made any agreement with the prefect of Côte d’Or for a lenient interpretation of the arms decree. The military police had inspected weapons that had been surrendered, eliminated any misunderstanding about the meaning of “unusable weapons,” and confiscated those that were usable. Rotberg claimed that he told the prefect that the amnesty was a generous gesture, but that anyone who failed to comply would be punished severely.54

  The Vichy plea to the Germans to issue yet another amnesty ignored that no amount of leniency or threats of death would induce many French to surrender their hidden arms. Resistance member Jacques Demange wrote to me relating how in 1940 he surrendered the least desirable of his father’s hunting guns, but buried his father’s good shotgun, a revolver, and some daggers, greased and oiled in a wooden box, in a cow pasture.55 In 1942, he dug them up only to find that they had rusted, although the shotgun still worked. He continued the story:

  In those days, my parents and I were farmers. So of course we had to provide the Germans with food, and they enforced the controls with their interpreters. They would come at different times of the day without warning. Those controls were very serious. Foreseeing the danger, I dug a second cellar in a remote place, under a mound of straw. I placed our food reserves for the year there. From that point on, the Germans could come whenever they wanted; the food was safely guarded by the gun that I had put at the same place.

  Then years passed, little by little “les Boches” lost their control and the liberation arrived. And the shotgun is still with me, hanging on the wall. It does not work, yet what memories does it bring me!

  For February and March 1942, the MBF reported 113 French citizens sentenced to death. Of these, 40 gave aid and comfort to the enemy, 39 possessed weapons, 18 committed espionage, and the handful of the rest committed acts of violence, guerrilla activity, hid a British citizen, committed murder or robbery, and demoralized the troops.56 In a report of other sentences, the judge acknowledged the difficult task of the French lawyers, and thanked the French police for their collaboration with the German police, making the arrest of the terrorists possible.57

  French Police Trace a Registered Pistol

  When a member of the Resistance shot a German and dropped his handgun at the scene, the commissioner of police of Rouen ordered the issuance of an alert to every prefect in France, in both the occupied and unoccupied zones, to check the registration records to determine the owner of the firearm.58 René Bouffet, the prefect of the department of Seine-Inférieure, urgently wrote to every other prefect in France under the subject heading “Identification of a firearm owner”:

  On April 24, 1942, around 10:10 p.m., in Rouen, at Crevier Street, a German sailor was attacked and seriously wounded by a revolver bullet, shot point-blank in the back, when he was walking down this street with a woman.

  The two assailants, on bicycles at the time of the attack, fell down; one of them fled on his bicycle and probably abandoned his glasses with a neutral lens, while the other man ran away and abandoned his bicycle, his Basque beret, and notably his firearm.

  This firearm is a 6.35 mm automatic pistol marked Oméga, serial number 1901, in new condition.

  It is extremely urgent to check the firearm registration records in your department carefully, to determine if the pistol found in Rouen was registered in your department,
in order to submit all information about the owner to me immediately.59

  The Omega was a small .25 caliber pistol made by Armero Especialistas in Spain. It was not normally marked “Oméga,” indicating that the above acute accent on the “e” may have been a mistake or that “Oméga” was stamped on a pistol by another manufacturer to avoid a trademark violation. The results of the attempt to trace the pistol to its owner are unknown, as further records could not be found.

  German occupation policy in all countries reflected Hitler’s premise: “The most foolish mistake we could possibly make would be to allow the subject races to possess arms. History shows that all conquerors who have allowed their subject races to carry arms have prepared their own downfall by so doing.” However, while the occupation model in France depended on the use of the French police, in the East the Führer rejected use of “any native militia or police,” insisting that “German troops alone will bear the sole responsibility for the maintenance of law and order throughout the occupied Russian territories….”60 He added, “The iron law must be: None but the Germans shall be permitted to bear arms … only a German has the right to carry a weapon; no Slav, no Czech, no Cossack, no Ukrainian.”61

  Pierre Laval Returns

  Since the beginning of the occupation, Germany made ever-increasing demands on France to exploit its resources and labor force and to cooperate with its brutal reprisal policies. Vichy was deemed insufficiently cooperative, prompting the Germans to seek the reinstatement of Pierre Laval to head the government. Jean Guéhenno wrote in his diary on April 11, 1942, “In Vichy, Laval is having mysterious conversations with the Marshal. No doubt we have some more progress to make in shame and degradation.” On April 20, he added: