by Frontinus
[9] When it was essential that Hasdrubal and his troops should be destroyed before they joined Hannibal, the brother of Hasdrubal, Claudius Nero, lacking confidence in the troops under his own command, was therefore eager to unite his forces with those of his colleague, Livius Salinator, to whom the direction of the campaign had been committed. Desiring, however, that his departure should be unobserved by Hannibal, whose camp was opposite his, he chose ten thousand of his bravest soldiers, and gave orders to the lieutenants whom he left that the usual number of patrols and sentries be posted, the same number of fires lighted, and the usual appearance of the camp be maintained, in order that Hannibal might not become suspicious and venture to attack the few troops left behind. Then, when he joined his colleague in Umbria after secret marches, he forbade the enlargement of the camp, lest he give some sign of his arrival to the Carthaginian commander, who would be likely to refuse battle if he knew the forces of the consuls had been united. Accordingly, attacking the enemy unawares with his reinforced troops, he won the day and returned to Hannibal in advance of any news of his exploit. Thus by the same plan he stole a march on one of the two shrewdest Carthaginian generals and crushed the other.
[10] Themistocles exhortans suos ad suscitandos festinanter muros, quos iussu Lacedaemoniorum deiecerant, legatis Lacedaemone missis, qui interpellarent, respondit, venturum se ad diluendam hanc existimationem; et pervenit Lacedaemonem. Ibi simulato morbo aliquantum temporis extraxit; et postquam intellexit suspectam esse tergiversationem suam, contendit falsum ad eos rumorem et rogavit, mitterent aliquos ex principibus, quibus crederent de munitione Athenarum. Suis deinde clam scripsit, ut eos qui venissent retinerent, donec refectis operibus confiteretur Lacedaemoniis, munitas esse Athenas neque aliter principes eorum redire posse, quam si ipse remissus foret. Quod facile praestiterunt Lacedaemonii, ne unius interitum multorum morte pensarent.
[10] Themistocles, urging upon his fellow-citizens the speedy construction of the walls which, at the command of the Lacedaemonians, they had demolished, informed the envoys sent from Sparta to remonstrate about this matter, that he himself would come, to put an end to this suspicion. Accordingly he came to Sparta. There, by feigning illness, he secured a considerable delay. But after he realized that his subterfuge was suspected, he declared that the rumour which had come to the Spartans was false, and asked them to send some of their leading men, whose word they would take about the building operations of the Athenians. Then he wrote secretly to the Athenians, telling them to detain those who had come to them, until, upon the restoration of the walls, he could admit to the Spartans that Athens was fortified, and could inform them that their leaders could not return until he himself had been sent back. These terms the Spartans readily fulfilled, that they might not atone for the death of one by that of many.
[11] L. Furius, exercitu perducto in locum iniquum, cum constituisset occultare sollicitudinem suam, ne reliqui trepidarent, paulatim se inflectens, tamquam circuitu maiore hostem adgressurus, converso agmine ignarum rei quae agebatur exercitum incolumem reduxit.
[11] Lucius Furius, having led his army into an unfavourable position, determined to conceal his anxiety, lest the others take alarm. By gradually changing his course, as though planning to attack the enemy after a wider circuit, he finally reversed his line of march, and led his army safely back, without its knowing what was going on.
[12] Metellus Pius in Hispania interrogatus, quid postera die facturus esset, “tunicam meam, si eloqui posset”, inquit, “comburerem.”
[12] When Metellus Pius was in Spain and was asked what he was going to do the next day, he replied: “If my tunic could tell, I would burn it.”
[13] M. Licinius Crassus percunctanti, quo tempore castra moturus esset, respondit: “vereris, ne tubam non exaudias?”
[13] When Marcus Licinius Crassus was asked at what time he was going to break camp, he replied: “Are you afraid you’ll not hear the trumpet?”
II. De Explorandis Consiliis Hostium
II. On Finding Out the Enemy’s Plans
[1] Scipio Africanus, capta occasione mittendae ad Syphacem legationis, cum Laelio servorum habitu tribunos et centuriones electissimos ire iussit, quibus curae esset perspicere regias vires. Hi, quo liberius castrorum positionem scrutarentur, equum de industria dimissum tamquam fugientem persectati maximam partem munimentorum circumierunt. Quae cum nuntiassent, incendio confectum bellum est.
[1] Scipio Africanus, seizing the opportunity of sending an embassy to Syphax, commanded specially chosen tribunes and centurions to go with Laelius, disguised as slaves and entrusted with the task of spying out the strength of the king. These men, in order to examine more freely the situation of the camp, purposely let loose a horse and chased it around the greatest part of the fortifications, pretending it was running away. After they had reported the results of their observations, the destruction of the camp by fire brought the war to a close.
[2] Q. Fabius Maximus bello Etrusco, cum adhuc incognitae forent Romanis ducibus sagaciores explorandi viae, fratrem Fabium Caesonem, peritum linguae Etruscae, iussit Tusco habitu penetrare Ciminiam silvam, intemptatam ante militi nostro. Quod is adeo prudenter atque industrie fecit, ut transgressus silvam Umbros Camertes, cum animadvertisset non alienos nomini Romano, ad societatem compulerit.
[2] During the war with Etruria, when shrewd methods of reconnoitering were still unknown to Roman leaders, Quintus Fabius Maximus commanded his brother, Fabius Caeso, who spoke the Etruscan language fluently, to put on Etruscan dress and to penetrate into the Ciminian Forest, where our soldiers had never before ventured. He showed such discretion and energy in executing these commands, that after traversing the forest and observing that the Umbrians of Camerium were not hostile to the Romans, he brought them into an alliance.
[3] Carthaginienses, cum animadvertissent Alexandri ita magnas opes, ut Africae quoque immineret, unum ex civibus, virum acrem nomine Hamilcarem Rhodinum, iusserunt simulato exsilio ire ad regem omnique studio in amicitiam eius pervenire. Qua is potitus consilia eius nota civibus suis faciebat.
[3] When the Carthaginians saw that the power of Alexander was so great that it menaced even Africa, they ordered one of their citizens, a resolute man named Hamilcar Rhodinus, to go to the king, pretending to be an exile, and to make every effort to gain his friendship. When Rhodinus had succeeded in this, he disclosed to his fellow-citizens the king’s plans.
[4] Idem Carthaginienses miserunt, qui per speciem legatorum longo tempore Romae morarentur exciperentque consilia nostrorum.
[4] The same Carthaginian sent men to tarry a long time at Rome, in the rôle of ambassadors, and thus to secure information of our plans.
[5] M. Cato in Hispania, quia ad hostium consilia alia via pervenire non potuerat, iussit trecentos milites simul impetum facere in stationem hostium raptumque unum ex his in castra perferre incolumem. Tortus ille omnia suorum arcana confessus est.
[5] When Marcus Cato was in Spain, being unable otherwise to arrive at a knowledge of the enemy’s plans, he ordered three hundred soldiers to make a simultaneous attack on an enemy post, to seize one of their men, and to bring him unharmed to camp. The prisoner, under torture, revealed all the secrets of his side.
[6] C. Marius consul bello Cimbrico et Teutonico ad excutiendam Gallorum et Ligurum fidem litteras eis misit, quarum pars prior praeceperat, ne interiores, quae praesignatae erant, ante certum tempus aperirentur. Easdem postea ante praestitutum diem repetiit et, quia resignatas reppererat, intellexit hostilia agitari.
[Est et aliud explorandi genus, quo ipsi duces nullo extrinsecus adiutorio per se provident, sicut:]
[6] During the war with the Cimbrians and Teutons, the consul Gaius Marius, wishing to test the loyalty of the Gauls and Ligurians, sent them a letter, commanding them in the first part of the letter not to open the inner part, which was specially sealed, before a certain date. Afterwards, before the appointed time had arrived, he demanded the same letter back, and finding all seals broken, he knew that acts of
hostility were afoot.
[There is also another method of securing intelligence, by which the generals themselves, without calling in any outside help, by their own unaided efforts take precautions, as, for instance:]
[7] Aemilius Paulus consul, bello Etrusco apud oppidum Vetuloniam demissurus exercitum in planitiem, contemplatus procul avium multitudinem citatiore volatu ex silva consurrexisse, intellexit aliquid illic insidiarum latere, quod et turbatae aves et plures simul evolaverant. Praemissis igitur exploratoribus comperit decem milia Boiorum excipiendo ibi Romanorum agmini imminere, eaque alio quam exspectabatur latere missis legionibus circumfudit.
[7] In the Etruscan war, the consul Aemilius Paulus was on the point of sending his army down into the plain near the town of Vetulonia, when he saw afar off a flock of birds rise in somewhat startled flight from a forest, and realized that some treachery was lurking there, both because the birds had risen in alarm and at the same time in great numbers. He therefore sent some scouts ahead and discovered that ten thousand Boii were lying in wait at that point to meet the Roman army. These he overwhelmed by sending his legions against them at a different point from that at which they were expected.
[8] Similiter Tisamenus Orestis filius, cum audisset iugum ab hostibus natura munitum teneri, praemisit sciscitaturos, quid rei foret; ac referentibus eis non esse verum, quod opinaretur, ingressus iter, ubi vidit ex suspecto iugo magnam vim avium simul evolasse neque omnino residere, arbitratus latere illic agmen hostium. Itaque circumducto exercitu elusit insidiatores.
[8] In like manner, Tisamenus, the son of Orestes, hearing that a ridge, a natural stronghold, was held by the enemy, sent men ahead to ascertain the facts; and upon their reporting that his impression was without foundation, he began his march. But when he saw a large number of birds all at once fly from the suspected ridge and not settle down at all, he came to the conclusion that the enemy’s troops were hiding there; and so, leading his army by a detour, he escaped those lying in wait for him.
[9] Hasdrubal, frater Hannibalis, iunctum Livii et Neronis exercitum, quamquam hoc illi non duplicatis castris dissimularent, intellexit, quod ab itinere strigosiores notabat equos et coloratiora hominum, ut ex via, corpora.
[9] Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, knew that the armies of Livius and Nero had united (although by avoiding two separate camps they strove to conceal this fact), because he observed horses rather lean from travel and men somewhat sunburned, as naturally results from marching.
III. De Constituendo Statu Belli
III. On Determining the Character of the War
[1] Alexander Macedo, cum haberet vehementem exercitum, semper eum statum belli elegit, ut acie confligeret.
[1] Whenever Alexander of Macedon had a strong army, he chose the sort of warfare in which he could fight in open battle.
[2] C. Caesar bello civili, cum veteranum exercitum haberet, hostium autem tironem esse sciret, acie semper decertare studuit.
[2] Gaius Caesar, in the Civil War, having an army of veterans and knowing that the enemy had only raw recruits, always strove to fight in open battle.
[3] Fabius Maximus adversus Hannibalem, successibus proeliorum insolentem, recedere ab ancipiti discrimine et tueri tantummodo Italiam constituit Cunctatorisque nomen et per hoc summi ducis meruit.
[3] Fabius Maximus, when engaged in war with Hannibal, who was inflated by his success in battle, decided to avoid any dangerous hazards and to devote himself solely to the protection of Italy. By this policy he earned the name of Cunctator (“The Delayer”) and the reputation of a consummate general.
[4] Byzantii adversus Philippum omne proeliandi discrimen evitantes, omissa etiam finium tutela, intra munitiones oppidi se receperunt assecutique sunt, ut Philippus obsidionalis morae impatiens recederet.
[4] The Byzantines in their war with Philip, avoiding all risks of battle, and abandoning even the defence of their territory, retired within the walls of their city and succeeded in causing Philip to withdraw, since he could not endure the delay of a siege.
[5] Hasdrubal, Gisgonis filius, secundo Punico bello in Hispania victum exercitum, cum P. Scipio instaret, per urbes divisit. Ita factum est, ut Scipio, ne oppugnatione plurium oppidorum distringeretur, in hiberna suos reduceret.
[5] Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, in the Second Punic War, distributed his vanquished army among the cities of Spain when Publius Scipio pressed hard upon him. As a result, Scipio, in order not to scatter his forces by laying siege to several towns, withdrew his army into winter quarters.
[6] Themistocles adventante Xerxe, quia neque proelio pedestri neque tutelae finium neque obsidioni credebat sufficere Athenienses, auctor fuit eis liberos et coniuges in Troezena et in alias amendandi relictoque oppido statum belli ad navale proelium transferendi.
[6] Themistocles, when Xerxes was approaching, thinking the strength of the Athenians unequal to a land battle, to the defence of their territory, or to the support of a siege, advised them to remove their wives and children to Troezen and other towns, to abandon the city, and to transfer the scene of the war to the water.
[7] Idem fecit in eadem civitate Pericles adversum Lacedaemonios.
[7] Pericles did the same thing in the same state, in the war with the Spartans.
[8] Scipio, manente in Italia Hannibale, transmisso in Africam exercitu necessitatem Carthaginiensibus imposuit revocandi Hannibalem. Sic a domesticis finibus in hostiles transtulit bellum.
[8] While Hannibal was lingering in Italy, Scipio sent an army into Africa, and so forced the Carthaginians to recall Hannibal. In this way he transferred the war from his own country to that of the enemy.
[9] Athenienses, cum Deceliam castellum ipsorum Lacedaemonii communissent et frequentius vexarentur, classem, quae Peloponensum infestare[n]t, miserunt consecutique sunt, ut exercitus Lacedaemoniorum, qui Deceliae erat, revocaretur.
[9] When the Spartans had fortified Decelea, a stronghold of the Athenians, and were making frequent raids there, the Athenians sent a fleet to harass the Peloponnesus, and thus secured the recall of the army of Spartans stationed at Decelea.
[10] Imperator Caesar Domitianus Augustus, cum Germani more suo e saltibus et obscuris latebris subinde impugnarent nostros tutumque regressum in profunda silvarum haberent, limitibus per centum viginti milia passuum actis non mutavit tantum statum belli, sed et subiecit dicioni suae hostes, quorum refugia nudaverat.
[10] When the Germans, in accordance with their usual custom, kept emerging from woodland-pastures and unsuspected hiding-places to attack our men, and then finding a safe refuge in the depths of the forest, the Emperor Caesar Domitianus Augustus, by advancing the frontier of the empire along a stretch of •one hundred and twenty miles, not only changed the nature of the war, but brought his enemies beneath his sway, by uncovering their hiding-places.
IV. De Transducendo Exercitu per Loca Hosti Infesta
IV. On Leading an Army through Places Infested by the Enemy
[1] Aemilius Paulus consul, cum in Lucanis iuxta litus angusto itinere exercitum duceret et Tarentini ei classe insidiati agmen eius scorpionibus agressi essent, captivos lateri euntium praetexuit, quorum respectu hostes inhibuere tela.
[1] When the consul Aemilius Paulus was leading his army along a narrow road near the coast in Lucania, and the fleet of the Tarentines, lying in wait for him, had attacked his troops by means of scorpions, he placed prisoners as a screen to his line of march. Not wishing to harm these, the enemy ceased their attacks.
[2] Agesilaus Lacedaemonius, cum praeda onustus ex Phrygia rediret insequerenturque hostes et ad locorum opportunitatem lacesserent agmen eius, ordinem captivorum ab utroque latere exercitus sui explicuit; quibus dum parcitur ab hoste, spatium transeundi habuerunt Lacedaemonii.
[2] Agesilaus, the Spartan, when returning from Phrygia laden with booty, was hard pressed by the enemy, who took advantage of their position to harass his line of march. He therefore placed a file of captives on each flank of his army. Since these were spared by the enemy, th
e Spartans found time to pass.
[3] Idem, tenentibus angustias Thebanis, per quas transeundum habebat, flexit iter, quasi Thebas contenderet. Exterritis Thebanis digressisque ad tutanda moenia repetitum iter, quo destinaverat, emensus est nullo obsistente.
