by Frontinus
II. De Loco ad Pugnam Eligendo
III. De Acie Ordinanda
IV. De Acie Hostium Turbanda
V. De Insidiis
VI. De Emittendo Hoste, ne Clausus Proelium ex
VII. De Dissimulandis Adversis
VIII. De Restituenda per Constantiam Acie
IX. Si Res Prospere Cesserit, de Consummandis
X. Si Res Durius Cesserit, de Adversis Emendandis
XI. De Dubiorum Animis in Fide Retinendis
XII. Quae Facienda Sint pro Castrorum Defensione, si Satis Fiduciae in Praesentibus Copiis non Habeamus
XIII. De Effugiendo
LIBER TERTIUS — BOOK III
I. De Repentino Impetu
II. De Fallendis His Qui Obsidebuntur
III. De Eliciendis ad Proditionem
IV. Per quae Hostes ad Inopiam Redigantur
V. Quemadmodum Persuadeatur Obsidionem Permansuram
VI. De Districtione Praesidiorum Hostium
VII. De Fluminum Derivatione et Vitiatione Aquarum
VIII. De Iniciendo Obsessis Pavore
IX. De Irruptione ex Diversa Parte quam Exspectabimur
X. De Disponendis Insidiis, in quas Eliciantur Obsessi
XI. De Simulatione Regressus
XII. De Excitanda Cura Suorum
XIII. De Emittendo et Recipiendo Nuntio
XIV. De Introducendis Auxiliis et Commeatibus Suggerendis
XV. Quemadmodum Efficiatur ut Abundare Videantur quae Deerunt
XVI. Qua Ratione Proditoribus et Transfugis Occurratur
XVII. De Eruptionibus
XVIII. De Constantia Obsessorum
LIBER QUARTUS — BOOK IV
I. De Disciplina
II. De Effectu Disciplinae
III. De Continentia
IV. De Iustitia
V. De Constantia
VI. De Affectu et Moderatione
VII. De Variis Consiliis
DE AQUAEDUCTU URBIS ROMAE — The Aqueducts of Rome
LIBER PRIMUS
LIBER SECUNDUS
STRATEGEMATA — Stratagems
LIBER PRIMUS — BOOK I
Cum ad instruendam rei militaris scientiam unus ex numero studiosorum eius accesserim eique destinato, quantum cura nostra valuit, satisfecisse visus sim, deberi adhuc institutae arbitror operae, ut sollertia ducum facta, quae a Graecis una στρατηγημάτων appellatione comprehensa sunt, expeditis amplectar commentariis. Ita enim consilii quoque et providentiae exemplis succincti duces erunt, unde illis excogitandi generandique similia facultas nutriatur; praeterea continget, ne de eventu trepidet inventionis suae, qui probatis eam experimentis comparabit.
Since I alone of those interested in military science have undertaken to reduce its rules to system, and since I seem to have fulfilled that purpose, so far as pains on my part could accomplish it, I still feel under obligation, in order to complete the task I have begun, to summarize in convenient sketches the adroit operations of generals, which the Greeks embrace under the one name strategemata. For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds. There will result the added advantage that a general will not fear the issue of his own stratagem, if he compares it with experiments already successfully made.
Illud neque ignoro neque infitior, et rerum gestarum scriptores indagine operis sui hanc quoque partem esse complexos et ab auctoribus exemplorum, quidquid insigne aliquo modo fuit, traditum. Sed, ut opinor, occupatis velocitate consuli debet. Longum est enim singula et sparsa per immensum corpus historiarum persequi, et hi, qui notabilia excerpserunt, ipso velut acervo rerum confuderunt legentem. Nostra sedulitas impendet operam, ut, quemadmodum res poscet, ipsum quod exigitur quasi ad interrogatum exhibeat.
I neither ignore nor deny the fact that historians have included in the compass of their works this feature also, nor that authors have already recorded in some fashion all famous examples. But I ought, I think, out of consideration for busy men, to have regard to brevity. For it is a tedious business to hunt out separate examples scattered over the vast body of history; and those who have made selections of notable deeds have overwhelmed the reader by the very mass of material. My effort will be devoted to the task of setting forth, as if in response to questions, and as occasion shall demand, the illustration applicable to the case in point.
Circumspectis enim generibus, praeparavi opportuna exemplorum veluti consilia. Quo magis autem discreta ad rerum varietatem apte conlocarentur, in tres libros ea diduximus. In primo erunt exempla, quae competant proelio nondum commisso; in secundo, quae ad proelium et confectam pacationem pertineant; tertius inferendae solvendaeque obsidioni habebit στρατηγήματα; quibus deinceps generibus suas species attribui.
For having examined the categories, I have in advance mapped out my campaign, so to speak, for the presentation of illustrative examples. Moreover, in order that these may be sifted and properly classified according to the variety of subject-matter, I have divided them into three books. In the first are illustrations of stratagems for use before the battle begins; in the second, those that relate to the battle itself and tend to effect the complete subjugation of the enemy; the third contains stratagems connected with sieges and the raising of sieges. Under these successive classes I have grouped the illustrations appropriate to each.
Huic labori non iniuste veniam paciscar, ne me pro incurioso reprehendat, qui praeteritum aliquod a nobis reppererit exemplum. Quis enim ad percensenda omnia monumenta, quae utraque lingua tradita sunt, sufficiat? at multa et transire mihi ipse permisi. Quod me non sine causa fecisse scient, qui aliorum libros eadem promittentium legerint. Verum facile erit sub quaque specie suggerere. Nam cum hoc opus, sicut cetera, usus potius aliorum quam meae commendationis causa adgressus sim, adiuvari me ab his, qui aliquid illi astruent, non argui credam.
It is not without justice that I shall claim indulgence for this work, and I beg that no one will charge me with negligence, if he finds that I have passed over some illustration. For who could prove equal to the task of examining all the records which have come down to us in both languages! And so I have purposely allowed myself to skip many things. That I have not done this without reason, those will realize who read the books of others treating of the same subjects; but it will be easy for the reader to supply those examples under each category. For since this work, like my preceding ones, has been undertaken for the benefit of others, rather than for the sake of my own renown, I shall feel that I am being aided, rather than criticized, by those who will make additions to it.
Si qui erunt, quibus volumina haec cordi sint, meminerint στρατηγικῶν et στρατηγημάτων perquam similem naturam discernere. Namque omnia, quae a duce provide, utiliter, magnifice, constanter fiunt, στρατηγικὰ habebuntur, si in specie eorum sunt, στρατηγήματα. Horum propria vis in arte sollertiaque posita proficit tam ubi cavendus quam opprimendus hostis sit. Qua in re cum verborum quoque inlustris exstiterit effectus, ut factorum ita dictorum exempla posuimus.
If there prove to be any persons who take an interest in these books, let them remember to discriminate between “strategy” and “stratagems,” which are by nature extremely similar. For everything achieved by a commander, be it characterized by foresight, advantage, enterprise, or resolution, will belong under the head of “strategy,” while those things which fall under some special type of these will be “stratagems.” The essential characteristic of the latter, resting, as it does, on skill and cleverness, is effective quite as much when the enemy is to be evaded as when he is to be crushed. Since in this field certain striking results have been produced by speeches, I have set down examples of these also, as well as of deeds.
Species eorum, quae instruant ducem in his, quae ante proelium gerenda sunt:
Types of stratagems for the guidance of a commander in matters to be attended to before battle:
I.
De occu
ltandis consiliis.
II.
De explorandis consiliis hostium.
III.
De constituendo statu belli.
IV.
De transducendo exercitu per loca hosti infesta.
V.
De evadendo ex locis difficillimis.
VI.
De insidiis in itinere factis.
VII.
Quemadmodum ea, quibus deficiemur, videantur non deesse aut usus eorum expleatur.
VIII.
De distringendis hostibus.
IX.
De seditione militum compescenda.
X.
Quemadmodum intempestiva postulatio pugnae inhibeatur.
XI.
Quemadmodum incitandus sit ad proelium exercitus.
XII.
De dissolvendo metu, quem milites ex adversis conceperint ominibus.
I. On concealing one’s plans.
II. On finding out the enemy’s plans.
III. On determining the character of the war.
IV. On leading an army through places infested by the enemy.
V. On escaping from difficult situations.
VI. On laying and meeting ambushes while on the march.
VII. How to conceal the absence of the things we lack, or to supply substitutes for them.
VIII. On distracting the attention of the enemy.
IX. On quelling a mutiny of soldiers.
X. How to check an unseasonable demand for battle.
XI. How to arouse an army’s enthusiasm for battle.
XII. On dispelling the fears inspired in soldiers by adverse omens.
I. De Occultandis Consiliis
I. On Concealing One’s Plans
[1] M. Porcius Cato devictas a se Hispaniae civitates existimabat in tempore rebellaturas fiducia murorum. Scripsit itaque singulis, ut diruerent munimenta, minatus bellum, nisi confestim obtemperassent, epistulasque universis civitatibus eodem die reddi iussit. Unaquaeque urbium sibi soli credidit imperatum; contumaces conspiratio potuit facere, si omnibus idem denuntiari notum fuisset.
[1] Marcus Porcius Cato believed that, when opportunity offered, the Spanish cities which he had subdued would revolt, relying upon the protection of their walls. He therefore wrote to each of the cities, ordering them to destroy their fortifications, and threatening war unless they obeyed forthwith. He ordered these letters to be delivered to all cities on the same day. Each city supposed that it alone had received the commands; had they known that the same orders had been sent to all, they could have joined forces and refused obedience.
[2] Himilco dux Poenorum, ut in Siciliam inopinatus appelleret classem, non pronuntiavit, quo proficisceretur, sed tabellas, in quibus scriptum erat, quam partem peti vellet, universis gubernatoribus dedit signatas praecepitque, ne quis legeret nisi vi tempestatis a cursu praetoriae navis abductus.
[2] Himilco, the Carthaginian general, desiring to land in Sicily by surprise, made no public announcement as to the destination of his voyage, but gave all the captains sealed letters, in which were instructions what port to make, with further directions that no one should read these, unless separated from the flag-ship by a violent storm.
[3] C. Laelius, ad Syphacem profectus legatus, quosdam ex tribunis et centurionibus per speciem servitutis ac ministerii exploratores secum duxit. Ex quibus L. Statorium, quem, quia saepius in isdem castris fuerat, quidam ex hostibus videbantur agnoscere, occultandae condicionis eius causa baculo ut servum castigavit.
[3] When Gaius Laelius went as envoy to Syphax, he took with him as spies certain tribunes and centurions whom he represented to be slaves and attendants. One of these, Lucius Statorius, who had been rather frequently in the same camp, and whom certain of the enemy seemed to recognize, Laelius caned as a slave, in order to conceal the man’s rank.
[4] Tarquinius Superbus pater, principes Gabinorum interficiendos arbitratus, quia hoc nemini volebat commissum, nihil nuntio respondit, qui ad eum a filio erat missus; tantum virga eminentia papaverum capita, cum forte in horto ambularet, decussit. Nuntius sine responso reversus renuntiavit adulescenti Tarquinio, quid agentem patrem vidisset; ille intellexit idem esse eminentibus faciendum.
[4] Tarquin the Proud, having decided that the leading citizens of Gabii should be put to death, and not wishing to confide this purpose to anyone, gave no response to the messenger sent to him by his son, but merely cut off the tallest poppy heads with his cane, as he happened to walk about in the garden. The messenger, returning without an answer, reported to the young Tarquin what he had seen his father doing. The son thereupon understood that the same thing was to be done to the prominent citizens of Gabii.
[5] C. Caesar, quod suspectam habebat Aegyptiorum fidem, per speciem securitatis inspectioni urbis atque operum ac simul licentioribus conviviis deditus, videri voluit captum se gratia locorum ad mores Alexandrinos vitamque deficere; atque inter eam dissimulationem praeparatis subsidiis occupavit Aegyptum.
[5] Gaius Caesar, distrusting the loyalty of the Egyptians, and wishing to give the appearance of indifference, indulged in riotous banqueting, while devoting himself to an inspection of the city and its defences, pretending to be captivated by the charm of the place and to be succumbing to the customs and life of the Egyptians. Having made ready his reserves while he thus dissembled, he seized Egypt.
[6] Ventidius Parthico bello adversus Pacorum regem, non ignarus Pharnaeum quendam, natione Cyrrhestem, ex his qui socii videbantur, omnia quae apud ipsos agerentur nuntiare Parthis, perfidiam barbari ad utilitates suas convertit. Nam quae maxime fieri cupiebat, ea vereri se ne acciderent, quae timebat, ea ut evenirent optare simulabat. Sollicitus itaque, ne Parthi ante transirent Euphraten, quam sibi supervenirent legiones, quas in Cappadocia trans Taurum habebat, studiose cum proditore egit, uti sollemni perfidia Parthis suaderet, per Zeugma traicerent exercitum, qua et brevissimum iter est et demisso alveo Euphrates decurrit; namque si illa venirent, asseverabat se opportunitate collium usurum ad eludendos sagittarios, omnia autem vereri, si se infra per patentis campos proiecissent. Inducti hac affirmatione barbari inferiore itinere per circuitum adduxerunt exercitum dumque fusiores ripas et ob hoc operosiores ponte[s] iungunt instrumentaque moliuntur, quadraginta amplius dies impenderunt. Quo spatio Ventidius ad contrahendas usus est copias eisque triduo, antequam Parthus adveniret, receptis acie commissa vicit Pacorum et interfecit.
[6] When Ventidius was waging war against the Parthian king Pacorus, knowing that a certain Pharnaeus from the province of Cyrrhestica, one of those pretending to be allies, was revealing to the Parthians all the preparations of his own army, he turned the treachery of the barbarian to his own advantage; for he pretended to be afraid that those things would happen which he was particularly desirous should happen, and pretended to desire those things to happen which he really dreaded. And so, fearful that the Parthians would cross the Euphrates before he could be reinforced by the legions which were stationed beyond the Taurus Mountains in Cappadocia, he earnestly endeavoured to make this traitor, according to his usual perfidy, advise the Parthians to lead their army across through Zeugma, where the route is shortest, and where the Euphrates flows in a deep channel; for he declared that, if the Parthians came by that road, he could avail himself of the protection of the hills for eluding their archers; but that he feared disaster if they should advance by the lower road through the open plains. Influenced by this information, the barbarians led their army by a circuitous route over the lower road, and spent above forty days in preparing materials and in constructing a bridge across the river at a point where the banks were quite widely separated and where the building of the bridge, therefore, involved more work. Ventidius utilized this interval for reuniting his forces, and having assembled these, three days before the Parthians arrived, he opened battle, conquered Pacorus, and killed him.
[7] Mithridates, circumvallante Pompeio, fugam in proximum diem moliens, huius consilii obscurandi causa latius et usque ad applicitas hosti valles pabulatus, colloquia quoqu
e cum pluribus avertendae suspicionis causa in posterum constituit, ignes etiam frequentiores per tota castra fieri iussit; secunda deinde vigilia praeter ipsa hostium castra agmen eduxit.
[7] Mithridates, when he was blockaded by Pompey and planned to retreat the next day, wishing to conceal his purpose, made foraging expeditions over a wide territory, and even to the valleys adjacent to the enemy. For the purpose of further averting suspicion, he also arranged conferences for a subsequent date with several of his foes; and ordered numerous fires to be lighted throughout the camp. Then, in the second watch, he led out his forces directly past the camp of the enemy.
[8] Imperator Caesar Domitianus Augustus Germanicus, cum Germanos, qui in armis erant, vellet opprimere nec ignoraret maiore bellum molitione inituros, si adventum tanti ducis praesensissent, profectioni[s] suae census obtexuit Galliarum; sub quibus inopinato bello affusus contusa immanium ferocia nationum provinciis consuluit.
[8] When the Emperor Caesar Domitianus Augustus Germanicus wished to crush the Germans, who were in arms, realizing that they would make greater preparations for war if they foresaw the arrival of so eminent a commander as himself, he concealed the reason for his departure from Rome under the pretext of taking a census of the Gallic provinces. Under cover of this he plunged into sudden warfare, crushed the ferocity of these savage tribes, and thus acted for the good of the provinces.
[9] Claudius Nero, cum e re publica esset Hasdrubalem copiasque eius, antequam Hannibali fratri iungerentur, excidi idcircoque festinaret se Livio Salinatori collegae suo, cui bellum mandatum fuerat, parum fidenti viribus quae sub ipso erant, adiungere neque tamen discessum suum ab Hannibale, cui oppositus erat, sentiri vellet, decem milia fortissimorum militum elegit praecepitque legatis, quos relinquebat, ut eaedem stationes vigiliaeque agerentur, totidem ignes arderent, eadem facies castrorum servaretur, ne quid Hannibal suspicatus auderet adversus paucitatem relictorum. cum deinde in Umbria occultatis itineribus collegae se iunxisset, vetuit castra ampliari, ne quod signum adventus sui Poeno daret, detractaturo pugnam, si consulum iunctas vires intellexisset. Igitur inscium duplicatis adgressus copiis superavit et velocius omni nuntio rediit ad Hannibalem. Ita ex duobus callidissimis ducibus Poenorum eodem consilio alterum celavit, alterum oppressit.
