Complete Works of Frontinus

by Frontinus

  [27] Hannibal directa acie ad Cannas DC equites Numidas transfugere iussit, qui ad fidem faciendam gladios et scuta nostris tradiderunt et in ultimum agmen recepti, ubi primum concurri coepit, strictis minoribus quos occultaverant gladiis, scutis iacentium assumptis, Romanorum aciem ceciderunt.

  [27] At the battle of Cannae, Hannibal, having drawn up his line of battle, ordered six hundred Numidian cavalry to go over to the enemy. To prove their sincerity, these surrendered their swords and shields to our men, and were dispatched to the rear. Then, as soon as the engagement began, drawing out small swords, which they had secreted, and picking up the shield of the fallen, they slaughtered the troops of the Romans.

  [28] Iapydes P. Licinio proconsuli paganos quoque sub specie deditionis obtulerunt, qui recepti et in postrema acie conlocati terga Romanorum ceciderunt.

  [28] Under pretence of surrender, the Iapydes handed over some of their to best men to Publius Licinius, the Roman proconsul. These were received and placed in the last line, whereupon they cut to pieces the Romans who were bringing up the rear.

  [29] Scipio Africanus, cum adversa haberet bina hostium castra, Syphacis et Carthaginiensium, statuit Syphacis, ubi multa incendii alimenta erant, adgredi nocte ignemque inicere, ut ea re Numidas quidem ex suis castris trepidantes caederet, Poenos autem, quos certum erat ad succurrendum sociis procursuros, insidiis dispositis exciperet. Utrumque ex sententia cessit, nam tamquam ad fortuitum incendium sine armis procurrentis adortus cecidit.

  [29] Scipio Africanus, when facing the two hostile camps of Syphax and the Carthaginians, decided to make a night attack on that of Syphax, where there was a large supply of inflammable material, and to set fire to it, in order thus to cut down the Numidians as the army scurried in terror from their camp, and also, by laying ambuscades, to catch the Carthaginians, who, he knew, would rush forward to assist their allies. Both plans succeeded. For when the enemy rushed forward unarmed, thinking the conflagration accidental, Scipio fell upon them and cut them to pieces.

  [30] Mithridates, a Lucullo virtute frequenter superatus, insidiis eum appetiit, Adathante quodam eminente viribus subornato, ut transfugeret et fide parta hosti facinus perpetraret; quod is strenue quidem, sed sine eventu conatus est. Receptus enim a Lucullo in gregem equitum non sine tacita custodia habitus est, quia nec credi subito transfugae nec inhiberi reliquos oportebat. Cum deinde frequentibus excursionibus promptam et enixam operam exhiberet, fide acquisita tempus elegit, quo missa principia quietem omnibus castrensibus dabant praetoriumque secretius praestabant. Casus adiuvit Lucullum. Nam qui ad vigilantem usque admitteretur, fatigatum nocturnis cogitationibus illo tempore quiescentem invenit. Cum deinde, tamquam nuntiaturus subitum aliquid ac necessarium, intrare vellet et pertinaciter a servis valetudini domini consulentibus excluderetur, veritus, ne suspectus esset, equis quos ante portam paratos habebat ad Mithridatem refugit irritus.

  [30] Mithridates, after repeated defeats in battle at the hands of Lucullus, made an attempt against his life by treachery, hiring a certain Adathas, a man of extraordinary strength, to desert and to perpetrate the deed, so soon as he should gain the confidence of the enemy. This plan the deserter did his best to execute, but his efforts failed. For, though admitted by Lucullus to the cavalry troop, he was quietly kept under surveillance, since it was neither well to put trust at once in a deserter, nor to prevent other deserters from coming. After this fellow had exhibited a ready and earnest devotion on repeated raids, and had won confidence, he chose a time when the dismissal of the staff-officers brought with it repose throughout the camp, and caused the general’s headquarters to be less frequented. Chance favoured Lucullus; for whereas the deserter expected to find Lucullus awake, in which case he would have been at once admitted to his presence, he actually found him at that time fast asleep, exhausted with revolving plans in his mind the night before. Then when Adathas pleaded to be admitted, on the ground that he had an unexpected and imperative message to deliver, he was kept out by the determined efforts of the slaves, who were concerned for their master’s health. Fearing consequently that he was an object of suspicion, he mounted the horse which he held in readiness outside the gate, and fled to Mithridates without accomplishing his purpose.

  [31] Sertorius in Hispania, cum apud Lauronem oppidum vicina castra Pompei castris haberet et duae tantummodo regiones essent, ex quibus pabulum peti posset, una in propinquo, altera longius sita, eam quae in propinquo erat subinde a levi armatura infestari, ulteriorem autem vetuit ab ullo armato adiri, donec persuasit adversariis, tutiorem esse quae erat remotior. Quam cum petissent Pompeiani, Octavium Graecinium cum decem cohortibus in morem Romanorum armatis et decem Hispanorum levis armaturae et Tarquitium Priscum cum duobus milibus equitum ire iubet ad insidias tendendas pabulatoribus. Illi strenue imperata faciunt. Explorata enim locorum natura, in vicina silva nocte praedictas copias abscondunt ita, ut in prima parte leves Hispanos, aptissimos ad furta bellorum, ponerent, paulo interius scutatos, in remotissimo equites, ne fremitu eorum cogitata proderentur; quiescere omnes silentio servato in horam tertiam diei iubent. Cum deinde Pompeiani securi oneratique pabulo de reditu cogitarent et hi quoque, qui in statione fuerant, quiete invitati ad pabulum colligendum dilaberentur, emissi primum Hispani velocitate gentili in palantes effunduntur et convulnerant confunduntque nihil tale exspectantes. Prius deinde quam resisti his inciperet, scutati erumpunt e saltu et redeuntes in ordinem consternant avertuntque; fugientibus equites immissi toto eos spatio, quo rediebatur in castra, persecuti caedunt. Curatum quoque, ne quis effugeret, nam reliqui CCL equites praemissi facile per compendia itinerum effusis habenis, antequam ad castra Pompei perveniretur, conversi occurrerunt eis, qui primi fugerant. Ad cuius rei sensum Pompeio emittente legionem cum D. Laelio in praesidium suorum, subducti in dextrum latus velut cesserunt equites, deinde circumita legione hanc quoque a tergo infestaverunt, cum iam et a fronte qui pabulatores persecuti erant incursarent; sic legio quoque inter duas acies hostium cum legato suo elisa est. Ad cuius praesidium Pompeio totum educente exercitum, Sertorius quoque e collibus suos instructos ostendit effecitque, ne Pompeius expediret; ita praeter duplex damnum, eadem sollertia illatum, spectatorem quoque eum cladis suorum continuit. Hoc primum proelium inter Sertorium et Pompeium fuit; X milia hominum de Pompei exercitu amissa et omnia impedimenta Livius auctor est.

  [31] When Sertorius was encamped next to Pompey near the town of Lauron in Spain, there were only two tracts from which forage could be gathered, one near by, the other farther off. Sertorius gave orders that the one near by should be continually raided by light-armed troops, but that remoter one should not be visited by any troops. Thus, he finally convinced his adversaries that the more distant tract was safer. When, on one occasion, Pompey’s troops had gone to this region, Sertorius ordered Octavius Graecinus, with ten cohorts armed after the Roman fashion, and ten cohorts of light-armed Spaniards along with Tarquinius Priscus and two thousand cavalry, set forth to lay an ambush against the foragers. These men executed their instructions with energy; for after examining the ground, they hid the above-mentioned forces by night in a neighbouring wood, posting the light-armed Spaniards in front, as best suited to stealthy warfare, the shield-bearing soldiers a little further back, and the cavalry in the rear, in order that the plan might not be betrayed by the neighing of the horses. Then they ordered all to repose in silence till the third hour of the following day. When Pompey’s men, entertaining no suspicion and loaded down with forage, thought of returning, and those who had been on guard, lured on by the situation, were slipping away to forage, suddenly the Spaniards, darting out with the swiftness characteristic of their race, poured forth upon the stragglers, inflicted many wounds upon them, and put them to rout, to their great amazement. Then, before resistance to this first assault could be organised, the shield-bearing troops, bursting forth from the forest, overthrew and routed the Romans who were returning to the ranks, while the cavalry, dispatched after those in flight, followed them all the way back to the camp, cutting them to pieces. Pro
vision was also made that no one should escape. For two hundred and fifty reserve horsemen, sent ahead for the purpose, found it a simple matter to race forward by short cuts, and then to turn back and meet those who had first fled, before they reached Pompey’s camp. On learning of this, Pompey sent out a legion under Decimus Laelius to reinforce his men, whereupon the cavalry of the enemy, withdrawing to the right flank, pretended to give way, and then, passing round the legion, assaulted it from the rear, while those who had followed up the foragers attacked it from the front also. Thus the legion with its commander was crushed between the two lines of the enemy. When Pompey led out his entire army to help the legion, Sertorius exhibited his forces drawn up on the hillside, and thus baulked Pompey’s purpose. Thus, in addition to inflicting a twofold disaster, as a result of the same strategy, Sertorius forced Pompey to be the helpless witness of the destruction of his own troops. This was the first battle between Sertorius and Pompey. According to Livy, ten thousand men were lost in Pompey’s army, along with the entire transport.

  [32] Pompeius in Hispania, dispositis ante qui ex occulto adgrederentur, simulato metu deduxit instantem hostem in loca insessa; deinde, ubi res poposcit, conversus et in fronte et utrisque lateribus ad internicionem cecidit, capto etiam duce eorum Perperna.

  [32] Pompey, when warring in Spain, having first posted troops here and there to attack from ambush, by feigning fear, drew the enemy on in pursuit, till they reached the place of the ambuscade. Then when the opportune moment arrived, wheeling about, he slaughtered the foe in front and on both flanks, and likewise captured their general, Perperna.

  [33] Idem adversus Mithridatem in Armenia, numero et genere equitum praevalentem, tria milia levis armaturae et D equites nocte in valle sub virgultis, quae inter bina castra erant, disposuit, prima deinde luce in stationem hostium emisit equites ita formatos, ut, cum universus cum exercitu hostium equitatus proelium inisset, servatis ordinibus paulatim cederent, donec spatium darent consurgendi a tergo ob hoc dispositis. Quod postquam ex sententia contigit, conversis qui terga dedisse videbantur, medium hostem trepidantem cecidit, ipsos etiam equos pedite comminus accedente confodit. Eoque proelio fiduciam regi, quam in equestribus copiis habebat, detraxit.

  [33] The same Pompey, in Armenia, when Mithridates was superior to him in the number and quality of his cavalry, stationed three thousand light-armed men and five hundred cavalry by night in a valley under cover of bushes lying between the two camps. Then at daybreak he sent forth his cavalry against the position of the enemy, planning that, as soon as the full force of the enemy, cavalry and infantry, became engaged in battle, the Romans should gradually fall back, still keeping ranks, until they should afford room to those who had been stationed for the purpose of attacking from the rear to arise and do so. When this design turned out successfully, those who had seemed to flee turned about, enabling Pompey to cut to pieces the enemy thus caught in panic between his two lines. Our infantry also, engaging in hand-to-hand encounter, stabbed the horses of the enemy. That battle destroyed the faith which the king had reposed in his cavalry.

  [34] Crassus bello fugitivorum apud Cantennam bina castra comminus cum hostium castris vallavit. Nocte deinde commotis copiis, manente praetorio in maioribus castris, ut fallerentur hostes, ipse omnes copias eduxit et in radicibus praedicti montis constituit; divisoque equitatu praecepit L. Quintio, partem Spartaco obiceret pugnaque eum frustraretur, parte alia Gallos Germanosque ex factione Casti et Cannici eliceret ad pugnam et fuga simulata deduceret, ubi ipse aciem instruxerat. Quos cum barbari insecuti essent, equite recedente in cornua, subito acies Romana adaperta cum clamore procurrit. XXXV milia armatorum eo proelio interfecta cum ipsis ducibus Livius tradit, receptas quinque Romanas aquilas, signa sex et XX, multa spolia, inter quae quinque fasces cum securibus.

  [34] In the Slave War, Crassus fortified two camps close beside the camp of the enemy, near Mt. Cantenna. Then, one night, he moved his forces, leading them all out and posting them at the base of the mountain above mentioned, leaving his headquarters tent in the larger camp in order to deceive the enemy. Dividing the cavalry into two detachments, he directed Lucius Quintius to oppose Spartacus with one division and fool him with a mock encounter; with the other to lure to combat the Germans and Gauls, of the faction of Castus and Cannicus, and, by feigning flight, to draw them on to the spot where Crassus himself had drawn up his troops in battle array. When the barbarians followed, the cavalry fell back to the flanks, and suddenly the Roman force disclosed itself and rushed forward with a shout. In that battle Livy tells us that thirty-five thousand armed men, with their commanders, were slain; five Roman eagles and twenty-six standards were recaptured, along with much other booty, including five sets of rods and axes.

  [35] C. Cassius in Syria adversus Parthos ducemque Osacen equitem ostendit a fronte, cum a tergo peditem in confragoso loco occultasset. Dein cedente equitatu et per nota se recipiente, in praeparatas insidias perduxit exercitum Parthorum et cecidit.

  [35] Gaius Cassius, when fighting in Syria against the Parthians and their leader Osaces, exhibited only cavalry in front, but had posted infantry in hiding on rough ground in the rear. Then, when his cavalry fell back and retreated over familiar roads, he drew the army of the Parthians into the ambush prepared for them and cut them to pieces.

  [36] Ventidius Parthos et Labienum, alacres successibus victoriarum, dum suos ipse per simulationem metus continet, evocavit et in loca iniqua deductos adgressus per obreptionem adeo debellavit, ut destituto Labieno provincia excederent Parthi.

  [36] Ventidius, keeping his own men in camp on pretence of fear, caused the Parthians and Labienus, who were elated with victorious successes, to come out for battle. Having lured them into an unfavourable situation, he attacked them by surprise and so overwhelmed them that the Parthians refused to follow Labienus and evacuated the province.

  [37] Idem adversus Pharnastanis Parthos, cum ipse exiguum numerum militum haberet, illis autem fiduciam ex multitudine videret increscere, ad latus castrorum XVIII cohortes in obscura valle posuit, equitatu post terga peditum conlocato. Tum paucos admodum milites in hostem misit; qui ubi simulata fuga hostem effuse sequentem ultra locum insidiarum perduxere, coorta a latere acie praecipitatos in fugam, in his Pharnastanem, interfecit.

  [37] The same Ventidius, having himself only a small force available for use against the Parthians under Pharnastanes, but observing that the confidence of the enemy was growing in consequence of their numbers, posted eighteen cohorts at the side of the camp in a hidden valley, with cavalry stationed behind the infantry. Then he sent a very small detachment against the enemy. When these by feigning flight had drawn the enemy in hot pursuit beyond the place of ambush, the force at the side rose up, whereupon Ventidius drove the Parthians in precipitate flight and slaughtered them, Pharnastanes among them.

  [38] C. Caesar, suis et Afranii castris contrarias tenentibus planitias, cum utriusque partis plurimum interesset colles proximos occupare idque propter saxorum asperitatem esset difficile, tamquam Ilerdam repetiturum retro agmen ordinavit, faciente inopia fidem destinationi. Intra brevissimum deinde spatium exiguo circuitu flexit repente ad montis occupandos. Quo visu perturbati Afraniani velut captis castris et ipsi effuso cursu eosdem montes petiere. Quod futurum cum praedivinasset Caesar, partim peditatu quem praemiserat, partim a tergo summissis equitibus inordinatos est adortus.

  [38] On one occasion when the camps of Gaius Caesar and Afranius were pitched in opposite plains, it was the special ambition of each side to secure possession of the neighbouring hills — a task of extreme difficulty on account of the jagged rocks. In these circumstances, Caesar marshalled his army as though to march back again to Ilerda, a move supported by his deficiency of supplies. Then, within a short time, making a small detour, he suddenly started to seize the hills. The followers of Afranius, alarmed at sight of this, just as though their camp had been captured, started out themselves at top speed to gain the same hills. Caesar, having forecast this turn of affairs, fell upon Afrani
us’s men, before they could form — partly with infantry, which he had sent ahead, partly with cavalry sent up in the rear.

  [39] Antonius apud Forum Gallorum, cum Pansam consulem adventare comperisset, insidiis per silvestria Aemiliae viae dispositis agmen eius excepit fuditque et ipsum eo vulnere affecit, quo intra paucos dies exanimaretur.

  [39] Antonius, near Forum Gallorum, having heard that the consul Pansa was approaching, met his army by means of ambuscades, set here and there in the woodland stretches along the Aemilian Way, thus routing his troops and inflicting on Pansa himself a wound from which he died in a few days.

  [40] Iuba rex in Africa bello civili Curionis animum simulato regressu impulit in vanam alacritatem; cuius spei vanitate deceptus Curio, dum tamquam fugientem Sabboram regium praefectum persequitur, devenit in patentes campos, ubi Numidarum circumventus equitatu, perdito exercitu, cecidit.

  [40] Juba, king in Africa at the time of the Civil War, by feigning a retirement, once roused unwarranted elation in the heart of Curio. Under the influence of this mistaken hope, Curio, pursuing Sabboras, the king’s general, who, he thought, was in flight, came to open plains, where, surrounded by the cavalry of the Numidians, he lost his army and perished himself.

  [41] Melanthus, dux Atheniensium, cum provocatus a rege hostium Xantho Boeotio descendisset ad pugnam, ut primum comminus stetit, “inique”, inquit, “Xanthe, et contra pactum facis; adversus solum enim cum altero processisti.” Cumque admiratus ille, quisnam se comitaretur, respexisset, aversum uno ictu confecit.