Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756
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The Scots Granadeers once forgot their Pouder and Ball in the Enemies Trench: Their Lieut. called Mackrackan, endeavoured to recover and regain it, but in vain, which perceiving; he threw three or four Granades with his own hand to set it a fire before it should fall in the Enemies hands, to the great danger of his life.97
He also made a reference to ‘Gentlemen of the Pouch’: ‘This is a most useful Officer in an Army, and ’tis requisite he be stout also, otherwise they may want Powder, and Ball when they have most to do.’ He also referred to ‘Powder-monckies’.98
From this evidence it is possible to make some tentative proposals about how the resupplying of ammunition was being managed on the battlefield. As also suggested by instances from the English Civil Wars of musketeers accidently blowing up powder barrels, it would seem that it was normal practice for units to carry into battle a supply of loose powder and musket balls. It would have to be loose powder in order to be able to refill the individual charges on a bandoleer. How this was done was suggested in the Earl of Newcastle’s drill manual of 1642 when it said: ‘A measured charge shall be given to every Musketier that holds just so much powder as halfe the bullet weighes at ten bullets in the pound, to fill their Bandaliers withal.’99 This ammunition may have been carried in small barrels or leather pouches, hence the ‘Gentlemen of the Pouch’ at Tangiers. Monck wrote in 1646 that, in addition to a bandoleer with powder and musket balls, ‘each musqueteer ought to have twelve Bullets a-piece in their pockets; and each company must carry with them a Powder-Bag full of Powder.’100 It seems that this supply was set down on the ground during combat, either to facilitate distribution or so that the carriers could fight. One thing is certain: the weight of powder and ball for a single bandoleer amounts to one and a half pounds. To supply, for example, a company of sixty musketeers with refills for their bandoleers just once required thirty pounds of powder and sixty pounds of musket balls. This was a not-inconsiderable weight to man-handle around a battle field. It is not possible, on this limited evidence, to say exactly how ammunition resupply was being managed or that this reflects anything other than the practice in Tangiers in the 1680s. However, it does begin to offer a possible answer to the question of ammunition resupply to musketeers using bandoleers rather than cartridges, which were already beginning to come in to use. The cavalry had used them for their firearms since the 1630s and Orrery was a champion of their use.101
During the English Civil War a particularly aggressive way of fighting based upon the close-range delivery of overwhelming firepower followed by an immediate advance to hand-to-hand combat was developed in England and Scotland and used by all protagonists. This was not something found in the drill books and although it was similar to the Swedish salvee developed by Gustavus Adolphus there were important differences, primarily in the manner of its application. The Swedes used this as a part of their fire tactics and with limited application.102 In contrast English and Scots infantry would frequently, even habitually, fight in this manner. Given the widespread availability of information about Swedish tactics it is possible that this represents a uniquely British development of the use of the Swedish salvee, but the manner of that development and its adoption right across the British Isles is unknown. This development occurred in isolation and was not matched by any similar development in Europe where the application of this way of fighting achieved dramatic results. In 1685 the adoption of a French firing system resulted in the loss of the ability to concentrate the firepower of a whole battalion into a single volley, thereby making it impossible to continue to rely upon the aggressive application of firepower as a key element of battlefield doctrine. This retrograde position was, however, short lived. In 1688 the Glorious Revolution placed the English and Scottish armies firmly under the influence of Holland when the French ways were swept aside and replaced by the latest Dutch practice, and in particular the recently developed platoon firing.
Chapter 3
The Origins of Platoon Firing and its Introduction into the English and Scots Armies
From the late seventeenth century and into the middle of the eighteenth century the method employed by British infantry to deliver its firepower was platoon firing, which was a major factor in British success on the battlefield. Its introduction from the Dutch Army to the British Army certainly followed the Glorious Revolution of 1688 when William III and Queen Mary succeeded the deposed James II.1 It has, however, been far from clear until now what the origins were of platoon firing, just when and how the English and Scottish armies adopted it (for they were still two separate establishments), and precisely what form it first took.
It is generally accepted that the introduction of platoon firing to British troops took place in Flanders in 1689 when Marlborough took a contingent of the army there to join William’s Dutch Army.2 But there has been no explanation of how platoon firing came to be in use throughout the English and Scottish armies and not just that part in Flanders. Furthermore, no historian has yet identified just how platoon firing was first carried out by the English and Scots armies. The most commonly given description of platoon firing is based on Kane’s instructions in his Discipline for a Regiment of Foot.3 This formed part of Kane’s book Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne; From 1689 to 1712, which was not published until 1745, after Kane’s death, and his version of platoon firing is clearly of a later date than 1689. Most obviously it contains no reference to pikemen, then still an integral part of infantry regiments. Furthermore the full title for this section of Kane’s book is A New System of Military Discipline for a Battalion of Foot on Action and the introduction states that Kane wrote it because he considered other military manuals available to be inadequate. He was writing what he considered to be contemporary best practice for the period after 1712 and before 1736, when he died, and not describing the practice of some twenty-five years or more earlier.
The questions about the origins and first form of platoon firing have remained unanswered for some time. In seeking to establish the origins of platoon firing the French writer Le Blond wrote in 1758: ‘Platoon fire, introduced in France as part of the 6 May 1755 Ordinance, was a well established practice by the Dutch; there is some evidence that they can be credited with the original idea and that it was they who introduced the practice to the other European nationswho adopted the practice.’4
More recently Chandler wrote: ‘It is almost impossible to trace the real origins of the platoon firing system with any certainty.’5 However, as well as crediting the Dutch as the originators of platoon firing Chandler also records the suggestion made by some that platoon firing actually originated with the Swedes under their king, Gustavus Adolphus, in the 1630s.6 It is now possible to give an account of the introduction of platoon firing into the English and Scottish armies, and identify and describe its original form as practiced in 1689.
There are three elements that when combined give platoon firing its unique character and distinguish it from any other fire-delivery system. First, the infantry were organised into platoons, a tactical sub-unit of a larger battalion or regiment that did not necessarily correspond to any other sub-unit, such as the company. Second, the soldiers were drawn up in three ranks, later reduced to two ranks, and all the ranks fired together. Third, the platoons were drawn up in a line and fired in turn along the line according to a preordained pattern, which ensured that a part of the line was always loaded and ready to fire.
Two of these elements – the platoon as a sub-unit of infantry formations and putting musketeers into three ranks rather than the more usual six – were well known before the start of the English Civil War in 1642. Both practices originated in the Swedish Army under Gustavus Adolphus and were described in some detail by the professional Scottish soldier Robert Monro, who served in the Swedish Army from 1630 to 1634.7 He described the organisation of the infantry into brigades with the musketeers in platoons or, as he writes, ‘Plottons’, of forty-eight men in eight ‘rots’ or files, each of six men, that is with each plot
ton having six ranks, see figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Diagram of a Swedish Brigade from an illustration in Barriffe based on Monro’s description.
Source: William Barriffe, Militarie Discipline or The Young Artilery-Man (London, 1661, 6th edition), pp. 172–3; Brockington, Monro, pp. 316–17. William Barriffe’s Militarie Discipline was first published in 1635, but without the information about Swedish formations, which first appears in the second edition of 1639.
Monro then described the process for firing three ranks together in what he called a ‘salve’ and later became known as a salvee or volley.
When you would command the body of your musketiers to give fire in a salve, as is ordinarie in Battell, before an enemy joyne, or against Horsemen; then you command the bringers up or Reare to double the Front to the right hand, and to make readie, having the match cocked and their pannes well guarded, having closed the three Rancks, though not the Files, the Officers standing in equall Front with the foremost Rancke, betwixt two Divisions, he commands to give fire, one Salve, two or three, and having charged againe, and shouldered their Armes, they retire to the left hand againe, every man falling behind his owne Leader.8
In this manoeuvre the rear three men in each file marched forward and placed themselves alongside the front three, either to their left or, as described by Monro, to their right. This three-deep formation was shallow enough for all three ranks to fire together, with the front rank kneeling, the second stooping and the third standing upright.9 After firing as many salvees as required the men from the rear could march back to their original positions, bringing the plotton back to six ranks.
The Swedish Intelligencer, published in London, described the effect of this form of firing at the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631:
The Scots ordering themselves in sevrall small battagliaes, about 6 or 700 in a body, presently now double their rankes, making their files then but 3 deepe (the discipline of the King of Sweden being, never to march above 6 deepe) this done, the foremost rancke falling on their knees; the second stooping forward; and the third rancke standing up; and all giving fire together, they powred so much lead at one instant in amongst the enemies horse, that their ranckes were much broken with it.10
Its use against infantry at Breitenfeld has already been described.11
This practice was deliberately spread to other armies allied to Sweden. On 9 May 1632 at Munich Gustavus Adolphus:
Held a generall Muster before the City: himself (to shew some content to the Bavarians) drilling and exercising his souldiers: teaching them especially how to give a Charge or Salvee; some upon their knees, other behind them stooping forward; and the hindmost ranke standing upright, and all to give fire at once, the hinder man over his foremans shoulder.12
Monro’s service with the Swedish Army ended in 1634 when his regiment was destroyed at the battle of Nordlingen while he was in Scotland recruiting.13 Two years earlier, in 1632, Sir James Turner had joined the Swedish Army and served briefly under Gustavus Adolphus who was killed that year at the battle of Lützen.14
In Pallas Armata (written in 1670–1) Turner gave a slightly different account of the Swedish use of musketeers. He also gave a description of the ‘Swedish Brigade’ and, referring to the gaps between the three blocks of pikemen as being like sally ports, described how the musketeers would sally out from behind the central pike block.
There were two passage like sally ports between the reer of the advanced Body of Pikes, and the two Batallions that staid behind, out of one whereof on the right hand issued constantly one or two more hundreds of Musqueteers, who before all the three Bodies of Pikes gave incessantly fire upon the Enemy, and when the word or sign for a Retreat was given, they retir’d by the other passage on the left hand, back to the great Body of Musqueteers, where so many of them as came back unwounded, were presently put into rank and file, the fire continuing without intermission by Musqueteers, who still sallied through the passage on the right hand; and it is to be observed that the firemen fought thus in small Bodies, each of them not above five files of Musqueteers, and these for the most part but three deep.15
There is, however, no suggestion of any pattern to this fire. Turner’s description also varies from Monro and others in that he has all the musketeers formed behind the blocks of pikemen and none flanking the pikes as in figure 3.1.
While two of the requirements for platoon firing, the use of platoons and firing in three ranks, can be attributed to the Swedish Army under Gustavus Adolphus, the third element, a line of platoons firing in a set pattern, is absent. Furthermore, after the death of Gustavus Adolphus the Swedish Brigade disappeared from use.16 Despite its success under Gustavus Adolphus it was complex and demanded a high degree of training and discipline. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the rest of Europe had gradually adopted the simpler linear deployment of infantry developed by Maurice of Nassau at the end of the sixteenth century and which, by the middle of the century, had become the norm.
The depth of infantry units had gradually decreased from the beginning of the century, when the tactics developed by Maurice of Nassau employed ten ranks, to the middle of the century when six ranks was the rule. The number of ranks was dictated by the length of time it took to reload a musket. As Turner discusses, initially ten ranks were required to keep up a sustained fire from a unit because it took as long for one rank to reload as it did for the other nine to come successively to the front and fire in their turn.17 As muskets were lightened and improved and loading was speeded up it became possible to reduce the depth to five or six ranks, but not to have less than that, let alone as few as three ranks. Turner states specifically that firing one rank at a time in three ranks does not give the first rank time to reload before the third has fired.18 As for firing in three ranks all together, the military writers of the first half of the seventeenth century are consistent in their reservations about this, which is that it leaves a unit open to attack before it can reload. Consequently they considered that it was only to be used in extremis, such as against a cavalry attack when firepower must be maximised to stop it or immediately before charging home against an enemy. Monro wrote that its use was ‘ordinarie in Battell, before an enemy joyne, or against Horsemen’.19 For all other occasions he says that firing by ranks is ‘the forme that I esteeme to be the best’.20 Thus, while the devastating effect of a three-rank volley was well known, the circumstances under which it could be employed were considered to be severely limited. For example, the description given above from the Swedish Intelligencer is of the effect of firing in three ranks against a cavalry attack at Breitenfeld.
Monro and Elton, although writing some twenty years apart, both described units of musketeers, six ranks deep, firing two ranks at a time – that is, in three volleys.21 This would seem to be at odds with Turner’s statement that three ranks could not reload fast enough to keep up a sustained fire. However, sustained fire was not always the objective. When Monro describes each pair of ranks advancing ten paces in front of the unit before firing, he is describing attacking an enemy, ‘ever advancing to an enemie, never turning backe without deathe or victorie’.22 Under those circumstances it would seem that a brief period of a high rate of fire was preferable to slower sustained fire. Elton also described firing the six ranks in two lots of three, which also would not allow enough time to reload in order to keep up a constant fire, but he also described firing one rank at a time, which would.23
Orrery, in his Treatise of the Art of War published in 1677, also discussed the number of ranks and the rate of fire.24 Based on his own experience, he recommended fighting in four ranks, whilst acknowledging that the idea would not be readily accepted.
The chief objection that I know of, is, as to the Musketeers, who being but four deep, and advancing firing, the first Rank cannot have loaded their Muskets again, by that time the fourth Rank has done firing; so that there will be an intermission of shooting. To that I answer, Let the Musketeers Charge their Muskets with suc
h Cartridges as I have mentioned, and the first Rank will be as soone ready if you are but four deep, as the first Rank will be if you are six deep, loading with Bandeleers, especially if I use the Fire-lock, and the Enemy the Match-lock.
What Orrery was saying was that musketeers with cartridges and firelocks could reload in two-thirds of the time that it took musketeers with matchlocks and bandoleers. Thus, a unit in four ranks could deliver fire from a rank just as often as one in six ranks. Given two units of the same size, the unit in four ranks would also have half as many men again in each rank as the unit in six ranks, thus firing half as many shots again from each rank. What four ranks could not do, however, was all fire at once, which was only possible with three ranks.
The cartridge had the advantage over the bandoleer that the powder for loading the musket and the ball were both contained in a roll of paper, the cartridge. The musketeer simply bit open the cartridge at the end opposite the ball and poured the powder down the barrel, followed by the paper and ball. Initially the musket was still primed from a separate flask. The advantages were spelt out by Orrery who was ‘a great approver of Boxes of Cartridges; for then, but by biting off the bottom of the Cartridge, you charge your Musket for service with one Ramming’.25 As for the firelock he gave a whole list of reasons for its superiority over the matchlock.26