Two important points are apparent in this account. First, the Dutch infantry let the French cavalry come very close before firing, and second, it became sufficient for the infantry to threaten to fire for the French cavalry to retreat, such was the effectiveness of their close-range fire.
Another account tells the same story and adds that the French infantry were just as intimidated by the Dutch firepower as the cavalry: ‘So that the enemy, by their [Dutch] close and punctual Fire were so often Galled and Shattered they knew not what to do; the French Infantry could not so much as dare look them in the face.’17 In all three of the preceding examples the infantry concerned behaved in complete accordance with Mackay’s Rules.
Chandler comments that ‘at the battle of Fleurus, it was widely noted that several German battalions using firearms alone had proved capable of repulsing French cavalry more effectively than others armed with the conventional number of pikes.’18 William III’s army contained troops of many nationalities in addition to English, Scots and Dutch. There were troops from many German states, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Brandenburg Prussia. The Prussian infantry were taught platoon firing in the autumn of 1688.19 It would seem reasonable to suggest that the troops from other nations were at least aware of platoon firing even if they did not adopt it or stick with it. For example, according to Nosworthy the Swedish army under Charles XII employed a tactic from 1701 called ‘ga-pa’, literally ‘go on’. In this they advanced in four ranks and at fifty paces the rear two ranks fired a volley. The advance then resumed with the front two ranks firing at point-blank range before charging home.20
Although the examples of the Boyne and Fleurus gave ample evidence of the effectiveness of platoon firing on these occasions the main protagonists were Dutch infantry. English and Scots regiments also made their presence felt in the war and clearly took to platoon firing, which they combined with their previous propensity for getting close to the enemy before firing. In 1689, the same year as Killiekrankie, at the battle of Walcourt one English battalion in particular distinguished itself. The French launched an attack that surprised the allied army under the command of Field Marshal von Waldeck while a large portion of it was foraging in the surrounding countryside. They were protected by the single English battalion of Colonel Hodges. The French attack was led by cavalry and began at about nine o’clock in the morning. The London Gazette carried the following graphic account:
Col. Hodges lined some convenient Hedges, and kept Firing upon them [the French cavalry] till between 10 and 11, in which time most of the Foragers were gone home. The French brought Dragoons and Foot to force Hodges from his Post, who thereupon retired to a Mill, which he maintained till he received Orders to retreat, which he did with extraordinary Bravery, still firing upon the Enemy, till he came about twelve a clock near to a little Town called Walcourt, a Mile from our Camp, and the Pass to it; where we had a Regiment of Lunenburgers, who fired very thick upon the French: so with the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Graham, Captain Davison mortally wounded, and about 30 Men killed, Col. Hodges returned to the Camp.21
This action and the actions of British troops in the ensuing battle earned nothing but praise, von Waldeck expressing surprise: ‘Mons. The Colonel Hotzes [Hodges] and the English, who are with him, have accomplished miracles, and I would never have believed so many of the English would show such a joie de combattre.’22 Although it is not explicitly stated that Hodges’ battalion was using platoon fire it is unlikely they were using anything else, given its official status.
At the battle of Steenkirk in 1692 it was William’s infantry who were on the offensive and the French who had the benefit of hedges. The battle was something of a disaster as William was unable to properly support the English infantry who led the attack on the French; the result was that despite their success the battle was a bloody defeat. The English infantry, however, further enhanced its reputation and demonstrated that they were still perfectly capable of closing with the enemy to make their musket fire tell. D’Auvergne described how:
Sir Robert Douglass, with his first Battalion, charg’d several of the Enemies, and beat them from three several Hedges, and had made himself Master of the fourth, where going through a Gap to get on the other side, he was unfortunately kill’d upon the spot; all the other Regiments performing equal wonder, and behaving with the same Bravery, and beating the Enemies from their Hedges so far, that in this Hedge-fighting their fire was generally Muzzle to Muzzle, we on the one side, and the Enemy on the other.23
Close-range fire was again being employed, this time offensively. The British infantry were closing with the French, who were protected by hedges, successfully engaging them at extremely close range and forcing them to retreat. The example of the Earl of Bath’s regiment has already been given, but includes the detail that the French fire was deliberately ignored in order to get close.24
The infantry also demonstrated a considerable amount of discipline and fire control in the subsequent withdrawal.
The night drawing on, the King order’d the Army to retreat, which was done with admirable Order; for tho’ the French did follow us for some time, yet they did not fire a shot, such was the order of our Retreat that they did not dare venture upon it; the English Grenadiers brought up the Rear, and whenever the French mov’d towards us, they fac’d to the Right about, and presented themselves to the Enemy; then the Enemy would halt, and so our Rear-Guard then march’d on; this halting and facing, and then marching, continu’d for some time.25
Again, this passage shows a close adherence to Mackay’s Rules, presenting muskets as if intending to fire, and that although the British were retreating the French were sufficiently wary of their fire capabilities that they kept their distance.
The increased firepower generated by platoon firing combined with the introduction of the socket bayonet meant that there was no longer a need for pikemen and over the course of the Nine Years War they were gradually reduced in numbers. Childs has suggested that the ratio of muskets to pikes increased from 2:1 in 1689 to 3:1 by 1697.26 Certainly by 1702 it would seem that the intention was that infantry regiments should have given up their pikes. Six regiments of infantry going to Ireland in June 1702 all received the same instruction: ‘Her Majesty’s pleasure is that all pikes already issued to the Regiment of Foot under your command be returned to the Stores of Ordnance, in lieu of a sufficient number of muskets which you are to receive out of the said stores.’27
The way that infantry fought and carried out platoon firing at the start of this period was clear from Mackay’s Rules. The disappearance of pikes, however, gives rise to the question of how regimental organisation and the management of platoon firing were consequently affected. Brigadier-General Douglass’ manuscript military manual, Schola Martis, contained very detailed directions on drill and platoon firing by battalions without pikes.28 The difficulty is that the manual was obviously written at some time after 1714 and there was no date given for when the drill described was in use during the twenty-six-year period covered by the title.
Douglass’s drill is certainly later in date than Mackay’s. When Mackay’s Rules of War appeared it was published as part of The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions.29 In this the drill for musketeers, individually and as part of a battalion, was using the matchlock musket. The drill for the firelock musket was given as a separate section. There was also pike drill. In Douglass’s manuscript battalions were completely armed with firelock muskets and socket bayonets. There was no mention of matchlocks and he used the phrase ‘since the pikes were out of use’, which indicates a date for the drill after the end of the Nine Years War.30 He also had each company making a platoon, which echoed Mackay.31 As will be shown, by 1708 it had become the practice in the British Army to divide battalions into fifteen platoons, regardless of the company organisation, which places Douglass’s drill before that date. That is if it was a British drill and not a Dutch one. Prior to 1701 Douglass had been serving in Holland wi
th the Scots Guards, but was then appointed lieutenant colonel of Aeneas Mackay’s regiment of the Scottish Brigade in Dutch service.32 As will be shown, the Dutch method of platoon firing remained much as Douglass described it up to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1714. He also included in his manuscript various ‘evolutions’ or drill manoeuvres that were abandoned in 1708 by the British Army. If he was writing a Dutch manual it could have been reflecting their practice for anytime from 1700 up to 1714, but it would not be unreasonable to expect a Dutch manual to have been written in Dutch. Perhaps most tellingly, however, he described how to salute the king. This must be a reference to William III, who died in March 1702 and was succeeded by Queen Anne. This evidence points to the turn of the century as the date for when the drill described by Douglass was in use.
As William III was head of both the Dutch Army and the English and Scots Aarmy it is reasonable to assume that the same drill, as described by Douglass, was in use in both armies at that time. This assumption is supported by sections of the manual where Douglass described differences between the Dutch and British organisation of grenadiers and how to allow for that in the drill, so it could be used by either army.33
Douglass’s instruction on firing included details on the order of firing of the platoons:
Let the firing begin from ye two extream plotouns upon ye rigt and left of ye Battallion and so continue sucesivly firing till you end in ye centre . . . But if a continuall fire must be keept as in Battell reqd after ye plotouns have fired they must immediately loadd againe & shoulder till ordered by ye Capt to make ready etc and this is done in addvancing and retearing as well as standing.34
The firing order of the platoons was specified and simple: it was from the flanks to the centre; gone was Mackay’s suggestion of a more complex order of firing.35 In the other respects of reloading immediately and his comment about advancing, retiring and standing he echoed Mackay. Mackay’s suggestions that the best shots be held in reserve and that the grenadier platoons could be hidden behind the flanks of a battalion had also gone, further simplifying the drill.36
Douglass also instructed that the men in each rank were to stand with the files at close order, that was ‘shoulder to shoulder, but so as they can be master of ther Arms’.37 This was closer than specified in the Exercise of the Foot that also contained Mackay’s Rules of War: there the distance between files when firing was given as half a pace.38 This closing up was undoubtedly a result of exchanging the matchlock for the flintlock and had the effect of concentrating a battalion’s fire over a narrower front. Both the Exercise of the Foot and Douglass said the distance between ranks ‘either standing or marching is 4 paces’.39 Although the number of movements required to load and fire a firelock musket was fewer than for a matchlock, the use of just the commands ‘make ready’, ‘present’ and ‘fire’ continued in action. On the order ‘make ready’ the ranks closed, the front knelt, the middle stooped and the rear stood, all cocking their muskets. On ‘present’ they levelled their muskets; then came ‘fire’. After firing, the ranks were to open ‘backwards to 2 paces distance that they may have roum to charge or load ther arms againe without expecting any word of command for ye same’.40
Douglass also included a revised version of Mackay’s Rules that gave an indication of how combat practices had changed over the course of the Nine Years War. In many places Douglass’s Rules used the same wording as Mackay, although elsewhere he improved on their intelligibility and simplified some of them. In general the content of both sets of rules was the same, but there were a few differences. For instance, Douglass made no mention of locking up, instead he reverted to the older method of the second rank stooping to fire over the heads of the kneeling front rank with the third rank standing to fire over the heads of the second rank.41
Douglass also discussed dealing with cavalry in a much simpler, clearer way, while retaining the need for close-range fire and being able to present without firing.
If the battallyon be charged with a body of Cavallry, the commanding officer shall keep up his fire until the horse be very close and then to fire either by rank or plotouns as he thinks proper.42
The Enemy in this case will now and then come briskly up as if they designed to fall in with you, although they doe not designe itt, but only to try what countenance you mak, and in such occurancys the Commanding officers must cause the whole Battallion present without any designe of firing wher with beforehand he is to advertise ye officers, and that will redaly make ye first Rank of ye Squadrons not only stoup but fall in confusion upon those that follow.
And to bring his souldiers to some expertness in this they must be often commanded to present ther Arms and againe recover without firing telling them ye reason for it.43
That this theory was put into practice was seen during the retreat of William’s allied army following its defeat at Landen in 1693.
Lieutenant-General Talmash had the care to bring off the English Foot of the main Body by Dormal, which he did with as much Prudence as he had before fought with Bravery . . . As the Enemy offer’d to trouble his Retreat, he made the Battalions face, and Present to them, and then they halted, unwilling to feel any more the fire of our Foot.44
Clearly the ability to not fire at close range was as important as actually firing.
During the course of the Nine Years War large numbers of new troops were raised, either for new units or to replace casualties, who all needed to be trained quickly.45 Not all units would have had the training and experience of regiments such as the Dutch Blue Guards. As well as demonstrating how the disappearance of pikemen was dealt with, it is also possible that Douglass’s manual represented a simplified version of drill and tactics pared down to the necessary basics in order to avoid confusing newly raised troops. However, it was with this drill and method of platoon firing that the British Army under Marlborough started the War of the Spanish Succession.
A significant difference between the tactical methods of the Nine Years War and those of the English Civil War and the campaigns following the Restoration of 1660 is the apparent abandoning of the infantry assault following close-range fire. Mackay states, and Douglass copies almost word for word: ‘If by a resolute continuance and close fire, the Battalion happen to break the opposite enemy, the Officers must take special care their men do not break after them, but content themselves to make the Granadeers fire amongst them to augment their Terrour and Confusion.’46 This emphasis on beating the enemy by firepower has been seen as indicating an abandonment of the infantry assault. As Chandler writes:
In the 1690s it became rare for infantry to fight hand-to-hand with their opponents, although there were of course notable exceptions such as Steenkirk (1692) where the English and Dutch battalions were divided from the French only by hedgerows. Generally speaking, however, commanders deemed their foot to be a source of more or less static fire-power once they had moved ponderously up into musket range, relying on the wheeling horsemen to decide the ultimate issue.47
Some explanation for the abandonment of the previously highly successful tactic of following a close-range volley with a charge to hand-to-hand combat can be found in Mackay and Douglass. They both drew attention to the importance of not breaking the line to pursue a broken enemy unit in case, as Douglass wrote, ‘you come to be flanked in yt irregular action by troups ye Enemie may have posted betwixt yr lines for that purpose.’48 Mackay used much the same words.49 To close with the enemy to hand-to-hand combat would inevitably leave a battalion in some confusion, making it extremely vulnerable to counter-attack. Thus the infantry chose to rely upon firepower to break an enemy. That they were able to do so was a result of the changes that had taken place since the English Civil War. During the Civil War infantry regiments were not able to generate long-range, sustained fire that was also effective and decisive. On the other hand an infantry regiment that advanced to point-blank range and maximised its fire had little choice but to close to hand to hand immediately after fi
ring. With all its fire delivered in one go and with reloading taking so long, to do otherwise would leave it vulnerable. By contrast a battalion at the end of the century could not only deliver more fire more rapidly at any range, but because of platoon firing it was sustainable fire: there was always some part of it that was firing and thus protecting those parts that were reloading. Furthermore, as suggested by Mackay, the fire of the front rank could be reserved and the battalion would still be able to generate a considerable amount of continuous platoon fire and be protected by the front rank with bayonets fixed.50 As Douglass wrote, and at the same time summed up the different roles of the infantry and the cavalry:
For now, in our modern way of fighting viz: by platouns alternativly firing, it is not aloud ye Infantry to fall in pell mell amongst any troups in confusion, least therby they bring themselves in to ane equall disadvantage an so change the smyles of fortune in to frouns and threats of loss, therfor whatever confusion ye Enemy may be in the Infantry ar not to brake ther Ranks to persheu but ar still to march softly on in full body closing ther files and making up ther Ranks as the men drops, and so re never out of condition of Battalling or Sustaining wher its requied leaving the accomplishment of the victory to ye Cavalry giving no quarters till ye victory is determined.51
Mackay, however, did write about the use of the bayonet:
That such Regiments as are provided of good Bayonets, fixt without the muzzles of their Pieces, may in approaching to the due distance of firing, cause the first rank of the whole Battalion to fix their Bayonets and continuing their march till they be close upon the Enemy, make the first rank kneel with the points of their Bayonets upon the Ground, and the other two Ranks closed up, fire over their heads upon the Enemy, who supposing readily all the fire spent, if he happen to stand it, will come up the bolder to your Battalion, who receiving him with the [fire of the] first Rank, second with the push of pike and Bayonet, will readily break him whether horse or Foot.52
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 8
