Mackay included the need to ‘be close upon the enemy’ before firing, but rather than maximising the infantry’s firepower, held the front-rank fire in reserve in case of a counter-attack, in which case the front rank was to fire and then charge, or present, their bayonets at the same time as the pikemen charged their pikes. It was a description of the bayonet used defensively, just as the pike was, and suggests that the bayonet was seen as an alternative to the defensive qualities of the pike and that its offensive qualities had not yet been recognised.
Douglass omitted any such advice on the use of the bayonet from his version of the Rules, although he did record his role in copying the socket bayonet from the French and comment on its superior qualities as a weapon compared to the plug bayonet.53 Writing of the battles of Fleurus, Steenkirk and Landen, he described how the French socket bayonet was a ‘great advantage’ as it meant the French ‘both push’d and fired at once’ and was ‘a much better defence than our pikes wer’.54 Again the bayonet was clearly seen as a defensive weapon.
Chandler wrote, in a comment later echoed by Nosworthy, ‘many contemporaries spoke with awe of the fury of the initial French fire in action, although its continuity and effectiveness tended to fall off rapidly after the initial discharge.’55 As already discussed, the French fired by ranks, and during the Nine Years War, when they habitually formed five ranks, they could deliver all their fire in two volleys of three and two ranks. Whilst this did result in a very heavy fire it also resulted in reloading problems once all the ranks had fired.56 From contemporary accounts it would also appear that French infantry opened fire at a greater distance than British infantry, allowing the British to get closer to the French, who were presumably busy reloading, before delivering their own, heavy and sustainable platoon firing.
A number of examples of this are available. Although it occurred against Jacobite Irish infantry, Story recorded one instance; ‘As our men advanced up the hill, the Irish fired a whole Volley upon them, and then set up the Huzzah, but scarce killed a Man, (for they shot over them) our Men however went on till they were got within Pistol-shot of them, and then fired, by which they galled the Irish, that they immediately run.’57 It is notable that the Irish are recorded as firing a ‘whole volley’ and no more. Presumably they were trying to reload as the English infantry advanced and then fired within pistol range. The example of the Earl of Bath’s regiment under Sir Bevil Granville has already been given as it ‘marched up to the relief of this Lunenburg Regiment, bearing the enemies fire before he suffered any Platton of his Battalion to discharge once’.58
There is no doubt that the English and Scots continued to deliver their fire at close range. This was clear from the account of the fighting at Steenkirk already quoted and the actions of the English regiments in the victory over the Jacobites at Aughrim in 1691. ‘The Irish at their near approach to the Ditches, fired upon them, but our Men contemning all Disadvantages, advanced immediately to the lowest Hedges, and beat the Irish from thence.’59
Platoon firing was extremely effective in a firefight where both sides sought to overwhelm the other by fire alone and one side, as the French did, chose to fire by ranks in a deep formation. It did not, however, always win the day. At Killiekrankie the Highlanders’ tactic of firing a single volley and then rushing in, sword in hand, allowed them to overwhelm Mackay’s infantry in hand-to-hand combat even though they suffered heavy casualties from the fire of his infantry.60 Similarly at the battle of Fleurus not all the fighting had gone in favour of the Dutch infantry. No less an authority than Maurice de Saxe in his Reveries described how platoon firing could be defeated in a manner not very different from that of the Highlanders at Killiekrankie.
It was an established maxim of M. de Greder, a man of reputation, and who has for a long time, commanded my regiment of foot in France, to make his men carry their firelocks shouldered in an engagement; and in order to be still more master of their fire, he did not even suffer them to make ready their matches: thus he marched against the enemy, and the moment they gave their fire, he threw himself, sword in hand, at the head of the colours, and crying out Follow me! rushed at once upon them. By this method he defeated the Frise guards at the battle of Fleurus, and was also successful on all other occasions.61
In 1693 French infantry under Marshal Catinat in Italy stormed Austrian positions with the bayonet. The effect of these events is summarised by Chandler: ‘Such success, however, encouraged French generals of several generations in the belief that the true métier of the French foot was cold steel – and this assumption led them to disregard the refinements of infantry fire tactics, with what proved to be near-fatal results in the following war.’62
Amongst the French generals who subsequently sustained this belief in cold steel was the Marechal de Saxe, whilst the influential writer Folard also adhered to it.63 ‘French ‘offensive tactics attached little importance to firefights conducted at a distance, every effort being made to approach the enemy and overthrow them with the threat of the bayonet or drawn sword.’64 The French remained content to rely on the bayonet and, despite its drawbacks, their version of firing by ranks. In contrast the British adopted an approach that emphasised firepower.
Although often overshadowed by the War of the Spanish Succession, the Nine Years War represents a pivotal period in the development of the firepower capability of British infantry. During this period the pike disappeared and was replaced by the bayonet, which increased the number of soldiers with muskets by half as many again. The matchlock was replaced by the flintlock, which was more reliable and quicker to load and fire. The speed of loading was further increased by the introduction of the cartridge in place of the bandoleer. The resultant increase in firepower was, at the same time, delivered by means of platoon firing, which allowed the full potential of the increase in available firepower to be realised by giving a battalion commander a range of options on how to deliver his battalion’s fire.
A battalion could now fire one of its twelve platoons every few seconds and still have the first platoon to fire reloaded and ready to fire again by the time all twelve had fired. Depending upon circumstances this rate of fire could be slowed down if sustainable fire was required over a long period of time. The option also existed for a battalion commander to fire only a given number of his platoons or to fire all his platoons together in a battalion volley. A further option was to fire only the second and rear ranks, in any of the ways mentioned, keeping the entire front rank as a reserve. Furthermore, British infantry retained its ability to sustain the enemy’s fire and get close before delivering its own fire, although the bayonet was, in the drill books at least, seen as a defensive rather than offensive weapon.
Despite these advantages platoon firing was not an inevitable battle winner. It was vulnerable to a rapid assault, as at Killiekrankie and Fleurus, and to being overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, as at Landen in 1693. Outnumbered approximately three to two, the Confederate Army of William finally collapsed when it could no longer keep the French at bay with musketry.
The elector upon the Right, order’d two Battalions to Charge the Enemy in Front, whilst three others should Charge them upon their Left Flank . . . The two Battalions, one Dutch and t’other of Scots Gurds, which the Elector had commanded to Charge the Enemy in the Front, had spent all their Ammunitions by their continual Fire for so many hours: The Elector order’d to have Ammunition brought them, but it could not time enough to do business.65
This failure was attributed to a lack of ammunition rather than any failing in the men or tactics. However, its ability with this new fire system was usually enough to allow British infantry to overcome its usual enemy of the time, the French. It was also sufficient to deal with frontal cavalry attacks.
Platoon firing as described by Lieutenant General Mackay had been developed at a time when a third of a battalion was made up of pikemen and the musketeers were armed with matchlocks and loaded from bandoleers. Although the disappearance of the pi
ke and the introduction of the flintlock musket and the cartridge led to minor adaptations in the way that platoon fire was delivered, it remained basically unchanged and was the fire-delivery system that the British infantry took into Flanders at the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in May 1702. A battalion in line formed its dozen line or hat companies into a dozen platoons in two wings of six. The platoons fired in turn from the flanks to the centre, starting with the right-hand platoon of the right wing, followed by the left-hand platoon of the left wing and alternating platoons on the right and left until the two platoons in the centre fired. The grenadier company was divided into two and formed a platoon on each flank. They appear to have operated almost independently of the main body. By the end of that war, however, platoon firing had undergone a major change that took advantage of the improvements in weapons and the resultant increase in potential firepower.
Chapter 5
The Age of Marlborough, 1702 to 1714
It is the view of David Chandler, writing about the Duke of Marlborough, that ‘England has never produced a greater soldier.’1 Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein’s assessment is that, ‘Of all the military personalities who pass across the stage during his times . . . Marlborough was the greatest . . . I have always considered that it was he who was responsible for the rise of the British army to become one of the foremost armies in Europe.’2
Marlborough’s praises have been sung by military historians such as Richard Holmes, John Keegan, Andrew Wheatcroft and J. W. Fortescue.3 But in studying the man and his campaigns historians have tended to ignore the detail of how Marlborough’s battles were fought and concentrate instead on the narrative of events, analysing his strategies and manoeuvres. Yet, regardless of Marlborough’s brilliance, the battles were ultimately decided by the outcome of the combat between battalions and squadrons, in which technique was critical. As John Houlding put it: ‘We are too easily dazzled by the brilliance of Marlborough’s grand-tactical dispositions, the more so when these are contrasted with those of William; Marlborough’s victories were the fruit of the military genius of the commander, and not of any radical departure in the drill and tactics (save for platoon-fire) of the individual corps under his command.’4
Marlborough’s greatness is not in dispute and there was little change after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in the way the British army operated tactically, except, vitally, for the introduction of platoon fire.5 However, using this new combat technique, British infantry, and their allies the Dutch, repeatedly punched above their weight on the battlefield in the face of frequently numerically superior French forces. In order to explain the success of British infantry it is necessary to look past the brilliance of Marlborough and understand what was happening in the ranks and files of his battalions.
The importance of platoon firing is clear in the views expressed by Houlding. ‘By the time of Blenheim a new fire-tactics – the famous platoon-fire system – had established itself as the forte of the British foot.’6 Houlding also states ‘that a sound appreciation of the supremacy of firepower over all other forms of combat had been a lesson well learned by the end of Marlborough’s campaigns, and had been taken to heart in the army.’7
Furthermore, although platoon firing was learnt from the Dutch, the British Army first made it its own and then, after William’s death in 1702, further developed it whilst the Dutch platoon fire changed hardly at all. It was thus at the very heart of the success of the British Army under Marlborough. However, despite this fundamental importance, the way platoon firing was organised and carried out and how it continued to develop under Marlborough has not been accurately described nor its application analysed.
Military historians invariably draw upon the description of platoon firing found in Richard Kane’s manual as representing British practice during the War of the Spanish Succession and then support this claim with an account of one particular firefight, at Malplaquet in 1709, that appears to match Kane’s description.8 This view of the nature of platoon firing during the War of the Spanish Succession is wrong.
Furthermore, the way platoon firing was conducted at the start of the war is also quite different from what was described at the battle of Malplaquet in 1709.9 There were a number of key changes to the organisation of platoon firing, something not recorded in any publication at the time and which has eluded historians. Not only was there was a very significant change in the conduct of platoon firing by 1709, but there were also major differences between the conduct of platoon firing in that 1709 firefight and what Kane later advocated.
In 1708 the Duke of Marlborough’s New Exercise of Firelocks & Bayonets was published, but this was not an official publication and only dealt with drill and not how firing was to be conducted.10 Fortunately a number of manuscripts and letters survive that record the steps in the development of platoon firing through this period. There was also a scarcity of eyewitness accounts to allow a comparison of theory with practice and few of these writers concerned themselves more than occasionally with the detail of drill and tactics. However, there are sufficient first-hand descriptions to allow an analysis of platoon firing in practice.
Despite his fall from favour with William III in 1692, Marlborough was politically and militarily rehabilitated by the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701–14. The two men worked together to prepare for the conflict, but, following a riding accident, William died in March 1702, to be succeeded by Queen Anne. The most obvious effect of this was to elevate Marlborough to the position of commander-in-chief of the English and Scots armies. Less obviously it broke the link that had existed between the English, Scots and Dutch armies when William was head of state and commander-in-chief of all three.
The first major engagement of the war for the British Army was the storming of the Schellenburg Heights on 2 July 1704. As part of Marlborough’s campaign, which culminated in the battle of Blenheim, it was necessary to acquire a suitable base for supplies. Accordingly a plan was laid to capture Donauworth on the Danube. The town and defences of Donauworth were dominated by the Schellenburg Heights and capturing those was the key to the town. The fight for the Schellenburg subsequently became synonymous with vicious hand-to-hand fighting where there was little opportunity for the disciplined and controlled application of platoon fire. Perhaps the most vivid description came from one of the French defenders, whose account left no doubt that the British infantry had not lost any of their stomach for hand-to-hand fighting.
It would be impossible to describe in words strong enough the details of the carnage that took place during this first attack, which lasted a good hour or more. We were all fighting hand to hand, hurling them back as they clutched at the parapet; men were slaying, or tearing at the muzzles of guns and the bayonets which pierced their entrails; crushing under their feet their own wounded comrades, and even gouging out their opponents’ eyes with their nails, when the grip was so close that neither could make use of their weapons. I verily believe that it would have been quite impossible to find a more terrible representation of Hell itself than was shown in the savagery of both sides on this occasion.11
Eventually the defences of the Schellenberg were penetrated and the heights were captured. The garrison of Donauworth itself abandoned the town without a fight.
At the subsequent battle of Blenheim the British infantry were able to demonstrate their courage, discipline and platoon firing to their full effect.12 The right flank of the French army rested on the banks of the Danube and the village of Blenheim. The village was held by sixteen battalions with another eleven in reserve supported by twelve squadrons of dragoons, many dismounted. The first attack on the village was made by the five British battalions of Rowe’s brigade who were at the head of Lord Cutts’s column. A vivid account of this attack was written by a chaplain, Josiah Sandby. It began with Brigadier Rowe leading his brigade against Blenheim.
And he had proceeded closely and slowly within 30 paces of the Pales about Blenheim before the enemy gav
e their first fire, and when this was given there fell a great many brave officers & soldiers on our side, but yet that did not discourage that Excellent officer Brigadier Rowe from marching directly to the very Pales, in which he stuck his sword, before he suffered a man to fire a piece & then our men gave the first volley in the teeth of the enemy. His orders were to enter sword in hand, but the superiority of the enemy & this advantage of the post made yt impossible. And therefore this first line was forced to retire, but without the Brigadier who was left by the side of the Pales by a shot he had received in his thigh. This was a great disadvantage to the service at the first beginning & his own Lt Col and Maj who but knew his worth endeavouring to fetch him off were both killed upon the spot.13
The loss of the three most senior officers of a single British battalion in this attack is an indication of the ferocity of the fire that the French were able to generate. Despite this the account shows a determined adherence to the principle of getting in close to maximise the effectiveness of musketry. The French fired at thirty paces, the British even closer, possibly at as little as five metres. This was followed immediately by an attempt to storm the defences of the village, which failed.
Unfortunately for Rowe’s brigade they were attacked by French cavalry as they retreated.
The Hessian Brigade, pursuant to orders, made ready to renew the attack: But while this was doing some Squadrons of the Gens d’Armes fell in upon the Right of Rowe’s Brigade, put two Regiments in disorder, & took the Collonels Collours of Rowe’s Regiment, upon which the Hessians in the second line, facing to the right, charged those Squadrons so warmly that they repulsed them & retook the Colours.14
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 9
