The Last of the President's Men
Page 26
D. The West Bank is to be demilitarized.
E. No troops of any other Arab nation are to be stationed on the East Bank of Jordan.
F. Jordan must sign a peace treaty with Israel on the above-mentioned basis.
9. This is the final Israeli position. Although peace is desirable, Israel can live without it if the above conditions are not accepted. Things will remain as they are now; and instead of a formal state of peace, Israel believes there will be a gradual drift toward peace since Israel is intent on teaching the Arabs to coexist with her.
TOP SECRET RUFF ZARF UMBRA
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
ISRAEL: THE JERICHO SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE PROGRAM APPARENTLY IS NEARING THE TESTING PHASE.
SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE YAVNE MISSILE TEST CENTER IN EARLY SEPTEMBER SHOWS WHAT APPEAR TO BE AT LEAST 11 MISSILE STAGE CANISTERS. ALL OF THE CANISTERS ARE AROUND THREE FEET IN DIAMETER; THE LONGER ONES ARE 18 FEET IN LENGTH AND TWO ARE SEVERAL FEET SHORTER.
TO DATE, NO MISSILE ACTIVITY HAS BEEN OBSERVED AT YAVNE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUPPORT FACILITIES AND TWO LAUNCH PADS WERE COMPLETED ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. THE APPARENT HIATUS IN THE PROGRAM HAS LED TO SPECULATION THAT THE ORIGINAL MISSILE DESIGNED AND DEVELOPED FOR ISRAEL BY THE FRENCH FIRM DASSAULT DURING THE 1960S HAS BEEN UNDERGOING MODIFICATION BY THE ISRAELIS TO IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE.
FOR SEVERAL YEARS ISRAEL HAS HAD THE INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO TURN OUT AT LEAST ONE JERICHO MISSILE A MONTH. IN ADDITION TO PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND A TEST RANGE, THE ISRAELIS ARE CONSTRUCTING WHAT IS BELIEVED TO BE AN OPERATIONAL SITE IN THE MOUNTAINS BETWEEN JERUSALEM AND TEL AVIV. APPARENTLY ISRAEL INTENDS TO HAVE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE JERICHO PROGRAM IN PLACE SO THAT AN OPERATIONAL FORCE CAN BE QUICKLY DEPLOYED ONCE THE MISSILE HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED A SERIES OF TEST FLIGHTS. {TOP SECRET RUFF NO FOREIGN DISSEM}
23 Sep 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
2
TOP SECRET RUFF ZARF UMBRA
Year
Laos
Vietnam S
Vietnam N
Cambodia
Thailand
Other
Total
1965
36,967
43,284
536
44
80,830
1966
63,447
193,254
128,280
41
385,022
1967
93,623
292,176
191,420
38
19
1,232
578,508
1968
156,619
338,042
198,670
102
1,280
694,713
1969
489,037
596,147
651
6
62
964
1,086,866
1970
631,658
403,882
1,691
78,220
5
59,320
1,174,775
1971
414,792
178,506
6,754
63,253
15
663,320
1972
167,370
706,894
207,284
57,042
104
337
1,139,031
1973
82,869
68,595
14,490
273,728
521
572
440,774
1974
21,717
21,717
1975
10,205
27
6
681
10,918
Total
2,136,380
2,852,701
749,776
472,313
863
64,445
6,276,477
FIGURE 4: Totals (Tonnage) by Country and by Year Based on CACTA/SEADAB Database.
Source: “Electronic Records of the Air War Over Southeast Asia: A Database Analysis,” Holly High, James R. Curran and Gareth Robinson, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 2013), pp. 86-124. Published by University of California Press; accessed via JSTOR. Table is from p. 104 of the article.
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 9, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM THE PRESIDENT
It is vitally important that we not psychologically downgrade the firmness of our action by protesting that it is not a blockade. People understand what a blockade is. They don’t understand what mining is.
The way everybody in the Administration should handle this question is to say that the order of the President’s action has the purpose and effect of a blockade -- to completely stop the delivery of all seaborne supplies to North Vietnam. We find that we are able to accomplish this goal through mining and through naval and other activities against shipping within the 12-mile limit claimed by Hanoi. This means that we have not found it necessary, in order to accomplish our goal of stopping all deliveries of supplies by sea, to stop ships in the high seas.
In other words, from a technical legal standpoint there is a blockade only when ships are stopped in the high seas. This we are not doing at this time -- but only because it is not necessary to accomplish our goal of completely cutting off seaborne delivery of supplies to North Vietnam.
What must be emphasized is that the action the President has ordered, both on sea and on land, has as its purpose completely denying to the enemy the supplies it needs to wage aggressive war. We will order those actions that are necessary to accomplish this goal. The fact that the initial order does not include stopping ships on the high seas -- which in the parlance of international law is a blockade -- in no way should be indicated as a sign of weakness or firmness of resolve. We are not doing that only because we find it is not necessary and that there is a more effective way to accomplish our goal -- mining and naval and air actions within the 12-mile limit claimed by North Vietnam.
I want you to make this point strongly in your briefing, and I want it circulated to all Administration spokesmen so that our action, both by the enemy and by the American people, does not run the risk of being considered so restrained as to be ineffective.
With regard to bombing strikes in the North I have decided that it is imperative that they be at the highest limit that Abrams can spare from the battle area in the next few days.
I mentioned that our primary target, except for the rail lines, should be POL. This, of course, should be our long-term goal. But over the next few days I also want some targets hit which will have maximum psychological effect on morale in North Vietnam. That is why it is so important to take out the power plants. If your operational group thinks of any other targets of this type hit them and hit them hard.
Remember that we will have more support for strong action than we will in the days ahead. As each day goes by criticism will reduce support for our action and also the failure to get results will reduce the enthusiasm of our supporters.
You have often mentioned the necessity of creating the impression in the enemy’s mind that I am absolutely determined to end the war and will take whatever steps are necessary to accomplish this goal.
The time to take those steps is now.
That is why some extensive B-52 strikes in the North should if at all possible be directed against military targets in North Vietnam this week.
I am concerned by the military’s plan of allocating 200 sorties for North Vietnam for the dreary “milk runs” which characterized the Johnson Administration’s bombing in the 1965–68 period.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that I have determined that we should go for broke. What we
have got to get across to the enemy is the impression that we are doing exactly that. Our words will help some. But our actions in the next few days will speak infinitely louder than our words.
I am totally unsatisfied at this time at the plans the military have suggested as far as air activities are concerned. On an urgent basis I want on my desk late this afternoon (Tuesday) recommendations to carry out this directive which I am now dictating. I intend to give the directive directly to Abrams in the field and I will inform Laird and bring him into line if there is any question in that direction.
Our greatest failure now would be to do too little too late. It is far more important to do too much at a time that we will have maximum public support for what we do.
What all of us must have in mind is that we must punish the enemy in ways that he will really hurt at this time. Over a longer period of time we can be more methodical in directing our air strikes to two specific targets -- the rail lines, highways and POL supply areas. I have an uneasy feeling that your present plans are simply too restrained and too much in the pattern of the 1965–1968 debacle.
Now that I have made this very tough water shed decision I intend to stop at nothing to bring the enemy to his knees. I want you to get this spirit inculcated in all hands and particularly I want the military to get off its back side and give me some recommendations as to how we can accomplish that goal.
Needless to say, indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas is not what I have in mind. On the other hand, if the target is important enough, I will approve a plan that goes after it even if there is a risk of some civilian casualties.
I think we have had too much of a tendency to talk big and act little. This was certainly the weakness of the Johnson Administration. To an extent it may have been our weakness where we have warned the enemy time and time again and then have acted in a rather mild way when the enemy has tested us. He has now gone over the brink and so have we. We have the power to destroy his war making capacity. The only question is whether we have the will to use that power. What distinguishes me from Johnson is that I have the will in spades. If we now fail it will be because the bureaucrats and the bureaucracy and particularly those in the Defense Department, who will of course be vigorously assisted by their allies in State, will find ways to erode the strong, decisive action that I have indicated we are going to take. For once, I want the military and I want the NSC staff to come up with some ideas on their own which will recommend action which is very strong, threatening and effective.
I want as part of the plan this week, on an urgent basis, making strikes on all air fields in North Vietnam, particularly in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. I realize that they can be put back into operation a few days after a strike, but the psychological effect could be considerable. On this score, I particularly want to hit the international airfield where civilian planes land.
Also, this week I want one major strike. Get Abrams to collect his assets and have one 500 plane strike by Thursday or Friday of this week so that the enemy will know that we mean business all the way.
[HANDWRITTEN NOTE]
RMW [Rose Mary Woods]
file
RN personal
K [Kissinger] reread -
& Haig also -
before filing
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
C
O
P
Y
October 23, 1972
SUBJECT:
Dr. Kissinger’s Meeting with President Thieu, October 23, 1972
1. Dr. Kissinger, accompanied by Ambassador Bunker, met with President Thieu for two and one-quarter hours at 0800, October 23.
2. Dr. Kissinger said that he would like to make a few observations concerning our discussions yesterday. The President has had a full report of these and has asked me to repeat that he believes that the effect of our proposal is quite the opposite of your characterization of it and that it will indeed achieve the mutual objective for which we have both been striving. But we are now faced with an immediate problem. First, I want to make it clear there never have been talks or communication with the other side which have not been communicated to you. You have been apprised fully of every development as it has occurred and have been consulted on every move we have made with the single exception of the meeting on September 15 when we believed it necessary to move before we had heard from you. While I cannot accept what you said yesterday, we nevertheless owe it to the sacrifices so many have made to our common cause to make another effort. We must let no disagreement be evident between us. If the other side goes public, we will blame it on the Newsweek article, although we cannot disavow the agreement. In the meantime, I had had to take some steps. I have cancelled my trip to Hanoi and have asked for a meeting in Paris to present your demands. In the meantime, Ambassador Bunker will consult with you.
3. President Thieu said that yesterday “I promised to avoid any confrontation and said that I would not publicly acknowledge any disagreement between President Nixon and myself.”
4. Dr. Kissinger responded saying that yesterday you asked for my personal opinion and I replied that I thought the course you were following was dangerous. I intended it as an expression of deep concern; it was not intended to be personal in nature or any reflection on you. You understand how it seems to an individual who has stood against 300,000 demonstrators, against bureaucratic and Congressional opposition, against public opinion and the press - this is why I took the liberty of speaking as I did. Both your present and former Ambassadors will tell you who stood for you and who against. As I mentioned yesterday, I believe the course you are following is suicidal.
5. President Thieu said he had expressed his views straightforwardly and had spoken frankly as a fighter, recognizing that at times we made mistakes. But after fifteen years of struggle, it does not seem too much to ask for only two changes. “If I am forced to accept, I will feel that I have been pressured by North Vietnam.” He did not intend to accuse anyone. He knew that President Nixon had many other obligations which exceed the interests of Vietnam. His only question is whether the U.S. Government and people intend to support Vietnam. If they do, then they should do whatever they can concerning these two points. It is exceedingly regrettable that North Vietnam has taken advantage of his pledge to maintain secrecy in order to mislead public opinion.
6. President Thieu said he would ask Dr. Kissinger to report to the President on three specific points:
-- The observance of the DMZ as required by the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
-- The question of self-determination to be left to the South Vietnamese people. In this respect the tripartite formula does not reflect political reality.
-- The question of North Vietnam forces in the South. The Communists have lied about their invasion and want to save face. If they wish to withdraw without an announcement, this can be accepted as a de facto withdrawal.
7. President Thieu asked whether we had presented to the other side his proposals of September 13 providing for the election of a president followed by the formation of a new government, and if so how the communists had responded. He added that he would write to President Nixon and tell him what he finds it difficult to accept. The final decision, however, will be that of the Vietnamese people. “I still consider President Nixon a friend and a comrade in arms. Whether or not I am President I will strive to create conditions so that the United States can help Vietnam. If I am an obstacle to American aid or to peace, I will not stay on as President. I had no intention of criticizing President Nixon. I only wish to point out that compared to the situation which would prevail in Cambodia and Laos I find the proposal disadvantageous to South Vietnam, but there is no reason for hatred and enmity among friends and I propose that we forget what has been said.”
8. Dr. Kissinger replied that we speak as friends and as admirers of you and your country and we share your sentiment. The U.S. will never sacrifice a trusted friend. We will not de
al with anyone but the President of Vietnam and will have no communication with anyone but the President of Vietnam. Regarding other points which have been reached:
-- The GVN opposition to the phrase “Administrative structure” used to describe the NCRC: We cannot judge the meaning of the phrase in Vietnamese, but to us it means something insignificant. We were determined to have nothing in the agreement which could be related in any way to a coalition government. In the U.S., the NCRC would be considered an absurdity, a tremendous defeat for Hanoi. It would, therefore, be difficult for us to explain the GVN’s objection to it. Dr. Kissinger said that on the other hand, had he been able to go to Hanoi, he would have been prepared to request the elimination of the provision for the three equal segments of the NCRC.
-- With regard to North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam: Our judgment is that the provision against reinforcement, the closing of the Laotian and Cambodian borders and the prohibition against infiltration would have the practical result of diminishing the NVN forces. Again had he been able to go to Hanoi, he would have asked the DRV for the removal of three divisions from MR 1.
9. We do not consider President Thieu’s demands unreasonable. We consider him a great patriot and soldier. But Dr. Kissinger said that he must tell President Thieu “in anguish” that if the war goes on at its present rate, in six months U.S. funds will be cut off.
10. Dr. Kissinger then described what it had been necessary to do in order to maintain Congressional support. For a year, we have attempted to isolate Hanoi. November 7 was pointed to as an unremovable deadline and, therefore, created a high degree of anxiety on the part of the North Vietnamese. They conceded much and undoubtedly, had Dr. Kissinger gone to Hanoi, they would have conceded more. Indeed the agreement would have been considered a great triumph and we could have continued with our aid and support. In both the United States and Europe it would have been considered a defeat for Hanoi. Since July, in order to maintain support, we have been conducting a delaying strategy. The tragedy now is that had the agreement been presented as a surprise, it would have enabled our continuing support which is now jeopardized. It is hardly conceivable that Congressional support can continue. Unfortunately, we are in the position now of having to make concessions. We thought we had achieved victory, but obviously were mistaken.