The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

  The equity principle asserts that people should receive benefits in proportion to their contribution: those who contribute more should receive more than those who contribute less.

  The equality principle states that all members of a group should share its benefits equally.

  The need principle indicates that those who need more of a benefit should get more than those who need it less.

  In any particular allocation situation, the three principles may be in conflict. Thus, paying the members of a work group according to their individual productivity may conflict with paying all the members of a work group equally, and these two principles may conflict with paying them according to their need, such as giving higher pay to those with more dependents. Only if all are equally productive and equally needy is there no conflict among the principles.

  The principles of distributive justice may be favored differently among individuals, groups, social classes, ideologies, and so forth. For example, in a collectivist community such as an Israeli kibbutz, the members have essentially the same pay and standard of living no matter how much they differ in their individual work productivity. In contrast, in an individualistic society such as the United States, the CEO of a profit-making firm may get paid more than a thousand times what an individual worker makes. Conflict within the kibbutz arises if individuals feel that their standard of living does not adequately reflect their unusually valuable contribution to the community; conflict within the American firm is likely if workers feel that they are not getting a fair share of the profits.

  Theory and research (Deutsch, 1985) suggest that the principles are usually salient in different social contexts. Equity is most prominent in situations in which economic productivity is the primary goal; equality is dominant when social harmony, cohesiveness, or fostering enjoyable social relations is the primary emphasis; and need is most salient in situations where encouraging personal development and personal welfare is the major goal.

  Many times, all three goals are important. In such situations, the three principles can be applied in a manner that is either mutually supportive or mutually contradictory. In a mutually supportive application, the equity principle leads to recognizing individual differences in contribution and honoring those who make uniquely important contributions. In a socially harmonious honoring, no invidious distinctions are drawn between those who are honored and those who are not; the equal divine or moral value of everyone in the cooperative community is affirmed as the community honors those who give so much to it. Similarly, the equal moral worth of every individual leads to special help for those who are especially needy.

  Thus, if a football player helps his team win by an unusually skillful or courageous feat, he is honored by his teammates and others in such a way that they feel good rather than demeaned by his being honored. His being honored does not imply that they have lost something; it is not a win-lose or competitive situation for them. If, in contrast, the equity principle is applied in a manner that suggests those who produce more are better human beings and entitled to superior treatment generally, then social harmony and cohesiveness are impaired. If the equality principle leads to a sameness or uniformity in which the value of unique individual contributions is denied, then productivity as well as social cohesion are impaired. It is a delicate balance that often tilts too far in one direction or the other.

  The judgment that you have received a fair outcome is determined not only by whether the appropriate distributive principles are employed but also by whether your outcome is in comparative balance with the outcomes received by people like you in similar situations. If you (a woman) and a male coworker are equally productive, do you each receive the same pay raise? Are all members of a club invited to a party given by the club leader? If it’s my turn to receive a heart transplant, is someone else—maybe a wealthy benefactor of the hospital—given higher priority?

  The theory of relative deprivation indicates that the sense of deprivation or injustice arises if there is comparative imbalance: egoistical deprivation occurs if an individual feels disadvantaged relative to other individuals, and fraternal deprivation occurs if a person feels her group is disadvantaged relative to other groups. The sense of being deprived occurs if there is a perceived discrepancy between what a person obtains of what she wants and what she believes she is entitled to obtain. The deprivation is relative because one’s sense of deprivation is largely determined by past and current comparisons with others as well as by future expectations.

  There is an extensive literature on the determinants of the choice of other individuals or groups with whom one chooses to compare oneself. This literature is too extensive to summarize here, but it clearly demonstrates that people’s feelings of deprivation are not simply a function of their objective circumstances; they are affected by a number of psychological variables. Thus, paradoxically, members of disadvantaged groups (such as women, low-paid workers, ethnic minorities) often feel less deprived than one might expect, and even less so than those who are more fortunate, because they compare themselves with “similar others”—other women, other low-paid workers. In contrast, men and middle-income workers who have more opportunities may feel relatively more deprived because they are comparing themselves with those who have enjoyed more success in upward mobility. Also, there is evidence that discontent, social unrest, and rebellion often occur after a period of improvement in political-economic conditions that leads to rising expectations regarding entitlements if they are not matched by a corresponding rise in one’s benefits. The result is an increased perceived discrepancy between one’s sense of entitlement and one’s benefits; this is sometimes referred to as the revolution of rising expectations.

  Procedural Justice

  In addition to assessing the fairness of outcomes, individuals judge the fairness of the procedures that determine the outcomes. Research evidence indicates that fair treatment and procedures are a more pervasive concern to most people than fair outcomes. (See Lind and Tyler, 1988, for a comprehensive discussion of procedural justice.) Fair procedures are psychologically important for several reasons, first in encouraging the assumption that they give rise to fair outcomes in the present and also in the future. When it is not clear what fair outcomes should be, fair procedures are the best guarantee that the decision about outcomes is made fairly. Research indicates that one is less likely to feel committed to authorities, organizations, social policies, and governmental rules and regulations if the procedures associated with them are considered unfair. Also, people feel affirmed if the procedures to which they are subjected treat them with the respect and dignity they feel is their due; if they are so treated, they find it easier to accept a disappointing outcome.

  Questions with regard to the justice of procedures can arise in various ways. Consider, for example, the evaluation of teacher performance in a school. Some questions immediately come to mind:

  Who has voice or representation in determining whether such evaluation is necessary?

  How are the evaluations to be conducted?

  Who conducts them?

  What is to be evaluated?

  What kind of information is collected?

  How is the accuracy and validity of the information ascertained, and how are its consistency and reliability determined?

  What methods of preventing incompetence or bias in collecting and processing information are employed?

  Who constitutes the groups that organize the evaluations, draw conclusions, make recommendations, and make decisions?

  What roles do teachers, administrators, parents, students, and outside experts have in the procedures?

  How are the ethicality, considerateness, and dignity of the process protected?

  Implicit in these questions are some values with regard to procedural justice. One wants procedures that generate relevant, unbiased, accurate, consistent, reliable, competent, and valid information and decisions, as well as polite, dignified, and respectful behavior in carrying out the p
rocedures. Also, voice and representation in the processes and decisions related to the evaluation are considered desirable by those directly affected by the decisions. In effect, fair procedures yield good information for use in the decision-making processes, voice in the processes for those affected by them, and considerate treatment as the procedures are being implemented.

  The Sense of Injustice

  Whether an injustice takes the form of physical abuse, discrimination in employment, sexual harassment, or disrespectful treatment, there will always be some people who are insensitive to the injustice and hence seemingly unaware of it. Here we examine factors that influence the sense of injustice.

  Victims and Victimizers.

  Distributive as well as procedural injustice can advantage some people and groups and disadvantage others. Those who benefit from injustice are, wittingly or unwittingly, often its perpetrators or perpetuators, and they are usually not fully aware of their complicity. Awareness brings with it such unpleasant emotions as guilt, fear of revenge, and sometimes feelings of helplessness with regard to their ability to bring about the social changes necessary to eliminate the injustice. As one might expect, the disadvantaged are more likely to be aware of the injustice. Associated with this awareness are feelings such as anger (outrage, indignation), resentment, humiliation, depression, and a sense of helplessness. Positive emotions related to self-esteem, sense of power, and pride are experienced by those who are engaged in effective actions to eliminate injustice, whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged.

  There seems to be a straightforward explanation for the asymmetry in sensitivity to the injustice of the disadvantaged (the victims) and the advantaged (the victimizers). The victims usually have relatively little power compared to the victimizers; the latter are more likely to set the terms of their relationship and, through their control of the state and other social institutions, establish the legal and other reigning definitions of justice.

  Thus, the victimizers, in addition to gains from their exploitative actions, commonly find reassurance in official definitions of justice and the support of such major social institutions as the church, the media, and the schools, to deaden their sensitivity to the injustices inherent in their relations with the victim. The victim may, of course, be taken in by the official definitions and the indoctrination emanating from social institutions and, as a result, lose sensitivity to her situation of injustice. However, the victim is less likely than the victimizer to lose sensitivity to injustice because she is the one who is experiencing its negative consequences. She is also less likely to feel committed to the official definitions and indoctrinations because of her lack of participation in creating them.

  This explanation of differential sensitivity in terms of differential gains and differential power is not the complete story. There are, of course, relations in which the victimizer is not of superior power; even so, he avoids experiencing guilt for his actions. Consider a traffic accident in which a car hits a pedestrian. The driver of the car often perceives the accident so as to place responsibility for it on the victim. Seeing the victim as responsible enables the driver to maintain a positive image of himself. Projecting the blame onto the victim enables the victimizer to feel blameless.

  If we accept the notion that most people try to maintain a positive conception of themselves, we can expect differential sensitivity to injustice in those who experience pain, harm, and misfortune and those who cause it. If I try to think well of myself, I shall minimize my responsibility for any injustice that is connected with me or minimize the extent of injustice that has occurred if I cannot minimize my responsibility. If instead I am the victim of pain or harm, I have to believe that it was not my due to think well of myself; it is not just desserts for a person of my good character. Thus, the need to maintain positive self-esteem leads to opposite reactions in those who cause an injustice and those who suffer from it. There is also the possibility that a victim may seek to maintain her self-esteem by denying or minimizing the injustice she is suffering; denial may not be completely conscious. Resort to denial is less likely to occur if there are other similar victims who are prepared to acknowledge and protest their own victimization.

  Although the need to maintain positive self-regard is common, it is not universal. If she views herself favorably, the victim of injustice may be outraged by her experience and attempt to undo it; in so doing, she may have to challenge the victimizer. If the victimizer is more powerful than she is and has the support of legal and other social institutions, she will realize that it is dangerous to act on her outrage—or even to express it. Under such circumstances, in a process that Anna Freud (1937) labeled “identification with the aggressor,” the victim may control her dangerous feelings of injustice and outrage by denying them and internalizing the derogatory attitudes of the victimizer toward herself as well as toward others who are similar to her (other women, other disadvantaged groups). Paradoxically, by identifying with the aggressor, you feel more powerful as you attack or aggress against others on whom you project the “bad” characteristics in yourself that you have suppressed because of your fear of being attacked by someone with the power to harm you. We can see this phenomenon in parents who were abused as children going on to abuse their own children and in traditionally submissive women derogating independent, assertive women.

  From this discussion, it is evident that for numerous reasons, victims as well as their victimizers may be insensitive to injustices that are occurring. I turn now to a brief discussion of how the sense of injustice may be activated in the victim and the victimizer. (See Deutsch and Steil, 1988, for an extended discussion.)

  Activating the Sense of Injustice.

  The process entails falsifying and delegitimating officially sanctioned ideologies, myths, and prejudices that “justify” the injustices. I am referring to such myths as these:

  Women like men to make sexual passes at them, even at work, because it makes them feel attractive.

  African Americans are morally and intellectually inferior to European Americans.

  The poor deserve to be poor because they are lazy.

  Everyone in the United States has equal opportunity in the competition to achieve success.

  The activation process also involves exposing the victims and victimizers to new ideologies, models, and reference groups that support realistic hope about the possibility that the injustice can be eliminated. Because of the anxieties they elicit, one can anticipate that the changes necessary to eliminate an injustice produce resistance from others—and sometimes in oneself. It is easier to manage resistance and anxiety by becoming aware of the value systems that support the change and of models of successful change as well as of the social support you can get from groups and individuals who support the change. You feel less vulnerable if you know that you are not alone, that others are with you.

  In addition, the process entails the work necessary to make oneself and one’s group effective forces for social change. There is internally directed work, aimed at enhancing cohesiveness, trust, and effective organization among those who favor change. There is also external work, involved in building up one’s political and economic strength as well as one’s bargaining power. Doing so enables effective action to increase the incentives for accepting change among the advantaged who are content with the status quo and among those who desire change but are fearful of the consequences of seeking change. However, some victims of injustice may have to free themselves from the seductive satisfaction of feeling morally superior to the victimizers before they can fully commit to and be effective in their struggle against injustice. (See Deutsch, 2006, for a more detailed discussion of overcoming oppression and injustice.)

  Retributive and Reparative Justice

  A study comparing responses to injustice and to frustration (reported in Deutsch, 1985) found that an injustice that is experienced, whether to oneself or to another, involves one not only personally but also as a member of a moral community who
se moral norms are being violated; it evokes an obligation to restore justice. The psychology of retributive and reparative justice is concerned with the attitudes and behavior of people in response to moral rule breaking.

  It is reasonable to expect a person’s response to be influenced by the nature of the transgression, the transgressor, the victim, and the amount of harm the victim experiences, as well as by the person’s relations to the transgressor and victim. A transgression such as murder evokes a different response from violation of customary norms of courtesy and politeness. In the United States, a white murderer is less likely to be executed than a black one. Similarly, beating and raping a black woman is less likely to result in widespread media attention than in the case of a white victim. Burning a synagogue is considered a more serious offense than painting swastikas on its walls. An Israeli Jew is less likely to be concerned about Israeli discrimination against Palestinians than Arabs are, and Arabs are unlikely to be as concerned about discrimination against Jews in their countries as Israeli Jews are.

  A number of means are employed to support and reestablish the validity of moral rules once they are violated. They generally call for one or a combination of these actions on the part of the violator: full confession, sincere apology, contrition, restitution, compensation, self-abasement, or self-reform. They also may involve various actions by the community addressed to the violator, such as humiliation, physical punishment, incarceration, or reeducation. These actions may be addressed not just to the violator but also to others related to the violator, such as his children, family, or ethnic group.

  Retribution can serve a number of functions:

  Violation of a moral code tends to weaken the code. One of the most important functions of retribution is to reassert the continuing strength and validity of the moral rule that has been violated. For example, many communities are experiencing a breakdown of the rules of courtesy and respect because children and adolescents are no longer taught these rules and there is no appropriate response when they are violated.