The First Great Air War

by Richard Townsend Bickers

  On 15th September he was in action again. At 3 p.m. he took off in a Nieuport armed with one fixed Lewis gun on an offensive patrol at 7000 feet. An Albatros, Type A, with guns front and rear, flying at an estimated 80 m.p.h., came in sight. Here is his Combat Report. “Albatros seen going south over Bapaume. Nieuport dived and fired one drum when within 50 yards after which the gun on the Nieuport came down and hit me on the head, preventing me from following the H.A. (hostile aircraft) down.” This was a hazard of the Foster mounting when firing at high elevation.

  Later that evening he was up again, this time armed with Le Prieur rockets in addition to his Lewis gun. “Five Rolands seen over Bapaume in formation. Nieuport dived and fired rockets in order to break up formation. Formation was lost at once. Nieuport chased nearest machine and got under it, firing one drum at 20 yards. H.A. went down quite out of control and crashed N.E. of Bertincourt.”

  These reports are made out in the name “Lieut. A. Ball, MC.”

  Before his next fight, 21st September, his Distinguished Service Order was gazetted, to add to his Military Cross, for the Combat Report of that date is accredited to Lieut. A. Ball, DSO, MC. Decorations came more quickly than in 1939-45.

  He met six Rolands flying at about 90 m.p.h. “H.A. seen N. of Bapaume in formation. Nieuport dived and fired rockets. Formation was lost. Nieuport got underneath nearest machine and fired a drum. H.A. dived and landed near railway. Nieuport then attacked another machine and fired two drums from underneath. H.A. went down and was seen to crash at side of railway. After this the rest of the H.A. followed the Nieuport towards the lines and the Nieuport turned and fired remainder of ammunition after which it returned to the aerodrome for more. Second machine was seen to crash by Lieut. Walters.”

  On 25th September he ran into two formations of Rolands and Type A Albatroses, and saw them both off. “Nieuport could not see any H.A. over Bapaume at a reasonable height, so it went along the Cambrai road. After being there for a few minutes, two formations came along. Nieuport attacked the first. The H.A. ran with noses down, but, when another formation came near it turned towards the Nieuport. The Nieuport fired one drum to scatter the formation after which it turned to change drums. One of the drums dropped into the rudder control and for a few seconds the Nieuport was out of control.

  “Nieuport succeeded in getting drum on gun and attacked an Albatros which was then flying at its side. Nieuport fired 90 rounds 1 in 3 Buckingham at about 15 yards range underneath H.A. H.A. went down quite out of control and crashed. The remainder of H.A. followed Nieuport, but in the end left. In order to keep them off at a safe range Nieuport kept turning towards them. Each time this was done H.A. made off with noses down.”

  Combat at so close a range risked collision, or his own aeroplane catching fire when he set alight to an enemy with Buckingham incendiary rounds.

  He had been promoted. This report is by “Capt. A. Ball, DSO, MC.”

  On 18th September, between whiles, he had written most touchingly to his father: “Oh, you did make my leave a topper, and if I live to be a hundred I shall never wish for a more happy time.”

  He would not live to be twenty-one.

  *

  The land battles on the Somme between July and November 1916 had a direct effect on the concurrent air operations. Air supremacy suddenly shifted once more into German hands. In September the Germans destroyed 123 French and British aeroplanes and lost 27. Boelcke’s Jasta 2 was the most effective instrument in changing the balance. Between 17th September, when it first went into action — by which time its commander had amassed 25 victories — and 31st October, it lost a mere 7 machines while bringing down 76 British. Two other Albatros Jastas, Nos I and 3, had been formed and were soon operational. In October the total Allied — mostly British — losses were 88; the enemy’s, 12. By the next month the number of Jastas had increased to seven.

  Jasta 2’s operational record got off to a flashing start on its very first patrol. The day was 17th September. The objects of the Jasta’s attention were eight BE2Cs of 12 Squadron and six escorting Fees of No. II, on their way to bomb the railway station at Marcoing, deep behind the enemy line. As the antiquated BE2Cs waddled in for the attack, the Germans pounced and shot down two of them and two scarcely less vulnerable fighters. Richthofen bagged an FE2B. He had as much cause to take pride in this as a man with a pistol would have for vanquishing a boy with a peashooter. Delighted at what he had accomplished, he landed by the wreck and helped to extricate the mortally injured pilot, Lieutenant L. B. F. Morris, and observer, Lieutenant T. Rees: both of whom died within minutes. In celebration, he wrote to a Berlin jeweller to order a silver cup engraved with the details of his “victory”: date, time, place, type of enemy aircraft, name of pilot. He perpetrated the same diseased act of bad taste, in concession to his psychopathic delight in killing, after each of his successes. It was also his morbid habit to scavenge the wreckage of aircraft he had destroyed for souvenirs with which to adorn his mess and a room in his parental home entirely dedicated to this unwholesome display. Some trophies were even, in execrable style, exhibited over his parents’ front door. From the site of his first kill in the air, he took the FE2B’s machinegun. The whole nasty business reeked of the custom among other savages of decapitating their enemies and shrinking their heads.

  The Germans’ rejoicing was not unblemished. On 28th October two of Lanoe Hawker’s 24 Squadron pilots, Lieutenants Knight and McKay, were far behind enemy lines when Boelcke and his Jasta, Albatros D2s, intercepted them. The Combat Report specifies that twelve Halberstadts and two small Aviatik Scouts attacked the pair of DH2s. The two Britons at once began to circle tightly, which confused the enemy. In the latter’s general disorder, the Jasta’s oldest member, thirty-seven-year-old Erwin Böhme, whom Boelcke had specially selected, got in Boelcke’s way as Boelcke attacked Knight. “After five minutes’ strenuous fighting” these two Albatroses collided. Bohme’s left wing crashed into Boelcke’s right wing and sent Boelcke’s aircraft down out of control in a steepening glide which ended in a crash that killed him.

  The RFC suffered a comparable blow less than a month later. On 23rd November, Hawker, patrolling at 6000 feet behind the German trenches, with Captain Andrews and Lieutenant Saundby, saw two enemy two-seaters; at which Andrews dived. Let the Combat Report take up the story: “… and then, seeing two strong hostile patrols approaching high up, was about to retire when Major Hawker dived past him and continued the pursuit.

  “The D.H.s were at once attacked by the H.A., one of which dived on to Major Hawker’s tail. Captain Andrews drove this machine off, firing 25 rounds at close quarters, but was himself attacked from the rear, and his engine shot through almost immediately, so that he was obliged to try and regain the lines. He last saw Major Hawker engaging one H.A. at about 3000 feet. Lieutenant Saundby having driven one machine off Captain Andrews’s tail, engaged a second firing three-quarters of a double drum at 20 yards range.

  “The H.A. fell out of control for 1000 feet and then continued to go down vertically. Lieutenant Saundby could then see no other D.H.s, and the H.A. appeared to have moved away east, where they remained for the rest of the patrol.”

  Richthofen’s Combat Report reads: “… with a Vickers single-seater …” Comment has already been made about the Germans’ incorrect aircraft identification. “… The crashed aeroplane lies south of Ligny Sector J. The pilot is dead. Name of pilot: Major Hawker.

  “I attacked in company with two aeroplanes of the squadron a single-seater Vickers biplane at about 3000 metres. After a very long circling fight (35 minutes) I had forced down my opponent to 500 metres near Bapaume. He then tried to reach the front, I followed him to 100 metres over Ligny, he fell from this height after 900 shots.” The disparity in the heights given by the opponents is noteworthy.

  In fact what happened was that Hawker, the far better pilot but in a greatly inferior machine, outflew Richthofen despite the fact that his engine was running roughly from im
peded petrol flow which robbed it of full power. Richthofen had to use a huge quantity of ammunition before he finally hit Hawker in the head; his eleventh victim.

  Leutnant Stephan Kirmaier succeeded Boelcke in command of the Jasta. Under his leadership it destroyed twenty-five Allied aircraft in twenty-five days. Kirmaier was a sound commander who might have achieved fame if Captain Andrews of 24 Squadron had not shot him down before he was into his stride.

  Another member of Jasta 2 laid the foundation of his fame over the Somme. Werner Voss was Jewish, a tailor’s son, who had falsified his age to enlist in the hussars. He transferred to the Air Service as an observer and operated as such at the Somme until he became a pilot and joined Boelcke in September. When he made the change he was the only surviving aircrew of those with whom he had begun his operational career. This gave him so sincere a sympathy for the crews of two-seaters that he aimed always for the engine, to give their occupants a chance of survival. Everything that has been said about Voss evokes admiration.

  Guynemer was the outstanding French success during this period. Wounds inflicted at Verdun had kept him out of action from March, when he had a total of eight victories, until June. On 16th July he scored his ninth. By the end of November, when the offensive had petered out, they numbered twenty-three.

  *

  The squadrons flying what are now known as interception or air superiority fighters were not the only ones embroiled in or drastically affected by the Somme Offensive.

  Contact patrolling, low flying in close co-operation with infantry in attack, was a new facet of air operations. Hitherto this had been regarded as wasteful of aircrew and aircraft, and unproductive of accurate information. It had been found that there was no exceptional hazard in flying low; and prearranged signals enabled properly trained air observers to make precise reports on the infantry’s progress. Trials with yellow smoke flares on the ground showed that these could be seen at 6000 feet. The French, during their infantry attacks in late 1915, had used flares, signalling lamps and strips of white cloth laid on the ground. In April 1916 Joffre had issued instructions for the use of such means of air-to-ground signalling, and the British had adopted them.

  At the Somme, troops laid strips of white cloth on the ground when they reached certain specified points. They also carried metal mirrors on their back packs, which reflected light and could be seen from the air, so that observers could follow the advance. In addition to lamp signalling, ground HQs used panels consisting of six or eight louvred shutters, painted white on one side, which operated rather like a venetian blind. By exposing the white sides, Morse code could be seen, and read by air observers.

  Line patrols were flown by pairs of aircraft, to familiarise the ground forces with friendly shapes and markings, and to strafe the enemy. For the first time, fighters — DH2s — were used to clear the air ahead of advancing troops and to tempt enemy aircraft up to fight, giving rise to the term “offensive sweep”.

  An important ancillary of the main battle in Flanders was strategic bombing. This was aimed at railway lines and junctions, to disrupt the delivery of ammunition and other supplies, at supply and ammunition depots in such places as Lille, Namur, Mons, and at factories in Germany.

  *

  Strategic bombing leads us back to Raymond Collishaw, the Canadian who had had to overcome so many obstacles in order to qualify as a pilot in the Royal Naval Air Service, and who became Britain’s third-highest-scoring fighter pilot. We left him at the close of 1915, awaiting shipment to England. He sailed from Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 12th January 1916; made his first solo on 16th June, after eight hours and twenty-three minutes dual; flew seven types of aeroplane during training; joined No. 3 Naval Wing on 1st August, to fly the single-seater version of the Sopwith 1 ½ - strutter; and arrived in France, at Luxeuil, on 21st, September 1916. The RNAS had been active in France since the war began, but the details of its operations are outside the scope of this work. Certain of them, however, do impinge on it: as will be seen, the RFC had to turn to its sister Service for help when in dire straits.

  The wing comprised two squadrons, Red and Blue. A Flight of Red Squadron had five two-seater II-strutter bombers and one single-seater fighter. B Flight had the full establishment of five bombers and two fighters; Collishaw flew one of the latter. A Flight of Blue Squadron had four Sopwith bombers, two fighters. B Flight, six Breguet bombers. The wing’s operations were directed by Wing Commander Bell Davies, who had won the VC at the Dardanelles. The Admiralty seemed to know even less about aviation than the War Office: Bell Davies had a strenuous time in France convincing his masters in London that when an aeroplane’s engine failed during an operation, it could not be attributed to pilot error nor could punishment be inflicted.

  Surprisingly, there were monthly meetings between the Admiralty Air Department and l’Aviation Militaire. At one of these the French had suggested that an Allied bombing squadron should be formed to raid German munition factories. More unexpectedly, the sailors agreed. What was more, they contributed an entire wing. Since the best situation for the wing was in the French sector, it was put under French operational control.

  The Naval airmen shared Luxeuil airfield with the Lafayettes and the Quatrième Groupe de Bombardement, commanded by Commandant Felix Happe. This colourful character, over six feet tall with a bushy black beard, parted in the centre, and beetling eyebrows, had a lively sense of humour and was a staunch friend of No. 3 Wing. Among the fighter escadrilles selected to escort the Franco-British bombers was the Escadrille Lafayette. Naturally they and the nautics got on very well. They played baseball against each other and indulged in “some tremendous parties”, Collishaw recalled. He also commented that Whiskey, the escadrille’s pet lion mascot, “gave newcomers a bit of a start”. He says that the publicity given to the Lafayettes was unfair, when there were many more Americans flying with the RFC and RNAS, scoring more kills, winning more decorations, but receiving no public acknowledgment.

  The first operation, on 12th October, was on a large scale for the times and modern in conception. The target was the Mauser factory at Oberndorf, 175 miles away. Three Wing was able to put up five bombers and one fighter of A Flight Red Squadron and five bombers and two fighters of B Flight; four bombers and two fighters of A Flight Blue, and six bombers of B Flight. Happe provided twenty bombers. The Escadrille Lafayette and twelve French-built Sopwith 11-strutters from other escadrilles would escort the raiders as far as their range allowed. Bombers and fighters of the French 7th Army would make a diversionary raid on Lörrach, well to the south of the target and near the Swiss frontier. This was a thoroughly modern stratagem intended to distract enemy fighters.

  The Allied formations would take a direct route to target. After bombing, 3 Wing would make for a point north-west of Oberndorf before turning for home at 10,000-12,000 feet. The French would fly home direct. At 1 p.m. a weather reconnaissance — another modern feature — reported favourably. Fifteen minutes later six Farmans of 4th GB took off, followed by A Flight of Red Squadron at half past one and B Flight five minutes afterwards with B Flight of Blue Squadron. At a quarter past two, Blue’s A Flight and the remaining French aircraft would depart.

  Cloud base descended. The last four bombers were unable to get into formation and turned back. One crashed, but there was no serious injury to the crew.

  It was Collishaw’s first operation and he said that anyone who claims not to have been nervous on such an occasion has to be an insensitive idiot or to have a bad memory. One of Red B Flight’s bombers could not formate, so turned back. The five remaining pilots, Collishaw among them, were all Canadians. Crossing the lines, they met flak, but no one was hit. At 3000 feet three enemy fighters attacked. Collishaw engaged one, his engine cut out after he had fired, he lost 2000 feet and had to return to base. The four bombers of Blue Squadron’s A Flight turned back after failing to make formation. Its B Flight found difficulty in climbing to 10,000 feet and did not cross the lines until half past three. By
then most of the rest were arriving at Oberndorf. Heavy flak brought one down and its crew was captured. Fighters attacked the remainder, which beat them off. At 4.10 p.m. they thought they were over the target, and bombed; but the town was Donau-Eschingen. One Bréguet was shot down by a fighter and another crash-landed. Both crews were taken prisoner. The Sopwith fighters of Blue Squadron claimed one German fighter destroyed and one probable.

  The French lost six bombers. Several fighters crashed on landing. Most of the bomber losses were among those which the Nieuports escorted: the latters’ range was too short. Happe thereafter ceased regular daylight raids and resorted to night operations. Three Wing, with its long-range fighters, carried on with daylights.

  The raid had scored several hits but caused no serious damage. Three Wing dropped 3900 pounds of bombs, of which not all were on target. Bombing from 10,000 feet with primitive bomb sights could not expect to be accurate.[9] Total Allied losses were sixteen aircrew killed or made prisoners of war.

  *

  On 1st January 1916 The London Gazette announced that Sholto Douglas had been mentioned in despatches; on the 14th, the award of a Military Cross to him and Childs, his observer. He went on a week’s home leave and thence to 18 Reserve Training Squadron, where he supervised flying training on advanced types, the BE2C and Avro 504J. In May, aged twenty-two, he was posted to Stirling to form a new squadron, No. 43, then take it to France by the end of the year. In August he was moved to Netheravon, where the squadron was supposed to equip with Sopwith 1 ½ - strutter two-seaters armed with a front-firing Vickers for the pilot and a swivel-mounted Lewis for his observer. The squadron’s task was to be long-range strategic reconnaissance, which necessitated an aeroplane that could fight as well as do observation.

  Douglas was promoted to major, and, on 16th October, attached to No. 70 Squadron at Fienvilliers, to obtain some experience of the work his own squadron would be doing. No.70 was carrying out long-range reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance and offensive patrols. At that time it had the heaviest casualties of the squadrons in France. The aerodrome, where HQ 9th Wing was also situated, was near the village in which Trenchard had his Advanced HQ. The wing was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Cyril Newall,[10] but had until recently been under Dowding. When Douglas returned to 43 Squadron at the end of October he found that owing to the casualty rate in France all his pilots and observers, including the flight commanders, had been posted to the Front. He had to begin training all over again with raw material. By January 1917 the squadron was fully equipped with 1 ½ strutters, and on 17th January went to France.