The First Great Air War

by Richard Townsend Bickers

  Parallel with the improving performance of aeroplanes, the weapons with which they were armed, and the artillery that threatened them from the ground, amidst all the overheated and often melodramatic politics of war, another concern than those that dealt with destruction was stirring. Typically, Henderson was at its core.

  On 6th February 1917 the Royal Flying Corps Hospital was opened. This was the culmination of a plan that had begun in early 1915, when a small hospital for RFC officers was started by Dr Atkin Swan and Mrs Paynter. At first it consisted of a few beds in a private London nursing home. Later they rented a small house which would accommodate twelve patients. Then Lady Tredegar offered her house, 37 Bryanston Square, with a large contribution towards equipment and upkeep. By May 1916, 350 cases had been treated there: wounded from the Front, victims of accidents at home, and others whose health had been impaired by continuous flying. Many dangerous and delicate operations had been performed, by means of which lives were saved and officers made fit to resume their duties. In addition, 1100 out-patients had been treated, almost all by Dr Atkin Swan. The whole medical staff and other workers gave their services voluntarily.

  The existing accommodation had become inadequate and a thirty-one-bed extension was being opened at 82 Eaton Square. The increased expenditure meant that the hospital could no longer exist on private contributions. Among the Henderson papers is an appeal he evidently sent out, but no indication of its circulation.

  “I am sure, if those who read this could only see the patients, whose one wish is to get back to their work, if they could know their indomitable spirit, and hear some of their stories of deeds done in the air, with utter simplicity which makes one proud to be of their race, they would give to their utmost to help these boys to regain the use of their broken limbs and their nerves, which are often shattered for the time being by all they have been through.”

  At last here was official recognition of battle fatigue and sympathy for it, not revilement. Medical treatment for suffering minds and spirits was proffered instead of a brusque order to undertake even more than usually trying duties in the air or to serve for a spell in the trenches.

  The War Office and Admiralty had ideas that differed from Henderson’s and were advocating a joint hospital in which RFC and Naval officers would be treated. The latter would include the RNAS; but as this was a much smaller Service than the RFC, naval Medical Officers had comparatively little experience of treating patients suffering from psychological illnesses arising from operational flying.

  On 14th June 1917, Henderson wrote to the Adjutant General. “I beg that you will submit this question to the Secretary of State for reconsideration. I have only now seen this paper for the first time, and there are a good many points which have not been considered at all.

  “1. Present experience of the peculiar ailments to which flying men are subjected is too valuable to be wasted. A great deal of knowledge is now possessed by the Standing Medical Board of the RFC and the staff of RFC Hospitals. Far more attention is being given by the Military than the Naval authorities. If officers of the RFC were to be relegated to a Naval Hospital, the whole of this knowledge and experience would be lost. There have been, ever since the beginning of the war, Medical Officers giving special attention to the RFC in France and they have accumulated the most knowledge.

  “2. If the Army Medical Authorities consider they are unable to look after RFC sick and wounded due to temporary difficulties with regard to medical personnel, the whole of the experience of the war will be lost to them and when the war is over the RFC will either have to be dependent on the Royal Navy for medical advice, or to subject themselves to medical experiments under the hands of Doctors to whom the whole subject will be absolutely new.

  “3. In the Military Wing of the RFC alone there is an average sick list of something over 400 officers, including wounded. Through private enterprise, we are able to deal with a certain number in RFC Hospitals (51 beds) and 70 beds in Auxiliary Hospitals in the country. Therefore there are still some 300 cases which should be concentrated. I cannot see that they would require any larger staff when concentrated than while distributed among Military Hospitals.

  “The number will certainly not diminish and is quite large enough to justify a separate Military Hospital without taking into account any possible Naval cases.

  “With regard to accommodation, I do not think it would be possible to work the present RFC Hospitals under Naval control or in conjunction with the Naval Hospital. There would also be many difficulties in combining the activities of the present Standing Medical Board under Naval administration.

  “4. After considerable delay and difficulty, we now have working a system by which the Standing Medical Board is able to keep records, more or less complete, of flying officers whose sickness or injuries cause any element of doubt about fitness for future flying.

  “These cases are peculiar, and require watching, and although there are great difficulties under the present system, where a large number of officers are not in special Hospitals, yet the whole organisation is Military, it is possible to do something towards this end. Civil staff of RFC Hospitals give great assistance in this respect but as they give their services voluntarily, it is necessary to establish and maintain personal friendly relations with them, and I am extremely doubtful of the attitude they would adopt if the scheme were put through.

  “5. I see no particular advantage in a joint Hospital because I do not think we are likely to obtain a single hospital large enough to contain all the Military cases alone. If, however, a joint hospital is insisted upon, it seems to me absolutely essential that it should be under Military control, if only for the reason that the whole of the organisation for treatment of and research into the peculiar ailments due to the Air have been carried out by the Army. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the Navy Medical Service has been very little acquainted with these problems.”

  There was no bigotry about Henderson’s stance. He was not moved by jealousy of the Royal Navy. He knew what was best for the Royal Flying Corps and had taken part in the efforts that had been made privately to provide it. As well as the depth of compassion to be concerned about the plight of those serving under him, he had the breadth of vision to be concerned about the effect that neglect of their needs would have on the efficiency of the Service.

  He submitted his plea to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. “One of the most important needs for the Air Service is a specialised Medical Service, but in this case, as in a good many other matters, the urgent necessity has only become apparent during the last year. It has been found by experience that flying men are subject to many peculiar physical disabilities, and research into methods of prevention and cure of these disabilities has advanced very rapidly. So long, however, as the Flying Services remain merely minor appendages of the Army and Navy, it is very difficult to provide for the study of these medical matters and for the special treatment of the patients.

  “Knowledge on the subject is limited almost exclusively to a few Medical Officers and civilian Doctors who have had considerable numbers of flying men continuously under their care, and it is necessary at once to take special measures to provide separate accommodation for these cases and separate staff to concentrate on the problems which arise. The mere selection of candidates for the Flying Services has become a highly specialised business and the standard of fitness required for flying is diverging from the standard for ordinary Naval or Military officers.

  “Also there are many minor physical reasons which render a man quite unfitted for flying, yet may, if taken in time, be removed or cured.

  “More important are the many precautions which have to be taken to enable pilots to maintain their fitness under the severe conditions of modern air warfare.

  “It is not too much to say that what has been called the strain of flying, and has in the past been put down entirely to nervous causes, is very frequently the result of physical conditions which can be ameliorate
d. It is probable that the advance of medical science may tend to prolong considerably what is called the life of a pilot, i.e., the period for which he can continue active flying.

  “It is only by means of a Medical Service devoted entirely to the study of aeronautical problems that real progress can be ensured.”

  Henderson’s interest in, advocacy of and ultimate success with Aviation Medicine benefited the Royal Flying Corps, and ultimately the Royal Air Force, as greatly as any of Trenchard’s achievements in other spheres of crucial importance to the existing and future Service.

  *

  Saving lives and sanity, healing wounds, repairing broken limbs, and the internal injuries common when aeroplanes crashed, was all very well; but analysis of the ways in which the total number of those killed at the Front had met their deaths indicates that one-third could have been saved by the provision of parachutes.

  Balloon observers on both sides used parachutes similar to the one that Pégoud had demonstrated at Hendon in 1913. They were contained in a bag attached outside the basket or aircraft and connected to the man by a long cord, which tugged the canopy open when he jumped. They could have been used by Service aircrews, although many would have been riddled with bullets or consumed by flames and rendered useless. Designers were working on one, to be worn by pilots and observers, which was compact and less at risk from damage.

  Whatever form such a life-saving piece of equipment might have taken, it seems that it was opposed by the senior officers who sat secure from danger at staff desks. The reasons put forward for prohibiting parachutes was, at best, a parody of the code of Victorian “manliness”: balloon observers could resort to a parachute without shame, because they were defenceless (apart from the concentration of machineguns and anti-aircraft cannon sited specially to protect them, which were evidently ignored). Aeroplanes, on the other hand, carried weapons: their crews were therefore not entitled to a means of escape. They must rely on their flying skill and good shooting to save their lives. The Air Board advocated, instead of parachutes, armour plating to protect aircraft and their occupants.

  The Air Board condemned itself. “It is the opinion of the Board that the present form of parachute is not suitable for use in aeroplanes and should only be used by balloon observers.

  “It is also the opinion of the Board that the presence of such an apparatus might impair the fighting spirit of pilots and cause them to abandon machines which might otherwise be capable of returning to base for repair.”

  In fact, the Board harboured the insulting suspicion that pilots would be tempted to abandon combat and jump for their lives in moments of extreme disadvantage instead of pressing on and fighting to the death. If a naval captain traditionally went down with his ship rather than take to a lifeboat or put on a life jacket and swim, why shouldn’t a pilot or observer display the same phlegm?

  Those who should have provided for the saving of life by parachute were guilty of ignorance and disregard for human life; which they evidently rated less important than the salvage of aircraft.

  As early as 1908 a parachute worn by the jumper and opened by a ripcord he operated had been invented in the United States and often displayed during the next four years. This could easily have been copied or bought by all the world’s air forces for their aeroplanes. Nobody gave the matter any attention.

  In 1914 a civilian, E. R. Calthrop, had perfected a parachute that, although it had to be attached to the fuselage, was smaller and more efficient than the Spencer type fitted to balloons. He gave it the unfortunate name “Guardian Angel”, whose connotation of a convenient means of avoiding danger prejudiced the Admiralty and War Office against it. He seems also to have been less than diplomatic in his approach to these pompous authorities. The RNAS and RFC refused to attend a demonstration.

  In 1915 the Superintendent of the Royal Aircraft Factory wished to make experiments with Calthrop’s parachute. He informed the Directorate of Military Aviation that he had fitted one to an aeroplane and was ready to carry out tests with a dummy. He asked if the Directorate wished him to proceed.

  Henderson himself replied and his words are astonishing after his general humanitarian concern and the many occasions on which he had shown high intelligence and foresight. He wrote back: “Certainly not.” But then, this was the man who had compared loss of life in war with the breaking of eggs for omelettes. So perhaps there was not so wide a gulf between his code and conscience and Trenchard’s after all.

  Although Calthrop persisted in trying to press his invention on the authorities, that was the end of the matter.

  Trenchard emerges from the controversy with credit. In 1917 he suggested that trials should be made in France. This was turned down: so he asked for twenty of Calthrop’s parachutes for dropping agents behind enemy lines; and got them.

  A ludicrous intervention was made by a sixty-nine-year-old member of the Air Board, Lord Sydenham, who had retired from the Army in 1896 and had never set foot in an aeroplane. He queried whether a pilot would have time to think of taking to his parachute in the throes of coping with an emergency. This absurdity was endorsed by General Groves, whose written comment was that a stricken aeroplane usually fell so fast that a pilot had no time to think of abandoning it. Groves had never flown either.

  The improvement of parachutes continued, but none was issued to any of the Allied air forces during this war. A few Germans were seen to use them in its last few months.

  *

  The Allied Commanders-in-Chief tried to alleviate the general gloom that had prevailed since the Somme by planning a Spring Offensive which would enable the 3,900,000 British, Commonwealth, French and Belgian troops to win substantial ground from the 2,500,000 Germans who opposed them.

  In the air, Germany had thirty-three Jagdstaffeln and was forming more. The RFC and Aviation Militaire were recruiting vigorously and expanding. Trenchard informed Haig that he would need twelve long-range bomber squadrons and fifty-six fighters and Army co-operation.

  The Albatros DIII and Halberstadt DII were better than any British fighter except the Sopwith Pup. This had first been issued to the RNAS in the last quarter of 1916. Armed with a Vickers gun synchronised with the propeller, a delight to handle, responsive, swift and free of vice, it climbed to 10,000 feet in under twelve and a half minutes and its speed at that height was 104 m.p.h. It instantly proved a success in action.

  In October 1916 Trenchard had asked the Admiralty for help: eighteen fighters from those based at Dunkirk. His urgent plea was granted. A new squadron, Naval Eight, was formed with one flight of Pups, one of Nieuport IIs and one of two-seater Sopwith 1½ -strutters. In November the two-seaters were replaced by Pups, which, in December, also replaced the Nieuports. By the end of the month the Pups had shot down twenty of the enemy and the Nieuports two. The squadron had lost two pilots. Early in 1917 it returned to its own Service.

  There was now also one Pup squadron in the RFC, No. 54. The Germans admitted the Pup’s speed, manoeuvrability and fighting qualities. On 4th January Flight Lieutenant A. S. Todd of Naval Eight fought three Albatroses led by Richthofen, who reported: “A Sopwith one-seater attacked us and we saw at once that the enemy aircraft was superior to ours. Only because we were three against one we detected its weak points. I managed to get behind him and shot him down.”

  The current Albatros and Halberstadt were superior to the French fighters except the Spad, which had begun to reach the Front by the end of 1916. Spad was the acronym for La Société pour l’Aviation et ses Dérives. The S7 of this marque was the fastest aeroplane at the Front and carried one Vickers gun firing through the propeller.

  The Italian Air Corps was also increasing in numbers and improving the quality of its equipment. The aviation industry was growing. Static warfare made it possible to improve living conditions and technical facilities on the aerodromes. Photographic reconnaissance was producing excellent results and dominated winter activities. Preparations were going forward for the Tenth Battle of the I
sonzo, in the spring.

  *

  McCudden, who had, as an observer, been promoted to flight sergeant in January 1916, was sent home that month for pilot training; at last. On 8th July he was back in France as a flight sergeant pilot on No. 20 Squadron. In August he had been transferred to 29 Squadron to fly DH2s and had made his first kill as pilot on 6th September.

  On New Year’s Day 1917 he was commissioned as a second lieutenant. He scored his second victory on 26th January; and, by the time he was posted to England as an instructor, on 23rd February, he had shot down three more enemy aeroplanes.

  Mannock, whose career as a fighter pilot ran parallel with McCudden’s, had applied for a transfer from the Royal Army Medical Corps to the Royal Engineers Signals Section as an officer cadet. In March 1916 he was a sergeant major in his new corps; and still burning with class hatred. He told his civilian friends that he had to work extra hard to compete with the better-educated candidates, loathed the conversation of the ruling class and hated them almost as much as he did Germans. While on leave he met a friend who was now an RFC pilot and this, together with the newspaper accounts of Ball’s exploits, attracted him to the idea of flying. As soon as he was commissioned, in June 1916, he had applied for the RFC and had begun his ground training in August. On 28th November he had passed the Royal Aero Club test. On 5th December he had joined No. 19 Training Squadron, then began a course at the Hythe School of Gunnery on 1st February 1917.