Midnight in Chernobyl

by Adam Higginbotham

  The first RBMK unit: Construction start dates for RBMK units across the USSR are given in Sich, “Chornobyl Accident Revisited,” 148.

  But the initial Leningrad reactor: The Leningrad station’s Unit One reached full power eleven months after its start-up, on November 1, 1974 (Schmid, Producing Power, 114).

  The first problem arose: International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 35–37.

  Even as it went into full-scale: Ibid., 37.

  The RBMK was so large: Ibid., 6.

  One specialist compared it to a huge apartment building: Veniamin Prianichnikov, author interview, Kiev, February 13, 2006.

  Isolated hot spots: Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 140; International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG– 7, 39–40.

  “experience and intuition”: International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 4–5.

  A third fault: Ibid., 43; Sich, “Chornobyl Accident Revisited,” 185. The original design documentation for the RBMK proposed seven-meter-long RCPS rods with a seven-meter absorber and displacer, which would completely span the core top to bottom when lowered; 68 of these would be Emergency Protection System (EPS) rods. But in the final design, none of the rods would be long enough to completely span the core, and instead of 68 EPS rods, there would be only 21. For second-generation RBMK reactors, this was amended to 24 EPS rods, and the total number of rods increased to 211.

  Yet the AZ-5 mechanism was not designed: International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 45.

  Starting from their fully withdrawn position: Ibid., 41.

  Fuel assemblies became stuck in their channels: Schmid, Producing Power, 114.

  The valves and flow meters in other RBMKs: Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 140–41.

  On the night of November 30, 1975: Vitali Abakumov, a former Leningrad station engineer, shared details and personal recollections of the accident in “Analyzing the Causes and Circumstances of the 1975 Accident on Unit One of Leningrad NPP (Perspective of an Engineer-Physicist, Participant and Witness to the Events)” [Анализ причин и обстоятельств аварии 1975 года на 1-м блоке ЛАЭС (комментарий инженера-физика, участника и очевидца событий)], April 10, 2013, http://accidont.ru/Accid75.html. Also see Valentin Fedulenko, “Versions of the Accident: A Participant’s Memoir and an Expert’s Opinion” [Версии аварии: мемуары участника и мнение эксперта], September 19, 2008, www.chernobyl.by/accident/28-versii-avarii-memuary-uchastnika-i-mnenie.html.

  But the commission knew otherwise: Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 161.

  Sredmash suppressed the commission’s findings: Ibid.; International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 48–49.

  The day after the Leningrad meltdown: The government decree no. 2638 R was issued on December 1, 1975 (International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 33).

  On August 1, 1977: Nikolai Steinberg, author interview, Kiev, May 28, 2017.

  Ukraine’s first nuclear electricity: Kopchinsky and Steinberg provide the date in Chernobyl, 116. For a history of Ukraine’s electricity grid, see “Section 3: Ukraine’s Unified Power Grid,” in K. B. Denisevich et al., Book 4: The Development of Atomic Power and Unified Electricity Systems [Книга 4: Развитие атомной энергетики и объединенных энергосистем] (Kiev: Energetika, 2011), http://energetika.in.ua/ru/books/book-4/section-2/section-3.

  Together they sang: Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 139–40. (The preceding part of the chant was a sardonic recognition that the more sophisticated VVER reactors that had been planned to go into operation were mired in production problems and delays.)

  Making dozens of adjustments every minute: Steinberg, author interview, 2015.

  Rumors reached them: Ibid.; Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 140.

  “How can you possibly control”: Georgi Reikhtman (at the time of this exchange, a trainee reactor operator at Chernobyl Unit One), author interview, Kiev, September 2015.

  The reactor was riddled with faults: Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 140–42.

  In 1980 NIKIET completed: International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 48–49.

  The report made it clear: Ibid., 82.

  But the staff of Soviet nuclear power plants: Schmid, Producing Power, 62–63; Read, Ablaze, 193.

  One of the new directives stipulated: International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 72.

  Deprived of information: Ibid., 48–50.

  Early on the evening of September 9, 1982: The KGB’s report on the incident the following day is provided in Danilyuk, ed., Z arkhiviv, Document no. 9: “Report of the UkSSR KGBM on Kiev and Kiev Region to the 2nd KGB Head-office of the USSR and the 2nd KGB Managing the UkSSR Concerning the Emergency Stoppage of the Chernobyl’ NPS Power Unit 1 on September 9, 1982,” September 10, 1982.

  Nikolai Steinberg was sitting at the desk: Steinberg, author interview, 2015.

  “to prevent the spread of panic-mongering”: The purported lack of radioactive releases was mentioned in a KGB report from September 13, 1982, available in Danilyuk, ed., Z arkhiviv, Document no. 10: “Report of the UkSSR KGBM on Kiev and Kiev Region to the USSR KGB and the UkSSR KGB Concerning the Results of Preliminary Investigation of the Cause of the Emergency Situation on the Chernobyl’ NPS as of September 9, 1982,” September 13, 1982. The fact that radiation was indeed released was noted by KGB on September 14. See KGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Report of USSR KGB on the number of foreigners from capitalist and developing countries in the Ukrainian SSR, England-Based Combatants of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Consequences of the Accident at the NPP [Информационное сообщение КГБ УССР о количестве иностранцев из капиталистических и развивающихся стран в УССР, ОУНовских боевиках в Англии, последствиях аварии на АЭС на 14 сентября 1982 г.], September 14, 1982, declassified archive of the Ukrainian State Security Service, http://avr.org.ua/index.php/viewDoc/24447/.

  In fact, radioactive contamination: Danilyuk, ed., Z arkhiviv, Document no. 12: Report of the UkSSR KGBM on Kiev and Kiev Region to the USSR KGB and UkSSR KGB concerning the Radioactive Contamination of Chernobyl’ NPS Industrial Site Due to the Accident on 9 September 1982, September 14, 1982; and Document no. 13: Report of the Chief of the UkSSR KGBM on Kiev and Kiev Region to the Chairman of the UkSSR KGB Concerning the Radiation Situation Which Occurred on the Chernobyl’ NPS Industrial Site Due to the Accident on September 9, 1982, October 30, 1982; Viktor Kovtutsky, chief accountant at Chernobyl construction department, author interview, Kiev, April 2016; Esaulov, City That Doesn’t Exist, 19.

  When the reactor had been brought back online: Read, Ablaze, 43–44.

  Workers carried blocks: Andrei Glukhov, author interview, Slavutych, Ukraine, 2015.

  The incident was classified: Author interviews with Steinberg and Glukhov.

  Nikolai Steinberg would wait years: Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 141; Steinberg, author interview, 2015.

  In October 1982 a generator exploded: Grigori Medvedev, Truth About Chernobyl, 19 and 44–45.

  Both incidents were concealed: Author interviews with Steinberg, Glukhov, and Kupny; Grigori Medvedev, Truth About Chernobyl, 19.

  The severity of this “positive scram” effect: The ORM, or operational reactivity margin, measured the total number of control rods—or their equivalent in power-quenching capacity—inserted into the core at any one time. For example, an ORM of 30 might indicate 30 rods completely inserted, 60 rods inserted to half their length, or 120 inserted to a quarter.

  If more than 30 of these rods: International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 39–43.

  The source of the positive scram effect: Steinberg, author interview, 2017; Sich, “Chornobyl Accident Revisited,” 159.

  Like all the manual control rods: Steinberg, a
uthor interview, 2017; Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 144; International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 42–44, 90n24. The letter (ref. no. 33-08/67) was dated December 23, 1983.

  But they weren’t: At a 1983 interdepartmental meeting in Moscow hosted by Aleksandrov, Efim Slavsky reacted with fury when discussion turned to the shortcomings of the RBMK. His stance helped “close the door to a serious conversation about this type of reactor,” recalls Georgi Kopchinsky, then the head of the nuclear energy sector at the Central Committee, who attended the meeting. See Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 145. There is more detail on the failures to address the known design faults of RBMK reactors in Nikolai Karpan, Chernobyl: Revenge of the Peaceful Atom [Чернобыль: Месть мирного атома] (Kiev: CHP Country Life, 2005), 399–404.

  Some partial modifications: INSAG–7 (45) reports that modification of the control rods was proposed by NIKIET as early as 1977 but implemented in only a few RBMK reactors. Kopchinsky mentions that the idea came from the atomic power plant in Kursk and “was never incorporated into the reactor blueprint.” Instead, alteration of each RBMK unit required individual confirmation from NIKIET, a process that “dragged on for months” (Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 144).

  The news never reached the reactor operators: Steinberg, author interview, 2015; Alexey Breus, author interview, Kiev, July 2015; Kopchinsky and Steinberg, Chernobyl, 144; Andrei Glukhov recalled that the staff of the nuclear safety department at Chernobyl received a document notifying them of the “tip effect” in 1983 but that it was marked for limited distribution only, and the operating instructions of the reactor were not revised to mention the phenomenon (Glukhov, telephone interview, July 2018).

  The last day of 1983: The commissioning date of Unit Four is confirmed by Nikolai Fomin, chief engineer of Chernobyl NPP, in Karpan, From Chernobyl to Fukushima, 143.

  Early in the morning of March 28, 1979: There is a brisk account of the accident in Mahaffey, Atomic Accidents, 342–50, and Mahaffey, Atomic Awakening, 314–17. More detail can be found in Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton Jr. (NRC Special Inquiry Group), Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980).

  News of Three Mile Island was censored: Grigori Medvedev, Truth About Chernobyl, 7.

  The failings of capitalism: William C. Potter, Soviet Decisionmaking for Chernobyl: An Analysis of System Performance and Policy Change (report to the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1990), 6; Edward Geist, “Political Fallout: The Failure of Emergency Management at Chernobyl’,” Slavic Review 74, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 107–8.

  Its operators were far better trained: Leonid Bolshov, a senior physicist at the Kurchatov Institute at the time, recalls that the official line went as follows: the American operators were poorly educated former navy cadets, who never completed college, while the Russian operators were all nuclear science majors from top universities with superior training (author interview, 2017). Also see Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 272–73.

  Privately, Soviet physicists began to analyze: Virtually the only public admission of these professional doubts that made it to print was a 1980 article coauthored by four physicists—Legasov, Sidorenko, Babayev, and Kuzmin—who wrote: “Under certain circumstances, despite existing safety measures, there might arise conditions for an accident at a [nuclear power plant] that would damage its active zone and release a small amount of radioactive substances to the atmosphere.” It was promptly criticized by Sredmash as alarmist. “Safety Issues at Atomic Power Stations” [Проблемы безопасности на атомных электростанциях], Priroda, no. 6, 1980. For discussions of the USSR’s evolving state oversight committees for nuclear power, see Schmid, Producing Power, 59–60 and 92.

  But neither Sredmash nor NIKIET: International Atomic Energy Agency, INSAG–7, 34–35.

  A ten-page report on the wonders of nuclear energy: “Nuclear Power Industry,” Soviet Life 353, no. 2 (Washington, DC: Soviet Embassy, February 1986), 7–16.

  “In the thirty years”: Valery Legasov, Lev Feoktistov, and Igor Kuzmin, “Nuclear Power Engineering and International Security,” Soviet Life 353, no. 2, 14.

  “one in 10,000 years”: Vitali Sklyarov, interview by Maxim Rylsky, “The Nuclear Power Industry in the Ukraine,” Soviet Life 353, no. 2, 8. When I spoke to Sklyarov in 2017, he claimed to have no memory of this statement or the article it appeared in.

  5. FRIDAY, APRIL 25, 11:55 P.M., UNIT CONTROL ROOM NUMBER FOUR

  A rancid haze of cigarette smoke: Alexey Breus, author interview, Kiev, July 2015. Smoking was forbidden in most parts of the plant, and the control rooms were one of the few places where it was tolerated. The reactor control engineers smoked at the control panels, and Leonid Toptunov (along with an overwhelming number of others in the USSR at the time) was a smoker.

  Now entering his second day without sleep: Dyatlov’s defender, cross-examining Fomin in court, in trial proceedings reproduced in Karpan, states that Dyatlov managed the operations of Unit Four alone for two days. Fomin responds that Dyatlov had gone home for a “break” on the afternoon of April 25, but remained available by telephone. Chernobyl to Fukushima, 148.

  Exhausted and unhappy: Boris Stolyarchuk, author interview, Kiev, July 2015.

  It was one scenario: A total loss of power of this kind had already occurred at the Kursk nuclear power plant in 1980: Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 269.

  The station had emergency diesel generators: Sich, “Chornobyl Accident Revisited,” 225.

  The rundown unit: Nikolai Steinberg, former senior engineer at Chernobyl NPP, recalls that three similar tests took place before 1986—not one of them able to generate the amount of electricity that a total external power failure would require (author interview, 2015). The International Atomic Energy Agency report (INSAG–7) summarizes the history of the rundown test on p. 51. The fact that Reactor Number Four was commissioned without this test being completed is noted by the trial judge in the transcript of Chernobyl court proceedings in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 143.

  Factories and enterprises throughout Ukraine: This practice of shturmovshchina before important production quota deadlines—literally, taking them “by storm”—was a regular feature of Soviet working life: Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 25–26. See also the account of Igor Kazachkov, who supervised the first shift at Unit Four that day, in Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 34.

  The dispatcher said: Gennadi Metlenko (chief engineer of Dontekhenergo), court testimony, in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 178.

  By midnight on Friday: Metlenko, questioned by Dyatlov in court testimony, in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 180.

  He hadn’t shown up at all: Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 146 and 191; Glukhov, author interview, 2015.

  Twenty-five-year-old: Leonid Toptunov’s date of birth (August 16, 1960) is provided by his mother, Vera Toptunova, in author interview, 2015.

  If the test wasn’t completed that night: Zhores Medvedev, Legacy of Chernobyl, 28.

  At fifty-five: Anatoly Dyatlov’s date of birth (March 3, 1931) is given in the court verdict reproduced in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 194.

  A veteran physicist: Dyatlov, court testimony, in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 151.

  The son of a peasant: Read, Ablaze, 33–34 and 46.

  As the head of the classified Laboratory 23: V. A. Orlov’s and V. V. Grischenko’s recollections, parts III and V in “Appendix 8: Memories about A. S. Dyatlov,” in Dyatlov, Chernobyl: How It Was, 183 and 187. For a history of the Lenin Komsomol shipyard, see “Komsomol’sk-na-Amure,” Russia: Industry: Shipbuilding, GlobalSecurity.org, November 2011.

  By the time he arrived in Chernobyl: Dyatlov, court testimony, in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 156.

  These small marine reactors: Dyatlov, Chernobyl: How It Was, 25–32; Dyatlov, court testimony, in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 152.

&nb
sp; But the manner Dyatlov had developed: Anatoly Kryat’s recollections, part IV in Appendix 8 of Dyatlov, Chernobyl: How It Was, 186; Steinberg, author interview, 2015; Glukhov, author interview, 2015.

  Even those colleagues: Valentin Grischenko, who worked with Dyatlov at both the Lenin Komsomol shipyard and Chernobyl, notes that out of all Dyatlov’s colleagues in Chernobyl, only one—another longtime collaborator, Anatoly Sitnikov—could be considered a close friend of his. Grischenko’s recollections in Dyatlov, Chernobyl: How It Was, 187.

  He could be high-handed: Korol, author interview, 2015.

  He demanded that any fault: Dyatlov, court testimony, in Karpan, Chernobyl to Fukushima, 152; Breus, author interview, 2015.

  Even when overruled from above: Grischenko’s recollections, in Dyatlov, Chernobyl: How It Was, 187.

  And Dyatlov’s long experience: Dyatlov, Chernobyl: How It Was, 25–26.

  Dyatlov had fulfilled: Steinberg, author interviews, 2015 and 2017; Read, Ablaze, 47; Grischenko’s recollections in Dyatlov, Chernobyl: How It Was, 187.

  Only long afterward would his secret emerge: Anatoly Dyatlov, personal letter (unpublished) to Toptunov’s parents, Vera and Feodor, June 1, 1989, from the personal archive of Vera Toptunova; Sergei Yankovsky (investigator for the Kiev Region Prosecutor’s Office), author interview, Kiev, February 7, 2016; Read, Ablaze, 47. Dyatlov describes the dose of radiation he received during his time at the shipyard—without attributing it directly to the accident—in an interview given to A. Budnitsky and V. Smaga, “The Reactor’s Explosion Was Inevitable” [Реактор должен был взорваться], Komsomolskoye Znamya, April 20, 1991, reproduced in Dyatlov, How It Was, 168.