Africa

by Guy Arnold

  At the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) conference held at Moshi, Tanzania, in February 1962, the split between the USSR and China became apparent as they argued about aid to Africa, prompting President Nyerere, the host, to issue a warning about a ‘second scramble for Africa’; he said that both the rich capitalist countries and the ‘rich socialist countries’ were using their wealth not to wipe out poverty but to gain might and prestige. Nonetheless, China and the Soviet Union vied with each other in their offers of aid and by the end of 1963 Soviet credits to Ghana, Guinea and Mali had exceeded Chinese promises by US$100 million while China was importing only one third the amount imported by Russia from the same three countries. Then, at the Sixth AAPSO meeting in Algiers during March 1964 the Chinese onslaught on the USSR was so vitriolic that it led to an open rebuke from the African delegates that China risked splitting Afro-Asian ranks. The USSR was learning the limitations that constrained the ‘progressive’ African states and the extent to which they could turn to it for assistance, and those who argued that the USSR would be able to help progressive leadership overcome imperialist subversion exaggerated either the power or the determination of the USSR. The relative ability of the USSR as opposed to the Western powers to intervene in Africa on behalf of its allies or protégés was illustrated to its disadvantage when in 1964 the armies of East Africa mutinied and Britain sent troops to restore order, or when the ousted President M’ba of Gabon was able to call on French paratroopers to restore him to power; on the other hand, when Nkrumah was overthrown in Ghana, or Keita in Mali, the USSR was unable or unwilling to come to their assistance.

  During the 1960s the USSR became a modest supplier of arms in Africa and as such remained no more than a marginal great power in relation to the continent. Its real impact as an arms supplier would come in the 1970s, especially in relation to Ethiopia and Angola. The state of relations between the USSR and Africa in reality depended upon two factors: the enthusiasm of the Soviet Union and the receptiveness of the partner and by and large both the enthusiasm and receptiveness were on a moderate scale during the 1960s and, despite Western propaganda about Soviet penetration of the continent, nowhere did the USSR impose a presence on an unwilling African partner. The USSR sought diplomatic and economic recognition everywhere but was not engaged in Communist subversion: that was largely a figment of Western imagination. Membership of the Communist camp may have been the theory but the practice was big power pragmatism. ‘There is no evidence of the single minded pursuit of well considered objectives that form the backbone of the “Communist subversion” arguments.’10 What the 1960s witnessed was little more than a modest advance of Soviet influence in Africa.

  Many of the newly independent African states proclaimed foreign policies that veered to the left as though this would compensate for the lack of necessary internal reforms. The rhetoric of socialism was really meaningless when the elites enjoyed European standards while the majority of the population continued to live on a scale of one fifteenth or more below their elite leaders. The end of empires left a series of power vacuums across Africa and those leaders who succeeded in replacing the departing imperial rulers proved exceedingly reluctant to let go once they had control of the levers of power and, notwithstanding all the demands for democracy that they had levelled at the colonial authorities prior to independence, were more concerned to entrench themselves and their supporters in permanent control than ever they were to have a genuine democratic dialogue with the masses. Thus, many members of the small elites that had provided the vanguard of the independence struggles now installed themselves in place of the departing whites and assumed all their privileges, although without justifying this by either work or dedication in building their new societies. As René Dumont claimed: ‘Too many African elites have interpreted independence as simply meaning that they could move into the jobs and enjoy the privileges of the Europeans.’ It then became necessary to decolonize these new leaders themselves. There was for these new elites another very African problem, which they had to face. This concerned the African tradition of hospitality and the expectation of poor relatives that those with jobs would find them places or keep them. Sometimes the descent of parasitic kin upon someone who did have a job deprived the wage or salary earner of any chance to invest his money or use it for himself and his immediate family, and pressures of this kind often forced those who were employed to seek a post in another part of the country so as to escape the attentions and demands of tribal kin. Western accusations of nepotism against members of the new elites, including the top political figures, often ignored what could be overwhelming pressures from kin, however distant in a Western sense; if a man did have influence, the easiest way to rid himself of what could be an intolerable burden was to obtain posts for them.

  The fruits of office have always beguiled even those who began as dedicated revolutionaries. Arguably, the greatest achievement of the colonial powers was to create a brainwashed elite whose members felt more at home in the metropolitan countries than in their own and who, at home, wanted all the appurtenances of Western culture and material comforts at the expense of indigenous African style. Meanwhile, the steady movement to the towns of young men seeking a better future denuded the countryside of its most able people while, all too often, those who reached the towns did not find work but instead ended up in the shanty towns that rapidly mushroomed round the principal cities. While this human drama was taking place, political leaders felt impelled to construct what were seen as the essential hallmarks of an independent nation: monuments to national heroes, new stadiums, conference halls, luxury hotels to accommodate visiting dignitaries, presidential palaces if the residence of the former governor was not considered grand enough, while motorways and new airlines or grandiose industrial ventures such as steel mills provided the outward show of an independent state even though the workers and peasants found they were little if at all better off. Such extravagances were, perhaps, inevitable, an expression of African personality at the highly visible state level. After all, the struggle for independence had been aimed at eliminating expatriate privilege, which was the symbol of colonial subjugation since the alien enjoyed a lifestyle so far removed from that available to the Africans over whom he ruled. Yet one of the great post-independence ironies was the extent to which this situation did not change: foreign business and commercial personnel, as well as the rapidly growing body of aid experts and representatives of international organizations, flourished as never before, enjoying an expatriate lifestyle that would rarely be within their grasp in their home countries. The enjoyment of the fruits of independence was understandable and yet ‘It would be dangerous, however, if enjoyment of the fruits and wines of power were to cause the enormous and urgent tasks to be forgotten’.11 And soon the radical, dissenting student would appear on the scene demanding ‘fewer foreign cars and more rice’.

  There was a tendency in both Britain and France at this time to argue that they had taken centuries to evolve their political systems and Africa could hardly be expected to reach the same position overnight. In part this was arrogance; in part an unconscious admission that they had done very little to prepare their colonies for independence; and finally a genuine realization of the enormity of the tasks facing the new rulers. In any case, African countries had to be free and only then could they construct institutions and devise systems that answered their needs. The charismatic leaders who had led their countries to independence quickly had to learn how to deal with new opposition from within, as opposed to the old external colonial enemy. Such opposition could be based on sectoral or separatist ambitions and this raised the question of whether such opposition should be given a chartered liberty to disrupt, entrench disunity or replace the new government. It was only possible for the departing British and French to leave behind what they knew: that is, replicas of their own systems. They could not bequeath something ‘made for Africans’ even had it been more appropriate since that would have been seen a
s insulting.12 Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria said that any Western tendency to excuse deviations from democracy was only another insulting colonialist assumption that Africans were too primitive and barbaric to conduct what he called ‘this beneficent and ennobling form of government’. That, however, is exactly what the Western powers would do through the years of the Cold War when it suited them to ignore the principles they claimed to believe for reasons of realpolitik.

  Almost without exception African leaders immediately before and after independence were immersed in the political process to the exclusion of all else. They might speak eloquently of their country’s development needs; in practice they were entrenching their political power and, given the struggle that had preceded independence and the fragile bases upon which that independence rested, this was perhaps not surprising. It meant, however, that huge opportunities were lost for ever. As Frantz Fanon said, ‘Everything can be explained to the people, on the single condition that you really want them to understand’, an aphorism that ought to be on a plaque in the office of every leader worldwide. Meanwhile, one of the first problems to face the new leadership, parties aligned themselves with tribes so that it became the tribe that made itself into a party. Nkrumah once said that only three or four members of his entourage were capable of understanding what ‘is going on’ in the area of economic and political change. As for the masses that gave the government its power, they had literally been seduced. They shouted ‘Freedom, Freedom, Freedom!’ which for them meant freedom to be African without shame.

  Following independence, a number of countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya practised Westminster-style multiparty systems, although it was not long before these were modified, while in the Francophone territories single-party regimes with highly concentrated presidential systems were installed. In both cases, it soon became apparent, these systems were liable to be overthrown by the military: either when they broke down, for whatever cause, or more simply because power-hungry soldiers saw an opportunity to seize control. Where the presidential form of government emerged (at first especially in Francophone Africa) the president as head of state and head of government possessed overriding powers and he also ruled the dominant and often, by law, the sole party. In a number of countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey (Benin), Niger or Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) the constitutions were virtually identical and the president held exclusive executive power.13 As the one-party system of government emerged to replace the bequeathed colonial systems, African leaders sought justifications for the changeover to presidential or one-party rule. They argued that the single party reflected a basic consensus among populations of both individual countries and the continent as a whole in order that they might better tackle the tasks of national reconstruction and development that needed so urgently to be addressed. The argument ran as follows: ‘In the anti-colonial period the mass nationalist party had been an expression of the united needs of the African people to struggle against colonialism. In the post-colonial era, once the colonialists had gone, there was no remaining division between rulers and ruled, and therefore no need for conflicting parties.’14 Why create an opposition when all were, or should be, united in a new national solidarity? It was a neat theory but it assumed too much. The single party, it was claimed, should represent all shades of opinion. The multiparty system, on the other hand, was repudiated since it was open to manipulation and misuse by regional or tribal interests or was liable to be subverted by neo-colonialist pressures. Such a political theory opened the way for the dominant group in the single party to control and if necessary suppress the minority groups or interests.

  By the mid-1960s the one-party system had become the predominant form of government in Africa and institutions of government had been transformed into instruments to serve the party and the ruling elite and by presumption the people. The mass mobilization parties to be found in Ghana, Guinea or Mali at this time did aim to transform the inherited political systems and economies. The more elite parties were conservative and tribalist. The mass parties were radical and espoused ‘scientific’ socialism while the conservative parties said they stood for ‘African’ socialism. No one at this stage claimed to be capitalist whatever actual policies may have been pursued. Much effort went into the search for a political system that could deal with the challenges faced by the new political leadership. These included fragile state structures, tribal divisions, ambitious politicians who had been excluded from the new power structures, military establishments that were soon to understand their strength in relation to weak political systems and the demands of unity in the face of economic underdevelopment and political inexperience. It became plain in state after state that the inherited political traditions passed on from Britain and France were not the answer. Instead, inexorably, Africa’s leaders moved towards the creation of the one-party state and the military moved towards the coup. It may be a matter of debate as to which came first, but once the one-party state structure was in place the coup became the natural alternative to the ballot box election. The move towards the one-party state began prior to independence for though during the struggle political militants had argued for the formulation of programmes for the future, yet ‘under the pretext of safeguarding national unity, the leaders categorically refused to attempt such a task. The only worthwhile dogma, it was repeatedly stated, is the union of the nation against colonialism’.15 In retrospect it is truly remarkable how Frantz Fanon foretold at the beginning of the 1960s so many of the problems that would bedevil Africa in the years to come, and the following passage is worth quoting at length.

  In these poor, under-developed countries, where the rule is that the greatest wealth is surrounded by the greatest poverty, the army and the police constitute the pillars of the regime; an army and a police force (another rule which must not be forgotten) which are advised by foreign experts. The strength of the police force and the power of the army are proportionate to the stagnation in which the rest of the nation is sunk. By dint of yearly loans, concessions are snatched up by foreigners; scandals are numerous, ministers grow rich, their wives doll themselves up, the members of parliament feather their nests and there is not a soul down to the simple policeman or the customs officer who does not join in the great procession of corruption.16

  Exploitation by the new rulers leads to contempt for the state and discontent among the masses. In turn, this leads the regime to become harsher and, in the absence of any parliamentary checks upon the ruler, it is the army that becomes the national arbiter. And so the new Africa faced a political paradox: that with the coming of the one-party state and military rule the freedom that had just been gained in the independence struggle might be lost again.

  Altogether some 26 military coups were executed during the independence decade of the 1960s, to set a pattern that would continue for a further two decades. The coup became the crucial, most frequent means of effecting political change or of preserving a system that favoured a particular elite and coups were mounted against every kind of system. The countries affected by coups included Algeria, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey (Benin), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea (unsuccessful), Lesotho, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and they were mounted against both Western-style parliamentary governments and those committed to social revolution. According to Ruth First: ‘The wave of coups d’état and the range of governments affected by them suggested that political instability was the expression of profound and generalized economic problems and social conflict, and that many seemingly dissimilar political systems shared an incipient state of crisis because political independence alone had not enabled Africa to break the circle of dependence that was the condition of colonialism.’ Some coups were pay strikes by soldiers acting like trade unions. Some were the army stepping in to keep a particular regime in power. Some were by sections of the army identifying with sections of the political spectrum. A
number of coups were met by counter-coups that demonstrated the conflicts within the armies themselves so that, for example, senior officers would be pitched against junior officers, or NCOs would be pitched against officers. Whatever first prompted these army coups, once armies had stepped into the political arena they became competitors for power in their own interest.

  This endless succession of coups in the first 10 years of the independence era suggested several things: that the bequeathed systems did not work for the new states; that a variety of underlying tensions threatened to tear the new societies apart; that the African choice was for strong central government; that a system of power pillage (later to be exemplified by Mobutu in the Congo – Zaïre) had been released by independence. Increasingly, therefore, African politicians sought how to regularize the new one-party systems and give them a permanent stamp of legitimacy. There appeared to be both a rejection of democracy by the political leaders and, at first at least, an acquiescence in this rejection by the mass of the people. Were the justifications for the one-party state – the desire for unity, the imperative of concentrating upon development, the need for strong central government to counter tribalism – also justifications for military take-overs? In Tanzania Julius Nyerere was able to create a one-party state structure that was not taken over by the military; he did so by ensuring a real measure of democracy that gave electors a choice of candidates within the one-party system. What is undisputed is that by the end of the decade the concept of the one-party state had been accepted in a majority of African countries while the military coup had also come to be seen, in many if not all one-party states, as the means of changing the government or the head of state. Freedom, nevertheless, was contagious and while more perceptive politicians and intellectuals saw the dangers and limitations of the one-party system, the people at large were sufficiently enamoured of the sense that at last colonialism had passed and that they were ‘free’ that they were prepared to accept all-powerful leaders in control of one-party systems. For a time at least the political leaders who had fought the colonialists and emerged as the first presidents of their newly independent countries enjoyed great popularity. Such popularity, however, would wear off sharply as continuing poverty reminded the mass of the people that their expectations had not been met. And as disillusion grew so the politicians began to fear the people whom they saw needed to be kept constantly in check – by increasingly hollow claims about the need for unity and the external threats to African development or, in the last resort, by the police. The party, meanwhile, acted as a barometer of public opinion and as an information service for the government. Opposition parties were banned and persistent opponents of the regime imprisoned and sometimes liquidated while elections for the single party achieved uniformly high turnouts.