Africa

by Guy Arnold

1 Contributions of African states to world peace.

  2 Threats to peace and stability in Africa.

  3 Promotion of better understanding, unity and co-operation among African states.

  4 Development of permanent machinery to provide for consultation among African states.

  5 Formation of general policy on the attitude to people striving for independence.

  6 The Congo situation.

  7 Working out general principles for border disputes, which arise from the emergence of independent states.

  President Tubman added that economic ties were the best way to political unity. He said the conference should endorse the decisions of other conferences ‘which we know to be in the best interests of Africa and the world’ – he included Casablanca in this statement. The Monrovia Conference was more important for the attitudes it revealed than for any concrete decisions it reached. The formation of the Casablanca and Monrovia groups emphasized the dangerous nature of the ideological divisions that Africa faced before the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, and others tried to resolve the differences, which had surfaced between the two main groups. In 1961 Nkrumah was still the mouthpiece of the genuinely independent African states. ‘There was some truth in Nkrumah’s criticism that the Francophone group were the puppets of French neo-colonialism, since France provided 80 per cent of their budgets. Similarly, some moves by the European Economic Community were regarded with suspicion as a new form of imperialism.’7 Barbara Ward, who might be described as a ‘soft’ Cold War warrior as opposed to a ‘hard’ one, advised President Kennedy not to back the Monrovia group since its members were seen as only partially independent. The Monrovia Conference did not reach any clear conclusions over the Congo or French nuclear tests in the Sahara. The members were only really united in their dislike of Ghana’s more radical and, therefore, divisive attitude. As Nigeria’s West Africa Pilot claimed in an editorial of 18 May 1961, ‘The truth is, Dr Nkrumah must be at the head of anything or outside it… He must be told that his reckless pursuit of his own ambitions for expansion will lead him nowhere’.

  These African conferences had allowed the growing number of independent states to air their views and their leaders to interact with each other and though there were wide differences as to how problems should be tackled there was fairly consistent agreement as to what the problems were. Neo-colonialism and freeing the remaining African colonies were at the top of the list. At the same time, despite all the talk of unity, it was becoming increasingly clear that Africa was in danger of dividing into rival groups rather than uniting. West Africa had led the way and Nkrumah had led West Africa. Even before the Casablanca and Monrovia meetings of 1961, on 23 November 1958, Ghana and Guinea had drafted a charter, which was later also signed by Mali, to create an African Union of States. This led to the Conakry Declaration of 1 May 1959 in which Ghana and Guinea agreed to establish a union between their two countries. On 1 July that year Mali also joined the ‘union’ although in real political terms this union never amounted to anything. However, on 19 July 1959, at the village of Saniquellie in Liberia, Presidents Tubman, Nkrumah and Touré formulated the principles for achieving a Community of Independent African States. These meetings, whether of only two or three countries as in the cases of Conakry and Saniquellie, or the much larger meetings that have been examined above, between them created the situation that led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Laying bare the problems was a necessary preliminary to achieving some form of unity. As Colin Legum wrote in 1961:

  Modern Pan-Africanism is reacting realistically to Africa’s fundamental problem: its disunity. Tribalisms, a plethora of unviable states, vying nationalisms, rival ideas, and divergent loyalties are part of Africa’s disorder. Everywhere the need is for unity: unity within the new states still struggling to become real nation-states; unity between states; unity in economic programmes to allow for a swift, co-ordinated effort to lift Africa out of its poverty; unity in the fight to get rid of the remnants of colonialism, and to ward off neo-colonialism; and unity to establish Africa’s voice in international affairs.8

  Another, similar statement was made by Julius Nyerere to the Second Conference of Independent African States in 1960:

  We know that even after our independence has been achieved that African Personality which we would build up will depend upon the consolidation of our unity, not only in sentiment but in fact. We know that a balkanized Africa however loudly it might proclaim to the world its independence and all that, will in fact be an easy prey to the forces of neo-imperialism. The weak and divided can never hope to maintain a dignified independence however much they may proclaim their desire to be strong and united; for the desire to unite is a very different thing from actual unity. One can see the forces of neo-imperialism manipulating these little states in Africa, making them complacently smug in this mere sentimental desire to be one, and at the same time doing everything possible to prevent the realisation of that unity.9

  Nkrumah was the dominant force working for African unity but in many ways he was his own worst enemy for his genuine idealism and vision were countermanded by his personal ambition. ‘At first Nkrumah was revered as the leader of Pan-Africanism but as he pushed eagerly to achieve his ambitions the governments of other African countries became increasingly suspicious of his motives, methods and interference. The more conservative African states were particularly worried when he set up a Bureau of African Affairs which encouraged subversion against other African states considered to be too close to the colonialists.’10 Nkrumah specifically rejected progress towards pan-Africanism by stages and through existing regional organizations. What he wanted was an all-embracing union where he could use his charisma to emerge as the leader. When the majority of conservative states produced the OAU charter in 1963 they rejected all Nkrumah’s pan-African ideas in favour of state status quo and the non-interference in another state’s affairs. As a consequence of their deep suspicions of Nkrumah’s motives, the heads of state created a largely powerless organization that, among other things, enshrined all the colonial boundaries without questioning their relevance to the people on the ground. Already, in 1960, Nkrumah had stepped up the activities of the Bureau of African Affairs which then had more than 100 agents trained in ideology and subversion, operating all over Africa against what Nkrumah considered were bourgeois regimes. Moreover, ‘because of his obsession with a union government for the whole of Africa, Nkrumah made vigorous attacks on any proposed regional groups’.11 Many Africans wanted unity and understood clearly how weak Africa must continue to be if it remained in its balkanized state but they were not prepared to cave in to Nkrumah’s interventions and pressures. In any case, as the eventual reality of the OAU would prove, the nationalist leaders who had led – or shortly would lead – their countries to independence wanted to enjoy the fruits of that independence and not surrender part of it, as they believed they must, to an African Union that would be greater than the individual parts.

  As much as anything, the African conferences of 1958–1961 represented a search by the leaders of newly independent countries for a modus vivendi both with regard to each other and as a bloc in relation to the outside world. The fact that Africa was likely to achieve unity as much or as little as the Arab world, Europe or Asia was beside the point. The search was certainly worthwhile even if it only revealed the obstacles to real unity. In fact it did much more. Perhaps Haile Selassie’s greatest contribution to independent Africa was his role as chairman at the meetings in Addis Ababa, which finally led to the formation of the OAU.

  In May 1963 the foreign ministers of 30 African countries met in Addis Ababa to prepare an agenda for a meeting of their heads of state. They discussed the creation of an Organisation of African States, which would be concerned with matters of collective defence, decolonization, and cooperation in economic, social, educational and scientific matters. Inevitably, the meeting also dealt with apartheid in South Africa and racial discrimination
. Then, on 23 May, the heads of state or government of 30 African countries came to Addis Ababa and, under the chairmanship of Haile Selassie, approved a Charter to create an Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Charter was signed on 26 May 1963 by 30 heads of state (Chad and Togo signed later to become founder members). The OAU represented a compromise between a strong federal type of structure that had been favoured by the Casablanca Group and a looser association of states favoured by the Monrovia Group. The founder members of the OAU were: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey (later Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso).

  The Charter of the OAU was similar to that of the United Nations but without a Security Council and without any veto powers. All African states as well as Madagascar and surrounding islands, should they wish, would be eligible to join. Its institutions were: Assembly of Heads of State and Government; Council of Ministers; General Secretariat; Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration; and Specialized Commissions. A number of leaders called for the OAU to provide assistance to liberate those states still under colonial control. Nyerere, for example, said: ‘The time for allowing our brethren to struggle unaided has gone; from now on our brethren in non-independent Africa should be helped by independent Africa.’ He said that Tanganyika was willing to contribute one per cent of its budget and willing to ‘die a little’ to remove the ‘final humiliation of colonialism’. Nkrumah, who had pressed for too much too quickly, was generally isolated but he put on a brave face and said: ‘The decisions we have taken here have made African unity a reality and we can see clearly a Union Government of Africa on the horizon. This is the goal, which we set ourselves when we struggled in our separate states for independence. It is also the compelling force which brought us together at Addis Ababa.’ The majority favoured gradualism. Immediately, however, as Haile Selassie told the conference, there would be a co-ordinated drive against continued white rule in Southern Africa, supported by the resources of the whole continent. A ‘Liberation Bureau’ was established and entrusted to a committee composed of Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Tanganyika, the Congo (Leopoldville), Senegal and Nigeria with headquarters in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere said that the signing of the Charter meant the ending of all power blocs, such as the Casablanca and Monrovia groupings. President Touré of Guinea was constrained to deny any rift between himself and Nkrumah though their paths had been diverging. All the decisions of the conference had been arrived at unanimously. He said: ‘Africa is above personalities now. I affirm here that we entirely trust President Nkrumah. We admire him for his real and active contribution to the evolution of Africa. We know of Ghana’s contribution to the speeding up of liberation on this continent and we are also aware that on the economic and political level Ghana’s dynamic proposals contributed to the intellectual awakening of Africa.’ This might be seen as an obituary to Nkrumah’s influence at that time. However, if it was an obituary, a handsome tribute to his vision, if not to his political behaviour, was paid him by the British journalist Keith Kyle. Writing in the Spectator he said:

  It is now generally accepted that the African summit meeting at Addis ended as a considerable victory for the gradualists. The success of the new Pan-African institutions, which were set up, will largely depend upon the calibre and drive of the permanent secretariat and how sincerely they are backed up by the member States. But before too much speculation about this, it is worth paying heed to the temporary loser at Addis, Kwame Nkrumah, and his one faithful supporter, Milton Obote, for despite all the moderation and common sense at the conference, the real insight and inspiration still seems to be theirs. Theirs is the real radicalism and one should not underestimate its appeal.

  He went on:

  The diplomatic pattern that preceded the conference had two main strands – the ‘militant diplomacy’ by which President Sekou Touré of Guinea led the other French-speaking States, many of them hitherto classified as ‘neo-colonialist stooges’ in Pan-African circles, and sponsored their leaders in the nationalist club; and the increasing alienation of Ghana and Nigeria. Going against the trend represented latterly by Touré of accepting African governments as they are and trying to talk them into line, Nkrumah has energetically backed those forces within African countries which endorsed his views. He has simply been caught out too often. Recently the Congo and Nigeria have drawn very close. During Adoula’s official visit to Lagos he and the Nigerians exchanged notes about Ghanaian interference in their internal affairs. In his attitude to Togo, Nkrumah has caused even greater offence by appearing to want to violate the great self-denying ordinance whose adoption by all (or nearly all) African independent states has been the supreme demonstration to date of their international maturity; the resolve to preserve the artificial colonial boundaries, lest ethnic irredentism open up endless occasions for war.

  It was unfortunate that his actions as opposed to his ideas had made Nkrumah more enemies than friends and by the time the meeting convened in Addis Ababa he was much distrusted. Nonetheless, as Kyle argued:

  Yet the sweep and logic of his speech at Addis, delivered in the full knowledge that it could not make immediate converts, invites a suspension of prejudice. Basically his argument is this: Africa is a rich continent, but her riches are unevenly distributed. So long as her States remain separate political units, most of them will not only be poor, but will have little prospect of escaping poverty. This is because most of them depend on the sale abroad of primary products and as far as one can see into the future the terms of trade will move against them. Moreover, as population rises and technological improvement is applied to the land, the number of landless will multiply. African governments will then not be able to do more for their people than colonial governments and ‘all the resentment which overthrew colonialism will be mobilized against us’.12

  Nkrumah had concluded his speech by advocating the development of heavy industry at the same pace as agriculture although this could only be done on a continent-wide scale: ‘Unless we can establish great industrial complexes in Africa – which we can only do in a united Africa – we must leave our peasantry to the mercy of foreign cash-crop markets and face the same unrest which overthrew the colonialists.’

  In the year following the establishment of the OAU the member states began to grapple with the many problems the organization would be called upon to settle. In November 1963 OAU delegates met in Accra where they discussed a number of problems. Ghana’s suggestion that the OAU should create an African High Command to control army, navy and air forces met with little support. The OAU, in its first major test, set up a commission to arbitrate the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco. Then in February 1964 OAU foreign ministers met at Lagos where they discussed the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, the army mutinies that had occurred in East Africa in the previous month, the rebellion in Gabon, the continuing Algeria–Morocco dispute, the killings in Rwanda and the question of freeing the non-independent states.

  The second OAU summit met in Cairo at the end of July 1964. Moïse Tshombe, who was then Prime Minister of the Congo, was excluded from participation. The most important resolution was to boycott South Africa and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique. It was decided to refuse both over-flying rights and port facilities to any aircraft or ship going to or from South Africa and a special bureau was set up to co-ordinate the boycott. A second bureau was established to co-ordinate an effective boycott against Portugal. Other resolutions were a blow to Nkrumah and it seemed that the majority of OAU members were determined to sideline both his ideas and Nkrumah himself. Nkrumah was opposed to establishing a permanent OAU headquarters and Secretary-General but this was done anyway: Addis Ababa became the OAU headquarters, and the G
uinean Diallo Telli the first Secretary-General. Finally, Nkrumah pressed for the proclamation of a continental Union Government within six months, but all the heads of state were prepared to do was set up an ad hoc committee to investigate the fundamental points of this proposal.

  Even so, one of the two most important speeches at this conference came from Nkrumah; the other, in direct opposition to his stand, was delivered by Nyerere. Nkrumah said that only Union Government of Africa could guarantee African survival. The imperialists were pouring vast sums of money into South Africa and Portugal to make them militarily and economically stronger. In particular, he attacked the performance of the Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam which, he said, had failed to make the best use of its resources while some military specialists (from Egypt and Algeria) had been excluded on ideological grounds. Further, under the Liberation Committee the ‘freedom fighters’ had no real security and were not given instruments for their struggle, nor were food, clothing and medicine given the men in training. The training scheme, he said, had collapsed in two months. ‘By raising a threat at Addis Ababa and not being able to take effective action against apartheid and colonialism we have worsened the plight of our kinsmen in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. We have frightened the imperialists sufficiently to strengthen their defences and the repression in Southern Africa, but we have not frightened them enough to abandon apartheid supremacy to its ill-fated doom.’ Nkrumah concluded by arguing that to say a Union Government for Africa was premature was to sacrifice Africa on the altar of neo-colonialism. ‘We should get together, think together, plan together, and organize our African economy as a reality.’

  In a bitter and caustic reply to Nkrumah, Nyerere suggested that part of the failure of the Liberation Committee was due to lack of funds because the Conference had committed the unforgivable crime of not including Ghana on the committee and of choosing Dar es Salaam as its headquarters. Nyerere then set out to demolish Nkrumah’s concept of a Union Government of Africa. What was needed, he said, was not more preaching about unity, but more practising of unity. The habit of unity must be encouraged in West Africa and East Africa. He attacked Ghana, in part, because the Ghanaian ambassador to Tanganyika had expressed satisfaction over the humiliation suffered as a result of the East African army mutinies.