Africa

by Guy Arnold

  On 28 April 1991 Habyarimana announced a multiparty system would be introduced that June and on 10 June he signed a new multiparty constitution that provided for separate legislative, executive and judicial branches of government and for a prime minister while the presidential tenure of office was to be limited.

  Over 30 September–1 October between 5,000 and 10,000 Tutsi exiles in Uganda, who described themselves as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), crossed the border into Rwanda. The RPF was led by Maj.-Gen. Fred Rwigyema, who had been a leader in the Ugandan army, but he was killed in the fighting that followed. The invasion was an attempt to restore Tutsi control over Rwanda. Habyarimana appealed to Belgium for assistance and the Belgian government sent 600 paratroopers, France a further 300, and Zaïre 500 troops that were later increased to 1,000. There was fighting through October until the rebels agreed a ceasefire. The government then insisted that there was no available land for the 70,000 exiled Rwandans then in Uganda. Further incursions from Uganda occurred on 12 December and on 4 January 1991 and sporadic fighting was to continue through 1991.

  CENTRAL AFRICA: CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

  For Chad the 1980s was a decade of unremitting civil war with Oueddei Goukouni in the ascendant from 1980 to 1982 only to be ousted by Hissène Habré who dominated the situation for the rest of the 1980s, to be ousted from power in his turn at the end of the decade by Idriss Deby. These principals were assisted or impeded by French interventions and withdrawals, US financial support, the Libyan invasions from the north and an OAU peacekeeping effort with troops supplied by Nigeria, Senegal and Zaïre. The war was greatly prolonged as a result of Gaddafi’s interventions. There was a major reaction to Gaddafi’s northern invasion when in June 1981, meeting in Nairobi, the OAU agreed to establish a peacekeeping force, which France and the United States promised to finance. It was mounted the following December and comprised 2,000 Nigerian troops, 2,000 from Zaïre and 800 from Senegal under Nigerian command. When the OAU then persuaded the Libyans to withdraw, the result was to leave many of their weapons in the north for Habré to commandeer so that he was able to pursue his struggle with Goukouni effectively: by June 1982 he had taken N’Djamena and by October had established his government in the capital, forcing Goukouni to flee. Thus the position of 1980, when Goukouni held the capital and appeared to control the government, was now reversed: Habré controlled the capital while Goukouni was back in the north where, with renewed Libyan intervention on his side, he attempted to reverse his defeat. In June 1983 Gaddafi increased his support for Goukouni to provoke a new French intervention – under pressure from Washington whose principal interest was to contain Gaddafi – and so France sent 2,800 troops to Chad. These were deployed across the country along the 15th (later 16th parallel) from east to west to create what became known as the Red Line to prevent Goukouni’s forces penetrating further south. At this point anti-Habré violence erupted in the extreme south of the country, temporarily diverting Habré’s energies from the main war and causing a number of refugees to flee into neighbouring countries. Later in the year Habré successfully repulsed the Libyans with heavy losses. In September 1983 Habré attended a Franco-African summit in France at which he criticized France for not being prepared to fight the Libyans (the French forces remained stationary on the Red Line and would not advance northwards to engage the Libyans). The war continued through 1984 with heavy loses on both sides. Habré dissolved FROLINAT (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad) and replaced it with the Union Nationale pour l’Indépendence et la Révolution (UNIR) in an effort to create a more evenly balanced north-south government, but the change made no difference. Further opposition to Habré’s rule in the south met with brutal government repression and caused a flood of refugees into Central African Republic. This fighting continued until April 1985.

  In September 1984 France and Libya agreed to withdraw all their troops from Chad simultaneously. By 10 November all 3,300 French troops had left the country while the Libyan forces remained in the north, forcing President Mitterand to admit that he had been fooled by Gaddafi. France offered to send its troops back to Chad but Habré refused the offer since he did not trust French motives. During 1985 Habré consolidated his power in the south. In the north, however, Libya had 4,000 troops by October and in February 1986 they launched an offensive across the 16th parallel, the Red Line that France had established. Habré appealed to France, and French bombers from Central African Republic attacked Libyan targets in the north. France then established an air strike force in Chad. The United States, which had carried out its air strike against Libya in April 1986, now provided Habré with US$10 million in aid. By mid-November 1986 US arms for Chad were arriving in Douala (Cameroon) while France had sent back to Chad 1,000 troops to support its air units and these were once more deployed along the 16th parallel. In December Habré launched an offensive against the Libyans at Bardai and in the Tibesti Mountains. Apart from dropping supplies to Habré’s forces, France would not commit its troops to ground fighting despite Habré’s strongest appeals, even though it had 4,000 troops stationed in Central African Republic. The US, however, promised a further US$15 million in aid. By this time, after 20 years of warfare, the Chad economy was in ruins. France tried to dissuade Habré from attacking the Libyans but in mid-December Goukouni’s forces, which meanwhile had switched sides to Habré, inflicted a major defeat upon the Libyans. Habré moved north to follow up this victory over the Libyans and in the new situation France decided to support Habré. In early 1987 Habré launched a major attack upon the Libyans and after quitting most of the towns they controlled, the Libyan forces were badly defeated at Fada where 784 of their soldiers were killed and 100 Russian tanks were destroyed. In response to this defeat Libya built up its forces to 15,000 while France sent another 1,000 troops to support Habré. In March 1987 Habré’s forces under the command of Hassan Djamous captured Ouadi Doum, Libya’s base for air strike aircraft; 3,600 Libyans were killed and 700 captured while a further 2,000 died of thirst as they fled in the desert. The Libyans now retreated from Faya-Largeau while between 2,000 and 3,000 of their troops had become isolated across the border in Darfur province of Sudan, and Habré at last appeared to be in control of the whole country. Many of the Libyan troops were conscripts who had been pressed into the Islamic Pan-African League; they had gone to Libya, where the war was deeply unpopular, to seek work.

  A precarious rapprochment between Libya and Chad was achieved in 1988 although Goukouni, who had depended upon Libyan support ever since 1981 when he had proposed a union with Libya, refused to accept the new situation. However, he was deserted by Achiek Ibn Oumar, the most important of his supporters, who returned to N’Djamena in November 1988 taking most of his troops with him. On 10 December 1989 Habré won a presidential election with 99 per cent of the vote for a seven-year term. This, however, was his last triumph. He had underestimated Idriss Deby, another aspiring ruler of Chad, who meanwhile had been building up an army of his own in Darfur. He invaded Chad in November 1990. France, whose relations with Habré had always been equivocal, refused to provide help at this crucial point and probably saw Deby as a more amenable leader for Chad than Habré. Habré went to lead his troops against Deby but was heavily defeated and fled, first to Cameroon and then Senegal. Deby assumed power in N’Djamena and the war, or series of wars, finally came to an end.

  There had been high casualties over the 20 years of fighting though numbers were always hard to quantify, with figures ranging between 50,000 and 80,000 although they may well have been much higher. The three French interventions were not popular in France. It was a senseless war, less about ideology than power. Both France and the US appeared more interested in checking Gaddafi than in assisting Chad solve its problems, while Gaddafi, always a troublemaker, wanted the Aozou Strip and had oil wealth to pay for his interventions as Chad became more deeply impoverished as the fighting continued.

  A decade of fighting among warlords assisted by the int
erventions of France and Libya had done little for the people of Chad except impoverish them still further. The dominant figure for the decade was Habré, a man more suited to war than peace. ‘Of all Chad’s warlords Hissène Habré was the most aggressive, determined and consistent… His ruthless determination and organizational skill brought him victory for a time, but the battle was long and ferocious against a host of rivals, particularly Goukouni Oueddei backed by his powerful Libyan allies. When Habré took power in N’Djamena for the second time in June 1982, he convinced France and the US that the survival of Chad depended on him alone and he won their grudging support. It was when he lost the support of France, in December 1990 that he was pushed from power by Idriss Deby.’6 Deby had originally thrown in his lot with Habré in 1978 and created an alliance between his own Zaghawa tribe and Habré’s Daza tribe. He became the Chief of Staff of the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) and led the campaign that restored Habré to power in 1982. In 1983 he repulsed Goukouni’s forces but by then he was becoming too popular and Habré sent him on a higher officers’ education course in Paris. When Deby returned to Chad, Habré made him his military adviser. However, in 1988 Habré gave most offices and positions to his own Daza supporters to become less dependent upon Deby, who saw his influence declining. Then, on 1 April 1989, Deby was accused of plotting against Habré; with his loyal troops he fought his way out of N’Djamena and retreated to Darfur. Later, from Lagos, he accused the Habré government of tribalism, extortion and injustice. He visited Libya and informed Gaddafi of Habré’s plans and troop dispositions. In March 1990 Deby moved into Chad from Sudan and embarked upon the campaign and battles with Habré’s forces that led to the latter’s downfall.

  The coup of 1979 that deposed Bokassa, who had crowned himself Emperor of Central African Republic, brought David Dacko, who had been personal adviser to Bokassa, to the presidency; his elevation to this office was backed by 700 French troops flown in from Gabon. Dacko, who was seen as having been too close to Bokassa, lasted less than two years. During 1981 he faced increasing unrest and opposition until on 1 September the military, led by Gen. André Kolingba, carried out another coup. Dacko’s rivals – he had just suppressed all opposition – issued a letter of support for Kolingba who became head of state. Kolingba suspended the constitution and banned all activities by political parties. He called for a privileged relationship to continue with France and wanted France to pay the salaries of the civil service for at least a year so as to leave him free to reorganize the economy. This, at least, was a frank admission of the country’s heavy dependence upon France. Kolingba set up an entirely military regime and claimed ‘when we have order everything else will follow’. His reluctance to set a date for a return to civilian rule soon created discontent and in March 1982 a former prime minister, Ange-Félix Patassé, mounted a coup attempt against him. Only in 1985, after four years of military rule, did Kolingba begin a process of limited democratization when in September he appointed civilians to a majority of the posts in government. There were other minor coup attempts and student unrest but Kolingba did not have any of those convicted of offences executed. In May 1986 Kolingba created a single party, the Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC). In November of that year a referendum confirmed Kolingba in power for a further six years and also approved a draft constitution that would give wide powers to the President. The return from France of the exiled Bokassa in October 1986 embarrassed the government; he had been sentenced to death in absentia. He was retried on a number of charges including murder and cannibalism and again sentenced to death; however, in 1988 Kolingba commuted the sentence to hard labour for life.

  In July 1987 Kolingba authorized the first legislative elections in 20 years. Growing demands over the following years to reform the single-party system led Kolingba to call an extraordinary general meeting of the executive committee of the party early in 1990 at which he rejected multipartyism, which, he said, was to accept ‘political systems which seemed to work in other countries’. However, he did agree to share power with a prime minister and appointed Edouard Frank to the post on 16 March 1991. On 22 April, despite his earlier rejection, Kolingba promised to revert to democracy and multiparty rule and on 7 June set up a national commission to revise the constitution and lay the groundwork for pluralism; in August he agreed to legalize three opposition parties. Central African Republic continued to be dependent upon France for aid and investment. The economy, apart from diamonds and coffee, was agrarian based and there was little industrial development. Periodically, eruptions of anti-French sentiment occurred – expressions of frustration at the all-pervasive influence of the former colonial power.

  EQUATORIAL AFRICA

  The Republic of Congo, despite a sharp post-independence shift to the left, had maintained close links with France (Brazzaville had acted as the capital of French Equatorial Africa in colonial days). In 1979 the Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT) had deposed Col. Joachim Yhombi-Opango and replaced him as President with Denis Sassou-Nguesso. He faced the problem of maintaining a balance between the pro-Soviet faction of the PCT and the pro-Western pragmatists. In addition, he had to balance the tribal rivalries that existed between north and south. He solved the first problem by posing as a left-wing Marxist while following Western-style economic liberalism. In May 1981 Sassou-Nguesso visited Moscow where he signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with his hosts, and made Congo one of the first Francophone countries to do so. At the same time he maintained close links with France. In July 1984 he was unanimously elected President for another five years by the central committee of the PCT and was also given greater presidential powers. In July 1987 20 senior army officers were arrested for plotting. They came from the northern Kouyou tribe (from which his predecessors Ngouabi and Yhombi-Opango came) while Sassou-Nguesso was from another northern tribe, the Mboshi. Pierre Anga, a former politician, was also involved in the plot: he was responsible for distributing arms to people in Owendo opposed to the government, and in fighting during August and September 60 people were killed.

  Despite the country’s left-wing stance it never received much aid from the USSR. France continued as the main source of aid, as the main trade partner and the principal exploiter of the Congo’s oil resources. Moreover, relations with France had improved after François Mitterand became President of France at the beginning of the decade and in 1983, after a period of suspended diplomatic relations, these were restored with both the US and Britain. In 1989 Sassou-Nguesso was re-elected head of the PCT. In 1990, on a visit to Washington, he agreed a treaty with President Bush guaranteeing protection to private American investors in the Congo. In July 1990 the PCT Central Committee voted to end the one-party system and at the end of the year it abandoned Marxism as its official creed and turned instead to social democracy. On 1 January 1991 opposition parties became legal and after a year of growing pressures President Sassou-Nguesso was forced to appoint Gen. Louis Sylvain Goma as prime minister (8 January 1991) and hold a national conference. The conference declared itself sovereign, rewrote the constitution and appointed a new prime minister, André Milingo, to head a transitional government of national unity. It set a date in mid-1992 for multiparty elections. As Congo was clearly turning to the market economy, Cuba withdrew its troops after 14 years. Sassou-Nguesso, though still President, had greatly reduced powers.

  Albert-Bernard (in 1973, encouraged by Gaddafi, he became a Muslim and changed his name to Omar) Bongo came to the presidency of Gabon in 1967; he was re-elected as sole candidate in 1979. Through the 1980s he faced increasing political opposition, largely expressed through the Mouvement de Redressement National (Morena), which emerged in 1981 and attracted the support of students and the younger generation and had offices in Paris. Morena accused the Bongo regime of corruption and called for multiparty elections. Bongo’s response was repression. Economic conditions deteriorated through the decade and in January 1985, for example, a wave of looting was directed against the Lebanese community i
n Libreville. Later that year the government carried out a census of foreigners: the borders were closed and illegal immigrants expelled. Employers were instructed to give priority to Gabonese when they recruited staff and financial restrictions were placed upon immigrants wishing to leave or re-enter Gabon. Overall, there was little effective opposition to Bongo through the 1980s despite the efforts of Morena. Generally, Gabon played a moderate role in African affairs though, apparently under the influence of Gaddafi, Bongo converted to Islam. Ties with France were more important than any other relationship: France was the principal source of both aid and investment and also maintained a military presence in Gabon. In 1989 the government announced a programme to study and preserve the country’s native languages since these had been neglected in favour of French for even moderate, pro-France Gabon felt nationalist revulsion against too much overt French influence.

  Discontent with the system exploded in January 1990 when five students on strike were shot dead by the police, setting off full-scale riots in Libreville. In February Bongo tried to placate the opposition by the device of turning the ruling Parti Démocratique Gabonais (PDG) into an all-embracing Rassemblement Social Démocrate Gabonais (RSDG) but this did not reduce popular discontent. In March Bongo called a national conference and confirmed the findings of a special commission, which backed democratization. He announced that he favoured moves towards a multiparty system. In May the central committee of the PDG and the national assembly approved amendments to the constitution that would lead to a multiparty system while Bongo resigned as Secretary-General of the PDG since, he claimed, the post was no longer compatible with that of head of state. However, the mysterious murder of Joseph Rendjambe, the leader of the Parti Gabonais du Progrès (PGP), led to violent demonstrations in both Libreville and Port-Gentil. French troops evacuated French citizens from Port-Gentil while in Libreville rioters burned public buildings and property belonging to Bongo. When elections were held in September 533 candidates from forty parties contested 120 seats. After fraud, re-runs, cancellations and additional rounds the ruling party (the PDG) obtained 62 seats, 55 went to the opposition parties and three to allied independents. Gabon, like much of Africa at this time, was making painful moves back towards full democracy.