Africa

by Guy Arnold

  At its third congress in December 1990, Angola’s ruling party, the MPLA, formally abandoned Marxism-Leninism and a constitutional revision law was enacted in May 1991, coinciding with the Bicesse Accords (peace accords between the government and UNITA) agreed in Portugal. The law of May proclaimed a democratic state based on the rule of law and respect for human rights; it introduced a multiparty system. Other laws passed at the same time regulated associations, political parties, the right of assembly, the press and the right to strike. In April 1992 a new electoral system was devised and a National Press Council established. These new laws preceded the first ever multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections in September 1992. When Jonas Savimbi failed to win the presidential election he returned to the bush in October and resumed the war. Dos Santos had not won the election with an outright majority but since Savimbi had returned to the bush the second round was postponed and later cancelled. The war over 1992–94 was exceptionally brutal and bitter and an estimated 100,000 people lost their lives. Those UNITA deputies who had won seats in the 1992 elections only took their places in the assembly in 1997. There had been a lull in the fighting from the end of 1994 but it was resumed in 1999, causing the abandonment of democratization and decentralization, at least for the time being. Hyper-inflation in May 1996 caused an outburst of public anger, leading dos Santos to replace his economic ministers, although subsequent demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed. The collapse of the peace process meant that Angola continued to operate under a system of sub-national government based entirely on the nomination of officials from above. ‘The provinces have provincial governments, headed by governors, who are appointed by the head of state and are considered his representatives at the provincial level.’27 Civil war, half-war, fear and destruction prevailed in Angola throughout the 1990s so that the presidential system, which had been developed under the one-party state, was given a new lease of life. The party was marginalized following the breakdown of the peace process in late 1992 and the president became all-powerful. The regime had accepted the democratic reforms of 1991 under pressure to end the war but when this flared up again, it became possible for the government to abandon the process and this suited both the president and the ruling elite. Only after the death of Savimbi on 22 February 2002 did the prospect again open up for a possible peace process that might last.

  Botswana can be regarded as the democratic and economic success story of Africa. It had been democratic ever since independence in 1966 although the political process had always been dominated by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) which had won every election up to 2000, under Seretse Khama from 1966 to 1980, Quett Masire (1980–98) and then Festus Mogae. At the beginning of the new century Transparency International rated Botswana in 26th place in the world and the highest in Africa while Moody’s Investors Service gave it the highest credit rating in Africa.

  By the 1990s the people of Malawi had become increasingly restless under the long dictatorship of Hastings Banda who had ruled the country more or less autocratically ever since independence in 1964. In October 1993 Banda became seriously ill and had to go to South Africa for medical treatment. In his absence the office of the president announced the creation of a three-member presidential council that would assume executive power in Banda’s absence. In November this council reshuffled the cabinet and took away from Banda his ministerial responsibilities. The National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment bill to repeal the life presidency that had been conferred on Banda while also reducing the age qualification for a prospective presidential candidate from 40 to 35 and laid down that prospective candidates need not be members of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The Assembly also repealed the right of the President to nominate members of the legislature exclusively from the ranks of the MCP and lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. Banda, meanwhile, made a rapid and unexpected recovery and returned to Malawi on 7 December to resume the presidency and the presidential council was discharged. In February 1994 the MCP announced that Banda would be its presidential candidate for the elections set for that May. On the eve of the elections the National Assembly adopted a provisional constitution. Banda’s long domination of Malawi finally came to an end with the elections of 17 May when Bakili Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) obtained 47.3 per cent of the votes, Banda 33.6 per cent and Chakufwa Chihana of AFORD 18.6 per cent. Muluzi became Malawi’s second president and in June he announced an independent commission of inquiry into the deaths of Dick Matenji, the former secretary-general of the MCP, and others in 1983 – it had long been suspected that they had been assassinated or murdered on Banda’s orders. In January 1995 Banda was placed under house arrest. John Tembo, who had been a rival of Matenji’s for the eventual succession, and was accused of a hand in his death, had been regarded as Banda’s choice, and two police officers were arrested and the three plus Banda were put on trial. However, the trial was adjourned because Banda was too ill to attend; the trial was later abandoned. These events signalled the destruction of Banda’s authority and in January 1996 an MCP newspaper published a statement by Banda in which he admitted he might unknowingly have been responsible for brutalities perpetrated under his regime and apologized for any ‘pain and suffering’ inflicted on Malawians during his presidency. It was a humiliating comedown for the once all-powerful president. The country reverted to a multiparty democratic system.

  Discontent in Zambia at the dire state of the economy and unrest among workers and students characterized much of 1989. There was rioting on the Copperbelt in July. In April 1990 the ruling party, UNIP, rejected proposals for multiparty politics but in May Kaunda announced that a referendum would be held on multipartyism in October and public meetings to discuss it would be allowed. In June, an announcement that the price of maize was to double set off rioting in Lusaka in which some 30 people were killed. In July the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was formed. The MMD was led by Frederick Chiluba, chairman of the ZCTU and a long time critic of Kaunda, and Arthur Wina, a former Finance Minister. Kaunda said that the proposed referendum was to be postponed to August 1991 in order to facilitate full electoral registration. Wina demanded that the referendum should be held in December. The National Assembly proposed a multiparty system which Kaunda at first opposed but he gave way a month later and appointed October 1991 for multiparty legislative and presidential elections. Despite rumours in the run-up to the elections – Kaunda accused international observers of a conspiracy to remove UNIP from power – the elections took place on 31 October and the observers said they had been conducted fairly. Chiluba obtained 75.79 per cent of the votes cast, Kaunda 24.21 per cent. In the legislative elections the MMD won 125 seats to UNIP’s 25. Kaunda stood down gracefully and Frederick Chiluba became Zambia’s second president, an office he held for 10 years. The MMD was an elite movement of trade union leaders and business leaders that had built up a mass following. The fact that during the elections both Chiluba and Wina felt able to go abroad to seek promises of aid lent some credibility to Kaunda’s suggestions of international support for his opponents. They were treated like a government in waiting. ‘The massive victory (of the MMD), however, conferred little legitimacy on the government, and by the time President Chiluba started his second term in office all illusions of Zambia as a pioneer of democracy had been shattered. Not only had the constitution skewed the election results, but the press had also been subjected to increasing intimidation and censorship during the election campaign.’28 In 1996 international observers refused to go to Zambia since to do so would give legitimacy to what was seen as a flawed process. At the beginning of 2001 Chiluba seemed determined to seek a third term as president but to do so required a constitutional amendment supported by two-thirds of the National Assembly and opposition to any such move mounted in the ranks of the MMD. In May 2001 Chiluba backtracked and said he would not seek a third term. In August Levy Mwanawasa was chosen as MMD presidential candidate and he promised to tackle corruption. The electi
ons, which were held in December, were fiercely contested, and Mwanawasa, who was presumed (wrongly as it turned out) to be a puppet or front man for Chiluba, won though with a minority of the total votes cast.

  Three other countries should be mentioned. Zambia’s neighbour to the south, Zimbabwe, entered the new century in a state of deepening crisis as its President, Robert Mugabe, resorted to increasing violence and denial of the rule of law to hold onto power (see chapter 38 below). In Nigeria President Obasanjo won a second term in the elections of 2003 and, hopefully, the long period of military dominance was a thing of the past. In South Africa the search for a viable opposition to the ANC led to the formation of the Democratic Alliance. The hope, expressed by a range of African observers, was that the new South Africa would act as the driving force in an African renaissance. ‘The experience of South Africa where, uniquely on the continent, Western and African notions of identity both have deep historical roots, will be an interesting test case of the extent to which Western-style democracy evolves in Africa.’29

  When we have stripped away all the external factors of pressure and interference – and these are many – the responsibility for African democracy, in whatever form it takes, remains with the African people. They face formidable tasks: greed of rulers and the determination of politicians to hold onto power at almost any cost; the endless pulls of rival ethnic groups; the manipulations of elites whose fortunes are tied to the preservation of tyrants in power. The return to democracy in the 1990s, where it took place, was fraught with dangers and setbacks, yet the determination of the African masses to bring an end to one-party dictatorships was an encouraging aspect of the continent’s politics, even when victories were subsequently whittled away or overthrown by the old power mongers of the one-party state era.

  Unfortunately, too often, democracy did not deliver the expected rewards and so was followed by disillusion and discontent. Why, it has often been asked, do democratically elected governments not deliver policies that the mass of the people want? Too often, those who obtain power do not work on behalf of the poor majority but in the interests of middle class or elitist groups to which they themselves belong. Many revolts leading to a form of democratization were less against the existing system than they were for better economic conditions. Poverty was the driving force for change and had economies been better managed and wealth more equitably distributed the chances are that existing power structures would not have been challenged. If we consider external pressures for democracy, which often come from such international institutions as the World Bank or IMF, it is time they were reformed and made truly democratic rather than based upon voting related to financial contributions while it comes ill from the major Western powers – the US, Britain and France – to argue for democracy when they insist upon their undemocratic vetoes in the UN Security Council. For democracy to be meaningful it must empower people to participate in the process of bettering themselves. One optimistic appraisal of change in Africa is as follows: ‘Most notably, the societies which have been subject to such extreme destabilization are continually developing new strategies of an extraordinary diversity and inventiveness, which offers proof that Africa, so often said to be governed by age-old tradition, is in fact a place of unrivalled change and mobility.’30 The argument too often applied to Africa is that ‘strong’ leaders (that is, dictatorial figures) are necessary to bring about necessary change and consequently that the luxury of political rights – democracy – has to be deferred to some indefinite future. It is an argument that has suited many authoritarian rulers – in Africa and elsewhere – but its appeal has been eroded by the performance of such leaders when in power. ‘Africa has a chance, but only as the old leaders – and, let us hope, their legacies – die off; only as the nations begin to recognize that open societies are the vital ones, that agriculture does not detract from a nation’s dignity, and that human development may make people worse subjects, but wonderfully better citizens.’31 Democracy has to be fought for every day.

  CHAPTER THIRTY - FOUR

  Civil Wars: Algeria, Somalia, Sudan

  The 1990s witnessed more than a dozen wars in Africa, most of them civil, some ongoing like that in Sudan. They were explained in multiple ways: religious divides, ethnic differences, ideological confrontations, unfair distribution of national wealth, but in reality they were about power – who had it and who lacked it. The three countries considered here had much in common: their populations were predominantly Muslim, they were each members of the Arab League, they belonged to the geographic northern belt of African countries and their governments had demonstrated marked determination to break their former colonial connections. There the similarities ended. Algeria had fought a bitter independence war against France and had emerged as one of the most politically radical countries in Africa. Sudan was distinguished from the rest of colonial Africa as a condominium of Britain and Egypt and was sharply divided along ethnic lines between the Arab north and the black south. Somalia was ethnically more homogeneous than any other African country and compensated for this apparently unifying factor by dividing on clan lines. Diversity, as ever, was the rule.

  ALGERIA

  From independence to the end of the 1980s Algeria was a one-party state though state power never resided in the hands of that party – Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) (National Liberation Font); rather, the party was an instrument of state policy while the centre of power, always, was the army. Neither was the FLN an ideological party in the sense of being committed to a particular creed. Its job was to safeguard the Algerian state.1 During the 1990s Algeria was to suffer from brutal confrontations and massacres, essentially between the secular state authorities and the Islamist ‘fundamentalists’ who sought a greater say in the running of the state than the army-backed government was prepared to allow. Although the confrontation that turned into civil war resulted from the growth of fundamentalist Islamic forces – the concept of fundamentalism has to be treated warily – the challenge to government arose out of the failure of the one-party state of the FLN to satisfy the economic and political needs of the people. In 1988 Algeria witnessed the worst rioting and social unrest since independence in 1962, and that was the measure of the government’s failure. That October riots erupted in Algiers, Annaba, Oran and other cities and continued for a number of days with government buildings and state-owned shops being especially targeted. The disturbances were suppressed by the army and resulted in 159 deaths (the official figure) but as many as 500 according to other estimates. Although the government blamed fundamentalists for the riots, a more likely explanation was simple popular dissatisfaction with harsh economic conditions. Discontent with the state of the economy could be traced to the austerity measures, including a 30 per cent devaluation, that had followed the 1986 fall in oil prices, and factions within the FLN that had also opposed the measures. When the riots had subsided the government quickly increased consumer supplies and at the same time promised constitutional reforms; it was these latter, implemented in 1989, which opened the way to multipartyism. Up to this time, Algeria had been ruled by a closed political hierarchy so that the eruption of Islamist claims for a role in the state was seen as a major threat. ‘The state is a very tightly run dictatorship which has long claimed, and has largely succeeded in maintaining, a monopoly over public life.’2

  The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was founded in February 1989 and legalized the following September; it rapidly emerged as a major political force, able to mobilize large numbers of supporters and commanding a nationwide appeal. The riots of 1988 were especially directed at President Chadli Benjedid who, with his surrounding cronies, was seen as deeply corrupt: ‘We don’t want butter or pepper, we want a leader we can trust.’ Despite the discontents with a failed economic system, the FIS did not advance any economic policy of its own although it drew its support from the poorest and most deprived sections of the community. Ironically, in the light of subsequent European judgements as to what was happenin
g in Algeria, the Islamists did not aim to overthrow the FLN state structures but wanted to advance their interests within the existing system. By the end of the 1980s demands for economic reform had become something of a crusade, enabling the adroit Benjedid to pose as a reformer as he changed the constitution to allow multiparty politics for the first time since independence. By September 1989 five political parties (apart from the FLN) had registered while within the FLN a power struggle had developed between President Benjedid and the old party hierarchy. The Gulf crisis of 1990, following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, led to massive pro-Iraqi demonstrations in Algeria with the FIS as well as secular nationalists opposing any US presence in the Gulf.

  Benjedid continued to carry out political reforms through 1990 and exiles, including former President Ahmed Ben Bella, were allowed to return to Algeria. In the town council and municipal elections of June the government and FLN suffered a huge setback: 65 per cent of the electorate voted with the FIS obtaining 54 per cent of the vote while the FLN managed only 28 per cent. The FIS took control of 32 out of 48 wilayats, mainly in the densely populated coastal regions. The result led to a split in the FLN and the resignation of Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche who had miscalculated how the elections would turn out. President Benjedid committed himself to elections for the National Assembly early in 1991. The end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of the alternative Soviet model for nationalist Algeria, and France at once began to reassert its influence, by attempting ‘to force upon the Algerian government its own preferences in economic policy, and to induce it to spring a pluralist constitution upon a society entirely unprepared for this transition as a pretext for legalizing the Islamists as the essential preliminary to instrumentalizing them against the nationalism of the FLN.’3 France, it may be argued, had never forgiven the FLN for the defeat of 1962. However, when the political experiment in multipartyism went wrong and the FIS escaped Benjedid’s control and the army intervened, Paris became ‘secularist’ and supported the subsequent repression.