Dreadnought
Page 83
On March 29, another packed house heard the debate on Balfour’s censure motion. Grey, rather than McKenna or Asquith, was the principal government speaker. His speech23 ranged widely, from the crushing burden of armaments on all countries, to the essential role of the navy in Britain’s security, the state of Anglo-German relations in general, and the Admiralty’s fears that Germany’s expanding capacity, rather than her moderate intentions, might govern German naval construction: “The great countries of Europe are raising enormous revenues and something like half of them are being spent on naval and military preparations... [which are], after all, preparations to kill each other. Surely... this expenditure... becomes a satire... on civilization.... If it goes on... sooner or later I believe it will submerge civilization.”
Britain, Grey argued, could not unilaterally drop out of the arms race: “If we, alone among the great powers, gave up the competition and sank into a position of inferiority, what good should we do? None whatever.... We should cease to count for anything amongst the nations of Europe, and we should be fortunate if our liberty was left, and we did not become the conscript appendage of some stronger power.”
In this area, the strength of the navy played a critical role in British policy: “There is no comparison between the importance of the German Navy to Germany, and the importance of our Navy to us. Our Navy is to us what their Army is to them. To have a strong Navy would increase their prestige, their diplomatic influence, their power of protecting their commerce, but... it is not a matter of life and death to them... [as] it is to us. No superiority of the British Navy over the German Navy could ever put us in a position to affect the independence or integrity of Germany because our Army is not maintained on a scale which, unaided, could do anything on German territory. But if the German Navy were superior to ours, they, maintaining the Army which they do... our independence, our very existence would be at stake.”
Anglo-German relations, Grey believed, were friendly and would remain so as long as both Powers respected each other’s vital interests: “I see a wide space in which both of us may walk in peace and amity.... In my opinion two extreme things would produce conflict. One is an attempt by us to isolate Germany. No nation of her standing and her position would stand a policy of isolation assumed by neighboring powers.... Another thing which would certainly produce a conflict would be the isolation of England attempted by a great Continental Power so as to dominate and dictate the policy of the Continent. That has always been so in history.”
Where did Grey find the road to peace?
“If I was asked to name the one thing which would mostly reassure... Europe... I think it would be that the naval expenditure in Germany would be diminished, and that ours was following suit.... On what basis would any arrangement have to be proposed? Not the basis of equality. It must be the basis of a superiority of the British Navy. No German, so far as I know, disputes that that is a natural point of view for us.”
Grey turned finally to the specific problem of apparent German acceleration and the British response. He spoke of German capacity (“Your intention to accelerate is one thing while your power to accelerate is another”). The only way to know what was going on in another country’s shipyards was for naval attachés to have free access.
On strict party lines, Balfour’s censure motion was defeated, 353 to 135. Four ships were to be built; four more were authorized and waited in the wings. Churchill himself later ruefully described what had happened: “In the end24 a curious and characteristic solution was reached. The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight.”
From the beginning of the Navy Scare, the British government attempted to learn the facts, not only from its Naval Attaché in Berlin and from shadowy unofficial sources, but from the German government. In the autumn of 1908, McKenna, hearing reports of materials collected in German shipyards and of contracts awarded to shipyards before funds were voted in the Reichstag, put these matters before Captain Widemann, the German Naval Attaché in London. Widemann denied everything. Indeed, he said, he was shocked that the First Lord would attribute such obviously unconstitutional behavior to State Secretary Tirpitz. McKenna, believing his own information, not Widemann, did not consult the Naval Attaché again.
Grey became involved in January 1909 after reading McKenna’s persuasive memorandum on German shipbuilding. Grey understood the importance of British naval supremacy; at Scarborough on November 20, 1908, he had said, “There is no half-way house25 in naval affairs... between complete safety and absolute ruin.” But, as Foreign Secretary, he felt an additional concern: if the German government were deliberately lying to conceal an acceleration of its building program, then the whole of German policy, not just the number and delivery dates of ships under construction, was thrown into question. From the beginning of January until the publication of the British Naval Estimates on March 12, Grey struggled to extract from Paul Wolff-Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, a straightforward statement about German naval building. In dealing with Metternich, the Foreign Secretary faced two problems: first, the German Ambassador was kept in the dark by Admiral Tirpitz; second, even when Metternich was accurately informed, he was often instructed not to pass the information along to the British. The Grey-Metternich conversations, therefore, were an exercise in frustration for both men.
Grey’s first meeting with Metternich took place on January 4, 1909, immediately after the Foreign Secretary had read the First Lord’s memorandum. Grey referred to the rumors and reports which the British Admiralty had heard and received; Metternich said they were untrue. Grey pointed out that Britons were worried because of the large theoretical capacity Germany had for building dreadnoughts; Metternich replied that the entire German program was laid down in the Navy Laws and that any sudden shift of German shipyards to dreadnought construction was forbidden by those laws. Grey suggested that the best way of ascertaining facts was to let the naval attachés visit shipyards in both countries and see what ships had been laid down and how far along they were. Metternich said that the Kaiser would never permit this.
By the time the second conversation took place, on February 4, Metternich knew that the evidence in British hands of accumulation of advance materials in German shipyards was incontrovertible; therefore, he admitted it. The reason, he explained, was simply fore-sightedness on the part of the contractors, who were proceeding at their own risk. He insisted that no acceleration was intended and that the rate of shipbuilding was fixed by law. It was true, he conceded, that the rate of building could be accelerated, but only by a public vote in the Reichstag. Grey was in a difficult position. He respected Metternich, but he suspected that the Ambassador was withholding information. Metternich had admitted only belatedly the advance accumulation of materials; he still had not acknowledged that contracts for two of the four 1909 ships had been let in October 1908. Grey could not accuse the Ambassador of passing false information, yet he could not believe the information Metternich gave him. Once again, Grey suggested an exchange of attaché visits to the shipyards. Metternich replied that the Emperor had refused absolutely. There was little more that Grey could do beyond warning that Britain would have to consider German capacity as well as the German Navy Laws in formulating its own building plans. On March 10, just before publication of the British Naval Estimates, Metternich officially informed Grey that German building would not be accelerated and that the High Seas Fleet would not possess thirteen dreadnoughts until the end of 1912. That night, Metternich warned Berlin that the British Admiralty would ask for more ships.
On March 12, the day of the publication of the British Naval Estimates and four days before they were to be presented to the House of Commons, Asquith summoned Metternich to reinforce Grey’s warning. As reported to Berlin by Metternich, this is how the Prime Minister explained the British program: “According to information26 received by the British Admiralty, three of the four [German] dreadnoughts of the... 1909–191
0 year have been under construction for several months. Not only has the material been collected, but the keel of one dreadnought of the 1909–1910 program has been laid in the Schichau yard. If preparations are made for building, and ships are actually begun some months before they are voted [by the Reichstag], it is clear that the completion of these ships can be antedated by a corresponding number of months. Mr. Asquith had no wish to complain [Metternich was paraphrasing and summarizing the Prime Minister’s words] and had no justification for any complaint about this procedure. Germany alone had the right to determine the rate of her shipbuilding, and no responsible persons in England would have the right to object; but the British Government... (in estimating their own program) could not avoid taking account of the development of the German program.”
The Prime Minister promised that Britain would withhold the laying down of the four contingent dreadnoughts until the pace of German construction made it imperative.
Metternich sent this report to Berlin; the answer was silence. Four days later, just two days before the opening of the naval debate in the Commons, Metternich urgently telegraphed Berlin, asking for permission to explain the German program in greater detail. Tirpitz was opposed and the Kaiser agreed with Tirpitz. “I think it would be better27 for Metternich to hold his tongue. He is incorrigible,” William wrote in the margin of the Ambassador’s telegram.
The stark nature of McKenna’s Naval Estimates speech and the passion of the Commons debate forced German reactions. On March 17, the day after the debate, Metternich complained to Grey that the British government had ignored his March 10 assurance that the German naval program was not being accelerated. Grey’s response was to say for the third time that the best way to clarify such misunderstandings and get accurate facts was for the naval attachés of each country to visit the other’s shipyards.
The same day in Berlin, Tirpitz publicly supported the position the beleaguered Metternich had been required to take. Opening the Reichstag debate on the German Naval Estimates, the State Secretary officially declared that British fears were groundless: Germany, he announced, would possess thirteen, not seventeen, dreadnoughts in 1912. Privately, however, Tirpitz decided to admit to Metternich a fact which Metternich had not known and which, on instructions, he had been denying vigorously: that the contracts for two of the four 1909–1910 German dreadnoughts had indeed been placed with private shipyards in the autumn of 1908, six months before the Reichstag could authorize funds. Now, since the British Admiralty and government already knew, Tirpitz decided that Metternich should confirm this information in London, and explain that the contracts had been given early not to steal a march on England, but solely to get lower, competitive prices from the builders while, at the same time, preventing the yards from having to dismiss any workers.fn3
Humiliated by his own government, Metternich had no choice but to obey instructions. On March 18, he admitted that the contracts for two of the four ships had been placed in October 1908. His miserable situation got no sympathy from Fisher, who by now believed that both Tirpitz and Metternich were dissembling. “We have got to have a margin28 against lying,” he declared. Meeting Metternich by accident on March 24, he glared at the German and burst out, “How all this scare would vanish,31 Ambassador, if you would let our Naval Attaché go and count them [the ships under construction].” “Impossible,” Metternich replied. “Other governments would also want to. Besides, something would be seen which we wish to keep secret.” Fisher assumed that the German ships, or the guns they carried, were even bigger than the published figures suggested.
Metternich continued to try to make his government understand the British viewpoint until he left London. He wrote early in April, admirably summarizing the cause of the Navy Scare in London:
“Until November last32 (1908) the British Government believed that in our Naval Law it possessed a standard of reasonable accuracy with which to regulate its own annual shipbuilding requirements.... Until last November it was assumed here that the execution of our program depended on the annual financial vote of the Reichstag. This security has now disappeared. The present Government has indeed our assurance that we do not wish to accelerate our ‘tempo’ and that we shall have no more than thirteen dreadnoughts in the year 1912. But the Government maintains that, although these may be our intentions at present, we have every right to change them at any moment we may wish to do so. The Government feels that in this important question it is groping in the dark in respect to our ship-building, and that it must not be dependent upon the good intentions of a foreign government—intentions which may change.”
When Metternich’s dispatch reached the Kaiser’s desk, William covered it with marginalia: “Nonsense!”33 “This is absolutely not so!” “No!”...
After Grey’s speech and the defeat of Balfour’s censure motion, parliamentary debate was over, but the furor in the Cabinet and country continued. Lloyd George and Churchill persisted in trying to stave off the four contingent dreadnoughts and to ensure that, if they were to be built, they would be part of the 1910 program. (Fisher wrote chaffingly to Churchill that if Churchill would permit the four additional ships to be built, he would see that they were named “Winston, Churchill, Lloyd, and George34. How they would fight!!”) McKenna was “very sore35 with his colleagues about the way he had been treated” and reiterated his threat to resign unless the four contingent ships were ordered. Grey supported McKenna. The Conservative press hammered the government. “If the Government36 is not composed of stony-hearted pedants, the shipbuilding... [orders] should be given out now,” declared the Daily Mail. “Eighty percent of the cost of a battleship goes in wages to the British worker.” “Our Navy and our unemployed may both be starved together and soon will be if you don’t turn this Government out.”
Ironically, the decision to build the contingent four, when it came, was prompted not by Germany, but by Austria and Italy. In July 1909, London learned that Austria was planning to build three and possibly four dreadnoughts. The Italians reacted swiftly; although Austria and Italy were nominal allies in the Triple Alliance, each regarded the other as a potential enemy. Italy immediately announced that it would build four dreadnoughts. Therefore, looking ahead to 1912, Britain would face a minimum of thirteen German dreadnoughts in the North Sea, plus Austrian and Italian dreadnoughts in the Mediterranean. The Admiralty case became irresistible. On July 26, McKenna announced that the four contingent ships would be laid down “without prejudice”37 to the 1910 program. Asquith, fulfilling his promise—and also keenly aware of the results of a recent by-election in Croydon in which the Liberal candidate had been overwhelmingly defeated—backed the First Lord. Liberals grumbled that there was still no sign of German acceleration and that the Austrian and Italian dreadnoughts cancelled each other out; Conservatives cheered; the Navy Scare was over.
The resolution was painful for a Liberal government which had taken office pledging to reducing the armaments burden. For three years, the government had met this pledge. Now, within twelve months, it had ordered eight costly ships.fn4 Indeed, it was to acquire more. Two of the dominions, New Zealand and Australia, aware of their reliance on the Royal Navy, were alarmed by McKenna’s portrayal of the narrowing margin of British naval supremacy. On March 22, only six days after the First Lord’s presentation of the Naval Estimates to the House of Commons, the government of New Zealand cabled an offer to pay the cost of building one dreadnought. In June, the Australian government followed with a similar proposal. Both offers were accepted and in 1910 two additional battle cruisers, New Zealand and Australia, were laid down. Directly and indirectly, the Navy Scare of 1909 resulted in a single year’s harvest of ten new dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy.
In retrospect, the grounds for the scare turned out to be false. The Germans were acquiring materials and gun mountings in advance, and shipyards had begun construction early, but there was no acceleration in the delivery dates of German dreadnoughts. The four ships of the 1908 program and the
four ships of the 1909 program were delivered on time and the four ships of the 1910 program were actually delayed eight months to permit a design change made necessary by the increase in gun caliber from 12-inch to 13.5-inch in six of the ten British ships.fn5 At the end of 1912, there were—as promised by Tirpitz and Metternich—thirteen German dreadnoughts in commission. They were faced by twenty-two British dreadnoughts. Later, Churchill assessed the results and the significance of the Navy Scare:
“In the light of what actually happened,38 there can be no doubt whatever that, so far as facts and figures were concerned, we [Lloyd George and himself] were strictly right. The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were in no respect fulfilled in the year 1912. There were no secret German dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral Tirpitz made any untrue statement.... But although the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I were right in the narrow sense, we were absolutely wrong in relation to the deep tides of destiny. The greatest credit is due to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. McKenna, for the resolute and courageous manner in which he fought his case and withstood his Party on this occasion. Little did I think, as this dispute proceeded, that when the next Cabinet crisis about the Navy arose, our roles would be reversed; and little did he think that the ships for which he contended so stoutly would eventually, when they arrived, be welcomed with open arms by me.”fn6