Interventions

by Kofi Annan

  The negotiators then came to an agreement and signed a statement on February 14. It noted that, given “there is a serious crisis in the country, we agree a political settlement is necessary to promote national reconciliation and unity.” In addition to this groundbreaking consensus, the statement laid out plans for reforms that included the identification and prosecution of perpetrators of the violence, and also a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission among other judicial reforms—all of which were, in my view, essential to the longer-term process of healing required to recover from this traumatic episode. In the simple February 14 document, therefore, there were not only the beginnings of an agreement for the cessation of the immediate crisis but also the seeds of a major political and societywide reform process.

  According to the Red Cross, the death count in Kenya had risen above one thousand by this time, with mass displacement alongside due to the burning of villages and the threat of armed gangs, the looting of farms and homes, as well as widespread sexual violence against men and women. Meanwhile, there was still no movement on what shape the political deal would take, but at least we now had a full agreement on the way out of the crisis: a coalition government. It was a great relief to me, not least because I was sure the other electoral options on the negotiating table would have likely triggered an escalation in the violence.

  By now, I had been in Kenya much longer than anyone had planned, and there was still no end in sight. I was physically drained after my heavy course of antibiotics, but there was no chance for any respite. It was like being a hunter: as you attempt to corner your quarry, any lapse in your endeavors may allow it to slip through and escape for good.

  By February 25, however, the negotiations were still deadlocked. Patience had been essential in getting us this far, but we now needed more. That morning the negotiators and the mediators, myself included, spent four hours in talks to push for the final agreement on the distribution of power in the coalition, and we got nowhere. By now it was clear what the power-sharing deal required: Kibaki would remain as president; an executive prime minister’s position would need to be created, which would be occupied by Odinga; and there would need to be a coalition cabinet shared between the PNU and the ODM that reflected the balance in parliament. But there was no movement on the question of the prime minister’s powers. The PNU side, in particular, was holding things back, continuing to project the argument that the power of the president could not be fettered and that the ministries should not be shared.

  I was frustrated and decided it was time to throw the PNU and the ODM to the people. So I went to the press and publicly explained that I had concluded the negotiators were “not capable of resolving the outstanding issues.” I said it was time for Kibaki and Odinga to conclude the negotiations face-to-face, as it was now their responsibility alone to break the deadlock.

  It was a risk, as this move could have triggered an expectation that the talks would fail, inflaming the situation on the streets and in the slums. But the alternative seemed to be no deal at all, which would almost certainly then lead to a much bigger round of bloodshed, and this would take the crisis into the next stage of conflict. I had to scorch the feet of Odinga and Kibaki somehow.

  I privately visited Odinga first and then Kibaki. They were not expecting this sudden move, and the prospect of negotiating face-to-face surprised them. Speaking to Odinga, I reminded him that he had all to wait for. If he worked through the compromise now, he would likely be set to become the next president. This message seemed to resonate. It was Kibaki’s willingness to compromise on the powers of the president, however, that represented the real obstacle and the chance for a Kenyan peace deal.

  In my meeting with Kibaki, I pressed him, explaining I was in regular contact with key members of the international community, Condoleezza Rice and George W. Bush of the United States, leaders from the EU, and elsewhere. “The international community is picking up that this failure to make a deal is because of the PNU’s unwillingness to move. There will be consequences from them if this fails.”

  I also tried to make Kibaki think about the long term, and presented this not as a threat to his rule but as an opportunity for him. “Raila is a younger man, Mr. President. But you are the elder and, right now, you are the president. It is you who has the power to change Kenya. This could be your legacy: a reconciled nation and a reconciled people.” He listened in his usual quiet and unemotional way, but replied there were technical issues with a coalition government and questions as to the validity of an executive prime minister in the Kenyan constitution.

  “You’re the one in charge here,” I reminded him. “Save your country. Otherwise you are going to have a lot falling on your head.” I studied his face carefully. “Mr. President, over one thousand people are dead,” I said in closing. “It’s time to make a deal.”

  The coming meeting between Odinga and Kibaki was our last chance. But I thought we now had it. My public exposure of the deadlock had made it clear that one side was holding things up. If I walked away now without a deal, it would be clear that Kibaki was to blame. He was exposed. Furthermore, I had called the U.S. administration to inform them of what was going on. Condoleezza Rice had then announced that any future relationship between the United States and Kenya depended upon them agreeing to the compromise now on the table. With the deck stacked in this manner, I thought he had to budge.

  Kibaki, Odinga, and I then entered into an intense five hours of negotiations on February 28. Other than the three of us, the only people I brought in were President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania and his predecessor, Benjamin Mkapa. I wanted them to counsel Kibaki on the Tanzanian system, which also includes a sharing of power between the president and a prime minister. Kikwete, Mkapa, and I had discussed and agreed on this approach the day before, at a meeting in the Grand Regency Hotel. They were now very effective in demonstrating to Kibaki that it was more than feasible for a strong president to operate in such a system, erasing the validity of his last substantive argument against the agreement.

  The quarry was now cornered. I had told the leaders that this was the final negotiation, that we would not leave until the deal was complete and we would sign it on the steps outside, in public, as soon as we were finished. Odinga was not going to back out now: this was a compromise to which he was already committed. But for Kibaki the choice was now either shift or walk out alone into the sunshine of derision at his failure to move—in the face of both the Kenyan people and the most powerful actors in the international community.

  Kibaki then, finally, agreed to the power-sharing deal. I made sure there was no chance of backing out. I walked them out onto the steps of Harambee House to publicly and immediately announce the deal to the world and sign the document: the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government. But it did not feel triumphant. It had taken far too long. As they say in a Swahili proverb, “When the elephants fight it is the grass that suffers.” This was what had happened with all the people killed around us.

  But with confidence restored, the bloodshed now ended. A process of political reconciliation could now begin, as would the difficult job of healing. Despite the tragic number of people already dead, we had averted a disaster of far greater potential. We had achieved something far too elusive in the history of peacemaking—halting a spiral of violence before too many of either side have little left to lose and live on only for vengeance. The signing of the accord on February 28 brought with it a sense of immense relief across Kenya: Kenyans wished each other “Happy New Year” in reference to the New Year celebrations they had been deprived of by the violence since late December.

  The amendment to the constitution in the agreement, approved by the parliament shortly after, was a transitional arrangement that was to lead to a full process of root-and-branch constitutional reform. With that provision my role in mediating the Kenyan political crisis would continue. I had come for two w
eeks and I would still be working with them four years later. Agenda item four of the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation process, agreed on by the parties on February 1, was to deal with the fundamental causes of the violence, much of which lay in the political system. Over the months and years that followed, with Nana Effah-Apenteng leading my team on the ground, further negotiations took place to create a new Kenyan constitution. It would redistribute power through a system of devolved government, built also around land reform, a bill of rights, and a permanent reduction in the president’s powers. Through this, each constituent county of Kenya and each community, including all its tribal and regional groups, would have representatives with access to a piece of power, negating the destructive winner-takes-all politics of the previous system.

  On August 4, 2010, a national referendum was held, and the new constitution, which would change the face of Kenyan politics countrywide, was approved. Working to curb his own authority, Mwai Kibaki also campaigned for the yes vote.

  One of the salient features of the mediation in Kenya, and implementation of the agreement thereafter, has been the active and continued engagement of all stakeholders—not only Kenyan politicians and the international community but civil society, religious groups, and the business community. Kenyan society as a whole provided a source of constant pressure on the political leadership. For instance, a commendable role played by the business community was its message regarding the negative consequences of the political crisis on the country’s economy—particularly the threat to Kenya if it lost its image as the business center and economic powerhouse of the region. The many facets of Kenyan civil society continue to play an active role in the peace process, helping in diverse ways to ensure the successful implementation of the agreement.

  Alongside the reformation of the Kenyan political system, other innovations came out of our mediation. In line with plans set down in the February 14 agreement, on March 4, 2008, the creation of two bodies was formally agreed to: the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV); and the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The TJRC, which began its work in 2009, is mandated to investigate not only the recent violence but the patterns of human rights violations and abuses since December 12, 1963, the date of Kenya’s transition to independence. In the TJRC, therefore, is bestowed the understanding that the resolution of the 2008 crisis means confronting the entirety of Kenya’s troubled past, not just the recent turmoil. Together with the TJRC, a National Cohesion and Integration Commission was created in 2008 to investigate, outlaw, and eliminate all forms of discrimination in Kenyan society, which have served to create so dysfunctional a system of ethnic inequality. These bodies are manifestations of our attempt to foment root-and-branch social and political change—nothing less than the leadership required to bring about enduring and prosperous peace and stability across the troubled heartlands of Africa.

  Another important feature of the reform process, particularly given our emphasis on the importance of affirming and strengthening the rule of law, has been the involvement of the International Criminal Court. The CIPEV included among its recommendations that the prosecutor of the ICC be forwarded the names and information of those suspected to bear the greatest responsibility for the violence. Justice Philip Waki, who led the commission, presented me with the final report of the CIPEV, along with a sealed envelope containing a list of suspects at the highest level, which I would hold and pass on to a prosecutor in a special national court that had been proposed. The recommendation of the Commission was that if the Kenyan government failed to take due steps to hold suspected orchestrators of the violence to account then the envelope should be passed to the prosecutor of the ICC.

  By July 2009, it became clear that the Kenyan government was not going to take these steps. As I said then, “Justice delayed is justice denied. The people of Kenya want to see concrete progress on impunity.” As demanded by the CIPEV report—which had also been certified and approved by the Kenyan parliament—I then passed the sealed envelope on to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the prosecutor of the ICC.

  After a period of investigation, in December 2010, Ocampo released the names of six prominent Kenyans, including three government ministers, suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for the violence. In January 2012, the ICC then confirmed that there was sufficient evidence against four of those suspects for them to stand trial. These included prominent figures in Kenyan politics, and the willingness to prosecute suspects of this level, regardless of the outcome, stands as an important marker in Africa’s battle with impunity for human rights violations.

  In the wake of the Kenyan dispute over the election result and the ensuing violence, the inadequacy of a growing economy and an electoral system alone as a shortcut to prosperity, peace, and stability were once more revealed. If we had brokered only a deal between leaders, our intervention would have been a plaster on a wound that would weep again tomorrow. We had to look, in the truest sense of the word, for a resolution. A peaceful, stable, and prosperous Kenya was one that could be delivered only through responsible, accountable leadership, a culture of respect for human rights, institutions for good governance, the fairer distribution of wealth and power, and, most important, the sanctity of the rule of law. Kenya’s future relies on this. Whether it will achieve these things remains to be seen, but it has pointed itself in a direction that all of Africa must take.

  AFRICA EMPOWERED

  My role in mediating the violent 2008 Kenyan political crisis, backed by a remarkable international and African support network, was one for which, in some ways, I had spent my entire decade-long tenure as secretary-general preparing. It was perhaps the hardest, most intensive, and enduring of all my interventions in the affairs of another country, and a deal that required me to draw on every aspect of my experience of diplomacy and energy for peacemaking—this time at the heart of my own continent.

  As flawed as the commitment of the parties might have been to the Kenyan power-sharing deal, the events following the intervention in Kenya represented a broader turning point, a continentwide change that came from within, conjured from a vision for all Africa. This was a vision that resurrected old dreams for the continent that had been dashed in the aftermath of independence—a vision dedicated to transforming Africa into a place where all people can achieve their aspirations. A future of peace and stability through institutions for good governance; respect for human rights; responsible, accountable leadership; and, above all, the rule of law.

  This all came together in Kenya, in an intervention that relied on a deeply changed continent to the one I knew before I took office as secretary-general. The foundations for these changes were laid in the years before 2007, through hard and innovative efforts in African diplomacy by Africans to change the political fabric of the continent. It was a long way from where I had stood and observed the continent in January 1997.

  Africa is now on the move. Much has changed on the continent. It is now rightly seen as a place of opportunity, with economic growth strong in recent years. Countries and companies are even queuing up to invest, and, increasingly, the fruits of economic progress are being used to create jobs, raise incomes, and to invest in the future—in education, in health, and vital infrastructure. Good governance is growing, enabling investor confidence and increasingly freeing the ambitions of Africa’s people. The eleven years since the Millennium Declaration and the subsequent establishment of the MDGs has been one of the most promising periods in Africa’s postcolonial history. Now approximately half the continent is enjoying strong economic growth, as well as rapid improvements in human development. But if African countries are to achieve the new future within their grasp, there needs to be a new focus on the daunting obstacles still to be overcome.

  High on this list is agriculture. There are 240 million people in sub-Saharan Africa who do not eat well enough for their health and well-being. Africa is the only continent that
fails to grow enough food to feed its own citizens. On average, cereal yields in Africa are a quarter of those of other developing regions—and have barely increased in thirty years. Meanwhile, per capita food production and agricultural labor productivity also remain remarkably low. This is not because of a lack of effort by Africa’s farmers but a lack of knowledge, resources, and infrastructure to support their hard work. A uniquely African “green revolution” would have a positive impact not only on food security but also on many of the other challenges facing the continent. It will, for example, reduce poverty, accelerate wider economic and social development, improve health and education, slow migration into Africa’s already overcrowded urban areas, boost women’s influence within their societies, and provide new opportunities for business.

  But there also needs to be a focus on infrastructure and the distribution of energy resources, which have always been two of the main obstacles holding back Africa’s economies. Furthermore, considerations of growth need to be held in tandem with concerns for employment, particularly youth employment. If growth does not benefit youth employment, it benefits little about the future. Finally, a bright African future is also one that requires gender balance in all areas of life. An empowered and successful Africa requires all the talents and the fair mobilization of all its resources—it can exist only with equally empowered and successful women.

  Africa’s people are the central agents, but outside actors have essential supporting roles. At certain times they need to respond with peacekeeping; other times, with intervention or preventive measures and mediation, or through attempts to shape the rules of regional organizations. But in all of this we are seeking a peaceful and prosperous Africa, and one that favors the aspirations of all African men and women.