Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
Page 31
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have revealed that military interventionism in Pakistan results
significantly, if not entirely, from the failure to develop a coherent ideological
superstructure. That failure, then, leads to the development of Shafqat’s two
conflicting political propensities, the ‘military-hegemonic’ and the ‘dominant-
party’ system. First, the ‘dominant-party’ system, while demonstrating a pre-
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ference for the civilian political leadership, parliamentary institutions and possible restoration of democratic processes, is non-consensual and confrontational.
Civilian political leaders, primarily coming from a feudal social origin, conduct
themselves in a manner unsupportive for the growth and development of
democratic institutions.77 Clearly, according to the research undertaken, there is a significant emphasis on the incompetence of the civilian and military political leadership in Pakistan.78 This political leadership, whether civilian or military, stems from feudal, upper-class social origins and struggles only for total,
unchecked and absolute control over the reins of power. The ‘dominant-party’
civilian-based political system was intended to encourage participatory and
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Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
representative politics; however, it rapidly degenerated into an overbearing,
confrontational and ideologically divided political dispensation. As a con-
sequence of chronic ideological divisions, which were seriously exacerbated
with the death of the leading figures in the political movement for Pakistan,
ideological extremes began dominating the political arena. In that political
scenario, achieving consensus was proving impossible to attain. In response,
the military intervened to secure its internal and external interests. However,
having tasted political power and secured their economic interests, they would
not let go without being compelled to do so:
The most serious consequence of the military’s involvement in economic
ventures relates to their sense of judgment regarding the political control
of the state. The financial autonomy of the armed forces … establishes
the officer cadre’s interest in retaining political control of the state. Since
political power nurtures greater financial benefits, the military fraternity see it
as beneficial to perpetuate it. In this respect, economic and political interests
are linked in a cyclic process: political power guarantees economic benefits,
which, in turn, motivate the officer cadre to remain powerful. 79
Thus, the military elites have every reason to grasp, wield and retain political
power. They have no incentive to let go unless they are coerced out of the political system. The best that can be hoped for, in this political scenario, is that a
political leadership emerges that represents a balance between the ‘foundational’
and ‘contextual’ spheres of inquiry – ‘revivalists’, who will be able to both con-
front hegemonic characteristics and rid Pakistan of military interventionism.
In other words, an appropriate ideological political superstructure and culture
needs to be developed in consonance with enduring ‘foundational’ values.
Otherwise, under the current political state of affairs, the military elites will
only make a cosmetic retreat to the barracks while a civilian government
takes the flak without wielding real power. This was pretty much the situation
for much of the 1990s, after General Zia’s death. It was only after former
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was deluded in thinking that his large parlia-
mentary majority gave him real power, and tried to dismiss General Musharraf,
that the military staged its coup in 1999. 80
The military-hegemonic system, in summation, grew out of both internal
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and external factors. Civilian political infighting, lack of consensus and the
failure of the civilian political leaders contributed to this malaise. The military-
hegemonic regime advanced the interests of the military-bureaucratic elites,
consolidated the financial industrial groups, co-opted a segment of the feudal
class, and led to laissez-faire economic growth and development. At the same
time, through domination and exclusionary policies, the military regime promoted
centralization and authoritarianism, restricted associational group activity and
suppressed the growth and development of political parties. This chapter empha-
sizes that in Pakistan, while political order was maintained through military
hegemony, unequal growth led to the concentration of economic wealth in the
Civil and military hegemony
151
hands of a few, which, in turn, politicized the excluded groups and classes. 81
In other words, the economic policies of the military regime promoted class
inequalities. This scenario, coupled with centralization, political suppression and
authoritarianism, evoked politics of regime confrontation. Since under the
military regime associational group activity is discouraged and the functioning
of political parties is restricted, political leaders excluded from the political
system resort to coalition-building, mass mobilization and confrontation. More
importantly, civil society is unable to organize and develop, thereby nullifying
methods of resolving conflict within the political system. Thus mass protest
movements emerge as a consequence of the exclusionary policies of the military
hegemonic system. Such mass movements focus only on regime change.
In this chapter we have shown that the inability of the civilian leadership to
construct a political order that recognises the foundational aspects of political
culture in Muslim polities and then apply it, according to a revivalist inter-
pretation, in their context was a major contributor towards ideological and
political instability. Without this ‘revivalist’ leadership, the military elites find it most opportune to intervene in the political system. Thereafter, it is clear that over the years the military-bureaucratic elites, through various policies of inclusion and exclusion, have created a coalition of interests that not only supported but
advocated the perpetuation of the military-hegemonic system. Likewise, political
parties, despite fragmentation, and weak institutional infrastructure, have con-
tinued to retain adherents and advocates who express pro-democracy sentiments
but in reality continue to reveal a preference for civilian hegemony as an alter-
native to military hegemony. Consequently, ‘democratic development in Pakistan
has been arrested both by the functioning of military-hegemonic systems and
also the constraints of political leaders to consolidate the dominant-party system
rather than work for the creation, construction and consolidation of federal,
parliamentary and democratic structures’ which is in consonance with the
‘foundational’ political values in Islam.82 Consequently, disharmony and tension between democratic dispensations and autocratic reality continues to be the
most pronounced characteristic of Pakistan’s political development. 83
Yet there is light at the end of this dark tunnel. The recent lawyers’ movement
that return
ed the deposed Chief Justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Iftikhar
Chaudhury, to his position as the head of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is
worthy of note. A new era seems to be emerging which is mandating respect
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for the rule of law. In addition, Imran Khan’s political party, Tehrik-i-Insaf –
Movement for Justice – is another promising development in the history of
Pakistan. This is, perhaps, the first time since Independence, when a grassroots,
popular mass mobilization is taking shape that is in line with the ‘revivalists’.
Both are positive indicators for the future of Pakistan.
Notes
1 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997) p. 3.
152
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
2 Bienan, Henry. ‘Armed Forces and National Modernization – Continuing the Debate,’ in Comparative Politics, 16 (1983): 8.
3 Moore, Raymond. Nation-Building and the Pakistan Army 1947–1969, (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1979) p. 42.
4 Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order In Changing Societies, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968) p. 243.
5 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 1.
6 Alavi, Hassan. ‘Class and State’, in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, (London: Zed Press, 1983) p. 42.
7 Sayeed, Khalid. The Political System in Pakistan, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967) p. 305.
8 Lord Birdwood. India and Pakistan: A Continent Divides, (Nadu Press, 2011) p. 56.
9 Wirsing, Robert. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1998) p. 10.
10 Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, (London: Pluto Press, 2007) p. 67.
11 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 3.
12 Hashmi, Bilal. ‘Dragon Seed: Military in the State’, in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, (London: Zed Press, 1983) p. 158.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 159.
15 Ahmed, Muneer, ‘Failure of Nation-building in Pakistan’, Pakistan Forum, (II) (3) (1971): 9.
16 Afridi,
Gul
Khan
(Brigadier-General).
Personal
Interview.
Peshawar,
Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan. 13 April 2006.
17 Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc., p. 5.
18 Rudolph, Lloyd J. and Suzanne Rudolph, ‘Generals and Politicians in India’, Pacific Affairs, Spring 1964, cited in Golam W Choudhury, Pakistan: Transition
from Military to Civilian Rule, (Essex: Scorpion Publishers, 1988) p. 27.
19 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 8.
20 Gardezi, Hassan and Rashid, Jamil (eds). ‘Independent Pakistan: Its Political Economy’, in Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, (London: Zed Press, 1983) p. 7.
21 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 255.
22 Gilgiti, Saleem (General). Personal Interview. Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir.
10 April, 2006. Mushahid Hussain (Senator). Personal Interview. Islamabad, Pakistan. 31 March 2005.
23 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 25.
24 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Military Coup in Pakistan: Business As Usual,’ in Roundtable Series. Vol. 360 (1): 358.
25 www.dawn.com. Feb 4/Monday, 2013. Tahir-ul-Qadri.
26 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 34.
27 Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc., p. 5.
28 Ibid., p. 6.
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29 Ibid., p. 64.
30 Khan, Jamshed (General). Personal Interview. Peshawar, Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan. 13 April 2006.
31 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, pp. 8–9. See, Iqbal, Nasir,
‘Whither Judicial Activism’, in The Dawn, Online Edition, www.dawn.com,
Saturday 10 March 2007.
32 Khan, Hamid. Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p. 153. See, The State v. Dosso and another, PLD 1958 Supreme Court, pp. 539–40; and,
Mahmud, Tayyab. ‘Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings:
Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdown in Pakistan’, in Utah Law
Review, (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah E Publications) p. 1254.
Civil and military hegemony
153
33 Ayaz, Amir. ‘The Problem of Spine in Pakistani Politics,’ Daily Dawn. Internet Edition. 26 September 2003.
34 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 8.
35 Ibid., p. 9.
36 Ibid., p. 11.
37 Yusufzai, Zafar Khan (Major-General). Personal Interview. Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir. Army Headquarters. 10 April 2006.
38 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 13.
39 Falk, Richard. ‘Militarization and Human Rights in the Third World’, in Absjorn Eide and Marek Thee (eds), Problems in Contemporary Militarism, (London:
Croom Helm, 1980) p. 217.
40 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Military Coup in Pakistan: Business As Usual’, in Roundtable Series, 360 (1): 358.
41 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 10.
42 Ibid.
43 Shah, Aqil. ‘Pakistan’s Armoured Democracy’, in Journal of Democracy, 14 (4) (2003): 34.
44 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 10.
45 Ibid., p. 11.
46 Ibid.
47 Choudhury, Golam W. Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, p. 12.
48 Noman, Omar. Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947, (London: Kegan Paul Ltd, 1988) p. 9.
49 Ibid.
50 Aziz, K. Party Politics in Pakistan, p. 86.
51 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Military Coup in Pakistan: Business As Usual,’ in Roundtable Series, 360 (1): 360.
52 Ibid., p. 361.
53 Khan, Imran. Personal Interview. Islamabad, Pakistan. 30 March 2006.
54 Ibid.
55 Noman, Omar. Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947, p. 13.
56 Huntington, Samuel P. ‘Democracy For the Long Haul’ in Journal of Democracy, 7 (2) (1986): 3–13.
57 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 15.
58 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Between Identity-Politics and Authoritarianism in Pakistan’, in Amyn B. Sajoo (ed.), Civil Society in the Muslim World, (London: I.B. Tauris,
2002) p. 281.
59 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 14.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Military Coup in Pakistan: Business As Usual’, in Roundtable Series, 360 (1): 364.
63 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 10.
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64 Ahmad, Aijaz. ‘Democracy and Dictatorship’, in Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, p. 103.
65 Gardezi, Hassan and Rashid, Jamil. ‘Independent Pakistan: Its Political Economy’, in Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, pp. 14–17.
66 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 11
67 Ibid., p. 12.
68 Choudhury, Golam W. Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule, p. 22.
69 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 12.
70 Ahmad, Khurshid (Senator). Personal Interview. Islamabad, Pakistan. 29 March, 2006.
154
Islam and Pakistan’s Political Culture
71 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Military Coup in Pakistan: Business As Usual’, in Roundtable Series, 360 (1): 360.
72 Ibid.
<
br /> 73 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 13.
74 Munck, Geraldo L. ‘Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective’, in Comparative Politics, 26 (3) (1994): 355–75.
75 Shah, Aqil. ‘Pakistan’s Armoured Democracy’ in Journal of Democracy, 14 (4) (2003): 37.
76 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 13.
77 Khan, Roedad. Pakistan: A Dream Gone Sour, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 145.
78 Malik, Iftikhar. ‘Military Coup in Pakistan: Business As Usual’, in Roundtable Series, 360 (1): 366.
79 Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc, p. 68.
80 Shafqat, Saeed. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan, p. 255.
81 Ibid., p. 256.
82 Ibid., p. 257.
83 Ibid.
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9
Conclusion
The real to the ideal
Conclusion
This book attempts to support Muslim societies in articulating indigenous
solutions to the myriad of political challenges confronting them. Con-
tinuously facing intellectual and ethical alternatives to their own convictions,
these rapidly changing societies are looking for pragmatic solutions that do
not necessarily compromise their own principles, values and ideals. Specifically
pertaining to the political realm, many Muslim polities grapple with the
reconciliation of modernity and tradition. In other words, they attempt to
intelligently contend with ‘permanence’ (thabit) and ‘change’ (mutaghayir).
This process of reconciliation often leads to ideological and, consequently,
political instability. Accordingly, with reconciliation not forthcoming, political
institutions, or politics per se, fail to capture the imagination of the masses.
That, then, was the raison d’être of this book – an exploration of the
dynamics of political instability, or mismanagement of permanence and
change, in Muslim polities, with Pakistan as a case study. Yet even to initiate
confronting such a colossal enigma, our exploration necessitates a host of
preliminary issues.
To begin with, this book analyses political culture, providing a thorough
overview of the literature on it. Therein, it locates constant references to the
‘core’, ‘enduring cultural component’ or ‘stock of knowledge’ in society. Sub-