by John Buchan
* Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, by O. D. Skelton, II., page 86, note.
II
Under the Act which brought the Dominion of Canada into being the British Government had assumed full responsibility for the defence of the Canadian frontier. The old Canadian levy, including a large proportion of men of French blood, had distinguished itself in the war of 1812 with the United States, and Lord Wolseley, when on the staff in Canada in the early ‘sixties, had prepared an admirable framework of a militia system which had been bequeathed to Canada with the grant of self-government. In 1872 the British troops, approximately 10,000 in number, had been withdrawn with the exception of the garrison at Halifax, and when Minto came into office there remained of British Regulars only the small detachments at Halifax and Esquimault under a British Lieutenant-General, while the main defence was in the hands of the Canadian Militia. This Militia was a purely Canadian force, under the charge of the Minister of Militia and Defence, but commanded by a British officer, who was paid from Canadian funds. It consisted of a small permanent nucleus, which in 1898 was only 850 strong, quartered in various schools, and used chiefly for the training of the volunteer Militia, which mustered in the same year about 35,000. Its efficiency had been allowed to decline, for the Government of the Dominion, with Britain to lean on, was not inclined to interest itself unduly in what seemed the academic question of defence. This was true of whatever party was in power; Sir John Macdonald and Sir Charles Tupper had been no less supine than Sir Wilfrid Laurier. The business of the Militia was left in the hands of a few enthusiasts, who were regarded by the politicians at the best with a good-natured toleration, as strange people who wanted to play at soldiers; and Parliament, whether Liberal or Conservative, voted supplies from year to year with scarcely disguised reluctance. A sum of £300,000 was considered enough for the purpose, the equivalent of one shilling and fourpence per head of the population, by far the smallest contribution in the British Empire. Under such circumstances it would have been a miracle if the Militia had preserved any high standard of competence. Its training was poor, its administrative services were rudimentary, it had nothing of what the Germans call the intendantur side. It was the Cinderella of the public services, a concession to the fussiness of Britain, and useful chiefly to provide a modest patronage for politicians.
But the Venezuela difficulty in the winter of 1895-96 had stirred the better kind of Canadian opinion to a juster view. War with America, however much it might be regarded as both a blunder and a crime, was seen to be within the bounds of possibility. General Nelson Miles, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States, had declared that any troops which the British Navy could transport would be wholly inadequate for the defence of Canada against the force which his country could put into the field. “By the time these vessels could go back for reinforcements and return there would probably be no British troops in Canada to be reinforced . . . Canada would fall into our hands as a matter of course.”* And Mr. Henrichson, President Cleveland’s Secretary of State, had announced that he thought a war with England would be “a very good thing. Our country needs a war about once in a generation. It serves to keep alive the American spirit; opens the field for the expenditure of a great deal of superfluous energy, enthusiasm, and patriotism; gives employment to a large number of people who would rather fight than work, and deadens the bitterness between political parties.” These were foolish utterances, but they came from responsible men, and thinking Canadians could not but regard with anxiety Canada’s land frontier of 3,800 miles, where, in place of the three routes of attack open from the south in 1812, there were now at least ten owing to the railway development of her southern neighbour. The problem of Canadian defence was not insoluble, but it demanded an energy and intelligence which had so far been conspicuously lacking in her Government.
* San Francisco Examiner, December 23, 1895.
At the same time the question was being raised from the other side of the Atlantic. In view of the growing menace of Germany, British soldiers, and an occasional British statesman, were turning their thoughts to the matter of Britain’s imperial liabilities, and attempting to work out a system of local defence for each part of the Empire, and a co-operative scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole. This involved no tampering with colonial autonomy. Its aim was by advice and assistance to enable each unit to place its own defence on a sound basis, and at the same time so to arrange the lines of such local defence that, in the event of Britain being engaged in war, a dominion would be able, if it so decided, to render prompt and effective assistance. The younger school of soldiers, under the inspiration of Lord Wolseley, set to work vigorously on the problem. The Colonial Defence Committee induced the Canadian Government to ask for a Defence Commission of three eminent soldiers to go to Canada in July 1898 and report on Canada’s problem. In August Major-General Edward Hutton (afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hutton) left England to take command of the Canadian Militia. He had already done good work in New South Wales, where the principle of his “cooperative defence” had been accepted by the different Australian Governments, he was one of the best known of Wolseley’s younger disciples, and his appointment seemed to herald an era of reform and construction in Canada’s neglected defences. Moreover, he had been at Eton with Minto, had been a brother officer of his in Egypt and a fellow-worker in the cause of the mounted infantry. If Canada was in earnest in the matter, it looked as if she had found the right man to carry out the work.
General Hutton was a soldier of high character, of real military talent, and of unsparing energy. He had already had experience of working with a Dominion government, and he realized that his task must be a delicate one; he was the servant of Canada, not of Britain; he could not dictate, but must persuade and advise, and in all things carry the Ministers with him. On certain matters like internal discipline he must clearly be supreme, but in all others he was the subordinate of the Militia’s Cabinet representative. But he was an enthusiast, and an enthusiast was the last thing that Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s Cabinet wanted in a domain in which they were something less than half-hearted. A Liberal Government is always in a difficult position as regards questions of armed defence, for the word has an ugly Conservative sound. Moreover, the Prime Minister owed much of his power to the French-Canadians in Quebec, who had shown a marked hostility to the whole business, and, being a most wary politician, he was averse to the expenditure of money or time on matters which, though he was prepared to admit their importance as an abstract proposition, had small electioneering value. The Minister of Militia, Dr. (afterwards Sir) Frederick Borden, was a country banker and physician from Nova Scotia, who held indeed a surgeon’s commission in the Militia, but had no serious knowledge of military affairs. He had many amiable qualities; but he was neither a courageous man nor an able man, and he conceived his duties chiefly as a balancing of party interests and a judicious exercise of party patronage. Among the other members of the Cabinet one of the strongest, Mr. F. W. Scott, the Secretary of State, was an irascible Irishman, who had not wholly shaken off the anti-British prepossessions of his youth; and Mr. Israel Tarte, the Minister of Public Works, was of so cross-bench a temper that it was hard to foretell what line he would take on any subject or by what fantastic reasons he would justify it. To the Laurier Government the advent of General Hutton was far from welcome. This ardent being, with a clear purpose and boundless vitality, might commit his masters against their will, and force them into a road where they saw no profit. Accordingly their apathy on matters of defence hardened into distaste, almost into hostility. The report of the Defence Committee was pigeon-holed; Minto could only get access to it after repeated demands, Hutton was never shown it at all. The new commander of the Militia was coldly received, and for long was denied an interview with his official superiors.
Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo. A man in such circumstances might have yielded to a foolish temptation to turn to the political Opposition; but
Hutton was too much in earnest to give way to pique, so he flung himself without further words into the duties of his office. These duties, as he saw them, were fourfold. As an expert he must rouse Canadian opinion to the reality of the need of a proper defence; by awakening the enthusiasm of its members and of young men throughout the Dominion he must make the Militia a force of the highest order of competence and discipline, must aggrandize its prestige and pluck Cinderella from the ashes; he must resist any political interference with questions of discipline, and so make it a national army, as clearly outside party influence as the army of Britain; and, finally, he must endeavour to put the force in such a position that, in the event of a war in which Canada decided to take part, her assistance should be prompt and effective. All of these four purposes lay strictly within the four corners of his official duties. He was there to exalt his office; he was there to secure the efficiency of his command; political interference had admittedly done mischief in the past, but it was repudiated as a policy by responsible Ministers. As for the question of bringing the Canadian force into line with the other forces of the Empire, there was sufficient warrant in Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s eloquent speech the year before at the Diamond Jubilee. “England has proved at all times that she can fight her own battles, but if a day were ever to come when England was in danger, let the bugle sound, let the fires be lit on the hills, and in all parts of the Colonies, though we may not be able to do much, whatever we can do will be done by the Colonies to help her.”* If such a generous policy was in the Prime Minister’s contemplation, it was surely right to prepare in advance the ways and means.
* June 18,1897. See Sandford Evans: The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism, page 36.
Accordingly General Hutton set himself with confidence and ardour to his task. He got into touch at once with his command. He inspected the Militia divisions and visited in turn each military district; he made the acquaintance of the officers, and had soon won their confidence and stirred their enthusiasm. He took an early opportunity, in a speech on October 14,1898, at Toronto, of expounding his ideal of a national army complete in all arms, which was received by the press and the public with general approval. His first annual report, in which he set forth in detail his proposed reforms, was apparently accepted without demur by the Government and met with no criticism in Parliament. Early in 1899 he had, indeed, a brush with his Minister over a disciplinary question, where party influence was used to prevent the retirement of an incompetent man, but he gained his point, though only after considerable opposition in the Cabinet. Finally, in June, a general order instituting a Militia Medical Service was accepted by the Government and published in the Gazette — a most significant step, for by that order the principle of a national militia army was first officially recognized. It may fairly be said that during his first nine months of office he had won for his scheme a wide popular acceptance and awakened in Canada a new military fervour. The trouble was that he was too successful, and with Ministers his stock sank daily lower. He was a propagandist, a missionary fired with an apostolic zeal, and apostles do not think greatly of tact. His frequent speeches, the constant interviews with him published by the newspapers, the pains he took to manipulate the press — with no other motive than to get technical matters correctly stated — it all looked to the Government like the whirlwind campaign of a man who was determined to carry the ministerial fortress by storm. No one of his doings was a breach of official etiquette; cumulatively, they left on Ministers the impression of a subordinate too masterful for safety.
With Hutton’s policy Minto was in full agreement. It was a matter to wllich he brought an expert judgment, and in the multitude of novel duties he rejoiced to find one that was familiar. Hutton behaved as regards the Governor-General with a rare discretion. He saw that nothing but mischief would ensue if it appeared that he and His Majesty’s representative were in too close alliance, so he did not press the claims of an old friendship, and let Minto take the first steps. Minto was of the same opinion; “it is better,” he wrote, “that I myself should not appear too military.” But of his own accord he began to appear at Militia gatherings and in some cases to address them, and he identified himself whenever occasion offered with the new Militia policy. He was not blind to the difficulties of the situation. The new policy should have originated with and been expounded by the Minister of Militia; instead, that oracle remained silent, and it was left for the general-officer-commanding to do not only the spade work but the exposition. Yet as both tasks lay within that officer’s duties, and the principles had been publicly blessed by the Prime Minister and were accepted by the mass of the Canadian people, he could only hope for the best. But he saw that in such a matter the acceptance of a plan was only the first step, and that the result depended on the spirit with which it was enforced; and between Hutton’s vigour and ministerial apathy a great gulf was fixed. Moreover, there were the old difficulties of emphasis and interpretation, which are apt to mar any formal agreement.
The Governor-General was a profound believer in the future of the Militia, and inclined to attribute its defects, in part at least, to the British soldiers who had been sent out to command it. In a letter to Wolseley on April 21, 1899, he summarized his views: —
“These officers have been keen enough as regards soldiering on stereotyped lines, but they have not seemed to me capable of making sufficient allowance for colonial shortcomings, due very much to want of knowledge of military routine (not to any insubordinate spirit) and to the criticism and political influences which have pervaded military matters. . . . Hutton has attacked these difficulties with a very great deal of tact. He has spoken out very freely as to abuses . . . but at the same time he has indicated what ought to be done, and has put forward the view that it rests with the people of Canada to decide whether they will have an efficient force or allow the old evils to continue. The country itself is very military in feeling, and he has struck a right note, with the result that the people and the press generally are on his side. . . . He really has put life into everything, is all over the place organizing and inquiring, and entertains a great deal, feeding military, political, and civilian society with great judgment, and evidently excellent effect!”
Minto went on to say that he himself had made a point of magnifying the social position of officers and inviting them to entertainments “on account of their military rank.” But he added that there was an enormous amount to be done. The Royal Regiment of Canada (the infantry portion of the permanent Militia) had not gone through a musketry course for three years, and many of the scattered battalions of the active Militia had not advanced beyond company drill and had never been brigaded. Above all, there was no departmental organization, and without such machinery it was impossible to progress. Yet, as he told Wolseley and other correspondents, he was confident that reform was on its way, and his one fear was the malignant effect of political interests.
Whenever he talked to Sir Wilfrid Laurier on the matter he found him broad-minded and sympathetic, but even from Sir Wilfrid he could not get the assurance he wanted about that vital question on which the discipline and efficiency of a national army must depend. There is a note of a conversation* four years later in which the Prime Minister frankly stated a view which was in the warp and woof of Canadian politics.
“As regards the existence of political influence Sir Wilfrid took up the line that in this country it was advisable to have a fair division of political influence in the force; that Sir Frederick Borden had done a great deal to eliminate political influence from the Militia; that when the Liberal party came into power they found the Militia a hotbed of Toryism, and that now, though he recognized the desirability of getting rid of politics as much as possible, yet as a matter of fact, if in the case of the raising of a new regiment the Conservative influence was predominant, Liberals would simply refuse to join the corps, and such regiment would become, as formerly, a Conservative machine. I told him that to me the recognition of politics in th
e Militia seemed entirely unnecessary, and that it simply rested with the Minister of Militia, when recommendations were placed before him, to uphold the selection of those men who were the most capable professionally. This view, however, I know it is impossible to persuade Sir Wilfrid to accept.”
* June 14, 1904.
That a man of Laurier’s quality should have explicitly stated a view so apparently indefensible pointed to certain intricacies in Canadian public life of which no newcomers could be wholly cognizant; but they were clearly difficulties which must stand most formidably in the way of that national army ideal which Minto and Hutton had set before them.
III
The campaign for Militia reform had already borne fruit in a new popular interest in defence questions when from South Africa came the first mutterings of the coming war. Minto shared to the full the new faith in the possibilities of an Empire, of which all the parts should be drawn into an organic union, but, as was his habit he envisaged that future soberly, practically, and without rhetoric. He profoundly admired the Colonial Secretary but he was no blind hero-worshipper; he had not been sent to Canada as was rumoured in some quarters, to carry out Mr. Chamberlain’s policy, for he had^ever been closely in touch with Mr. Chamberlain, and had often criticized him. On South African questions he had found himself out of sympathy with Mr. Rhodes and his followers and he had vigorously condemned the whitewashing of the Jameson Raid; his inclination was rather toward the Boers and their wily President than towards the new-rich of Johannesburg. But in the years between 1895 and 1899 while Lord Milner was striving to clarify the issue, he had come — reluctantly, if we may judge from his private letters* — to the decision that the Government of the Boer republics was pursuing a course which must be relinquished or end in war, and that if war came, Britain, in spite of many blunders of detail, would be justified. This was also the view of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and most of his Ministers. On July 31, 1899, a resolution, moved by the Prime Minister, was unanimously carried in Parliament, expressing the sympathy of Canada with the efforts of Britain to obtain justice for British subjects in the Transvaal. It was President Kruger’s denial of the franchise which specially influenced Sir Wilfrid, and his hope was that “this mark of sympathy, of universal sympathy, extending from continent to continent and encircling the globe, might cause wiser and more humane counsels to prevail in the Transvaal, and possibly avert the awful arbitrament of war.” On this point Canada was nearly unanimous, but Canada was neither well-informed nor greatly concerned. The trouble seemed small and remote to a people very much busied with its own affairs.
