by John Buchan
* He wrote to his brother Arthur on 28th September: “It will be a war, if we fight, which, in my opinion, will always be wrapped in remorse, however well our soldiers come out of it. . . . I would fight for the preservation of the paramount Power if it is in danger, but it is the policy which has led up to it which has been so fatal. We have never been courteous to the Boers. . . . In my opinion the last phase of South African history began at Majuba Hill, when we chose to let an ignorant people who had beaten us three times remain with that idea in their heads; but, having done so, we might have behaved with greater dignity. . . . We shall win and get all South Africa; but how shall we have got it? And what a mean heritage of bad feeling we shall have! . . . I don’t yet believe in war, but I can’t put half my heart in it if it does come.”
In the spring of that year there had begun the intricate negotiations concerning Canada’s share in a possible war which must be carefully traced. In March 1899 the War Office and the Admiralty raised the question of the powers of Britain under the Militia Act to require the Canadian Militia to serve outside Canada in time of war. Section 79 of that Act apparently gave the right to call out the Militia for service “within or without Canada,” but Sir John Macdonald in 1885 had been of opinion that this referred only to crossing the frontier in the event of war with the United States, and that there was no power to move troops outside the North American continent. This was also Minto’s interpretation; but when he consulted Laurier and his Cabinet he found that they took a different view. On the letter of the Act they held that in time of war the Imperial Government could move Canadian troops anywhere — a point in which they were probably right; but Sir Wilfrid added that the decisive question seemed to him to be, not whether the theatre of war was at home or abroad, but whether the troops were required for the defence of Canada. “They no doubt feel quite safe in this opinion,” Minto wrote, “as there is not a single regiment of the active Militia capable of being sent out as a unit on foreign service.” In putting the question before the Prime Minister Minto had added that he was inclined “to draw a distinct line between an official calling out by the Queen of Canadian troops for foreign service, and the offering of Canadian troops by the Dominion, which I feel certain would be enthusiastically made if the Empire were threatened.” Canada had never shown a lack of fighting spirit. Her sons had fought in thousands for the North in the American Civil War; they had volunteered in the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny; they had offered themselves in the Sudan War of 1884, but as their Government, while ready to facilitate the raising of a contingent, had felt itself unable to pay for it, the offer had not been accepted. In any war of Britain’s it might be assumed that some kind of Canadian force would be available; the questions were, whether the British Government could count, as of right, on any definite numbers, and whether the Canadian Government could or would offer, as of grace, to equip a contingent. The first question Sir Wilfrid Laurier answered in the affirmative, provided the war were for Canada’s defence; as to the second he gave no sign.
In a letter of 3rd July Mr. Chamberlain forecast the ultimatum to President Kruger, and asked categorically whether, should this happen, there would be an offer of Canadian troops to serve with Her Majesty’s forces. “Such a proof of the unity of the Empire would have a great moral effect and might go far to secure a pacific settlement. Is such an offer probable? If so, it should be made soon, but I do not desire that it should be the result of external pressure or suggestion.” What at this stage was desired was an imperial demonstration to prevent war. Minto at once communicated with Laurier, to whom he wrote: —
“In this particular crisis the demonstration of such strength would be invaluable; but its effects would, I think, reach far beyond the difficulty of to-day. It would signify the acceptance of a principle which I believe would tend not only to strengthen enormously the Empire generally, but which would also consolidate the individual strength, credit, and security of each of the offspring of the mother-country. Of course, I am quite aware that questions of imperial emergency may arise in which a colony, deeply interested in its own development, may very justly not see its way to assist; but a proof of a possible imperial unity, once exhibited before the eyes of the world, would, I believe, do much for the future history of the mothercountry and her colonies. It is a principle which appears to be fraught with great possibilities, and personally, as an old friend of Canada, nothing would please me better than seeing her first in the field in accepting it.”
Minto honestly put all his cards on the table. Any Canadian offer must be spontaneous; but it was his duty, as a friend of the Prime Minister and a well-wisher of the country, to put before him the chances and hopes of the situation as he himself saw them.
The immediate result was the resolution of sympathy with British subjects in the Transvaal moved in Parliament on 31st July — a course which Sir Wilfrid had refused to follow three months earlier. “Personally,” he had then written to Minto, “I feel very strongly with them, but it would be more than questionable wisdom to pretend to have a word to say in such a question. I told those who approached me very flatly that we might leave the matter in the hands of Lord Salisbury.” Things had moved since then, a crisis was imminent, the Opposition was pressing the Government for a declaration, and individual members of the Opposition were urging an offer of troops, while the British press kept dropping hints to the same effect. A few days later Parliament was prorogued, but before it rose Sir Wilfrid had replied to Minto’s letter. “I am sorry that my colleagues do not agree to that proposition, and I must add that I share their views. The present case does not seem to be one in which England, if there is war, ought to ask us, or even to expect us, to take a part; nor do I believe that it would add to the strength of the imperial sentiment to assert at this juncture that the colonies should assume the burden of military expenditure, except — which God forbid! — in the case of pressing danger.” There was reason in these words, for the principle to which the Governor-General had referred was an intricate matter. He hoped for a beau geste, which would have a direct political importance and a great indirect sentimental value; but in the armed contribution of a self-governing colony there were many constitutional ramifications which the premier of such a colony was bound to consider. A war was in prospect which could not be regarded as imperilling the existence of the Empire, and which by no stretch of imagination could be considered as one of Canadian defence. If Canada volunteered to share in it officially, the step might involve a new doctrine of Canadian responsibility within the Empire. No Canadian statesman of any party — certainly not Sir John Macdonald — had definitely accepted the principle of Canada’s duty to share in imperial defence; and this appeared to be scarcely even a question of imperial defence, for the coming campaign was looked on as a simple matter, likely to be soon finished, and involving only the interests of one locality. On the general question of the desirability of closer relationship between all parts of the Empire there was small difference of view; but this method of bringing about a closer relationship opened out at once a series of problems which went to the root of colonial autonomy. Canada might well find herself committed to the course of sharing in all British wars, however remote their interest for her and however little she was privy to the policy which had led to them; and, as a consequence, of greatly increasing her military estimates and losing something of her freedom.
It was a prospect which any responsible colonial statesman must view with serious anxiety. Moreover, the Liberal Government had their own special difficulties. They depended for their power largely on Quebec, and French Canada was apathetic or hostile in the face of the new imperialism. A rash step might not only involve the Dominion in an undesirable external policy, but lead to deep racial bitterness within its borders. Sir Wilfrid Laurier had every reason for moving circumspectly, and Minto, in acknowledging the resolution of 31st July, admitted the grave implications of any step. A month later the former, in a speech defending his policy, told hi
s audience: “So long as I have the honour to occupy my present post you shall never see me carried away by passion, prejudice, or even enthusiasm. I have to think and consider.” Beyond doubt his interpretation of his duty was just.
* He wrote to Arthur Elliot (28th September): “From the point of view of a Canadian statesman I don’t see why they should commit their country to the expenditure of lives and money for a quarrel not threatening imperial safety and directly contrary to the opinion of a colonial government at the Cape. They are loyal here to a degree, and would fight for the old country if in a difficulty to the last man, but I confess I doubt the advisability of their taking part now, from the point of view of the Canadian Government. Sir Wilfrid told me the other day that if the question was reconsidered he should call a Cabinet Council and ask me to be present. I hope he Won’t, for I should be in a nice muddle-my chief at home thirsting for blood, all my friends here ditto, and myself, while recognizing imperial possibilities, also seeing the iniquity of the war, and that the time for colonial support has hardly yet arrived.” It needed the offers of the other colonies to change his view on this last point.
Minto had the enthusiasm which the Prime Minister lacked, but on him also it was incumbent to move warily. He desired that the conundrums which so perplexed Sir Wilfrid should be solved by Canada definitely accepting the policy of sharing in imperial defence; but he recognized that such a step was a momentous departure, and must be taken on Canada’s own initiative. On one point he was early satisfied; Hutton’s work had not been in vain, and the new military ardour which he had kindled would soon reveal itself in an overwhelming popular demand for Canada’s participation in the war. Throughout August and September offers of service poured in from commanding officers of battalions of the active Militia, and these were duly submitted through the Militia Department and the Governor-General to the Imperial authorities. Other colonies offered contingents, but no such offer came from Canada. Meantime, Hutton, as he was bound to do, had worked out, in consultation with Minto, a detailed plan for a Canadian contribution, should the occasion arise. The first idea was a small brigade of all arms; but this seemed to be impossible, and an infantry battalion of eight companies was substituted. Every arrangement was made for raising, equipping, and transporting this battalion, and the plan was duly handed to the Minister of Militia, who was personally favourable to the policy of contributing troops. During these months opinion in the Cabinet, fluid in July, had, under the guidance of Scott and Tarte, hardened against it, but in Canada generally there was a growing party in its favour, and Ontario enthusiasts were laying plans to force the Government’s hand. Hutton, having prepared a scheme in every detail for a contingent should it be decided to send one, thought it wiser to vanish for a little from the scene of action, lest he should appear to be implicated in such coercion, and started for a tour in the West. He was less happily inspired in a visit which he paid to Mr. Scott on his way through Ottawa, when he told him that if war came public opinion in Canada would force the Government to send troops, a view angrily denied by that Minister. The incident gave colour to the notion, now firmly implanted in the mind of the Cabinet, that Hutton had been offering a contingent to the War Office behind its back.
On 3rd October the Canadian Military Gazette, an unofficial publication, announced that if war broke out the Canadian Government would offer a force from the Militia for service in South Africa, and proceeded to give the details of Hutton’s scheme. With the article Hutton had nothing to do; it was the work of some one who shared his views and was familiar with his work, but he would never have assented to an attempt at the coercion of his superiors, which would have been in a high degree insubordinate and in flat contradiction of the principle he had repeatedly announced—”The general-officer-commanding only carries out the policy indicated to him by the people speaking through their representatives.” Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in an interview published in the Toronto Globe, denied the rumour. The Militia Act, he said, empowered the Canadian Government to send troops to fight abroad if Canada were menaced, but there was no such menace from the South African Republics. Even if the Government desired to do so, they could not send troops without permission of Parliament. There had been no offer of an official contingent to Britain; only individual offers had been transmitted home.
The announcement opened the flood-gates of the storm. Sir Wilfrid departed for Chicago to keep an engagement, and in his absence controversy raged throughout the land. It was very plain that a great majority of the people desired that Canada should do what every other British colony had already done and offer a contingent, and Sir Charles Tupper marshalled the forces of the Conservative Opposition to the aid of the popular clamour. On 10th October the Boers invaded British territory and war began. Sir Wilfrid returned on the 12th to find his Cabinet divided and the country in an uproar.
Meantime, on 3rd October an important cable had been received from Mr. Chamberlain: —
“Secretary of State for War and Commander-in-Chief desire to express high appreciation of signal exhibition of patriotic spirit of people of Canada shown by offers to serve in South Africa, and to furnish following information to assist organization of forces offered into units suitable for military requirements. Firstly, units should consist of about 125 men; secondly, may be infantry, mounted infantry, or cavalry — in view of numbers already available, infantry most, cavalry least, serviceable; thirdly, all should be armed with .303 rifles or carbines, which can be supplied by Imperial Government if necessary; fourthly, all must provide own equipment and mounted troops own horses; fifthly, not more than one captain and three subalterns each unit. Whole force may be commanded by officer not higher than major. In considering numbers which can be employed, Secretary for War, guided by nature of offers, by desire that each colony should be fairly represented, and by limits necessary if force is to be fully utilized by available staff as integral portion of Imperial forces, would gladly accept four units. Conditions as follows: Troops to be disembarked at port of landing South Africa, fully equipped at cost of Colonial Government or volunteers. From date of disembarkation Imperial Government will provide pay at Imperial rates, supplies and ammunition, and will defray expenses of transport back to Canada, and pay wound pensions and compassionate allowances at Imperial rates. Troops to embark not later than 31st October, proceeding direct to Cape Town for orders. Inform accordingly all who have offered to raise volunteers.”
A needless mystery was made of this telegram, and it was assumed by some that it was a design on the part of Mr. Chamberlain to commit Canada by accepting an offer which had not been made. It was obviously a circular message sent to all colonies who had offered troops officially or unofficially, and it might be taken in Canada’s case to refer to the individual offers of service already transmitted home. Nevertheless, it put the Canadian Government in a quandary. If the various battalion commanders and regiments that had volunteered went abroad for service it must be with the Government’s sanction and assistance. Having gone thus far, they must perforce go further, in view of the attitude of other colonies and the growing popular clamour in Canada. The alternatives were to equip an official contingent, or to tell Mr. Chamberlain that he had made a mistake and that the Government could not agree to the acceptance by Britain of the offers by individuals which had been transmitted; nay, the practical choice was narrowed to an official contingent or resignation.
Minto was in New York when Mr. Chamberlain’s cable arrived and Hutton was in the North-West. The message was at once forwarded to Sir Wilfrid, and a copy sent to Minto, and it would have remained private had not the British press published the pith of it, so that its contents were almost at once accessible to the Canadian people, and added fuel to the fires of agitation. At first there was no sign of yielding on the part of the Cabinet, and on 4th October Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Minto, in deep disappointment, a letter which seems to contradict the obvious meaning of his telegram of the previous day. “We do not intend to accept any off
er from volunteers. We do not want the men, and the whole point of the offer would be lost unless it was endorsed by the Government of the Colony.” Till Sir Wilfrid’s return on the 12th, Minto scrupulously refrained from any communication with the Imperial Government. After that day the Cabinet sat almost continuously. There were three parties — the intransigents from Quebec, who objected to any contribution; those who sought a half-way house on the terms of the telegram of 3rd October; and those who wanted a Canadian contingent, paid for by Canada and preserving its individuality. The struggle really lay between the first and third, between Mr. Tarte, who based his opposition on the ground that if Canada were to share in Britain’s wars she must share in Britain’s councils, and the Ontario leaders, who knew the drift of popular feeling in their province. On the 12th Minto cabled home that there was no hope of a contingent, but next day the pressure of public opinion convinced the doubters and carried the day. An order-in-council was passed, an ingenious document framed to preserve an air of consistency. After reciting Mr. Chamberlain’s proposals of 3rd October, it went on: —
