Goverment In India

by T S R Subramanian

  Decline in Administration Standards – O, what a fall was there my countrymen…

  The decline in administrative standards started seriously from about the mid- 70s. It is not a coincidence that the commencement of sharp deterioration in all governance standards relating to diverse sectors dates back from this period. This was when the 'political' aspirant or the worker in the district started interfering in administration in a massive way, as has been described elsewhere. Coupled with instability in state governments, the opportunity arose for politicians and legislators to arrange for the immediate transfer of this or that police official inconvenient to them; or to get a 'preferred', pliant official located where he can become a 'collaborator'. The local campaign would start at the door of the SP or DM, and if this failed, would be escalated till it reached the chief minister. It is my experience that two determined district level politicians in any district, of the right complexion, could guarantee the removal or transfer of any district official, be it the DM or the SP, or the block development officer or the naib tehsildar or the police sub-inspector, even the lowly constable. It did not matter if the SP or the sub-inspector had spent ten days or six months or eighteen months in his post; if he stood against some influential local interest, he was blown off unceremoniously. This became the new dharma of administration. Whether an official continued in his post or not, from then on, became a function of whether he was helpful to and cooperative with the concerned local politician, and helped the politician in his career – this was the only relevant detail. The criterion hitherto was that he was a servant of the local people, and functioned with their best interests in mind, he was an agent of the state government to deliver the benefits of development to the area under his charge. This was replaced by new job descriptions overnight. Of course, the new mandate to the civil servant was not enshrined in any 'conduct rules' or public service manuals, or gazetted government orders; it was made clear to one and all that this is the new dispensation; take it or leave your post.

  The 1980s was an era of the rise of the politician. A new breed of entry into politics came into vogue. Criminals, goondas and riff-raff from society used dubious means to acquire legitimate political authority. Politics became a business; a lucrative one at that. The breed of politicians entering politics exclusively to make wealth became the norm. Henceforth people from 'good' backgrounds preferred not to enter the political arena where survival now needed a crude display of raw power. Total political control over civil servants became essential, as the main objective was to make money; the civil servant was the instrument, willing or unwilling, towards the same. N.N. Vohra in the 1990s had already said his piece on the political-criminal nexus, a diagnostic which appeared revolutionary at that time to all but the cognoscenti, and doesn't merit a glance today. By the 1990s, the subjugation of the civil service was total and complete. Many chief ministers, who were also leaders of the regional parties, ruled their respective kingdoms much like a tyrant or despot of yore. The public servant had now to become a 'private servant' if he had indeed to survive, not to speak of thriving in the system. Many aspects of the Mughal system of governance resurfaced. Those among the civil servants who read the signs well, and were willing to adjust their attitudes and behaviour, found it extremely satisfactory, rewarding and lucrative; others more able and conscientious were condemned to sit it out in a corner doing their daily crosswords – Sudoku had not emerged at that time. In a couple of conferences of senior level civil servants in Delhi, it was sad to hear civil servants describing their ministers as their political 'masters', with the implication that the relationship indeed had become one of 'master and man'.

  The Transfer Industry – musical chairs…

  It is now an open secret in every state as to how much money is to be given and to whom, for anything specific that needs to be done – relating to higher education, school systems, excise policy, sugar policy, housing policy, land-use policy, construction regularisation, zoning policy – the list is infinite. Some rates are fixed, some negotiable, some based on ability to pay – but everywhere the client has to pay a 'rent', to get anything done. In state capitals, the rates charged by the minister is as openly discussed and known (in certain circles), as easily as taxi rates or railway fares; it only remains to have them put on the internet – indeed, the enterprising person who does so will do a public service, save a lot of hassle, and reduce the number of touts.

  Each field is a potential goldmine, to be exploited with care, in a manner not to get caught. Sophisticated techniques emerge by the day, in ensuring that these objectives are met. Great cooperation from the concerned officials in each matter is required, if not total complicity; hence, the critical importance of getting the right official dealing with each particular subject. The concept of 'the right man for the right job' has been turned on its head, and there is now a new reality! It is essential to understand this relationship between the politician and the bureaucracy, to get to the root of decline in governance standards. In a coalition government, where apart from monetary pressures, other pressures develop to ensure continuation of government, the situation gets further exacerbated. This is the anatomy of 'transfer'. Inconvenient officials have to be transferred out at short notice, in the 'public interest' – read, in the 'interest of the minister'. It is thus that when any chief minister takes over, there is wholesale transfer of officials at all levels. Thereafter as various issues come to the fore, inconvenient officials are set aside and more pliant ones located. Over time and with experience in each government, people are identified who are 'men for all seasons' – they will fit into any situation, and make sure that the boss 'succeeds'.

  Normally it ought to be of no concern to the general public as to which official is transferred and posted to which place. No doubt, a minimum tenure of two or three years in a post, if not five, as during British times, contributed to the official understanding his work, and being able to render sensible advice or execute programmes with adequate comprehension. The frequent transfers hits at the root of this principle. The official is not required to analyse and render good advice; he is required to get a file or policy change cleared, which is of benefit to the political executive. This creates ludicrous situations; field officers get posted and then transferred within three months – many do not get even the chance to get a first hand knowledge of the terrain of their operation. Secretaries to state governments get unceremoniously rotated. Every new secretary has to spend six months to understand all the issues, procedures and policies before he can start contributing meaningfully; often times he is yanked out because he did not 'play ball' in one matter or the other. All of these are exacerbated in a coalition government situation. Is there any wonder that many officials take their work lightly, get involved minimally, show little passion or attachment to the work they do and turn out to become 'pen pushers'. Many officials bide the time till they get the transfer order and do the same in a new department. There are, of course, an increasing number of officials at all levels who learn the ropes, play the game in the 'desired' spirit – they frequently find it lucrative, 'rewarding' – and acquire higher social status. Some fifteen years back, it was rare to hear of a secretary in a state or in Delhi who was delinquent in a financial sense; though such officers did exist, they formed a small proportion, say less than two or three percent – there was a larger ratio in the field formations. Alas, it is a totally different situation now – sadly one cannot be sure of anyone today. I would estimate such officers to be definitely in the double-digit ratio. I have heard corridor rumours casting aspersions even on some chief secretaries. While this is alarming, it is also important to realise that it is increasingly difficult for an honest officer to function in many departments – he cannot even look 'the other way'; he will get willy-nilly entangled. The result on the quality of governance can be imagined.

  This transformation of the role of the civil servant was not just at higher levels. Every district magistrate understood that he had to
follow directions from some designated local power centres in the districts, if he had to survive. Those who did not pay heed or were slow on the uptake, got the boot swiftly. In many states, in every district, specified private individuals had been delegated the authority to command or direct the district magistrate with specific instructions. No wonder that in many states, the average tenure of a district magistrate was about six to seven months, and that of superintendents of police even shorter. In a local Regional Development Authority in a state, known to be a 'lucrative post' and a conduit of finances to 'party' headquarters, there were five chief executive officers posted within one year. Even officials at the block level and thana got the message in unmistakable terms; they had to toe the line dictated by the local political henchman or be shunted to the remotest part of the state. Most local officials found it very convenient to follow the orders, which also incidentally made them personally prosperous. In many states, e-governance had been introduced as early as the 1990s in a peculiar way – the posting of station officers of police stations in the district, hitherto entirely in the province of the local superintendent of police, not even the DIG or IG or the DG, was straightaway hijacked and lodged in a computer in the personal office of the chief minister. Similar was the case of transfer of local sub-district officials in the revenue department, forest department, irrigation and local engineering departments, health departments; all were controlled through 'e-governance' from the state capital! One can imagine the havoc caused to local administration, which directly affects the life of villagers. No wonder that one will find it difficult to locate even one family in much of rural India not engaged in land-related litigation – the management of land records is in shambles. The less we say about investigation of crimes in rural areas, the better – if there is one Jessica Lal case in Delhi, one can locate a hundred such in every district of India – at least most districts.

  Merit started to have no more meaning as a criterion for selection or promotion or reward. The weapons used for subjugation included frequent transfers, start of an interminable departmental inquiry, malicious character-roll entries and the like. The morale and cohesiveness of the services have been systematically broken down by introducing caste, communal, regional and other factors in postings and transfers; further confounded by arbitrary and discretionary intervention by inexperienced politicians and their coterie. In much of this skullduggery, it is the civil servants themselves who join hands with their 'political masters' in 'dealing' with their own brethren.

  Naturally such a change did not come overnight in each state nor did it come all over the country at the same time. However, this new system of administration has indisputably been established, and is not just prevalent or widespread, but is the actual functioning norm. This new administrative principle applies at all levels. Even as early as the 80s, one could identify at least three or four states where this had become the de facto rule in every district. The chief minister of the day would nominate about four or five of his confidants in each district, who were not office bearers of any sort; and they would informally be allocated portfolios. The district magistrate had freedom of action to take any decision on merits on any issue coming before him, except on those where these chosen worthies had a point of view, naturally based on 'unselfish considerations'; on these their words were final, merits be damned. The district magistrate has a clear choice of following instructions or leaving his post. In general, the DM would work out a working equation with the 'leaders' and generally follow a peaceful coexistence path, without overtly violating the law or directly participating in anything immoral, improper or illegal. Some of course would take a tough line and sooner or later leave the scene of battle! Many would leave the matter to subordinates, turn a blind eye to what was going on, and let administration take its own course. A few revelled in it, converted a problem into an opportunity, actively and imaginatively collaborated with the local henchmen of the chief minister, and soon found their own path to 'fame and fortune'. Such types were quickly identified by their bureaucratic brethren in the initial stages and were shunned or ostracised in social gatherings of the senior bureaucracy. However, Gresham knew his onions; from being a small minority in every state, this tribe grew in numbers, boldness, and ubiquity – you would find these types generally in top positions especially in state governments. I would again add the caveat that there are, astonishingly even today, a large number of bureaucrats who are brilliant, totally honest, thoroughly courageous, straightforward, public spirited – bureaucracy is still blessed with many of this category of God's children. You can see many of them in middle management and senior positions in the Government of India, strangely even in these hard times; a few of them still come to very senior positions in state governments; aberrations do sometimes take place unwittingly in administration!

  Secretariat Postings – blue bed to the dull grey . . .

  Till about fifteen or twenty years back great care was taken between the Cabinet secretary and the prime minister of the day, to ensure that only competent officers were posted as secretaries to ministers, in such a manner that the secretary will not readily pander to the minister's not-so-straight requirements. In other words, specific requests for a particular secretary's posting by a minister was not only frowned upon, but definitely denied, in the hope of a 'cleaner' administration. This was an informal form of 'check' to facilitate good governance. Perhaps now that the desire for 'clean' administration is no more a goal – the unspoken objective is to provide the political executive with as much room as possible to deliver decisions, even though many or most of them may be highly motivated, and directly related to monetary considerations. Thus, an important internal check through the appointments of high officials, inherent in the system hitherto, has been jettisoned in favour of meeting the direct request of the minister, ostensibly in the interest of efficiency, and facilitated due to the weakened clout or interest taken by the PM or CM. Indeed over the last three or four years or so, one has not even heard the aspiration for 'clean administration' from any major political leader at a formal national day speech. Regular Republic Day or Independence Day speeches, in the past few years do not even carry a proforma reference to 'clean administration'. Presumably the objective of clean administration has been jettisoned, quietly, and nobody has noticed! As usual this is an ex post facto formalisation of something which has happened. When I mentioned this to a very senior politician the reply was, 'look, we can't be too unrealistic in our claims!'

  Not only at the level of secretary, even at lower levels of joint secretary, even director or deputy secretary, none eligible can get an invitation to work in a particularly ministry, unless he is specifically demanded by the minister concerned. This practice has prevailed in most states for at least fifteen years; this is now nearly formal in the Central Secretariat over the past five years or so. The minister invariably chooses officers he is comfortable with; in general, the minister does not want anybody to question his ultimate aims in terms of decision-making within his empire. Anybody officially opposing a policy or detail internally will be swiftly shown the door. Despite having retired over ten years back, I periodically receive plaintive calls from officers I knew while in service, from all over India, asking me to intervene with some minister or the other to 'ask' for his services; indeed, they want to get into any ministry, at the Centre; all they want is to get away from the state. The poor fellow does not realise that ministers do not 'ask' out of goodness of heart; they induct people well known to them from earlier avatars, with the clearly understood implicit arrangement that the official concerned should, at all times, 'play ball'; he should not stand in the way, but indeed act in such a manner which ensures that the minister will get his way.