Stalin- The Enduring Legacy

by Kerry Bolton

  V

  The Origins of the Cold War:

  How Stalin Foiled a ‘New World Order’

  A fact unrealised by most on both the Right and the Left is that if it was not for Stalin a World State would have been imposed immediately after World War II. The USSR by an irony of history, stood for nationalism against the internationalism of the USA. The USSR was a bastion of conservatism and tradition; while the USA remains a centre of world revolution, the ‘colour revolutions’ sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy, and many other globalist fronts, being present-day evidence of a process that has been taking place since the internationalist administration of President Woodrow Wilson, his ‘Fourteen Points’ for re-organising the world, and his promotion of the abortive League of Nations, the precursor of the United Nations.

  While sections of the American Right, such as the John Birch Society, warned that the United Nations (UN) was a ‘communist plot’ to rule the world, they were correct in their critique of the UN on many points accept one of major importance: it was Stalin who stymied the American globalist plan to use the UN as the basis for a ‘one world government’, a concept that was condemned by the USSR in favour of nationalism.

  Russia: The Perennial Disappointment (To the Globalists)

  Russia has never fitted well into the plans of those seeking to impose a uniform system upon humanity. Russia has remained untamed in terms of the sophisticated Western liberals seeking to establish a unipolar global world. Conservative philosophers, especially in Germany, such as Oswald Spengler, despite their opposition to Communism, could see that Bolshevik Russia would soon jettison Marxist dogma and transform into a nationalist state and empire.

  Russia’s economy was regarded as backward by Western financiers and many bankers and industrialists not only welcomed the March and the November 1917 Revolutions,[343] but also provided backing for the revolutionaries to overthrow the Czarist regime.[344]

  Industrialists and financiers looked optimistically to a post-Czarist Russia with a new government that would embark on industrialization, which implied the need for foreign capital and expertise, regardless of the revolutionary rhetoric about foreign capitalists. However, Stalin, even at this embryonic stage of the Soviet regime, was the spoiler. While Trotsky wished to pursue foreign investment,[345] as had been the case under Lenin’s New Economic Policy,[346]Stalin dealt some swift blows to the broadly termed opposition bloc led by Trotsky, and pursued a course that was not amicable to foreign capital.

  With the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR, there was renewed hope for Russia being integrated into a post war new world order. Stalin relied on Western technology for his war machine in fighting the Germans.[347] However Stalin was not about to become America’s junior partner in a post-war ‘new world order’, despite all the friendly rhetoric that had been spoken during World War II.

  United Nations – Basis for World Parliament

  Things seemed very jovial between ‘Uncle Joe’,[348] Roosevelt, and Churchill while the common enemy was being fought. Having secured the appeasement of the Allies at Potsdam for the establishment of a new Russian Empire over Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, Stalin was not about to compromise Russia’s position of strength.

  The first break in the wartime alliance came with America’s grand new design to establish the United Nations as a world parliament, just as President Woodrow Wilson had tried a similar scheme with the League of Nations after World War I. The American plan for the UN called for power to be vested with the UN General Assembly, based on a parliamentary-type majority vote of the member states, with the USA able to buy the votes with the bribes of foreign aid and loans, such as Marshall Aid. Under such a system the Soviet bloc would have been outvoted and subservient to US policy behind the façade of the ‘international community’. The Soviet position, on the other hand, was to make the UN Security Council the final arbiter of decisions with member states having the right to veto. Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister, summed up the situation:

  The US position in fact allowed the UN to be turned into an instrument for imposing the will of one group of states upon another, above all the Soviet Union as the sole socialist member of the Council.[349]

  Despite long standing conservative conspiracy theories regarding the UN being a Soviet plot to create a communist controlled World State,[350] it was the USSR that rendered the UN redundant as a method of imposing a new world order, thanks to the Soviet insistence on national – or imperial – sovereignty for itself and its power bloc.

  Baruch Plan to ‘Internationalise’ Atomic Energy

  The second pillar for the creation of a post-war new world order rested on the supposed ‘internationalisation’ of the awesome power of atomic energy. Like the democratic façade of the American plan for a UN General Assembly world parliament, this ‘internationalisation’ was perceived by the USSR as really meaning US control.

  Dr Carroll Quigley[351] described the post-war situation leading to the Cold War, stating that the immediate policy of the USA rested on free trade and aid via the Marshall Plan, which would have included assistance for economic recovery to the Soviet bloc. However Stalin saw this as a means for the USA to establish its pre-eminence in the post war era. Quigley, a liberal globalist who saw the ‘hope’ of the world being through a world government and the ‘tragedy’ being its rejection,[352] wrote:

  On the whole, if blame must be allotted, it may be placed at the door of Stalin’s office in the Kremlin. American willingness to co-operate continued until 1947, as is evident from the fact that the Marshall Plan offer of American aid for a co-operative Europe recovery effort was opened to the Soviet Union, but it now seems clear that Stalin had decided to close the door on co-operation and adopted a unilateral policy of limited aggression about February or March of 1946. The beginning of the Cold War may be placed at the date of this inferred decision or may be placed at the later and more obvious date of the Soviet refusal to accept Marshall Aid in July 1947.[353]

  Quigley refers to the American initiative for atomic energy ‘internationalisation’ and how Stalin again scotched this strategy for US world domination:

  The most critical example of the Soviet refusal to co-operate and of its insistence on relapsing into isolation, secrecy, and terrorism is to be found in its refusal to join in American efforts to harness the dangerous powers of nuclear fission.[354]

  A US State Department committee under Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson and Dr David Lilienthal, in conjunction with a ‘second committee of citizens’, led by the international banker and perennial presidential adviser Bernard Baruch, were convened in 1946 to draft a plan for ‘some system of international control of nuclear energy’. Baruch presented the plan to the UN General Assembly on June 14 1946.[355]

  Under this plan, the UN would own, control, or licence all uranium from the mine through processing and use, with operation of its own nuclear facilities throughout the world, inspection of all other such facilities, absolute prohibition of all nuclear bombs or diversion of nuclear materials to non-peaceful purposes, and punishment for evasion or violation of its regulations free from the Great Power veto which operated in the UN Security Council.[356]

  This was therefore a method of trying to bypass the problem of veto that had been insisted upon by the USSR to ensure its sovereignty, which had from the start rendered the UN impotent as a world-governing authority. Quigley laments that this ‘generous offer’ by the USA, ‘…was brusquely rejected by Andrei Gromyko on behalf of the Soviet Union within five days…’[357]Quigley pointed out that one of the main points the USSR raised in rejecting the Baruch Plan[358] was that there must be no tampering with the Great Power veto at the UN Security Council. Gromyko recalling his time as Soviet representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, states of the Baruch Plan:

  The actual intention was to be camouflaged by the creation of an international body to monitor the use of nuclear energy. However, Washington did not
even try to hide that it intended to take the leading part in this body, to keep in its own hands everything to do with the production and storage of fissionable material and, under the guise of the need for international inspection, to interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign nations.[359]

  Baruch told Gromyko that experts would inspect all industries dealing with fissionable material. Gromyko remarked: ‘Inevitably at that time they would all be Americans’.

  Quigley’s moral indignation at the USSR’s rejection notwithstanding, we are now in a position of hindsight, considering recent world events, to understand Soviet suspicions. The moral choice is not as clear-cut as Quigley supposed. Japan had been A-bombed whilst seeking peace terms, their only real condition being the sanctity of their Emperor. America’s position was unconditional, and of course it can be assumed that the Administration knew the Japanese could not accede to anything that would compromise Hirohito or the imperial house. Allen Dulles, who became head of the CIA, related in an interview in 1963 that he had been in contact with Japanese factions that were in a position to sue for peace,[360] and that the sole Japanese concern was that the Emperor would be left alone. ‘Just weeks later… Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed’.[361] The Americans in bombing Japan sought to impress upon Stalin the need to continue their wartime alliance into the post-war world, with the USSR as a junior partner at best.

  Veteran journalist Robert Fisk comments on the bombing of Japan:

  Stalin was finally impressed by the effect of Truman’s new weapon at Hiroshima. He very much wanted the bomb for Russia. When US proposals to limit the bomb to America alone were uncompromising, Stalin’s scientists accelerated their work.[362]

  Even Britain was concerned at US intentions, Prime Minister Clement Atlee explaining:

  We had to hold up our position vis-à-vis the Americans. We couldn’t allow ourselves to be wholly in their hands… We had worked from the start for international control of the bomb… We could not agree that only America should have atomic energy…[363]

  Were both the USSR and Britain being selfish, as implied indignantly by Quigley? Bernard Baruch himself stated:

  The gains of our scientists, our engineers, our industrialists, produced the supreme weapon of all time — the atomic bomb. That we shall never give away, until and unless security for us, for the world, is established. Until that time comes, the US will remain the guardian of safety. We can be trusted….[364]

  The rhetoric by Baruch about the USA being the ‘trusted guardian’ of world peace and freedom is the same mantra the world has heard from President Woodrow Wilson to President Obama: Trust the US to act as the world’s policeman.

  Pacifist guru Bertrand Russell wrote in 1946 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, expressing the type of hatred widely felt by globalists for the USSR after World War II, because of the Soviet rejection of a one world government. Russell, who was to play a key role along with many other eminent liberals and leftists as Stalin-hating Cold Warriors in the CIA founded Congress for Cultural Freedom,[365] makes it plain that the atomic bomb represented the ace card to the forcible establishment of a one world state:

  The American and British governments… should make it clear that genuine international co-operation is what they most desire. But although peace should be their goal, they should not let it appear that they are for peace at any price. At a certain stage, when their plans for an international government are ripe, they should offer them to the world… If Russia acquiesced willingly, all would be well. If not, it would be necessary to bring pressure to bear, even to the extent of risking war.[366]

  Russell proposed what was clearly the intention of the US Administration and other globalists in assuring that atomic energy would be monopolised by an ‘international agency’ with power to act against any state reticent about being subjected to a one world state:

  It is entirely clear that there is only one way in which great wars can be permanently prevented, and that is the establishment of an international government with a monopoly of serious armed force. When I speak of an international government, I mean one that really governs, not an amiable façade like the League of Nations, or a pretentious sham like the United Nations under its present constitution. An international government, if it is to be able to preserve peace, must have the only atomic bombs, the only plant for producing them, the only air force, the only battleships, and, generally, whatever is necessary to make it irresistible. Its atomic staff, its air squadrons, the crews of its battleships, and its infantry regiments must each severally be composed of men of many different nations; there must be no possibility of the development of national feeling in any unit larger than a company. Every member of the international armed force should be carefully trained in loyalty to the international government.

  The international authority must have a monopoly of uranium, and of whatever other raw material may hereafter be found suitable for the manufacture of atomic bombs. It must have a large army of inspectors who must have the right to enter any factory without notice; any attempt to interfere with them or to obstruct their work must be treated as a casus belli. They must be provided with aeroplanes enabling them to discover whether secret plants are being established in empty regions near either Pole or in the middle of large deserts.[367]

  Note that Russell is already by this time disparaging of the UN as having been rendered useless as an ‘international government’ by the USSR. His proposals are akin to those of the USA’s Baruch Plan. Russell made it clear where he stood in terms of American global hegemony:

  In the near future, a world war, however terrible, would probably end in American victory without the destruction of civilisation in the Western hemisphere, and American victory would no doubt lead to a world government under the hegemony of the United States —a result which, for my part, I should welcome with enthusiasm.[368]

  Contingent upon the usefulness of the UN as a global government was the elimination of the Soviet-imposed veto in the UN Security Council:

  If the United Nations Organisation is to serve any useful purpose, three successive reforms are necessary. First, the veto of the Great Powers must be abolished, and majorities must be declared competent to decide on all questions that come before the organisation; second, the contingents of the various Powers to the armed forces of the organisation must be increased until they become stronger than any national armed forces; third, the contingents, instead of remaining national blocks, must be distributed so that no considerable unit retains any national feeling or national cohesion. When all these things have been done, but not before, the United Nations Organisation may become a means of averting great wars.[369]

  In 1961 Russell, in considering the Soviet attitude to the Baruch Plan and the UNO, stated that,

  it was Stalin’s Russia, flushed with the pride in victory over the Germans, suspicious (not without reason) of the Western Powers, and aware that in the United Nations it could almost always be outvoted.[370]

  CFR Blueprint for Cold War

  When Stalin scuttled the UN as the basis for an ‘international government’ a re-evaluation of the USSR was made by America’s self-described ‘foreign policy establishment’, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).[371]

  CFR historian Peter Grosse states that the internationalist proposals for a post-war new world order were met with a firm ‘nyet’ from the USSR: ‘In characteristic fashion, [CFR] Council planners conceived a study group to analyze the coming world order’. What they envisaged was a joint CFR-Soviet study group to prepare proposals for what Grosse calls the ‘coming world order’ (sic):

  Percy Bidwell, director of the Council’s new Studies Program, had courteously approached the Soviet Embassy as early as January 1944 to stimulate interest in the joint project. He was received by Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, whose response would become all too familiar in the years to come. Through Gromyko the Russian word ‘nyet’ entered the English language. Without any pretense of diplomatic tact, the ambassado
r (soon to be foreign minister) told the men from the Council he would not permit any responsible Soviet spokesman to join in such a discussion.[372]

  Since Stalin rejected US post-war aims, a new policy towards the USSR was required. This policy was to be not one of direct military confrontation, but of ‘containment’, a word coined by American diplomat, veteran expert on Russia and CFR member George Kennan.[373] Grosse is candid in describing the ‘behind-the-scenes’ (sic) manner by which the CFR influenced Cold War policy:

  The Council on Foreign Relations functioned at the core of the public institution-building of the early Cold War, but only behind the scenes. As a forum providing intellectual stimulation and energy, it enabled well-placed members to convey cutting-edge thinking to the public—but without portraying the Council as the font from which the ideas rose.[374]

  An initial report by George S Franklin in 1946 recommended attempting to work with the USSR as far as possible, ‘unless and until it becomes entirely evident that the USSR is not interested in achieving cooperation…’ However the USA should pursue co-operation from a position of military strength:

  The United States must be powerful not only politically and economically, but also militarily. We cannot afford to dissipate our military strength unless Russia is willing concurrently to decrease hers. On this we lay great emphasis.

  We must take every opportunity to work with the Soviets now, when their power is still far inferior to ours, and hope that we can establish our cooperation on a firmer basis for the not so distant future when they will have completed their reconstruction and greatly increased their strength…. The policy we advocate is one of firmness coupled with moderation and patience.[375]