Double Cross in Cairo

by Nigel West

  Owing to ill-health (due to the hardships I was forced to bear on the island) I was permitted on 11 May 1943 to enter the Civil Riuniti Hospital at Foggia, for treatment. On 19 August 1943, due to heavy air bombardments which made it unsafe to stay any longer in Foggia, I was transferred to the military hospital at San Severo. On 21 August the medical officer in charge instructed the Carabinieri Police of the town to take charge of me, saying that he could not keep me any longer owing to shortage of beds, so that the Carabinieri Police, not knowing what to do with me, being unable to send me back to the Island, brought me to the prison of San Severo, when they ordered that I should be kept to await the pleasure of the Questura at Foggia.

  On 17 October 1943, a few weeks after the occupation of San Severo by the British troops, by the AMGOT CAO officer Captain Cooley who the following day engaged me to act as his interpreter and clerk. I gladly accepted the position offered to me, which up to date I am holding.

  This is all I have to say regarding my activity since I left Istanbul on 4 June 1941 and I would be pleased if you will let me know whether you require my services any longer.

  I wish to point out that on my release from gaol in San Severo, I was finable to produce my British Passport or other documents to prove my identity as a British subject. I would be much obliged if you would confirm same to the AMGOT authorities for whom I am now working and further clarify my personal position with them regarding my future duties.

  I wish to state that taking into consideration my past activity it would give me great pleasure if you would arrange to have me transferred to the Intelligence Section, even if I am to be officially attached to the British Army. Please note that I can speak and write correctly in German, French and Italian.

  Before closing I would like to state that, since my arrest on 2 August 1941 up to the date of my release on 17 October 1943, apart from personal suffering which I [was] forced to bear in gaol and on the island as a political prisoner, I have concurred a large financial loss in the way of sums of money in foreign currency confiscated as previously mentioned, and other large sums paid out by my family for the defence of any trial, and for my personal expenses while on the island and in hospital. No allowance was ever made to me by the Italian Government as generally was the custom with the other political prisoners. Consideration should also be taken that, for the above period, I had no means to earn any money with which to provide my family, who, fortunately could be provided for by my bankers in Genoa from my personal account. I await your further instructions.

  Upon receipt of Levi’s four-page letter SIME was faced with a considerable dilemma and the priority was to establish firstly whether CHEESE had been blown and, if so, on what date. There was also the underlying fear that Levi had himself been playing some complex game of his own, perhaps as a triple agent, and a lengthy analysis was undertaken to establish the truth. Another anxiety was that if the Germans learned that Levi had been liberated, and was in British hands, they might assume that CHEESE had been compromised. All these were considered by James Robertson in a four-page memorandum dated 26 February 1944:

  1. Renato Levi’s background and his original major role in creating CHEESE have been discussed in previous reports. On 19 February 1944 SIME received a letter dated 10 February 1944 from Levi at present apparently employed as an interpreter-clerk by Civil Affairs Branch in Italy. This letter is the first communication between Levi and ourselves since he left Istanbul for Rome at the beginning of June 1941.

  2. The following is a summary of own account of his activities from June 1941 up to the present time (February 1944).

  1941

  4 June: Left Istanbul for Rome.

  12 June: Arrived Italy, reporting en route to Major Travaglio in Munich.

  14 June: Arrived Rome. Reported to Helfferich who congratulated Levi for his good work, and told him that wireless communication had not yet been established with Cairo.

  July: Wireless communication finally established after attempts and following an exchange of telegrams between Cairo and Rome via Istanbul.

  Helfferich was delighted and was very keen that Levi should return to Egypt to pay his agents and organise a further network in Palestine and Egypt. Levi pretended he had no wish to return to Egypt, but finally yielded to Helfferich’s insistent demands and agreed to return, the date of his departure fixed for 9 August 1941. Helfferich gave Levi detailed directive of information required, a new cipher and traffic plan and a ‘large sum’ in English and American currency. Helffferich also gave him a list of a few persons living in Haifa, Cairo and Alexandria to be contacted and who would give valuable aid. One person in particular was mentioned who could put Levi in touch with a high government official.

  Levi took leave of Helfferich and proceeded to Genoa on fifteen days’ leave to see his family and settle his private affairs.

  2 August: Arrested by Italians in Genoa. Removed to Rome.

  August – September – October: A few days after arrest interrogation commenced. He was charged with having cooperated with British Intelligence in Belgrade and Cairo. No questions were put to him concerning his work for the Deuxième Bureau in France. The first question put to Levi was ‘why the radio and receiving set erected by me in Cairo was working under the control of the British authorities?’ Levi denied the charge of cooperation with the British authorities and stated that if the set was really under British control the reason was probably that Levi’s men had been caught by the British or else they had sold their information to the British authorities. Levi stuck to his story through several interrogations, spread over a period of two and a half months. The case was regarded as non-proven and Levi was not charged before the Tribunal Speziale.

  17 October: Levi sentenced to five years imprisonment to be served as a political prisoner on the island of Tremiti and to the confiscation of $3,801 and £100.

  1943

  15 May: Released from Tremiti owing to ill-health, transferred to civil hospital at Foggia.

  19 August: Owing to heavy air bombardments, transferred to military hospital at San Severo.

  21 August: Owing to shortage of beds in the hospital Levi was transferred to the prison of San Severo.

  17 October: A few weeks after the British occupation Levi was released by Civil Affairs Branch officer Captain Cooley who engaged Levi as an interpreter and clerk.

  B COMMENTS ON LEVI’S LETTER

  3. While Renato’s narrative tallies in the main with the scanty information which has reached us from most secret sources there still remain a number of points which require clarification:

  4. It is evident from Levi’s narrative that he was imprisoned on suspicion and escaped with a comparatively light sentence for treason because there was no concrete proof against him. Levi states that he was arrested on 2 August 1941, a few days after he had taken leave of Helfferich in Rome, with the understanding that Levi should return to Egypt on 5 August 1941. It is reasonable to suppose therefore that Helfferich (or the Italians?) gave the order for Levi’s arrest on information received during the ten days or so prior to 2 August 1941. (Levi does not give exact dates).

  An examination of CHEESE traffic of this period shows that on 21 July CHEESE was told ‘tell George that Levi will arrive soon with funds. In the meantime get information.’ This is consistent with Levi’s own intended return to Cairo, and one may perhaps assume that until 21 July CHEESE was unsuspected. There were only two other wireless contacts between the date and the date of Levi’s arrest, the evidence therefore points to the probability that the serious suspicions of the Germans or Italians were aroused by the subject matter or phrasing of one or more of the three messages sent by us on 21 and 24 and 31 July 1941. It is known from most secret sources (original not at present available in Cairo) that the hand of the British Intelligence Service was regarded by the Germans as apparent in November 1941.

  5. It is difficult therefore to reconcile the fact that CHEESE was apparently brulé at the end of July 1941, and certai
nly at some stage in November 1941, with the theory we held prior to the receipt of Levi’s letter that ‘CHEESE was the main source by which successful deception was achieved resulting in complete strategic surprise at the outset of the Western Desert Campaign.’ (19 November 1941) i.e. about three and a half months after Levi had been arrested.

  6. The information in Levi’s letter throws no further light on the question as to how the re-establishment of CHEESE was effected.

  7. At the beginning of April 1943 we received information from a most secret source that he was to be released from imprisonment, and Rossetti was asked by Scirombo of the Italian Intelligence Service what should be done with him. There was an obscure reference to his being transferred to the Germans. Rossetti requested that Levi be sent to Sofia to be at Rossetti’s disposal. In mid-May 1943 Rossetti in Istanbul asked Athens if Levi could be brought to Sofia. Ten days later he again asked Athens what had happened to Levi.

  We received no further information on this subject and, if Levi’s statement is true, he never was actually released from prison except to go to hospital for medical treatment in May 1943. It may well be that the Germans were considering releasing Levi for use as a courier to pay CHEESE, but finally decided against it.

  CONCLUSIONS

  8. It is suggested that Levi should be interrogated closely on the following points:

  (a) The exact date on which he took leave of Helfferich to go to Genoa.

  (b) The exact details of his interrogations.

  (c) Whether he heard any mention of a possible release from prison in April/May 1943.

  (d) Whether it is likely to be known that he is now in Allied hands.

  (e) Why did he not communicate earlier with British Intelligence in Cairo?

  9. On the basis of the evidence at present available, the contents of the Levi letter do not in any way interfere with or alter the position with regard to our present use of CHEESE.

  Thus Robertson concluded that there was no reason to believe that CHEESE had been compromised, but the priority was for SIME to talk to Levi direct, and his travel under the alias ‘Mr Rose’ was arranged so he arrived in Cairo early in March 1944 to undergo a series of lengthy interviews, the first of which was conducted on 3 March, as recorded by James Robertson in a three-page memorandum:

  1. The purpose of this preliminary conversation was primarily to establish:

  (a) Reasons for arrest in August 1941.

  (b) To determine the attitude of the German and Italian Secret Services towards Levi both before his arrest, and during the subsequent period of the CHEESE operation.

  (c) To decide whether or not the return of Levi and the information obtained from him has in any way added to or detracted from the reliability of the CHEESE link.

  It is hoped that the following interim report will throw some light on the above questions. Levi is still being interrogated daily and a full report and appreciation will follow.

  2. Attitude of Travaglio and other Abwehr officers towards Levi before his arrest

  On about 15 June 1941 Levi met Rossetti in Naples and the latter said that he had been hearing ‘adverse reports’ about Levi. (Levi believes that his name had been blackened by an Abwehr agent in Belgrade who was afraid that Levi might have reported his inefficiency to the Abwehr and was therefore trying to get his story in first.)

  When Rossetti added that Levi’s name had been coupled with that of the British Intelligence Service, Levi pretended to be deeply hurt, and handing his passport to Rossetti, said, ‘I can do no more work for you till this matter is clarified.’ At this Rossetti protested that he had complete confidence in Levi, handed him back his passport, and stated that Dr Travaglio would meet Levi in Venice the following week, and would go into the matter personally.

  It is to be noted that Rossetti did not at any time actually say that had been accused of working for the British.

  Levi met Travaglio in Venice as arranged. Travaglio was most friendly and insisted that the whole affair should be forgotten until they had had a week’s leave. Levi (remaining however on his dignity) agreed and they spent a pleasant week on the lido, Levi posing as Travaglio’s clerk.

  At this stage, another Abwehr official, bearing like Travaglio the title ‘Dr’ joined the party. Over drinks Travaglio said that they would now settle the matter once and for all.

  The unidentified Abwehr official then produced a long list of questions, of which the first was ‘Do you know a man called JEAN?’

  Levi at first denied this, but when he perceived that his questioner knew for certain that he had known JEAN, he admitted to an acquaintanceship with him. It was then revealed to him that JEAN – who had formerly worked for Travaglio in Holland – had stated categorically that Levi had been working simultaneously with himself for the Deuxième Bureau. Levi states that it was clear at this point that the Abwehr had positive evidence that he had been a Deuxième Bureau agent. He nevertheless parried every thrust until, to his surprise, Travaglio suddenly appeared tired of the interrogation, and, stating that he had absolute proof that Levi was 100 per cent loyal and that he had absolute confidence in him said, ‘give me the paper and I will sign it.’

  Levi believes that Travaglio – whom he describes as a rather weak character who admitted himself not to be a good Nazi – saved him on this occasion in order to avoid the discovery by his superiors that he had been fooled, not only by the double agent JEAN, but also by Levi.

  3. Arrest and interrogation of Levi

  When Levi was arrested in August 1941 no formal charge was ever made against him. On 5 August a senior civilian official of the Italian CS Department said to him, ‘What about this radio set that you are supposed to have organised so well being under British control?’ Levi replied to this, ‘I know nothing about it.’

  Throughout the interrogation Levi was not questioned at all about the story which had been concocted in Cairo and subsequently told to Zähringer in Istanbul about Paul Nicossof and the acquisition and establishment of the wireless set in Egypt. He is convinced that the Italians in fact knew practically nothing about his activities in Cairo, and this indicates that the Germans had no share in the responsibility for his arrest.

  The interrogation took place in a friendly atmosphere, a few questions being put to him every few days. The subject of the wireless set was not brought up again after the first remark that is quoted above. He was questioned about a number of photographs which had been found in his possession, the majority of which were of Mena House ‘lovelies’. He was also questioned about a cabaret girl whom he had taken with him to Istanbul on the first stage of his journey to Egypt (and who, in complete innocence had been arrested at the same time as himself in 1941). He was asked, in addition, about his activities in Belgrade, all of which he was easily able to explain. It was apparent throughout that the Italian officers had little or no ‘ammunition’ to use against him in the interrogation.

  It is particularly noteworthy that when, after about four days of interrogation, Levi asked how long the affair would take, and urged that enquiries be made from Travaglio and from Rossetti, he was informed that this had already been done and that the information received from both Abwehr officers was excellent. They were even prepared to take Levi back into employment as soon as the matter at issue had been settled.

  At this, Levi asked why, when the service for which he had been working had nothing against him, and even wanted him back, he was still detained. He was then told that for reasons which it was not possible to explain, this question could not be correctly answered. The enquiries up to that time however, were all in Levi’s favour. It was merely a question of slight suspicion (leggero sospetto) which, owing to the position which Levi held, had caused his arrest, and had to be cleared up before his release. He was urged not to worry, as it was only a question of a few days before he obtained his freedom.

  4. Attitude of the Italians and Germans towards Levi during the period of his imprisonment

  During 1942
Levi’s relations met Travaglio in Genoa, and asked for his favourable intervention. He replied that the matter was out of his hands and that he could not help. Rossetti, in contrast, showed himself favourably disposed towards Levi, and it was as a result of a letter written to Rossetti and Scirombo that Levi was granted leave in mid-August 1942 to go to Mont Cattini.

  When he went on leave Levi was informed by two Brigadieri of the CS (Rome Section) that the cause for which he had been imprisoned was not really of very great importance and that the decision against him had only been reached as a result of one man’s vote. The CS official responsible for this casting vote remains unidentified.

  In November 1942 a Sardinian named Pirie was released from the island and subsequently arrested in Cagliari. Among the documents found on this man was Levi’s address, which Levi had given him simply in order to help him find work after his release. As a result a CS official already known to Levi was sent expressly from Rome to interview him on the island. Nothing was discovered against him, and at the questioning approached him on the subject of his release. The official replied that Levi was only on the island for a reason which he was unable to explain to him. Later on, one of the guards informed Levi that the Rome official said to him that he ought in reality to be released.

  5. The story told to Zähringer in Istanbul

  After his various experiences Levi had some difficulty in remembering the details of the story he told Zähringer nearly three years ago. He was emphatic however that the picture he had painted of CHEESE was almost exactly that which had been agreed upon in Cairo. He gave no physical description of CHEESE, as he was not asked for it. All he said about him was [that he was] a Syrian, supposed to be a former Merchant Service wireless operator. CHEESE’S motive for working he gave as mainly financial. He had found CHEESE through the intermediary of an Italian who had been responsible for producing the wireless set after sufficient financial inducement.