Anonymous Soldiers

by Bruce Hoffman

  Stanley supported these proposals, and on October 10 the joint communiqué was duly issued. The thrust of the message was Jewish ingratitude. Although the British army had saved Palestine from the “ravages of war” by defeating Rommel in the Western Desert, Jewish terrorism was now impeding the war effort. It was also preventing the training of combat units destined for Europe and interfering with the battle-wearied troops sent to Palestine to rest and recuperate. In all-too-familiar tones, the community was admonished that verbal condemnation was insufficient and that “actual collaboration” with the authorities was required. This specifically entailed the provision of information on the terrorists as evidence of the Yishuv’s determination to “eradicate this evil from their midst.”40

  No one was more distressed by the deterioration in Anglo-Zionist relations caused by the Irgun’s and Lehi’s terrorist campaigns than Weizmann. From London he had watched with increasing dismay the unimpeded escalation of violence in Palestine since the winter. Weizmann had already been warned by the prime minister some months before that “if such murders continued and the campaign of abuse of the British in the American papers did not stop, we might well lose interest in Jewish welfare.” This was a very serious admonition indeed. Churchill was an old friend of Zionism who at nearly every critical juncture since the Balfour Declaration had stood by his commitment to Jewish nationhood. His unqualified opposition to the 1939 white paper was a matter of record—as were his continuous efforts to overturn that policy and embrace an alternative solution more amenable to Zionist interests. The prime minister had forcefully intervened in 1943, for example, when Lord Cranborne, the lord privy seal, had stated during a cabinet meeting that the white paper was “the firmly established policy” of the government. To the contrary, Churchill argued in a note he circulated afterward, “I do not feel that the fact that we make no new declaration in any way compromises or commits those who have opposed the White Paper of 1939. Faced with the emergencies of war, we have left the question where it stood. We are free as a new Government to review the entire field at the end of the war.”41

  Churchill had perhaps scored his greatest victory on behalf of Zionism at a critical meeting of the war cabinet held on July 2, 1943, when he declared his undiminished support of the Balfour Declaration and his unmitigated hostility to the white paper policy, which he regarded as “a breach of that solemn undertaking.” It was at this meeting that the war cabinet had decided that Jewish immigration to Palestine should be permitted beyond the white paper’s March 1944 expiration date and moreover that it should remain in force until the entire quota of seventy-five thousand entry certificates was filled. The war cabinet had also agreed that there should be no attempt to “disarm the Jews unless or until equal measures could be effectively enforced against the Arabs.” The final outcome of the meeting was the most propitious so far as the Zionism movement was concerned. The war cabinet had approved the appointment of a ministerial committee on Palestine to consider a new, long-term policy for the country—with the specific remit to reassess the previous government’s rejection of partition.42

  The committee’s members included many of Zionism’s British friends, such as Herbert Morrison (home secretary) as chairman, Leopold Amery (secretary of state for India and Burma), Sir Archibald Sinclair (secretary of state for air), R. K. Law (parliamentary undersecretary for foreign affairs), and Stanley. “On the whole a great day for the Jews if they had known of it,” Amery confided in his diary. “Perhaps some day they will include Winston with Balfour (and to some extent myself too) as one of their real friends.”43

  The ministerial committee had approved a plan to partition Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states on December 10, 1943—which the cabinet’s Committee on the Middle East endorsed the following month. But Churchill thought that the full cabinet should wait until after the American presidential election scheduled for November 7, 1944, before taking further action. Accordingly, a final decision on partition was left in abeyance for nearly a year, hence Weizmann’s immense anxiety that the resumption of Jewish terrorism in Palestine would crush Zionism’s most fervent hopes at precisely the moment of their realization. Throughout the intervening eleven months, moreover, Churchill had repeatedly hinted at this positive outcome. He had told Harold Laski, a Labour leader, in the summer of 1943, “I have never forgotten the terrible sufferings inflicted upon the Jews; and I am constantly thinking by what means it may lie in our power to alleviate them, both during the war and in the permanent settlement which must follow it.” And, after the Allied Big Three conference in Tehran in late 1943, Churchill had publicly declared, “We shall, however slowly, fulfill our pledge to the Jews.” The prime minister himself had also personally assured Weizmann in 1944 that when the cabinet soon took up the partition proposal, the outcome would be welcomed by the Jews. Churchill had promised he would “plunge into the pie and extract a real plum” for Weizmann—in other words, a Jewish state.44

  For this reason, by the latter half of 1944, with the prospect of Jewish statehood imminent, Weizmann had unhesitatingly thrown his full weight behind an official Jewish Agency program of active cooperation against the terrorists. There were already signs that opinion in the Yishuv was moving increasingly in this direction. A reliable OSS source, referred to only as “Z,” had reported in mid-October 1944 that the Jewish Agency was preparing to launch a concerted counterterrorist campaign that would involve the actual arrest and detention of members of the extremist organizations. British intelligence had detected that month for the first time an inclination among more moderate elements in the Yishuv to view terrorism as a threat to both Zionist political aims and the authority of its official representative institutions.45

  Weizmann now acted to ensure that this momentum continued. Both Shertok, the head of the Jewish Agency’s political department, and Golomb, the Haganah’s leader, were then in London negotiating with the War Office over the formation of an independent Jewish brigade to fight alongside the Allies in the final push against Hitler. Weizmann impressed upon both men the disastrous effect that any failure to proceed with the antiterrorist program would have on the government’s forthcoming decision on partition. A chastened Shertok and Golomb returned to Palestine shortly after. Abandoning his earlier objections, Golomb addressed the Yishuv on October 18. He briefly outlined the nature of his discussion with Weizmann and then declared,

  Through the conviction of my responsibility for the security of the Yishuv and the fate of the People, I hereby demand from you:

  Go out and fight those demolishers and destroyers, that irresponsible handful of lunatic boys, who play with our fate, and disobey our orders. Be ready even for bloody sacrifices in this holy war …

  We must immediately liquidate them, and maintain in our country the great peace which has so far given us all our achievements and all our victories … The English have already become angry, and they might become more angry.

  Failure to do so would have catastrophic consequences not only for the Yishuv but for European Jewry as well. Immigration to Palestine would be prohibited, extinguishing the last hope of salvation for Jews trapped in Europe. Indeed, those refugees presently interned by Britain in other parts of the empire would be barred from entering Palestine. Furthermore, a new white paper would be issued reaffirming the 1939 policy statement and thereby ending any prospect of statehood. The result would be the establishment of a unitary state in Palestine with a fixed Arab majority/Jewish minority.46

  The Jewish Agency Executive met four days later to discuss the practical dimensions of implementing the counterterrorist program. Shertok emerged as its foremost exponent. He argued that the time was past when mere words of condemnation could suffice in place of signal action. The agency’s effort to isolate the terrorists through a campaign of public awareness had clearly failed. Not only had terrorist outrages continued, but they had escalated. The Yishuv was now at a critical juncture where further violence would jeopardize all that had been achie
ved—and, moreover, risked closing Palestine permanently to Jewish immigration. Accordingly, Shertok proposed that the Jewish Agency dedicate itself to the elimination of the terrorist organizations, instructing the community to provide information on known and suspected terrorists and ordering the Haganah to act on that information. Golomb supported Shertok, declaring, “We must endeavour to finish this business without victims, but if it is necessary we will finish it even if it means victims.”47

  Opinion among the executive was by no means unanimous. Three members in particular—Rabbi Yehuda Fishman, Itzhak Gruenbaum, and Emil Schmorak—objected to the proposed campaign on the grounds that the Yishuv was betraying itself by assisting the British. They argued that fighting terrorism was the responsibility of the government and police and not the Jewish community. They also maintained that by actively participating in such a campaign, the Yishuv would be cast in the role of common collaborators. As long as the white paper remained in force, Fishman said, it was the British who were the Jews’ real enemy, not their terrorist brethren. As the debate grew more fractious, Ben-Gurion offered a compromise solution. No information collected by the operatives would be given to the British authorities, he proposed, without the express and unanimous consent of the Jewish Agency Executive. His idea was accepted and the program approved. The Vaad Le’umi endorsed it on October 23 and the Inner Zionist Council the day after that.48

  Preparations for the implementation of the Saison (Season, as in the expression “open season” of hunting parlance), the code name for the counterterrorist operations, commenced immediately. The Haganah’s Intelligence Service, Shai, would be responsible for collecting information on known and suspected terrorists. Haganah personnel or members of the Palmach, its elite “shock troops,” would then be tasked with apprehending, detaining, and interrogating suspected Irgun members in special Haganah incarceration facilities. Nearly two hundred men were selected to spearhead the campaign. In addition to their counterterrorism responsibilities, these handpicked, specially trained operatives would serve as bodyguards for Jewish Agency and Haganah officials who might be targeted in retaliation. They would also be detailed to provide protection for ordinary Jewish businessmen and citizens who had long been victims of terrorist extortion rackets. Within days, the Jewish Agency had distributed pamphlets and handbills criticizing the Irgun and attempting to rally the Yishuv behind the counterterrorism program.49

  That the campaign was to be directed solely against the Irgun at this stage was justified by the Jewish Agency on ostensibly tactical grounds: given that the Irgun was the numerically larger and better armed and financed of the two terrorist organizations, it was the greater menace to Palestine’s security. There was also the concern that simultaneous action against both terrorist groups might drive them into an alliance against the Jewish Agency and the Haganah. These fears were not entirely unfounded. Since the end of 1943, the Irgun and Lehi had been engaged in exploratory talks about establishing a joint command. But other, more political considerations appear also to have been a major factor in the Jewish Agency’s decision to focus exclusively on the Irgun. It doubtless recognized that by meeting the government’s demands for an active counterterrorist program, the Jewish Agency—and in turn the Labor Zionists—had been provided with an ideal opportunity to eliminate the main threat to their own political power base in Palestine.50

  The new high commissioner, Lord Gort, arrived in Palestine on October 31. He had not been Churchill’s first choice for the post. The prime minister had initially hoped to appoint Weizmann, resurrecting the success of the first holder of that office, Sir Herbert Samuel, who, though himself a Jew, had “held the scales there evenly.” But by April 1944 the worsening security situation in Palestine had effectively scotched the Zionist leader’s candidacy. Churchill had also briefly entertained the idea of appointing another prominent English Jew, Lord Melchett, but poor health had eliminated him from contention. In June, American intelligence reported that Churchill was seeking a “military man” to replace MacMichael given the expectation that “serious troubles in Palestine” were expected as the war in Europe wound down. This was the reason that MacMichael’s term had been extended by six months, the report opined: virtually all the most able British flag officers had been consumed with the planning and execution of the invasion of Europe and could not be spared. Hence, it was not until July that Gort’s appointment was finalized. “Look after our [Jewish] friends and see that they are treated well” were Churchill’s parting words to the new high commissioner. “The Jews have rendered us great service in this war.”51

  Gort proved to be an immensely popular high commissioner. And unlike his immediate predecessor, the U.S. military intelligence liaison officer in Jerusalem reported, the new high commissioner “has been mixing freely and informally and is frequently seen walking on the streets without ostensible escort.” When he attended a play or went to the cinema, the entire audience—Jew and Arab alike—would rise to its feet and cheer as Gort took his seat. “They daren’t shoot me,” Gort liked to say. “They will get something much worse.” Ben-Gurion judged Gort “a rare and good man” who was deeply moved by the suffering of the Jews under Nazi rule.52

  In one of his first reports to Stanley, the new high commissioner sounded a cautiously optimistic note. There has been “no overt manifestation of terrorist activities since the murder of Wilkin a month ago and the counter-measures which were subsequently taken.” A major cordon-and-search operation of Netanya a few days earlier had resulted in the arrests of some fifty terrorists and suspects. Moreover, in contrast to previous search operations, the mayor and the population had been especially cooperative and helpful. Accordingly, although the likelihood of further attacks could not be ruled out, Gort seemed hopeful that ongoing police efforts would produce more terrorist arrests and that the quiet prevalent since his arrival would continue. Other, more experienced Palestine hands, however, knew better than to construe the warm welcome that had greeted Gort and the calm that had settled over the country as anything but evanescent.53

  This was certainly the message that the terrorists themselves were intent on communicating. The absence of any new incidents during October did not mean that the Irgun and Lehi were inactive. To the contrary, their respective propaganda arms had been especially energetic. For more than a year, the Irgun’s clandestine radio station, re-branded the Voice of Fighting Zion, had been broadcasting intermittent messages publicizing the group’s aims and objectives and attempting to generate popular support. The Jewish Agency’s counterterrorism program gave new impetus to these efforts, prompting both the Irgun and Lehi to issue a joint statement calling on the Yishuv to ignore the entreaties “to collaborate with the secret police in passing information, denouncing and delivering the Jewish Fighting Youth to the oppressive authorities.” For the first time the Irgun’s propagandists had also begun to tailor their messages to British service personnel. Posters called upon the troops to think about why they had left home to fight in the war. “Does your duty consist [of] oppressing Jews in their homeland? Don’t you realize the humiliation to which you are subjected by participating in such police-actions? Is THIS your task in this war, which is being called by Your politicians [a] ‘war of liberation’?”54

  More ominous was the October issue of Lehi’s underground newspaper, He-Hazit (The front). Its lead article, titled “Cairo: The Centre of Plots,” contained a detailed indictment of the minister of state resident in the Middle East, Lord Moyne. Moyne had long been a particular bête noire of the Jews. While colonial secretary between 1941 and 1942, he had been instrumental in opposing the formation of a Jewish division in the British army. He had also opposed admitting the ill-fated Struma refugees to Palestine. During a critical debate in the House of Lords in 1942, Moyne had described the prospect of allowing further Jewish immigration to Palestine as akin to “putting exactly three pints into a pint pot.” To these familiar charges, Lehi now added a new one: that the minister had conni
ved to dispatch secret agents from Cairo “who are touring the Arab villages in Palestine, and distributing modern weapons among its inhabitants … instigating robbery and murder [of Jews], and preparing a new phase of the 1936–1939 ‘disturbances.’ ”55

  Coincidentally, Moyne’s name had also come up in a conversation between Churchill and Weizmann over lunch on November 4. The previous day, per Churchill’s instructions, the cabinet secretary had placed discussion of the ministerial committee’s partition proposal on the cabinet’s agenda. Weizmann, however, was concerned by reports that the proposed Jewish state’s boundaries would be much smaller than the Zionists hoped. Was it true, he asked the prime minister, that the Yishuv would be allocated “little more than a beach-head—or a bathing beach—in Tel Aviv”? Churchill hastened to assure his old friend that these rumors were no more than a “pack of lies” and moreover that it was his conviction that the Negev desert should be included in any Jewish state. Indeed, if the Jews “could get the whole of Palestine,” the prime minister stated, “it would be a good thing.” But, he cautioned Weizmann, although the cabinet committee was composed of Zionism’s closest friends, including all the leading pro-Zionist Labour Party ministers, there was little support for Churchill’s views within his own party. Accordingly, if it came down to a choice between no state at all or partition, the prime minister advised Weizmann that the Jews should take whatever partition deal was offered.56