The Ugly Game: The Qatari Plot to Buy the World Cup

by Heidi Blake

  The meeting between Peeters and Bin Hammam was a big opportunity for Belgium. Chirakal booked the two men a table for lunch at L’wzaar, Doha’s best seafood restaurant, by the long pale stretch of Katara beach. The president of Flanders strode in grinning widely and made his way past the long fish counter heaped with fresh catch to the table where Bin Hammam was waiting. It had already been a good day, and it was about to get better. Peeters had spent the morning with the Emir, and was looking forward to a trip to the Al Shaqab equestrian centre that afternoon to see Qatar’s collection of thoroughbred Arabian horses. But there was no doubt about it: this lunch, arranged for him by Belgium’s FIFA voter, was the highlight of the whole trip. He was there to make a pitch on behalf of a major consortium of Belgian companies for the multi-billion-dollar contracts to help construct the infrastructure for the Qatar World Cup, and Bin Hammam was the man he most wanted to speak to.

  The Belgian Sports Technology Club (BSTC) was an umbrella group covering some 70 firms which wanted to compete for a slice of the $50 billion planned infrastructure spending in Doha over the next decade, and Peeters had been enlisted to make their case. The consortium included the Belgian construction giant Besix Group, which had won a $375 million contract to help build the third phase of the passenger terminal at the New Doha International Airport in Qatar the previous summer. Besix saw itself as a major contender to help build the brand new stadiums Qatar would need to have in place by 2022, and the Belgians wanted to steal a march on the competition. That was why Peeters was lunching with Bin Hammam.

  After the pair dined together, BSTC proudly briefed the media that Belgium had been the ‘first on the ball’ with Qatar’s 2022 construction plans. ‘Belgian companies were the first to talk with Mohamed bin Hammam, president of the Asian Football Confederation, in view of the organisation of the World Cup in 2022 in Qatar,’ the financial magazine Trends-Tendances reported after a briefing from BTSC. ‘Qatar wants to soon begin preparations for the 2022 World Cup . . . Initial contact has occurred . . . between the BTSC and Mohamed bin Hammam, as part of the visit to the region of Kris Peeters, Flemish Minister-President.’

  There was no doubt in the Belgians’ mind that Bin Hammam was the man to come to if you wanted a slice of the World Cup pie, and the contact with the most powerful man in Qatari football was a big boon. A wholly owned subsidiary of Besix, Six Construct Qatar,37 went on to win the multi-million-dollar contract to renovate the Khalifa International Stadium ahead of the World Cup – including by building in innovative cooling technology. There was nothing to suggest that the contract had not been won fair and square, but no one knew that the Belgians’ first foray into Qatar 2022 had been secretly arranged by the country’s FIFA voter thanks to his ‘collegial relationship’ with Bin Hammam.

  Indeed, Qatar’s World Cup hero was busily portioning off his own share of the spoils. Bin Hammam had quickly begun lining himself up to win a multi-million-pound contract to supply services to Qatar 2022 days after the vote was won – and the bid’s chief executive Hassan Al-Thawadi was ready to help him set up the deal. Bin Hammam was starting a joint venture with Elie and Mona Yahchouchi, a couple of Lebanese television moguls, to provide information technology services for the tournament.

  He first met Elie Yahchouchi during the Asian Cup in Doha on 18 January, a few days after holding discussions with officials from Qatar’s ministry of information and communications technology (ICT). Yahchouchi wrote to Bin Hammam four days later to ‘congratulate you for the great achievement not only for Qatar, but also for the Arab world and Middle East region’ of bringing the World Cup to his country. He continued: ‘We feel privileged, indeed, to be given the opportunity to be part of your vision of what can be achieved to put Qatar at the leading edge, high above the rest, in what it can implement and offer to the world as facilities, services and end to end solution for the Qatar 2022 World Cup.’ Yahchouchi concluded by asking Bin Hammam to convey his ‘gratitude’ to ‘your seniors’ in the Qatari royal family. Bin Hammam responded warmly: ‘It was my pleasure and privilege to meet you and your colleagues. I am looking forward to assist you to achieve your goals with Qatar.’

  The two men set about establishing the consultancy firm that would be jointly owned by Bin Hammam and a small consortium of Lebanese businessmen. Yahchouchi emailed Bin Hammam again in February. ‘As discussed and agreed, under your blessing, direction and custody, we will start by establishing an IT consultancy company in Qatar based on the initial business plan presented during our meeting.’ He said his consultancy firm would look for a managing director to be based in Doha, conduct a prospecting exercise in Qatar to identify opportunities and search for international vendors to partner with. His email concluded: ‘Your Excellency, please accept again our gratitude for allowing us the opportunity to be of Service and kindly reiterate our gratitude to your seniors and family as well.’

  The documents were soon finalised and, when they were ready to swing into action, Bin Hammam emailed Al-Thawadi asking him to set up a meeting for the Yahchouchis with officials from the government information ministry. The 2022 bid chief quickly ushered Bin Hammam’s new business partners in to see the government’s executive director of ICT development to discuss the deal, and further meetings with the Qatar 2022 bid committee followed. Bin Hammam was already enjoying the status of a national hero in Qatar after pulling off his World Cup victory, and now he was on his way to reaping the financial rewards too.

  Everyone wanted a piece of Qatar’s victory. Chris Eaton was already enjoying the fruits of his new friendship with the men from the Gulf and he was keen to take the relationship to the next level. FIFA’s investigator wrote happily to tell a friend that: ‘The emir sent me a wonderful gift following the announcement of Qatar’s success. I am sure it was arranged by Mohamed from his protection squad but it came through the embassy in Zurich with a card from the emir.’

  The package that had landed on Eaton’s desk in FIFA headquarters had contained a luxury watch and cufflinks. This was a generous present from the ruler of the country whose bid he had been investigating only months before, and Eaton was eager to show that the goodwill was mutual. He had pocketed the card bearing Qatar’s name that Blatter had pulled out of the envelope at the ceremony in Zurich in December and he intended to turn it into a memento for the country’s ruler. He wrote to a friend: ‘I have a special gift for the emir (in fact I have the original envelope that contained the card that announced Qatar’s success that Sepp Blatter opened on the night – see the picture below). I would like to present it to the emir or someone from his staff while I am in Qatar.’ Eaton later asked an aide to ‘get something really smart done with the 2022 envelope’ and a plan was devised to get it framed with a picture of Blatter declaring the winner.38

  At the same time, Eaton was keen to continue his talks with the Qataris about the sports security project they had mooted when he visited Doha the previous autumn. For the sake of decency, he waited until exactly two weeks had passed after the secret ballot before he wrote effusively to Al-Thawadi. ‘Dear Hassan, I have waited a reasonable time before sending you this message of my most sincere congratulations to you and your team for Qatar being selected to host the World Cup. I am very much looking forward to working with you and whoever will be the security chief at the LOC [Local Organising Committee]. When I was in Doha the Minister discussed with me the idea of establishing a Sports Security Academy in Doha. I said at the time that it is a very interesting initiative and could place Qatar in a unique position. There is a very real need for such an international academy. On the next occasion I am in the region I would appreciate the opportunity of further discussing this initiative among of course other security issues that are part and parcel of the World Cup. Again Hassan, Mabrook, and I hope to see you soon.’

  Al-Thawadi responded two days later saying: ‘I will mention to the minister the sports academy project and let me know when you will be in town to continue with the discussions.’

/>   By now, Eaton was seriously eyeing a move to Doha. The investigator had stuffed his security team at FIFA with a handful of trusted acolytes, and he called these men together in January to confide that he was pursuing opportunities in Qatar that he hoped would yield a bigger budget, more freedom and much better pay. If it worked out, he wanted them to come with him – but for now their lips were to remain tightly sealed. Shortly afterwards, Eaton discovered that a freelancer who had been brought in to work with his team on a specific project was romantically linked to a senior FIFA official. A stand-up row ensued with his consigliere Terry Steans, in which the investigator raged that his plans had been compromised by the proximity of this interloper to his paymasters at FIFA.

  After the argument, Steans wrote an emollient email to Eaton, apologising for losing his temper and assuring his boss that he had not breathed a word about the plan to decamp to Doha to the freelancer. ‘Today was a bad day for personal reasons, no excuse for unprofessional behaviour . . . I had my thumb up my bum and my brain neutral,’ he wrote. ‘I have been at great pains not to speak to [the freelancer] about the plans we have discussed because I understand he is in a difficult position with [his girlfriend] and he is better off not having any information he can share and discuss with her.’

  He went on: ‘I have discussed nothing about Qatar or any other potential that presents itself to be capitalised on outside of FIFA as he was not going to be involved in such opportunities. Also if he confided in [his girlfriend] about any such venture you would be compromised . . . What I want from you commercially is exactly what you have planned out for me. I am not going to pass up the chance to build a pension pot as you once said, that would be stupid. Outside of the FIFA entity I want what we have agreed, to find an income stream for [the other members of the investigations team], yourself and me.’ Eaton was pacified, and soon after tasked Steans with getting Qatar’s winning envelope framed, because he was trying to ‘arrange a meeting either with the emir or his staff to give him a special presentation’.

  Eaton was planning to travel to Doha in March for the International Sports Security Conference, and he emailed Hassan Al-Thawadi to suggest a meeting to discuss ‘the concept for establishing an international football (or sports more generally) security academy in Qatar’. Shortly after, he received a tip-off that the exciting new sports security project he had discussed in October with Qatar’s interior minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser Bin Khalifa Al Thani, had come to fruition more quickly than he had expected. He learned that the conference in March would be used by the president of Qatar’s International Academy for Security Studies, Mohammed Hanzab, to announce the creation of a sports security centre based in Doha. These were glad tidings indeed.

  Eaton immediately fired off an email to Hanzab, attaching his own curriculum vitae ‘for ease of reference’. He explained: ‘I met with Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser Bin Khalifa Al Thani during the Interpol general assembly in Doha late last year. At that meeting Sheikh Abdulla [sic] raised the possibility of Qatar developing an International Centre for Sports Security. I said to him at the time, that not only was this an interesting proposal generally, but that should Qatar win the bid for 2022, that on behalf of FIFA I would do my best to promote the concept widely . . . I note that you are giving an address at the Conference that appears to be on this subject.’ Eaton said he was in the process of developing a holistic security plan for FIFA and would be talking to Al-Thawadi later in the year about arrangements for the Qatar World Cup. He concluded ‘I am most anxious to discuss these issues with you when I am in Doha.’

  A couple of hours later, he forwarded the same email to Al-Thawadi, along with a short note saying that he hoped they could meet while he was visiting Qatar to ‘discuss issues of mutual importance’. Al-Thawadi responded familiarly: ‘Chris . . . I would very much like to meet with you when you are in Doha.’ He was unavailable during the conference, but Eaton extended his stay so that the pair could meet on the following Sunday morning.

  Eaton flew into Doha in March, and watched from the audience as Hanzab unveiled the International Centre for Sports Security to the world. The new organisation had the ambitious aim to ‘to enhance security and safety in the world of sport’, using the Gulf state’s oil and gas riches, as part of the grander scheme to make Qatar a global sporting hub. It was also the perfect enticement for FIFA’s investigator and his entire team.

  Two days after the announcement, Eaton typed an excited email to his underlings back in Zurich. ‘I have had a full day with the head of the Qatar Academy for International Security Studies, which has launched the International Centre for Sports Security,’ he wrote. ‘Lots in this for us I think.’ He was right.

  Mohamed bin Hammam was an honoured guest at the launch of the International Centre of Security in Doha and he smiled and nodded in all the right places, but his mind was a long way away. After much deliberation and discussion with his friends in the Qatari royal family and the World Cup bid team, he had decided that the time was right to strike Blatter down. Bin Hammam had been waiting to see if another credible contender would emerge after the loss of Chung and had promised to back Michel Platini if he stood, but now the UEFA president had ruled himself out of the running and there was no one to oppose Blatter unless Bin Hammam stepped up to the plate.

  The Qataris had lost all confidence that the FIFA president was on their side, and his capricious pronouncements about their prized tournament had left no choice but to go for the jugular. With Bin Hammam at the top of FIFA, their World Cup dream would remain intact. So later the same day that the ICSS was unveiled, Bin Hammam gave his strongest indication yet that he was preparing to run for the FIFA presidency. ‘People have to try change. Change is good,’ he told the Guardian, adding suspensefully: ‘Within ten days I will formally declare whether I will stand or not.’

  Behind the scenes, Bin Hammam had already been canvassing for support with the help of Manilal Fernando. The football bosses of Yemen, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Thailand had written to FIFA nominating him as a candidate to oppose Blatter, and the English FA had pledged its support. Junji Ogura of Japan had been asked to back Bin Hammam, and the Qatari had arranged to meet privately with Jack Warner to sound him out, too. Chung had promised South Korea’s backing at lunch in February, but Fernando wanted to be sure. The Sri Lankan wrote to Chung on 9 March asking him whether he would support Bin Hammam and suggesting a private chat to reassess his own future in football. He also asked whether Chung intended to continue ‘the development programme and assistance programme you promissed [sic] for persons in my region’ and whether it would be possible to help Bin Hammam’s ally Ganesh Thapa ‘secure a percentage from the Hyundai Car Agency in Nepal’. History does not relate Chung’s reply.

  Thapa, the president of the Nepalese FA, was one of Bin Hammam’s stalwarts in Asia. A total of $115,000 had been paid into his personal bank accounts in the run-up to the World Cup vote, and in the weeks before Bin Hammam announced his presidential campaign, Thapa was busily squeezing more cash out of his contacts in Qatar. He set up a meeting with Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Thani, the president of the Qatar FA, and emailed Najeeb Chirakal to report back on the meeting on 8 March. ‘He agreed with my proposal for paying US$ 2,00,000 [sic] . . . for 4 years. On this regard he had told me to send you a confidential letter for releasing our 1st year’s payment which amounts US$ 2,00,000,’ Thapa said.

  The money, he claimed, was for Nepal’s national league, the ‘total estimated budget’ for which was $800,000, and Qatar had agreed to pick up the whole bill. Thapa followed up with another email on 12 March providing the bank details of the Nepalese FA.39 The association would later claim that it had received only $200,000 from Qatar and accuse Thapa of creaming off the rest of the $800,000 he appeared to have secured. He was suspended and is currently under investigation for allegedly embezzling around $6 million from the association during his 19 years as its president.

  As word spread that Bin Hammam was p
reparing a bid for the presidential crown, requests began to roll in again from his friends across Asia and Africa. The day after his interview with the Guardian, accounts staff at the AFC recorded in their ledger that he had withdrawn $20,000 as a ‘cash advance for Al Musabbir Sadi’, the president of the Bangladesh FA, and a further $40,000 in cash for an unspecified purpose later the same day.

  The irrepressible Seedy Kinteh of Gambia was also knocking on his door once more, this time asking for ‘financial assistance’ to pay for the West African Football Union’s extraordinary general congress in Gambia, including five-star accommodation and meals for all the members, the venue, local transport, dinner and cultural entertainment. ‘Please rest assured of our union’s support and solidarity always. Find below is my bank details for transfer,’ he wrote. Najeeb got on the phone to Kinteh to discuss his needs and then quickly arranged for $50,000 to be wired into his personal account from the funds of Bin Hammam’s daughter, Aisha.

  It was necessary to shower his supporters in such generosity if he was to have a hope of defeating Sepp Blatter, the ever-bountiful fount of football’s gold. With typically exquisite timing at the start of March, the FIFA president had triumphantly disclosed that the organisation had raked in $4.19 billion income from the latest four-year World Cup cycle, declaring: ‘I am the happiest man. It’s a huge, huge financial success.’ The income was all tax-free thanks to FIFA’s status as a ‘non-profit body existing to invest in football development’. It had ploughed $794 million in that noble cause, and funnelled a further $631 million into its bulging reserves, which Blatter revealed were now standing at a record $1.2 billion, up from just $76 million in 2003. World football’s governing body had lavished $707 million on ‘expenses’ and its wage bill had swelled to $65.3 million, meaning its 387 employees were paid an average of $168,700 each. Football bosses around the globe were waiting eagerly to hear how Blatter would divide up the treasure when he released his manifesto later that spring.