The Intelligence War against the IRA

by Thomas Leahy

  Both former SDLP member Paddy Devlin, and Maria McGuire, a former Provisional, have written about their conversations with Dáithí Ó Conaill. They suggest Ó Conaill was eager to politicise the movement and engage in talks.33 In an undated interview (most likely from late 1972, because it discusses the recent Operation Motorman, which had taken place in summer 1972) Ó Conaill mentions that even after the collapse of the truce he felt republicans were aiming to ‘expand [their] political organisation particularly in the north’ and ‘contest local elections on a wide scale in the south’.34 In addition, Ó Conaill had co-authored the Éire Nua plans with the Ó Brádaigh brothers, highlighting their willingness to consider unionists in a united Ireland.35 British officials also felt Ó Conaill would provide political concessions. Republicans selected Ó Conaill and Gerry Adams to speak with government intermediaries Philip Woodfield, of the Northern Ireland Office, and Frank Steele, of MI6, in Donegal on 20 June 1972. This meeting occurred shortly before the truce in June. Woodfield and Steele said that both men made no hard-line demands and wanted talks with the UDA if the British could arrange meetings. Woodfield concluded: ‘these two [O’Connell and Adams] … genuinely want a cease-fire and a permanent end to violence’.36 The British representatives recognised that some Provisionals wanted to change course. Yet the British government did not outline political alternatives to help republicans make the transition from conflict.

  The claim that republican leaders wanted the ceasefire to end is questionable. Brendan Hughes does say that Twomey and Ivor Bell, two of those who attended the talks on 7 July in London, wanted the ceasefire broken. But Hughes adds that he did not ‘think Gerry [Adams] wanted the ceasefire broken’.37 This claim could be true, as Steele and Woodfield felt that Adams ‘genuinely’ wanted ‘a permanent end to violence’.38 Joe Cahill, another senior Belfast republican at that time, also mentions that failure to politicise the republican cause was a missed opportunity. He believed republicans could have acquired an electoral mandate to encourage concessions at talks. Cahill also says that he saw no military solution. McGuire certainly saw Cahill as a moderate.39 There is even evidence that MacStiofáin wanted a political compromise. The British felt that MacStiofáin was unreasonable and should not be at the July talks.40 But MacStiofáin believed that the talks were the start of substantial political negotiations that would lead to a conference on the future of Ireland.41 The fact that MacStiofáin tried to arrange another meeting with Whitelaw shows a willingness to continue negotiations.42 Whitelaw recognised that some republicans wanted further negotiations. On 10 July, Whitelaw told the Cabinet that certain republican leaders might renew the ceasefire for this reason.43

  The British government appeared naïve in believing that the Provisional delegation would immediately make major compromises at the first meeting. This belief is surprising, when considering the republican movement’s strengths by July 1972. These strengths included its increase in armed activity across Northern Ireland and the existence of no-go areas. Ó Dochartaigh points out that it ‘is simply bad negotiating practice to let it be known how much you are willing to concede’.44 The IRA would have known that if they had compromised straight away, the British government would have been far more reluctant to grant concessions. It was not so much that various republican leaders would not provide concessions, even if that were true of some republicans, such as Séamus Twomey. It was more likely that various republican leaders were biding their time until future meetings, when concessions would be needed from all sides. Joe Cahill, for example, remembers that in the post-ceasefire talks with Wilson in July 1972, ‘IRA tactics would be to take a hard line until we found out what he wanted.’45 In a similar way, during the March ceasefire talks with Wilson, the IRA representatives said: ‘talks … would consider the three points [noted previously] to secure British disengagement, but there would be a British presence. That would be the first phase.’ They added: ‘Our friends would go forward [to talks]. The second phase would cover a united Ireland.’46 Various IRA leaders envisaged that meeting their objective of a united Ireland would require a process made up of a number of different stages. There was flexibility and willingness to negotiate in stages.

  Heath’s government was not prepared to prolong talks to see if it could negotiate a political settlement with the IRA. Aldrich’s and Cormac’s view is that Heath tended not to prioritise intelligence on the long-term intentions of the government’s ‘enemies’ within the UK in any detail. The emphasis was on protecting the reputation and policies of the UK Conservative government.47 In contrast, it is surprising that Wilson failed to appreciate that the IRA did not want the SDLP to represent them in future talks in 1972. According to Aldrich and Cormac, Wilson was willing to use intelligence to explore the intentions of insurgent leaders. He was often interested in seeing whether a negotiated political settlement was possible in various situations. Wilson also wanted to show his socialist credentials by solving conflicts and bringing about peace if possible. These motivating factors can explain why Wilson had met with the IRA in March 1972. In contrast, Whitelaw and the Conservative government only decided to meet the IRA in July 1972. Nonetheless, Wilson failed to grasp that the IRA and Sinn Féin wished to represent their community during any multi-party talks. Intelligence should have made this point clear. Since Wilson was not in government at the time, there is a possibility that he did not have access to such intelligence, or that it did not exist because Heath’s government was not asking the intelligence services to provide information on the IRA leadership’s political intentions. Wilson did learn from these talks. When his Labour party returned to power in 1974, he ensured that intermediary contacts with the IRA were gathering information on what republicans might accept in terms of a political settlement.48

  The incidents at Lenadoon provided an excuse for the British Conservative government to get out of trying to compromise with the Provisionals. Whitelaw admitted that if he was going to have to meet the Provisionals again it was going to be very difficult. The Provisionals wanted him to produce a statement by the 14 July meeting (the next one scheduled) that could appease republican demands for a British declaration of intent to withdraw. But the British government did not want to enrage unionists.49 With UDA pressure against the ceasefire building, Lenadoon presented the British government with a reason to ensure that they still were only fighting a single-front campaign.50 Despite publicly blaming the IRA for the incidents at Lenadoon, Whitelaw admitted to the Cabinet in private that ‘the heaviest responsibility for the resumption of violence rested with the Ulster Defence Association, who had never welcomed the [IRA] “ceasefire”’.51

  It is crucial to remember that part of the reason why the Provisional IRA initially emerged in Belfast was to defend working-class nationalist areas from loyalist attacks. There was little possibility at the time that republicans could ignore a situation whereby the British Army seemed unwilling to stop loyalist intimidation of nationalist refugees. Having said that, some leading republicans still tried to save the ceasefire. MacStiofáin mentions that Ó Conaill phoned a ‘hotline’ to Frank Steele at Laneside during the Lenadoon incident to try to prevent the ceasefire ending.52 A report in British government archives mentions that Ó Conaill attempted to contact Whitelaw as the situation deteriorated too. Whitelaw did not respond. The report also mentions that the Northern Ireland Housing Executive had agreed before the riots to allow the Catholic families from Rathcoole to move into Lenadoon. The GOC and the 39 Brigade commander in Belfast had met at Lisburn on 8 July as the disturbances in Lenadoon began. They agreed that they should target the IRA before a battle between loyalists and republicans commenced, in which the Army might get caught in the middle. It is true that the Army did mediate between the UDA and Seamus Loughran of the Provisionals on 9 July. But talks ended once Catholics tried to cross an agreed peace line to move into the area.53 Frank Steele also told Taylor that a section of the Army felt that the ceasefire should end, as they believed that they could still
defeat the IRA. Steele further admitted that Ó Conaill and another republican had phoned him, but that the British government refused to return to talks.54 The British government allowed the Lenadoon incident to develop in order to end talks with the IRA. Whitelaw and Heath had mistakenly believed that the IRA would make substantial concessions from the very first meeting in London.

  The IRA did not help their own attempts to extract concessions during the 7 July talks. Joe Cahill speaks of a missed opportunity for republicans in the early 1970s, particularly following nationalist anger after Bloody Sunday. Cahill believed that:

  if we had been in a strong position politically, then we could have taken over the country … I have never seen such a wave of revulsion against British rule in Ireland … if we had had political clout … we could have done fantastic things. If we had had a couple of TDs [Dáil members] at that stage and a stronger Sinn Féin … we could have seized the opportunity.55

  This could be interpreted as Cahill attempting to criticise the previous republican leadership. He later sided with the Adams–McGuinness leadership that promoted politicisation in the 1980s. Nevertheless, he makes a valid point for the period up to July 1972. The British government could always ignore the IRA’s demands whilst republicans lacked a substantial political mandate. The British were inclined to do so throughout the conflict. They were reluctant to end their commitment to upholding the majority of consent principle in Northern Ireland, in order to avert a loyalist backlash and a two-front war.56 If republicans wanted to pressurise the British position, a political mandate was essential. The increase in IRA violence, and signs of solidarity with republicans in southern Ireland by 1972 such as the burning of the British Embassy after Bloody Sunday, demonstrates that there was support for the movement at that time. This support could have been politically significant. Whilst the ban on Sinn Féin was in place in the North, the organisation could have asked before the ceasefire for the British government to legalise Sinn Féin. Attempts to form some understanding between the Irish government and the SDLP could also have reaped political rewards. Both sides wanted some form of a united Ireland to end the conflict in the long term. A unity of purpose between nationalists and republicans, such as agreeing to get the British government to promote Irish unity to unionists in talks, as was later attempted in the 1990s, could have produced political concessions from the British government in the early 1970s. True, Ó Conaill suggests that the Lynch government refused the offer of talks about an all-Ireland conference in April 1972.57 But in January 1972 Lynch said to British officials that he would talk to ‘all people in Ireland’, including the IRA if they renounced violence, and if they ‘were realistic enough to see [that] a slow movement’ towards unity was the way forward.58

  Conclusion

  The IRA called a truce in June–July 1972 because they were keen to negotiate from a position of strength. Furthermore, many IRA leaders recognised the need for a negotiated political settlement. Few republican leaders envisaged driving the British Army back home at the point of a gun – although that is not to say that some volunteers did not hope for such a scenario.59 The evidence also suggests that the British government were at least equally at fault for the ceasefire’s collapse by July 1972.60 The British government never outlined for the Provisionals the boundaries of a political settlement. Neither did they try to politicise the republican movement by legalising Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland. Whitelaw also offered no concessions to the IRA if they were to agree to end their campaign during the 7 July meeting. The British government used the Lenadoon housing estate incident to prevent a potential two-front war against republicans and loyalists. It does appear that Whitelaw only reluctantly entered talks with the IRA at the behest of the SDLP. The Heath government showed little willingness to gather insight into possible political compromises that the IRA might accept before the ceasefire. This approach to the talks with the IRA in July 1972 does correspond with the Heath government’s preference for using intelligence for short-term advantage over enemies, rather than searching for long-term solutions to political disputes and conflict.61

  The republican movement had their part to play in the failure to create a political settlement with the British during the June and July ceasefire. In spite of their sizeable support levels in working-class nationalist areas, they had no political mandate from which to encourage the British government, the SDLP, the Irish government and unionists to provide concessions towards the republican position.62 The IRA also failed to engage in talks and a possible agreement on nationalist principles with the SDLP and the Irish government in 1972, both of whom wanted Irish unification in the long term. Republicans missed an opportunity by failing to obtain, before July 1972, a political mandate on which a settlement could be based that would lead to the fulfilment of some of their objectives.

  Part II

  On the Verge of Defeat? The Intelligence War: July 1972 to December 1975

  4

  British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: July 1972 to December 1975

  Before May 1974, British political policy had focused on creating a political settlement between the SDLP and unionists. British security policy attempted to reduce the IRA’s campaign to an ‘acceptable’ level between August 1972 and April 1974.1 The British state did not envisage political settlements involving republicans until April 1974. In contrast, leading British civil servants and Labour government ministers envisaged loyalists and republicans agreeing to an independent Northern Ireland after May 1974. Other authors have suggested that Harold Wilson and lone members of the British state contemplated a form of withdrawal.2 But this chapter argues that eventual independence for Northern Ireland became the British Labour government’s favoured policy option between May 1974 and December 1975. The legalisation of Sinn Féin and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in May 1974 marked the beginning of attempts to encourage a political settlement between republicans and loyalists. My argument is supported by evidence from British state archival papers, Merlyn Rees’s diaries, Dr Garret FitzGerald’s papers, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh’s papers and the diaries of Brendan Duddy, the main republican intermediary with the British government in 1975.3

  A constant feature of British military and intelligence policy between July 1972 and December 1975 was the aim of reaching an ‘acceptable level’ of IRA violence. Under William Whitelaw, the British government sought to damage the IRA’s armed capacity to such an extent that it could not disrupt a new power-sharing executive.4 Under Rees a reduction in IRA activities was a prerequisite to getting republicans to accept a political compromise.5

  From ‘Defeating’ to Talking to the IRA, July 1972 to December 1975

  Bloody Friday altered the British Conservative government’s approach to dealing with the IRA. On 21 July 1972, the IRA detonated twenty devices in Belfast city centre. The sheer number of bombs planted meant that it was too difficult for the security forces to evacuate each area between warnings.6 The bombings killed 9 people and injured 130, with devastating scenes appearing on national television.7 Bloody Friday was a propaganda disaster for the IRA and ushered in a swift British security response. Thereafter, Operation Motorman removed the IRA barricades that had prevented the security forces entering parts of Belfast and Derry City.8

  Whitelaw saw Bloody Friday as the perfect opportunity to end further dialogue with the IRA and to seize the IRA’s no-go areas. For Whitelaw, the IRA had had its chance. He decided: ‘I would never again consider any … meeting with the IRA leaders.’9 Whitelaw was true to his word. He consulted only with the SDLP and unionists to produce a political settlement. His aim of reducing IRA activity was evident during a meeting at Downing Street on 9 November 1972. Whitelaw informed the meeting that ‘the broad lines of the Government’s future strategy [were] to seek increasingly to isolate the extremists from the moderates of both communities’. He hoped that this approach would ‘develop the … prospect of a peaceful political settlement’ between constitutional
nationalists and unionists. ‘This strategy’, he insisted, ‘must be pursued simultaneously on the security and on the political fronts’.10 Whitelaw believed that by increasing military pressure on the IRA and creating a ‘moderate’ nationalist and unionist political agreement, British forces could restrict the IRA’s ability to disrupt Northern Irish political affairs.11

  From July 1972 until the Conservatives left office in February 1974, the British government, the Northern Ireland Office and Laneside officials refused to negotiate again with republicans.12 For instance, in November 1972, MI6’s Frank Steele met representatives of Conciliation Ireland, an organisation promoting dialogue as a means of ending the conflict. Their representatives had met leading republicans in Dublin. Conciliation Ireland told Steele that the IRA ‘wanted a negotiated peace that left them with some honour’. Steele replied: ‘neither [Whitelaw] nor his staff would again negotiate with the IRA’. Steele added that it was not ‘advantageous’ for the British government to talk to the IRA at the time because Whitelaw was creating a constitutional party alliance.13 Paddy Harte, a Fine Gael TD in Donegal, faced a similar rejection after approaching British officials in Dublin in July 1973. Whilst a British official told Paddy Harte that ‘[t]he door was not … screwed shut’ to the IRA, the official’s other remarks suggested that it was: