The Intelligence War against the IRA

by Thomas Leahy

  The nature of the intelligence war against the IRA indicates the importance of human intelligence. Electronic and signals intelligence did play an increasing role by the 1990s. But it was frequently complemented by human intelligence informing the intelligence services whose phone to tap or where to place a listening device. Stephen Grey and Steve Hewitt suggest that human intelligence remains vital in the modern age. They propose that agents and informers can potentially be more effective if they target specific individuals rather than indiscriminately focusing on the entire population. Grey adds that human intelligence sources can provide ‘cultural context’ and ‘understanding’ of armed groups and their leadership. During the peace process, informers such as Donaldson within Sinn Féin were no doubt useful in convincing the British state that the republican leadership was serious about a political compromise.24 But this argument is not to say that human intelligence ‘won the war’ against the IRA or forced that organisation into peace.

  On the other hand, human intelligence in Northern Ireland also caused problems. This book contends that it had mixed results and did not reduce IRA activity to an ‘acceptable level’ across Northern Ireland. As discussed, the actions of particular sources have led to inquiries and investigations into state intelligence agencies. Hewitt also suggests that the betrayal of agents and informers can actually create greater community cohesion and opposition to the state:

  The resistance to informing points not only to the continuing lack of legitimacy of the state in some quarters, but also to an even greater allegiance to human bonds of family, religion, ethnicity, nationality, geographical location, community, gender, sexuality and, most fundamentally, friendship … any one of these factors or several in combination, trump any special loyalty to the state and thus generate anger toward those who would choose that entity over these fundamentally more important allegiances.25

  In the republican communities it appears that agents and informers remain hated. The reluctance of Sinn Féin to offer guarantees of safety for all alleged agents and informers exiled who wish to return to Northern Ireland demonstrates that they continue to be rejected by the republican community.26 Any short-term disruption they caused was not matched by long-term increase in support for the state within republican and nationalist communities. As McKearney suggests: ‘there’s a level of distaste for informers. I have a feeling that while the threat to people like that would not come from … the Provisional IRA … the neighbours wouldn’t be happy’.27

  The conclusions within this book contribute towards the debate concerning when it is right to ‘talk to terrorists’. After studying the Northern Ireland and Basque conflicts, John Bew, Martyn Frampton and Inigo Gurruchaga believe that whilst governments will continue to ‘talk to terrorists’, talks must be conducted at particular points in the conflict that favour the state. They argue:

  there is a qualitative difference between talking to terrorists who are on the crest of a wave – in terms of propaganda, confidence and momentum – and talking to terrorists who have been made to realise that their aims are unattainable by violent means (but who have also been induced to believe … that an alternative path might lead them towards these objectives).

  In relation to Northern Ireland, they mention various factors that permitted the peace talks with paramilitaries to eventually succeed in the 1990s. These include a generational shift in the republican and British leadership, Sinn Féin’s electoral difficulties and the focus in peace talks on the democratic parties. Ultimately, however, the authors emphasise that:

  [b]y the late 1980s, the IRA had been heavily infiltrated by informers and it was subject to a successful strategy of containment by the British security services … the highly effective [intelligence war] … had a decisive impact on what occurred subsequently.

  In their view, ‘talking to terrorists’ succeeded in bringing peace to Northern Ireland by 1998 primarily because the IRA was facing a steep decline as a result of British security and intelligence pressure.28 By briefly evaluating whether it was ‘right’ for the British state to talk to the IRA during each of their prolonged cessations, it is possible to point out the inaccuracies in this argument.

  Bew and Frampton suggest that ‘it is not always “good to talk”’ and that Whitelaw’s dialogue with the IRA in 1972 enhanced the IRA’s sense that increased violence would force British disengagement.29 In contrast, Jonathan Powell makes a crucial observation:

  it is not obvious that the meeting [with the IRA in June 1972] itself provoked the renewed IRA campaign by indicating weakness. In fact the attacks were probably triggered by Whitelaw’s tough line in making it clear that the IRA’s demands were completely unacceptable.30

  Whitelaw provided no alternative political solutions to republicans. Sinn Féin was not even legalised as a political party, limiting the IRA’s options in terms of moving away from armed conflict. Powell argues that a key purpose of ‘talking to terrorists’ must be to ‘convince them that a peaceful political way forward exists’, and that they are likely to achieve greater success in attaining their objectives through political means in the long term. If no political alternatives are on offer, it is not surprising that armed groups will not agree to a permanent ceasefire, especially if they maintain a robust armed capacity.31

  A ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ and armed groups’ realisation of the need to politicise are said by Powell to be vital for peace. If both are present, this shows that the paramilitaries could be convinced to accept a political alternative. Powell believes that the government should try and help the ‘moderates’ who recognise the need for political mandates. Powell also argues:

  Armed groups always start with unnegotiable demands. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t have resorted to violence in the first place. The point about talking to them is to persuade them to moderate their demands so that they abandon their initial claims and settle for something else that can meet their interests. The government offers them certain compromises that persuade them they can pursue their aims politically.

  The problem in 1972 was that Whitelaw never recognised the need for further negotiations or the requirement to bolster the ‘moderates’ within the Provisionals by providing an attractive political alternative.32 In addition, by not engaging in talks with insurgent groups, governments can prolong violence because this sends out a message that force is the only way to achieve their political aims.33 The fact that IRA activity increased after the British government refused to engage with the organisation when they released their five-point peace plan in September 1971 supports this view. Moreover, peace processes can take a long time, and often do not succeed at first.34 The sooner negotiations begin, the sooner that common ground might emerge.35 The 1972 talks at least began the process of both sides learning each other’s positions.

  The ceasefire of June 1972 also failed because the IRA lacked a political mandate. Powell convincingly argues: ‘[w]hen groups do not make that transition from being primarily military to being primarily political, peace is not possible’.36 It is difficult for armed groups to know exactly what would be acceptable to their community without a political mandate to guide them.37 A lack of a political mandate undoubtedly makes it easier for hardliners within an armed group to disrupt attempts to create a political compromise, since there is no political mandate from which to contradict their views.

  Bew et al. believe that talks with the IRA in 1975 did not succeed partly because the British government was unclear about its bottom line. They argue that this lack of clarity encouraged further IRA activity, inspired by the belief that the British were weakening. Furthermore, Bew and Frampton suggest that by talking to paramilitaries in 1975 the British government was ignoring constitutional parties, prompting the paramilitaries to remain committed to their hardline demands.38 They are right to suggest that ‘constructive ambiguity’ over British policy during the 1975 ceasefire was eventually anything but ‘constructive’. Powell accurately states that whilst ambiguity may aid both
sides to move forward without getting weighed down in areas of disagreement, ‘sooner or later it will become destructive’.39 In particular, Part II of this book demonstrated that the Provisional republican leadership worked out that the British state wanted an IRA and loyalist agreement. Yet republican leaders thought that comments by British mediators about ‘structures of disengagement’ meant that there would be at least a private declaration of British intent to withdraw before an agreement with loyalists was made. When this declaration was not forthcoming, the IRA lost faith and gradually slipped back to their armed campaign, with some republicans convinced that they had been tricked.

  Other important factors encouraging peacemaking as identified by Jonathan Powell were present in 1975: constant dialogue, gestures of goodwill by the state and paramilitaries, the need to bring in the ‘extremes’ for a settlement, and no preconditions for talks other than a ceasefire.40 For example, in terms of gestures, the British government relocated the Price sisters from an English prison, and, at least until August 1975, the IRA generally adhered to its cessation.41 The British government also offered the IRA the chance to politicise and encouraged them to stand in elections. It seems that the significant missing ingredient for peace at the time was again the lack of a republican political mandate. From a British perspective, a small republican electoral mandate may have made the IRA accept greater compromises. On the republican side, a strong political mandate may have convinced the British government to grant greater concessions. Furthermore, Part II argued that whilst suffering damaging infiltration in Belfast, the IRA elsewhere was persisting and disrupting political, social and economic life in many parts of Northern Ireland and to a lesser degree in England. Without a political mandate in this period, and with the IRA remaining a formidable force, republicans saw no reason to accept considerable concessions. Republican leaders did learn from 1975. They had begun to actively organise politically by the 1980s. In this way, the talks made the republican movement realise that it needed visible political support in order to extract concessions from the British state.42 This point is crucial because it supports Powell’s view that negotiating can eventually bring about the politicisation of paramilitary groups, which can help both those armed groups and governments to have more realistic expectations about what is achievable through peace talks.43 Dialogue in 1975 also showed the Provisionals that democratic options were not closed, which, if it had occurred, could have made the violence worse.44

  The main argument of this book is that ‘talking to terrorists’ was successful in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the 1990s primarily because of Sinn Féin’s electoral mandate. For one thing, this enabled the British government to allow the smooth transition for republicans from conflict to full participation in politics. Republicans already had an electoral mandate to justify their inclusion in elected institutions.45 Sinn Féin’s modest but consistent performance in Northern Ireland highlighted to the Irish and British governments, as well as the SDLP and Ulster Unionist Party, that the party was too sizeable a minority to be ignored in political solutions. Equally, the inability of Sinn Féin to win a majority of the nationalist vote across the island made the republican leadership realise that whilst they could bargain for the best possible peace terms with the pan-nationalist alliance, unionists and British government, ultimately they lacked the political strength to force an agreement on their terms. Powell is accurate to conclude that ‘talking to terrorists’ who have at least a significant minority of community support is the right course of action. Talks between republicans, the Irish government and the SDLP, but also between republicans and the British government, undoubtedly helped to fully politicise republicans by lowering their expectations about what was achievable through further conflict. At the same time, these talks were crucial in encouraging republican leaders to see what could be gained in the future by means of a purely political approach.46 The increased vote for Sinn Féin during and after the peace process justified to its leaders the compromises made. Other factors were important in bringing about peace in the 1990s, including a military stalemate (albeit to varying degrees on each side). But a pivotal factor influencing many republicans towards peace was the realisation that they could achieve more through purely political means, in terms of increasing their electoral support levels and prospects of bringing about a united Ireland. Republican leaders eventually realised that even if the IRA had successfully carried out more attacks like that at Loughgall, the republican movement would still have lacked the political support necessary to bring about a united Ireland.

  Debates surrounding the intelligence war against the IRA have not yet been consigned to history. There is the ongoing inquiry into the actions of Stakeknife, called Operation Kenova. Further details about Stakeknife’s alleged activities continue to emerge, although I doubt that further revelations will reveal that Stakeknife or other agents and informers ultimately brought republicans to the negotiating table, for reasons explained in this book.47 In addition, pressure from some families has seen the IRA apologise for killing certain alleged agents and informers. The IRA now admit that these specific people were not informers.48 A few former spies continue to publicise their grievances against British intelligence for allegedly failing to keep their promises of financial rewards and protection.49

  On a day-to-day operational level, agents and informers, alongside other aspects of the intelligence war, did prevent various republican attacks from being carried out, and disrupted the IRA in certain periods. But the complexity of the IRA prevented the intelligence war from containing the entire organisation and forcing republicans into peace. The Provisional IRA still could not win, however, because they lacked substantial support from the Irish people. In the words of Tommy McKearney: ‘The insurgency doesn’t pose a threat by remaining intact from state infiltration, but instead poses a threat by the numbers it can mobilise against the state.’50

  Appendix 1

  IRA ‘Intended-Target’ Killings by Year in Various Geographical Areas Where the IRA Operated, 1969–1994

  Belfast Derry City South Armagh Tyrone Co. Derry Armagh Fermanagh Newry Down

  1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

  1970 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0

  1971 31 5 3 4 0 2 1 0 0

  1972 53 18 12 8 5 7 11 2 1

  1973 24 9 14 13 0 7 3 0 1

  1974 12 7 12 13 2 4 3 1 2

  1975 2 4 14 5 1 3 1 0 0

  1976 10 7 8 4 7 6 3 0 0

  1977 18 5 1 11 4 3 3 0 1

  1978 6 3 10 5 2 0 1 3 0

  1979 18 1 28 12 0 2 5 1 0

  1980 7 2 7 1 1 2 8 0 3

  1981 11 4 8 8 3 4 3 3 2

  1982 6 6 1 4 0 7 2 2 0

  1983 6 4 2 9 1 3 0 2 5

  1984 2 2 5 10 0 1 4 1 2

  1985 2 3 14 2 1 1 3 11 3

  1986 2 1 5 5 1 2 3 5 3

  1987 10 4 1 2 1 0 3 0 3

  1988 12 1 2 13 0 2 4 0 2

  1989 2 1 4 4 4 2 2 0 3

  1990 5 0 3 5 7 11 0 0 5

  1991 9 0 2 1 2 6 2 0 0

  1992 3 0 2 8 0 1 1 1 0

  1993 1 1 8 4 0 2 0 1 0

  1994 2 1 1 0 1 3 0 0 1

  References for IRA ‘intended target’ killings by geographical area. All references found in David McKittrick et al., Lost Lives (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company Ltd, 2007). The exceptions are the south Armagh references (see below): For Belfast, see reference numbers 53, 60–2, 66–8, 74, 78–9, 82, 112–13, 125, 135, 142–43, 146–7, 162, 164, 166, 168–9, 173, 179–80, 182, 209, 210, 220, 230, 242, 257, 291, 307–8, 311–12, 315, 327, 350, 353, 362, 371, 387–8, 392–3, 397, 404, 410, 422, 458, 460, 462, 464–5, 467, 470, 475, 481, 505, 507, 526, 540–1, 545, 547–8, 561, 573, 575–6, 599, 607, 621, 624, 649, 662, 668, 672, 700, 703, 735, 739, 760, 769, 774–5, 777, 781, 788, 790, 793, 800, 805–7, 814, 830, 838, 841, 892, 898–9, 939, 976, 1023, 1028, 1045, 1090–1, 1148–9, 1154, 1162, 1168, 1185, 1186, 1297, 1298, 1613–14, 1643, 1671, 1704, 1740, 1787, 1823, 1832, 1846, 1870, 1877, 1893, 1894, 1900, 1942,
1944, 1946–7, 1952, 1959, 1960, 1962–3, 1965, 1969, 1977, 1980, 2006, 2008, 2064–7, 2074, 2087–9, 2097–8, 2105, 2113, 2129, 2161–2, 2167, 2174, 2176, 2183–4, 2186, 2193, 2205, 2213, 2230–2, 2238, 2266, 2288–9, 2296, 2309, 2316, 2333, 2362, 2371, 2381, 2388, 2397, 2401, 2412–14, 2420, 2458, 2514, 2522, 2529, 2537, 2541, 2586, 2612, 2658, 2693, 2705, 2769, 2783, 2807, 2819, 2852, 2854–5, 2858, 2864, 2868–9, 2875, 2905, 2908–9, 2922–3, 2951, 2960, 2964, 2980, 2991, 2992, 2995, 3009, 3018, 3116, 3118–19, 3140–1, 3196, 3199, 3201–2, 3210–11, 3235, 3246–7, 3329, 3344, 3362, 3376, 3458 and 3461.

  For County Derry (excluding Derry City), see reference numbers 414–16, 679, 712, 1001, 1163, 1490, 1618, 1656, 1766, 1809–10, 1839, 1864, 1901, 1911–12, 1975, 1987, 2012, 2211, 2328, 2365, 2366, 2591, 2707, 2787, 2830, 3022–3, 3044, 3069, 3146–51, 3166, 3234, 3249 and 3468.

  For Derry, City see reference numbers 145, 159, 160, 178, 228, 256, 270, 317, 331, 332, 396, 403, 412, 421, 449, 562, 571, 593, 597, 609, 659, 685, 720, 733–4, 820, 829, 832, 880, 946, 967–8, 1000, 1004, 1037, 1070, 1213, 1233–4, 1374, 1533, 1548–9, 1587, 1703, 1746, 1761, 1845, 1848, 1857, 1879, 1881, 1888, 1910, 1916, 2005, 2026, 2043, 2107, 2250, 2271, 2285, 2291, 2373, 2394, 2416–17, 2426, 2428, 2435, 2465, 2515, 2556, 2564, 2567, 2615, 2625, 2718, 2722, 2723, 2774, 2816–18, 2831, 2924, 3016, 3369 and 3463.