Brotherhood of the Bomb

by Gregg Herken

  65. Transcript of speech, Nov. 27, 1945, unmarked folder, carton 1, Frank Oppenheimer papers; summary report, July 23, 1947, and San Francisco field report, Frank Oppenheimer file, FBI. According to FBI documents, Frank’s speeches had been cleared in advance by army censors.

  66. ITMOJRO, 4. Frank never gave the class; the head of the school, David Jenkins, thought the topic too technical.

  67. Frank Oppenheimer to Alvarez, “Magnet Design for Linac,” Oct. 9, 1946, “Linear Accelerator—Correspondence” folder, box 1, Alvarez papers, SBFRC.

  68. “History of the University of California Radiation Laboratory,” undated, box 171, folder 1, Neylan papers.

  69. Sproul thought the results “good not great.” Notes of telephone conversation, Oct. 3, 1945, memos, Sproul papers; minutes, Jan. 4, 1946, Committee on Finance and Budget Management, University of California archives (CFMB); Lawrence to Loomis, June 15, 1946, folder 8, carton 46, EOL.

  70. However, the cross-country recruiting drive that Lawrence and Cooksey began near war’s end would mean an overall increase in the research staff.

  71. Lofgren interview (1998); Panofsky interview (1993).

  72. York (1987), 31; York interview (1997).

  73. “Recommended Program for the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley,” Sept. 15, 1945, folder 37, carton 29, EOL.

  74. Alvarez planned a machine that would be almost half a mile long and achieve energies five times that of the great cyclotron. “Some accelerator!” Lawrence observed. Alvarez (1987), 156–57; Panofsky interview (1993); Lawrence to Alvarez, Apr. 9, 1945, folder 16, carton 1, EOL.

  75. Entry, Sept. 20, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA; Underhill to Sproul, Sept. 26, 1945, Underhill papers, LANL.

  76. Underhill to Bradbury, Sept. 26, 1945, Underhill papers, LANL.

  77. “Proposed Post-War Program of Dr. E.O. Lawrence,” Captain J. A. King to General Groves, Sept. 20, 1945, and Groves to Lawrence, Oct. 15, 1945, series 5, MED/NARA; “Gen. Groves’ talk,” Oct. 21, 1945, box 171, folder 1, Neylan papers; Oct. 1, 1945, Groves diary, Groves/NARA.

  78. In 1944, Lawrence had projected an annual postwar budget of $85,000 for the Rad Lab. Heilbron, Seidel, and Wheaton (1981), 46–47.

  79. Molly Lawrence interview (1992).

  80. Oppenheimer was more embittered than they knew. Smith and Weiner (1980), 307.

  81. Sept. 28, 1945, memos, Sproul papers.

  82. Oct. 11, 1945, memos, Sproul papers.

  83. Birge, vol. 5, xvii–9.

  84. Oct. 16, 1945, memos, Sproul papers.

  85. Smith and Weiner (1980), 310–11.

  86. Birge, vol. 5, xxii–6.

  87. Oct. 26, 1945, memos, Sproul papers.

  88. Childs (1968), 375–76. Oppenheimer’s request “places the University of California in a very difficult position,” Birge wrote, since the physics department could not recruit a replacement for Oppie while he remained on leave. Birge to Sproul, Oct. 29, 1945, folder 42, box 16, Sproul papers.

  89. Oppenheimer also met with Charles Kramer, an aide to Senator Harley Kilgore, the sponsor of one of many bills then before Congress for the domestic control of atomic energy. Unknown to Oppie, Kramer was an NKVD informant code-named Mole, who subsequently reported to the Soviet rezident that Oppenheimer believed technical information on the bomb should be shared “only when there is political cooperation among the countries.” Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 184–85.

  90. Harrison, “Memorandum for the Files,” Sept. 25, 1945, no. 77, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.

  91. Truman-Oppenheimer meeting: ITMOJRO, 35; Davis (1968), 258; Michelmore (1969), 121–22; David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol. 2, (1964), 118. The Atomic Energy Years, 1945–1950 (Harper and Row, 1964). It was this visit that inspired Truman’s later characterization of Oppenheimer as a “cry-baby scientist.” Herken (1980), 401 fn.

  92. Groves’s diary indicates that the Scientific Panel met in Washington from Sept. 19 to Sept. 22, 1945.

  93. Groves to Harrison, Aug. 29, 1945, series 1, pt. 2, file 3, MED/NARA.

  94. “Proposals for Research and Development in the Field of Atomic Energy,” box 20, tabs 1 and 2, MED/NARA.

  95. Asked in 1954 “at what time did your strong moral convictions develop with respect to the hydrogen bomb?” Oppenheimer answered: “When it became clear to me that we would tend to use any weapon we had.” ITMOJRO, 250.

  96. Harrison to Karl Compton, Oct. 8, 1945, no. 69, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.

  97. Compton to Wallace, series 5, file 312.1, box 48, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA. Compton evidently drafted his letter after the panel’s meeting in Washington but was careful to confirm that he had the others’ assent. From New York, Lawrence wrote Compton on October 8: “It is a fine statement and, as you already know, I am in complete agreement.” “Memorandum to the panel,” n.d., folder 15, carton 29, EOL; Bernstein (1990), 1396. The author thanks Barton Bernstein for a copy of Lawrence’s letter to Compton.

  98. In a footnote, Compton indicated that the paragraph containing the panel’s emphatic recommendation against the Super was particularly sensitive.

  99. Wallace had irritated Acheson at the meeting by telling, at length, a story about his visit years earlier to a Mongolian animal disease laboratory. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (Norton, 1969), 124–25.

  100. “Plea to Give Soviet Atom Secret Stirs Debate in Cabinet; Wallace Plan to Share Bomb Data as Peace Insurance,” New York Times, Sept. 22, 1945; Herken (1980), 31–32.

  101. A month later, Wallace would launch his own ill-fated secret diplomatic initiative on the bomb—one that resembled Stimson’s plan—in a meeting with the new NKVD rezident in Washington, Anatoly Gorski. Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 284.

  102. Wallace letter: Wallace to Truman, Sept. 24, 1945, Henry Wallace papers, University of Iowa, Iowa City; John Morton Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace (Little, Brown, 1973), 485.

  103. Patterson to Bush, Nov. 12, 1945, and Patterson to Oppenheimer, Dec. 4, 1945, no. 69, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA. Compton’s letter would later figure into the AEC’s investigation of Oppenheimer. ITMOJRO, 70.

  104. Hawkins (1983), 305; Blumberg and Owens (1976), 185; Bethe interview (1988).

  105. Badash et al. (1985), 162; Bradbury to Stewart, Nov. 14, 1945, Underhill papers, LANL.

  106. J. A. Derry to Groves, Dec. 14, 1945, series 5, file 600.12, MED/NARA.

  107. Teller to Mulliken, Sept. 22, 1945, Teller file, LANL.

  108. “Catalogue of Los Alamos University Courses and Student Enrollment,” Sept. 17, 1945, reprinted in Edith Truslow and Ralph Carlisle Smith, Project Y: The Los Alamos Story, vol. 2, Beyond Trinity (Tomash, 1983), 377.

  109. Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 215–16.

  110. Smith (1971), 115.

  111. Ibid., 288; Teller to Mayer, n.d. (fall 1945), box 3, Mayer papers.

  112. “I neither can nor will do so” was Oppenheimer’s response, according to Teller. Teller and Brown (1962), 23.

  113. Smith and Weiner (1980), 320; “A Speech Given by J. R. Oppenheimer at a Meeting of the Association of Los Alamos Scientists,” Nov. 2, 1945, no. 125509, CIC/DOE.

  114. “Notes on Talk Given by Comdr. N. E. Bradbury at Coordinating Council,” Oct. 1, 1945, CIC/DOE.

  115. Teller and Brown (1962), 22.

  116. Bradbury to Division and Group Leaders, Nov. 14, 1945, no. 120953, CIC/DOE; Hawkins (1983), 307; Teller and Brown (1962), 22–23. “I was very much tempted to take [Bethe’s job]. At last it would have meant some activity.” Teller to Mayer, n.d. (Aug.–Sept. 1945), box 3, Mayer papers.

  117. Bradbury to Groves, Oct. 30, 1945, series 5, file 400.112, MED/NARA.

  118. “Partly it is just sad to see the place disintegrating and partly I am sorry for all the things I could have done and did not do.” Teller to Mayer, n.d. (late 1945), box 3, Mayer papers.

  119. Los Alamos reports and patent: “Poli
cy and Progress in the H-bomb Program” (H-bomb Chronology), Jan. 1, 1953, no. DLXXXIV, 11, JCAE.

  120. Teller to Ball, Dec. 29, 1945, and Teller to McMahon, Jan. 28, 1946, Teller file, LANL.

  121. Fermi to Patterson, Nov. 3, 1945, no. 76, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.

  122. Teller to Fermi, Oct. 31, 1945, no. 76, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA. Oppenheimer later testified that Bethe and Teller had boasted to him in fall 1943, regarding the Super: “If we had the material now, we could have a bomb in 3 weeks.” ITMOJRO, 84.

  123. “By now even [Oppenheimer] is pessimistic about the political situation,” Teller wrote. Teller to Mayer, n.d. (late 1945), box 3, Mayer papers.

  124. Having gone to the first postwar meeting of foreign ministers in London that fall with “the bomb in his pocket,” Byrnes returned convinced that the atomic monopoly had been more a liability than an asset to American diplomacy there. Herken (1980), 43–91.

  125. The outcry began anew six weeks later, when army occupation troops in Japan, following an order attributed to Groves, destroyed five cyclotrons at research institutes in Toyko, Osaka, and Kyoto. Groves (1962), 367–72.

  126. Telegram, Groves to Bradbury, Sept. 27, 1945, Bradbury folder, JRO. The text of Groves’s speech is in the New York Times, Sept. 22, 1945.

  127. Manley to Groves, Sept. 26, 1945, Groves folder, box 36, JRO.

  128. Groves wrote Bradbury. Groves to Bradbury, Sept. 28, 1945, Groves folder, JRO.

  129. May-Johnson bill: Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 431–48; Smith (1971), 128–73; Herken (1980), 116–25.

  130. Groves to Patterson; Patterson to Byrnes, Nov. 23, 1945, series 1, pt. 1, file 13, MED/NARA.

  131. Smith (1971), 150–59.

  132. Frank Oppenheimer to Editor, New York Review of Books, Jan. 28, 1969, unmarked folder, box 1, Frank Oppenheimer papers. As a result of Frank’s refusal to publicly criticize the May-Johnson bill, the Communist Party rescinded an invitation to lecture on nuclear policy.

  133. Harrison to file, Oct. 17, 1945, no. 98, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA; Smith (1971), 142–48.

  134. Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 432. The following day, Lawrence telegraphed Patterson, notifying him: “I do not favor certain provisions relating to control and security.” Lawrence to Patterson, Oct. 12, 1945, folder 31, carton 30, EOL.

  135. Lawrence sent Neylan copies of all three bills then before Congress with the request: “I would be very grateful if you would have a look at them and give me the benefit of your thoughts.” Lawrence to Neylan, Feb. 5, 1946, folder 1, box 171, Neylan papers.

  136. Serber interview (1992); Smith (1971), 311. Lawrence also politely declined a personal appeal from the sponsor of a rival bill, Senator Brien McMahon, that he testify before Congress. Lawrence to Neylan, Feb. 5, 1946, and Lawrence to McMahon, Feb. 13, 1946, folder 1, box 171, Neylan papers.

  9: A World in Which War Will Not Occur

  1. “Biography,” n.d., Brien McMahon papers, Special Collections, Georgetown University Library, Washington, D.C.

  2. McMahon bill: Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 454–55.

  3. Weinstein and Vassiliev (1999), 104–5. Groves may have been the source of the leak to a Washington columnist, who reported that the Russians were after atomic secrets. Herken (1980), 130–33.

  4. Higinbotham interview (1993); Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 485; Strickland (1968), 89.

  5. Bernstein (1990), 1397; summary report, Apr. 16, 1954, JRO/FBI.

  6. An FBI informant was in the audience when Oppie admonished ALAS members not to become involved in politics.

  7. ITMOJRO, 10–11; summary report, Apr. 22, 1947, 136, COMRAP file, FBI.

  8. “I expressed my opinion that Chevalier will never be a great scholar, and it would be better if he went somewhere else,” Sproul wrote in his office diary. Chevalier’s novel, published in 1949, was panned by critics and made little money for the now-struggling writer. Oct. 1, 1945, memos, Sproul papers.

  9. “Re: Communist Infiltration of the Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California,” Mar. 5, 1946, CINRAD file, FBI.

  10. Ladd to Tamm, June 17, 1946, sec. 30, Eltenton file, FBI.

  11. Ladd noted that a “confidential informant”—almost certainly Lansdale—had already told the bureau about Groves’s December 1943 meeting with Oppenheimer. Ladd to Tamm, June 17, 1946; Ladd to Hoover, July 10, 1946; Hoover to Attorney General, July 19, 1946, sec. 3, Eltenton file, FBI.

  12. Hoover to Groves, June 13, 1946; Groves to Hoover, June 21, 1946, box 99, series 8, MED/NARA.

  13. Strickland to Ladd, Aug. 13, 1946, sec. 3, Eltenton file, FBI.

  14. San Francisco field report, Mar. 27, 1947, sec. 4, Chevalier file, and June 28, 1946, sec. 3, Eltenton file, FBI; Chevalier (1965), 61–68.

  15. San Francisco field report, July 3, 1946, sec. 3, Eltenton file, FBI.

  16. Chevalier (1965), 69–70.

  17. As Whitson pointed out, “Chevalier has been in contact with Oppenheimer since immediately after Chevalier interview.” Strickland to Ladd, Aug. 13, 1946, and San Francisco field report, Sept. 18, 1946, sec. 3, Eltenton file, FBI.

  18. Like Chevalier and Eltenton, Oppenheimer and Weinberg were interviewed separately but on the same day. San Francisco field report, Sept. 18, 1946, box 1, JRO/AEC.

  19. Summary report, Apr. 18, 1952, JRO/FBI; Rhodes (1995), 309.

  20. San Francisco field report, Aug. 19, 1949, Weinberg file, FBI.

  21. The bureau was informed of the Justice Department’s decision on November 19, 1946. San Francisco field report, Mar. 27, 1947, sec. 4, Chevalier file, FBI; Bernstein (1990), 1397.

  22. Hoover to Lilienthal, Mar. 8, 1947, 11, JRO/FBI. Tamm reminded Hoover that the evidence on the Chevalier incident was “presented to the [Justice] Department and prosecution was declined.” Hoover evidently wrote to Clark again about the case shortly thereafter. Schrecker (1998), 235.

  23. Secretary of State’s Committee: Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 531–32; Herken (1980), 97–98.

  24. Herken (1980), 35–39.

  25. Lilienthal (1964), 13.

  26. Ibid., 17.

  27. Board of Consultants: Daniel Lang, “Seven Men on a Problem,” New Yorker, Aug. 17, 1946, 49–60.

  28. ITMOJRO, 37–38.

  29. Rabi interview (1982).

  30. Baffled by Oppenheimer’s explanation of denaturing at a Joint Committee briefing, the congressmen expressed regret that there was not a simpler way to safeguard the peace.

  31. Rabi interview (1982).

  32. Oppenheimer to Freeman Dyson, Oct. 9, 1960, Fermi folder, box 31, JRO.

  33. Rabi interview (1982). Denaturing was perhaps the weakest element of the plan—as Oppie himself would later acknowledge. Oppenheimer et al., “Notes on Denaturing,” n.d., file 319.1, series 5, MED/NARA.

  34. Lilienthal (1964), 29.

  35. Groves (1962), 411.

  36. Lilienthal (1964), 27; Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 540–51.

  37. Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 549–51.

  38. Ibid., 551–54; Lilienthal (1964), 29–30.

  39. Transcript of interview for “The Day after Trinity,” box 3, Frank Oppenheimer papers.

  40. Teller (2001), 234; “HB” to Borden, Apr. 29, 1950, no. 1497, JCAE.

  41. Smith (1971), 335.

  42. James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (Simon and Schuster, 1998), 125.

  43. Lilienthal (1964), 30.

  44. Higinbotham interview (1993).

  45. Groves (1962), 412; Acheson (1969), 154.

  46. Lilienthal (1964), 43.

  47. Baruch plan: Herken (1980), 158–65.

  48. Herken (1980), 166.

  49. Groves to Secretary of War, Mar. 27, 1946, file 10, series 1, pt. 1, MED/NARA.

  50. Baruch told Bush why he had decided to drop the scientists: “because as I told them, I knew all I wanted to know. It went boom and it killed millions of people.” Herken (1980), 161, 168.

&
nbsp; 51. ITMOJRO, 40; Acheson (1969), 155.

  52. Herken (1980), 162.

  53. Truman and Byrnes yielded when Baruch threatened to quit unless his revisions of the Acheson-Lilienthal report were approved.

  54. Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 576–77.

  55. Oppenheimer’s prediction of what would happen if the UN negotiations failed would later seem prophetic, but Lilienthal attributed his friend’s pessimism to “nerves.” Lilienthal (1964), 70.

  56. Alfred Loomis reinforced Neylan’s message. Childs (1968), 379.

  57. Ibid., 378.

  58. Ibid., 374. “He says that these will mean considerable income to him, and that, moreover, he is practically being ordered by his present federal superiors to accept,” Sproul wrote in his office diary. Oct. 1, 1945, memos, Sproul papers.

  59. York (1987), 37.

  60. Lawrence to Neylan, Aug. 13, 1946, folder 85, box 155, Neylan papers.

  61. Childs (1968), 379.

  62. “Program for the Radiation Laboratory,” Apr. 1, 1946, administrative files, box 1, LBL; Lawrence to Groves, Feb. 15, 1946, file 600.12, series 5, MED/NARA.

  63. Nichols to Groves, Jan. 22, 1946, file 334, series 5, MED/NARA.

  64. “Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Research and Development,” Mar. 8–9, 1946, file 334, series 5, MED/NARA.

  65. Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 633–35.

  66. Cooksey to Loomis, Apr. 23, 1946, folder 8, carton 46, EOL.

  67. Nichols to Groves, Mar. 14, 1946, file 600.12, series 5, MED/NARA.

  68. Teletype, Bradbury to Douglas, Jan. 11, 1946, and Nichols to Regents, Jan. 14, 1946, Underhill papers, LANL.

  69. Mar. 12, 1946, memos, Sproul papers.

  70. Nichols to Underhill, Apr. 3, 1946, and Underhill to Regents, “Re: New Mexico Project,” Sept. 18, 1946, Underhill papers, LANL.

  71. “I want to keep Lawrence as close to atomic energy as I can,” Sproul told the regents. Minutes of the Finance Committee, Sept. 27, 1946, Underhill papers, LANL.

  72. Military Liaison Committee and Joint Committee: Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 434–35, 504–13.

  73. Ironically, McMahon was no longer the committee’s leader. Iowa senator Bourke Hickenlooper became chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy when the Republicans captured control of Congress in the 1946 election.