Brotherhood of the Bomb

by Gregg Herken

  66. Hershberg, 356.

  67. Entries for Sept. 8–10, 1947, Lawrence day books, carton 11, EOL.

  68. “Meeting Notes on Radiological Warfare Conferences,” June 26, 1948, no. 70749, CIC/DOE.

  69. ITMOJRO, 805.

  70. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [fall 1946], folder 5, box 3, Mayer papers.

  71. LA-643: H-bomb Chronology, Jan. 1, 1953, no. DLXXXIV, 15–16, JCAE; Rhodes (1995), 305–7; Mark (1974), 8–9.

  72. Fitzpatrick (1998), 128.

  73. The only encouraging sign on the horizon was the possibility that a solid compound—lithium deuteride—might substitute for the cryogenically cooled liquid deuterium, which seemed impractical for use in a weapon.

  74. Minutes, Oct. 10, 1947, GAC no. 6, CIC/DOE.

  75. Oppenheimer to Lilienthal, June 6, 1948, GAC no. 10, CIC/DOE. Booster: Minutes, July 28–29, 1947, GAC no. 5, no. 30337, CIC/DOE.

  76. Webster to AEC, Dec. 2, 1948, no. 71763, CIC/DOE.

  77. Long-range objectives panel: Oppenheimer to Parsons, June 18, 1948, and Carpenter to Greenewalt, June 9, 1948, file 184, RG 330, records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/NARA), National Archives; Nichols (1987), 264.

  78. Oppenheimer sent the report to Nichols that Aug. H-bomb Chronology, no. DLXXXIV, 16–17, JCAE.

  79. Bradbury to McCormack, Sept. 7, 1948, and Teller to Bradbury, “The Russian Atomic Plan,” Sept. 3, 1948, no. 125268, CIC/DOE.

  80. Fuchs’s new Soviet control officer, Alexander Feklisov, would confirm in his memoirs that Fuchs at these meetings gave him some ninety secret documents—including “the diagram of the principle behind the hydrogen bomb.” Alexander Feklisov, The Man Behind the Rosenbergs (Enigma Books, 2001), 219. The bomb that Fuchs outlined was considerably more sophisticated than the device based on Fermi’s lectures that the spy had given Harry Gold a year and a half earlier. While the new design still employed a gun-type primary, three different stages of thermonuclear burning—involving sequentially increasing amounts of tritium and deuterium—were represented in the drawing. The effect of compression in increasing the efficiency of the thermonuclear reaction was also noted for the first time in the documents that Fuchs gave the Russians. Soviet Super: Albright and Kunstel (1997), 346 fn.; “Construction of the DTB,” June [?] 1948, in possession of the author. The author would like to thank Joe Albright and Marcia Kunstel for a copy of the Fuchs-Feklisov document, Herb York for comments on its significance, and Cole Goldberg for a translation of the document. Soviet H-bomb: German Goncharov, “Thermonuclear Milestones: Beginnings of the Soviet H-Bomb Program,” Physics Today 49, no. 11 (1996), 50–54; Albright and Kunstel (1997), 187–88; Holloway (1994), 294–319.

  81. Estimates of Soviet atomic bomb: Borden to Walker, May 20, 1952, no. 2814, JCAE; Herken (1980), 112; Charles Ziegler, “Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Atomic Capability, 1945–1949: Myths, Monopolies, and Maskirovka,” Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4, (1997), 1–24.

  82. Cabell to Chief of Staff, Dec. 12, 1947, box 4, series 337, Headquarters records, U.S. Air Force, R.G. 341, National Archives (USAF/NARA).

  83. Strauss (1962), 201–2; Strauss to Secretary of Defense, Mar. 17, 1948, no. 69943, CIC/DOE.

  84. Long-range detection: Charles Ziegler and David Jacobson, Spying Without Spies: Origins of America’s Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (Praeger, 1995), 63–70.

  85. ITMOJRO, 47.

  86. Minutes, AEC-MLC meeting, Jan. 7, 1948, “Agendas and Minutes” folder, series 1, AEC/NARA.

  87. The AEC later obligated the amount. Strauss (1962), 204.

  88. The GAC “heartily concurred” with the prewar policy, urging that it be further liberalized. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 81; Stern (1969), 115.

  89. “I don’t think, actually, [Strauss] sensed at all that this was no way to treat his brother Commissioners.” Lilienthal (1964), 234.

  90. Ibid., 240.

  91. Hoover to Tolson, Tamm, et al., Oct. 30, 1947, sec. 2, Frank Oppenheimer file, FBI; “Ex-FBI Man Testifies Russ Tried to Get Atom Data from Oppenheimer in 1942,” San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 31, 1945; U.S. Congress, HUAC, Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry (1947 HUAC hearings), 80th Congress, 1st sess., Oct. 1947, 514–22.

  92. HUAC’s efforts to expose a Soviet spy ring in the film industry had been “a complete flop,” Hoover advised Clark. Hoover to Tolson, Tamm, et al., Oct. 30, 1947, Frank Oppenheimer file, FBI. Hoover’s memo also coyly put pressure once again on Clark to hand down indictments in the CINRAD investigation.

  93. A HUAC staffer told the Associated Press that the bureau had approved release of Russell’s story about the Chevalier incident “ahead of time.” San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 31, 1947.

  94. In a letter to Consodine, Groves thought “Oppie’s remarks regarding the treasonable acts was especially interesting. I would appreciate hearing from you as to your reaction and recollections if any on the whole affair.” Groves to Consodine, Nov. 5, 1947, series 5, MED/NARA.

  95. “Oakland Inquiry into Communism Opens Monday,” San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 1, 1947.

  96. Schwartz (1998), 410.

  97. Stern (1969), 111.

  98. Kimball to Hoover, Oct. 30, 1947, sec. 4, Chevalier file, FBI.

  99. Barrett (1951), 31; Scobie (1970), 201.

  100. So secretive a figure was Combs that journalists routinely misspelled his name. However, it was Combs who organized the Tenney Committee hearings, wrote the questions asked of witnesses, drafted the final reports, and even served subpoenas. “Tenney Hearing: Subpoena Servers Arrive—Witness Sought Hurt in Fall,” San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 2, 1947.

  101. Like HUAC’s Thomas, Tenney relied heavily on information contained in FBI files, including the wartime records of army counterintelligence. California Legislature, Third Report: Un-American Activities in California, 1947 (Sacramento, Calif., 1947), 201–19.

  102. “Investigator Reports on Atomic Laboratory,” San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 7, 1947.

  103. “Ex-U.C. Professor Isn’t Asked Details of FBI Man’s Story,” San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 7, 1947.

  104. Stern (1969), 112.

  105. Lilienthal (1964), 377–78.

  106. Everson to Kelly, Jan. 8, 1947, folder 16, carton 16, EOL.

  107. Lilienthal (1964), 361–62; “Survey of Berkeley Area,” Aug. 15, 1947, no. 380.01, Central Correspondence series, AEC/NARA.

  108. “Interim Procedure,” Apr. 15, 1948, folder 9, box 175, Neylan papers.

  109. Wilson to J. Stewart, June 19, 1948, folder 9, box 175, Neylan papers.

  110. In a letter to the AEC, Neylan defended Berkeley’s PSB. Neylan to Flaherty, Aug. 28, 1948, folder 2, box 171, Neylan papers.

  111. Minutes, Aug. 25, 1949, no. 1203, JCAE.

  112. Berkeley PSB: folder 9, box 175, Neylan papers.

  113. Mrs. Hurley also came under suspicion for buying “folk song albums” at a Washington, D.C., book store reportedly owned by Communists. Pollman to Hurley, June 24, 1948, folder 9, box 175, Neylan papers.

  114. Following the Hurley hearing, Latimer himself became a target of suspicion, in a letter by Neylan to the AEC. Latimer to Lilienthal, Aug. 10, 1948, and Neylan to Lilienthal, Aug. 12, 1948, folder 9, box 175, Neylan papers.

  115. Neylan, “Findings in the Matter of Carl Robert Hurley,” n.d., folder 9, box 175. Ironically, the AEC wrote back to Neylan, asking for more details on why Berkeley’s PSB was denying Hurley a clearance—since the transcript of the hearing “tends to build up the employee’s case.” Tammaro to Neylan, Aug. 30, 1948, folder 9, box 175, Neylan papers.

  116. Childs (1968), 406.

  117. “Proceedings Before the Personnel Security Board of the Atomic Energy Commission, United States of America, in the Matter of Robert Serber,” n.d. The author thanks Robert Serber for a copy of the transcript of his PSB hearing.

  118. “Findings in the Matter of Robert Serber,” n.d., folder 9, box 175, Neylan papers.

&n
bsp; 119. F. Oppenheimer to Lawrence, Oct. 25, 1948, carton 1, Frank Oppenheimer papers.

  120. Elsie McMillan interview (1992).

  121. “I don’t think Ernest minded that, but, as often the case, my wife said something sharper, and I think maybe he minded that.” Interview with Robert Oppenheimer, n.d., box 2, Childs papers.

  122. Nuell Pharr Davis speculated that Lawrence learned the truth about Frank’s party membership from Hoover. Davis (1993), 275. But Ernest may also have had Fisk look into the matter. Fisk to Lawrence Aug. 18, 1948, folder 25, carton 32, EOL; Fisk to Oppenheimer, July 28, 1948, box 33, RO.

  123. Ibid.

  124. Ibid. Velde: Walter Goodman The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968), 279–81. Although Truman issued a “freeze order,” forbidding members of the executive branch and the military from cooperating with the House committee, the order actually had little effect upon HUAC, which was seemingly already in possession of a comprehensive set of MED and FBI espionage files.

  125. Stripling described HUAC’s strategy in a Sept. 7, 1948, telephone call to Hoover aide Louis Nichols. H. B. Fletcher to Ladd, Aug. 19, 1948, HUAC file, FBI.

  126. “Martin D. Kamen Fired from Army Project at California U. After Talking to Reds,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 2, 1948; Kamen to Oppenheimer, Jan. 26, 1949, box 43, JRO; Kamen, 222.

  127. Nelson et al. (1969), 291–95; Goodman (1968), 241.

  128. U.S. Congress, HUAC, Report on Soviet Espionage Activities in Connection with the Atom Bomb, 80th Congress, 2nd sess., Sept. 28, 1948.

  129. HUAC’s report left some doubt as to whether the committee’s real target was Soviet spies or the Truman administration, and specifically, Tom Clark. L. Day to Slavin, Sept. 23, 1948, HUAC file, FBI.

  11: A Rather Puzzled Horror

  1. Borden: Allardice to Westinghouse Security, July 3, 1953, and undated memo, Borden folder, box 105, JCAE; Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (Knopf, 1985), 10–14; author interview with William Borden, Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1981.

  2. Stockpile: Hewlett and Anderson (1990), 450–51; Rosenberg (1982), 26; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 178–79; Rhodes (1995), 361.

  3. H-bomb Chronology, 23, JCAE.

  4. Lilienthal to Clark, Sept. 28, 1948, Justice Department file, series 11, AEC/NARA.

  5. Transcript of John Manley interview, box 1, Robert Oppenheimer Oral History Collection, MIT.

  6. Minutes, Apr. 6, 1949, no. 1059, JCAE.

  7. Borden interview (1981); Borden to Oppenheimer, Apr. 11, 1949, box 22, JRO.

  8. Letters, folder 10, carton 6, EOL.

  9. U.S. Congress, HUAC, Hearings Regarding Communist Infiltration of Radiation Laboratory and Atomic Bomb Project at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif. (1949 Rad Lab hearings), 81st Congress, 2nd sess., April–June 1949, vol. 1, 282.

  10. U.S. Congress, HUAC, Hearings Regarding Steve Nelson, June 8, 1949, 128–53, and U.S. Congress, HUAC, Report on Atomic Espionage (Nelson-Weinberg and Hiskey-Adams Cases), 7; Nelson et al. (1969), 295.

  11. Lomanitz interview (1996); Stern (1969), 120–24.

  12. Wood’s deference may have had its roots in an earlier deal between HUAC and the Joint Committee. Author interview with Fred “Dusty” Rhodes, Washington, D.C., Nov. 2, 1998.

  13. R. Oppenheimer to F. Oppenheimer, Sept. 18, 1948, unmarked folder, box 1, Frank Oppenheimer papers.

  14. HUAC, 1949 Rad Lab hearings, vol. 1, 362.

  15. Ibid., 373.

  16. Bohm and Lomanitz: Peat (1997), 90–103.

  17. Stern (1969), 124–29.

  18. Ibid., 126.

  19. Author interview with Judith Oppenheimer, San Jose, Calif., Apr. 30, 2001.

  20. Lilienthal (1964), 488, 528. By summer 1947, there were no fewer than six bills before Congress to return control of atomic energy to the army. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 91.

  21. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, “Investigation into the U.S. Atomic Energy Project,” pt. 5, June 8, 1949, 224–27; AEC press release, June 13, 1949, no. 140804, CIC/DOE.

  22. Volpe had earlier experienced Strauss’s vindictiveness. Volpe interview (1996).

  23. Ibid.

  24. Teller (2001), 259. “I keep wishing for someone to whom I could talk about physics, about politics or about any other subject,” Teller complained to Mayer that fall. Teller to Mayer, n.d. (late Oct. 1948), box 3, Mayer papers.

  25. Teller to Mayer, n.d. (Aug. 1948), box 3, Mayer papers.

  26. Bradbury to Sproul, July 29, 1948, Underhill papers, LANL. “It is clear that I must not mix in politics again—wherever I am—not, for some time to come,” Teller vowed upon his return to the lab. Teller to Mayer, n.d. (Dec. 1948–Jan. 1949), box 3, Mayer papers.

  27. Fitzpatrick (1998), 140.

  28. However, Teller’s return to Los Alamos signaled no change in his point of view, as indicated by a letter to Mayer: “It is very dangerous not to believe in anything. It is very dangerous not to be clear about one’s beliefs. It is very dangerous to believe in anything half-heartedly, to try to believe in something that one knows (in some other way) not to be quite true.”

  29. “Even my lethargy is counted here as praiseworthy industry.” Teller to Mayer, Jan. 20, 1949, box 3, Mayer papers.

  30. In a 1974 interview for an authorized biography, Teller claimed that he “had no intention of working on the super” when he returned to Los Alamos in 1948. But Teller’s efforts at the lab indicate otherwise. Blumberg and Owens (1976), 201.

  31. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [Jan. 1949], box 3, Mayer papers.

  32. Bacher to commissioners, May 26, 1947, series 17, AEC/NARA.

  33. The CIA predicted that the maximum number of weapons in the Soviet’s nuclear stockpile by 1955 would be twenty to fifty. Hillenkoetter to Hickenlooper, July 1, 1948, file CD11–1–2, series 199, OSD/NARA. In Jan. 1949, the agency raised this figure. Hillenkoetter to Hickenlooper, Dec. 18, 1948, no. CXXIX, JCAE.

  34. Rhodes (1995), 363.

  35. Strauss showed a personal interest in the long-range detection program. Minutes, AEC-MLC meeting, Nov. 24, 1948, no. 71764, CIC/DOE; Strauss, 200–207; Pfau (1984), 95–97; Ziegler and Jacobson (1995), 176–78.

  36. Oppenheimer and the committee believed that the Russians might evade detection of their first bomb by testing it underground. Zielger and Jacobson (1995), 135.

  37. Finney to McCormack, Aug. 2, 1949, no. 28483, CIC/DOE.

  38. McMahon to Secretary of Defense, Aug. 9, 1949, no. XLVII, JCAE.

  39. Pike to McMahon, Aug. 31, 1949, no. 1196, JCAE.

  40. More than three weeks after the Russians’ first nuclear test, a CIA estimate pegged mid-1950 as “the earliest possible date” for a Soviet bomb. Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 319–20; Doyle Northrup and Donald Rock, “The Detection of Joe 1,” Studies in Intelligence 10 (fall 1966), 23–33, box 14, CIA/NARA; Ziegler and Jacobson (1995), 199–224.

  41. The Soviets exploded their bomb on Aug. 29, 1949, over the steppes of Kazakhstan, in a test code-named First Lightning. Joe-1 was a virtual copy of the Fat Man device, based upon blueprints stolen by Russian spies. Holloway (1994), 213–19.

  42. Ziegler and Jacobson (1995), 208; Gordon Arneson, “The H-bomb Decision,” Foreign Service Journal, May 1969, 28. As late as 1953, Truman questioned whether the Russians had actually exploded an atomic bomb in 1949. Robert Oppenheimer, The Open Mind (Simon and Schuster, 1955), 70.

  43. ITMOJRO, 910; Zachary (1997), 349.

  44. Truman decided to wait another four days to make the news of Joe-1 public, and then pointedly announced only that there had been “an atomic explosion” in Russia, refusing to concede that it was, in fact, a bomb.

  45. ITMOJRO, 75.

  46. Childs (1968), 413; Teller and Brown (1962), 33.

  47. Lilienthal (1964), 570.

  48. Lilienthal to Oppenheimer, Sept. 23, 1949, box 46, JRO.

&
nbsp; 49. “[Teller] said that these talks would be just a courtesy inasmuch as he has made up his mind to leave Chicago and come to us.” May 25, 1949, memos, Sproul papers.

  50. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In any light: Scientists and the decision to build the Superbomb, 1942–1954,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 19, no. 2 (1989), 283; Teller to von Neumann, Aug. 23, 1949, AEC/NARA.

  51. Teller to Mayer, n.d., box 3, Mayer papers.

  52. Childs (1968), 405.

  53. Teller (2001), 282.

  54. Oct. 7, 1949, diary, box 3, Alvarez papers, SBFRC.

  55. Minutes, Sept. 23, 1949, no. CXXIII, and “Reaction to Russian Atomic Development,” Sept. 28, 1949, no. LXXXVI, and “Questions for Meeting,” Sept. 23, 1949, no. LIII, JCAE.

  56. Nichols, 272–73; Donnelly to Schlatter and Kennedy, Oct. 3, 1949, file 471.6, entry 197, USAF/NARA.

  57. Bergman to Borden, Oct. 19, 1949, no. LXVIII, JCAE.

  58. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 373; Pfau (1984), 113.

  59. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 374; Strauss (1962), 217.

  60. While Alvarez remained pessimistic about the future of radiological warfare—“Program approved but probably nothing will happen”—he was cheered that the RW panel’s recommendation for expanded neutron production “tie[d] in well with our program.”

  61. Borden to files, Oct. 10, 1949, no. LXVI, JCAE; Oct. 10, 1949, diary, box 3, Alvarez papers.

  62. In his diary, Alvarez described Lilienthal’s response as “lukewarm.” Borden to files, July 5, 1951, no. 2365, JCAE.

  63. Alvarez (1987), 171.

  64. Nichols (1987), 273–74; ITMOJRO, 682.

  65. Minutes, Oct. 14, 1949, no. LXIV, JCAE.

  66. Strauss to Lilienthal, Oct. 17, 1949, no. LXIII, JCAE.

  67. Oppenheimer to Conant, Oct. 21, 1949, Oppenheimer file, entry 60, box 11, AEC/NARA.

  68. Lilienthal (1964), 577, 582.

  69. Lilienthal to Oppenheimer, Oct. 11, 1949, box 46, JRO.

  70. A Joint Committee staffer warned Borden of the “peculiar situation” at the Rad Lab—namely, Lawrence’s propensity for empire building. Borden to files, Oct. 20, 1949, no. LXVII, and Brobeck to Borden, Oct. 20, 1949, no. 1266, JCAE.