by Gregg Herken
71. Teller believed that Bethe had agreed to go to Los Alamos. “The Development of Atomic Weapons,” Jan. 30, 1950, no. 1447, JCAE; ITMOJRO, 715.
72. Blumberg and Owens (1976), 210.
73. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 380.
74. Oct. 24, 1949, diary, Alvarez papers; H-bomb Chronology, 29–30, JCAE.
75. “I would have to hear some good arguments before I could take on sufficient courage to recommend not going toward such a program,” Seaborg wrote. Seaborg to Oppenheimer, Oct. 14, 1949, AEC/NARA.
76. Another visitor was Oppie’s former Berkeley colleague, Kenneth Pitzer. Pitzer was surprised to learn of Conant’s opposition and disturbed that Oppenheimer seemed to share Conant’s view. Pitzer interview (1997).
77. LeBaron: “Robert LeBaron—Man of Many Talents,” n.d., folder 4, box 1, Robert LeBaron papers, Hoover Institution Library, Stanford University; author interview with Gerard Smith, Ratcliffe Manor, Md., Sept. 15, 1992.
78. Oppenheimer was gradually severing his ties with Berkeley. In early Nov., he informed Birge that, for the first time since the war, he would not be back on campus in the summer to teach Physics 221A. Interview with Robert Oppenheimer, n.d., box 2, Childs papers.
79. Oppenheimer to Birge, Nov. 9, 1949, box 20, JRO.
80. Serber interview (1992).
81. “I had no idea that people like Conant and Oppenheimer would harbor such ideas. At Berkeley they would have been unthinkable.” Serber (1998), 169.
82. Hamilton to files, Nov. 8, 1949, no. LXXVI, JCAE.
83. Oct. 18, 1949, diary, box 3, Alvarez papers.
84. Tomei to Conant, Oct. 18, 1949, box 27, JRO.
85. Kennan report: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: (FRUS), 1950 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), vol. 1, 22 fn. Kennan later wrote a draft press statement for Truman to announce that he had decided against proceeding with the Super as “not in the national interest.” Untitled draft, Nov. 18, 1949, box 43, JRO.
86. Although Oppenheimer was later unable to remember whether he acquainted the committee with Seaborg’s waffling letter—a point that would assume some importance in his 1954 security hearing—Smyth recalled following the text over the chairman’s shoulder while Oppie read aloud.
87. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 379–81.
88. The previous spring, Conant had threatened to quit the committee. Conant to Oppenheimer, Mar. 7, 1949, box 27, JRO.
89. JRO to DuBridge, Oct. 8, 1949, box 33, JRO.
90. Lilienthal (1964), 581.
91. John Manley, “A Fateful Decision,” unpublished manuscript, Manley papers, LANL.
92. ITMOJRO, 395.
93. Lilienthal (1964), 582.
94. Roger Anders, ed., Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean (University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 59.
95. Davis (1968), 314.
96. Rabi agreed that what he and Fermi proposed—in effect, a verifiable thermonuclear test ban—should have been more clearly spelled out. “It should have been many pages.” Rabi interview (1984).
97. Stern (1969), 145–46.
98. Rabi interview (1984). Oppenheimer decided to sign the majority report because he thought that the letter by Rabi and Fermi, in proposing a diplomatic initiative to Russia, presumed too much upon the State Department’s prerogatives. “Development of Atomic Super Weapons,” Jan. 30, 1950, no. 1447, JCAE.
99. Manley diary, Oct. 31, 1949, Manley papers, LANL.
100. Oppenheimer to Bohr, Nov. 2, 1949, box 21, JRO.
101. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 385–86; Michelmore (1969), 173.
12: A Desperate Urgency Here
1. Manley diary, Manley papers, LANL; Lilienthal (1964), 584–85.
2. McMahon to Truman, Nov. 1, 1949, no. LXXII, JCAE.
3. Lilienthal (1964), 584.
4. Manley diary, Manley papers, LANL.
5. Arneson (1969), 29; Acheson (1969), 346.
6. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [Nov. 1949], box 3, Mayer papers.
7. ITMOJRO, 91.
8. Manley, “Recollections and Memories,” 5; Manley diary, 13–14; and “A Fateful Decision,” 5, Manley papers, LANL. Los Alamos colleague Stanislaw Ulam bet that Teller would not be quiet for long. Ulam to von Neumann, Nov. 15, 1949, box 2229, von Neumann collection, AEC/NARA.
9. Pfau (1984), 116.
10. Serber interview (1992).
11. Alvarez to Teller, Nov. 10, 1949, Teller folder, box 3, Alvarez papers, SBFRC.
12. Lilienthal (1964), 591.
13. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 386–87.
14. Manley diary, 13, Manley papers, LANL.
15. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 391.
16. Bradbury to Oppenheimer, Oct. 27, 1949, and Oct. 31, 1949, Bradbury folder, box 22, JRO. Teller to Alvarez, Teller folder, box 3, Alvarez papers. Teller accused Manley of trying to prevent him from meeting with McMahon. “Recollections and Memories,” and Manley diary, 6–8, Manley papers, LANL archives; Teller and Brown (1962), 44.
17. Although Bethe explained that he had changed his mind after talking with two physicist friends—Victor Weisskopf and George Placzek—Teller blamed Oppenheimer. Rhodes (1995), 393; Bethe interview (1996).
18. “November was as early as I heard a name mentioned, and then only informally and under seal,” Strauss later told the Joint Committee. But other evidence suggests that Strauss learned about Fuchs earlier. Minutes, Mar. 10, 1950, no. CXXXVIII, JCAE. Strauss knowledge of spying: Pfau (1984), 114–15; Williams (1987), 115–16.
19. The bureau became suspicious of Fuchs in Aug. 1949, when it learned that the Soviets were in possession of a top-secret Manhattan Project document on gaseous diffusion, written by Fuchs. On Oct. 21, 1949, Hoover formally informed the AEC that Fuchs was the subject of its investigation. Dean had been advised in Sept. that the German-born physicist was a suspect. Minutes, Mar. 10, 1950, no. CXXXVIII, and Hoover to McMahon, Apr. 21, 1950, no. CXL, JCAE.
20. “Bureau Source 5” was probably the Venona decrypts. See chap. 5. Robert Lamphere, Oct. 22, 1997, personal communication.
21. Robert Bacher recalled that before he went to England in Sept., AEC security officials instructed him to ask John Cockcroft whether the British had any reservations about Klaus Fuchs. Transcript of Bacher interview, Caltech archives.
22. Groves to Strauss, Nov. 4, 1949, Strauss folder, Groves/NARA.
23. Strauss to Nichols, Dec. 3, 1949, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
24. The committee’s first meeting dissolved almost immediately into rancor when Johnson brusquely declared that the military services were unanimous on proceeding with the Super as the “minimum” next step. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 398–99, 643 fn; Acheson (1969), 348.
25. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [Dec. 1949–Jan. 1950], box 3, Mayer papers.
26. Los Alamos briefings: Hamilton to files, Nov. 8, 1949, no. LXXVI, and Hamilton to files, Nov. 10, 1949, box 6; and minutes, Jan. 9, 1950, no. CXXV, JCAE.
27. Minutes, Jan. 9, 1950, no. CXIII, JCAE.
28. McMahon to Truman, Nov. 21, 1949, in “Thermonuclear Weapons Program Chronology” (TWPC), n.d., 53–59, AEC/NARA.
29. Strauss (1962), 220; Borden to file, Nov. 28, 1949, no. LXXXI, JCAE.
30. Bradley to Truman, Jan. 13, 1950, 78–86, TWPC, AEC/NARA; Borden, “Questions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Jan. 10, 1950, no. CVIII, JCAE.
31. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 394.
32. Minutes, Jan. 9, 1950, no. CXXV, JCAE.
33. Pfau (1984), 121.
34. “You can’t expect morals from immoral people?” ventured Texas Congressman Paul Kilday. “This is the point, sir!” responded Strauss. Minutes, Jan. 27, 1950, no. CXVIII, JCAE.
35. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 405.
36. Oppenheimer defended the GAC report: “We thought the beginning of wisdom was to stop, look and listen about weapons of mass destruction, and this was the place to do it.” Minutes, Jan. 30, 1950, no. 1447, JCAE.
&n
bsp; 37. Teller and Brown (1962), 46.
38. Acheson (1969), 347; Rhodes (1995), 405.
39. U.S. Department of State, FRUS: 1949 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), vol. 1, 573–76; transcript of Warner Schilling interview, box 65, JRO.
40. Lilienthal (1964), 582; Arneson (1969), 25.
41. Jan. 31 meeting: Acheson (1969), 348–49; Lilienthal (1964), 623–32.
42. Lilienthal (1964), 632. Earlier, on Jan. 19, Souers had told Acheson that Truman thought the joint chiefs’ memo “made a lot of sense and he was inclined to think that was what we should do.” H-bomb decision: FRUS: 1950, vol. 1, 511; Herken (1980), 319–21.
43. Lilienthal (1964), 633.
44. Minutes, Jan. 31, 1950, no. CXXVI.
45. Davis, 316.
46. Author interview with Gordon Arneson, Washington, D.C., Oct. 19, 1979.
47. Pfau (1984), 123.
48. Minutes, Mar. 10, 1950, no. CXXXVIII, JCAE.
49. Pfau (1984), 124. Wilson had agreed to allow British members of the Anglo-American Combined Development Trust to have an office in AEC headquarters, where they could roam unescorted. One—Donald Maclean—was later found to have been passing secrets to the Soviets.
50. Cited in Galison and Bernstein, p. 311; “Hydrogen Bomb Secret Feared Given Russians,” Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1950.
51. Lilienthal (1964), 635.
52. Minutes, Feb. 4, 1950, no. 1371, and minutes, Feb. 6, 1950, no. 1376, JCAE. Hoover later passed MI-5’s interview with Fuchs along to the Joint Committee to prove his point. Minutes, Mar. 10, 1950, no. CXXXVIII, JCAE.
53. Wilson to McMahon, Mar. 14, 1950, series 10, AEC/NARA.
54. Lilienthal to McMahon, Feb. 7, 1950, series 10, AEC/NARA.
55. The damage report was not completed until late Apr. 1950. Boyer to Borden, Oct. 3, 1951, no. 2390, JCAE.
56. Minutes, Feb. 3, 1950, no. CXXXI, and Lilienthal to McMahon, Feb. 7, 1950, no. CXXII, JCAE.
57. Minutes, Feb. 27, 1950, FRUS: 1950, vol. 1, 173. In response to a Joint Committee inquiry as to when he thought the Russians might have an H-bomb, Oppenheimer wrote that it was his “conviction that what Fuchs may have told the Russians about thermonuclear weapons would prove substantially misleading.” Oppenheimer to Borden, December 1, 1952, no. 7807, JCAE.
58. Cited in Bernstein (1990), 1408.
59. Borden to Chairman, Nov. 3, 1952, no. DCXXXV, JCAE.
60. “I mean, it was pretty laconic,” Bradbury conceded of Carson Mark’s presentation. “Carson didn’t put himself out in the best Air Force briefer style.” Transcript of Bradbury interview, Bancroft Library.
61. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 411–12.
62. Minutes, Nov. 8, 1949, no. LXXVI, JCAE.
63. Pike to LeBaron, Mar. 2, 1950, series 1, MLC folder, and Pike to McMahon, Mar. 2, 1950, series 4, “Classified Reading” file, AEC/NARA. MTA: Heilbron et al. (1981), 64–65; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 425; Pitzer to Tammaro, Feb. 10, 1950, LBL.
64. Entries of Jan. 20, May 12, and Sept. 12, 1950, memos, Sproul papers; Sproul to Bradbury, May 2, 1950, Contract 48 file, LBL.
65. Ironically, all thirteen of the bills that Tenney proposed to the California legislature, requiring the oath, died in committee.
66. Oath controversy: George Stewart, The Year of the Oath: The Fight for Academic Freedom at the University of California (Da Capo, 1971); Sproul to Cooksey, Aug. 18, 1949, folder 14, carton 33, EOL. Neylan regularly received reports of closed meetings of the Academic Senate from the Rad Lab’s assistant personnel director. Documents in black binders, boxes 187–88, Neylan papers.
67. Fox decided to admit his Communist past after talking with Sproul, who reportedly assured him “that everything would be all right if he just told the truth.” David Fox, June 11, 1998, personal communication. Fox controversy: Stewart (1971), 42–46; Birge, vol. 5, XIX, 20–21, 44–45.
68. “[Birge] tells me that the physics department is sharply divided between two factions, one of which is led by the Rad. group (Alvarez, Lawrence, et al.), and the other by the more academic physicists (Segrè, Brode, et al.).” Jan. 2, 1950, memos, Sproul papers.
69. In Sept. 1950, Oppenheimer signed a statement condemning the regents’ stand on the oath. Oppenheimer et al., “UC-Group for Academic Freedom” folder, box 25, JRO.
70. Wick firing: Segrè (1993), 235; Reynolds to Everson, Sept. 28, 1950, “Loyalty Oath” file, box 7, LBL.
71. Birge, vol. 5, XIX, 53; Reynolds to file, Aug. 1, 1950, “Loyalty Oath” file, box 7, LBL. Observed Segrè of the oath’s effect upon Berkeley’s physics department: “For theory, it was a body blow; for experiment, something a bit less.” Segrè (1993), 235.
72. Teller’s letters to Mayer showed a range of conflicting feelings about whether to stay at Los Alamos, return to Chicago, or go to UCLA. Teller to Mayer, various letters, n.d. [Jan.–Oct. 1950], box 3, Mayer papers.
73. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [late Nov. 1950], box 3, Mayer papers.
74. Lawrence to Teller, Dec. 1, 1950; Teller to Lawrence, Dec. 5, 1950, folder 9, carton 17, EOL.
75. “You know that I did not mind signing the Oath—by now I have signed it four different times.” Teller to McMillan, Nov. 16, 1950, Teller file, series 4, McMillan papers, SBFRC.
76. Dec. 29, 1952, memos, Sproul papers.
77. Strauss had recently shown Defense Secretary Johnson four top-secret documents from the commission’s vault. All pertained to the hydrogen bomb and had been compromised by Fuchs, Strauss claimed. Ironically, one was apparently the 1946 Fuchs–von Neumann patent. Strauss refused to show the documents to his fellow commissioners.
78. “Basis for Estimating Maximum Soviet Capabilities for Atomic Warfare,” Feb. 16, 1950, “NSC Atomic Energy—Russia folder,” box 201, president’s secretary’s files, Harry Truman papers, Truman Library.
79. Rhodes (1995), 420–21.
80. Teller and de Hoffmann to Bradbury, Dec. 5, 1949, AEC/NARA. Wrote Teller to Bradbury in Dec. 1949: “It must be kept in mind that it is by no means certain that a super can be made at all.” Cited in Fitzpatrick (1998), 261.
81. The bomb was plainly too big and heavy to be carried by existing bombers. Lee Bowen, U.S. Air Force Historical Division, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943–1953 (USAF history)(U.S. Air Force History office, n.d.), vol. 4, 188; Rhodes (1995), 379.
82. Wilson to Schlatter, Oct. 20, 1949, entry 197, and Feb. 3, 1950, series 26, USAF/NARA; USAF history, vol. 4, 187, 206.
83. Smyth to McMahon, Jan. 25, 1950, no. CXIV, JCAE; Fitzpatrick (1998), 122. LeBaron admitted to Johnson that it was “becoming clearer that the program will cost us a sizeable number of fission atomic weapons.” LeBaron to Johnson, Mar. 1, 1950, series 184, OSD/NARA. In May 1950, Bethe testified before the Joint Committee that the neutrons necessary to make 1 gram of tritium could make 100 grams of plutonium. Minutes, May 3, 1950, no. CXLIV, JCAE.
84. “Daddy Pocketbook”: Appendix E, Sept. 12, 1952, no. DLXIII, JCAE; Fitzpatrick (1998), 261–62; Rhodes (1995), 414, 424.
85. Norman Macrae, John von Neumann: The Scientific Genius Who Pioneered the Modern Computer, Game Theory, Nuclear Deterrence, and Much More (Pantheon, 1992), 312–14; Wheeler, (1998), 221–22.
86. “The expense of such a large amount of tritium would make the design wholly impractical,” Teller admitted. Teller (2001), 302–3; appendix E, Sept. 12, 1952, no. DLXIII, JCAE.
87. Oppenheimer to Dean, no. 104150, CIC/DOE; Rhodes (1995), 424.
88. Von Neumann to Teller, May 18, 1950, LANL; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 439–40; Rhodes (1995), 423–24; S. M. Ulam, Adventures of a Mathematician (University of California Press, 1991), 212–16; Ulam to Manley, Aug. 10, 1988, Manley papers, LANL. “Together, the two pieces of work appeared to sound the death knell for the super: it would neither light nor burn.” Peter Galison, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (University of Chicago Press, 1997), 723.
89. Ulam (1991), 217.
90. H-bomb Chronolo
gy, 54; Wheeler (1998), 200; Ulam (1991), 217.
91. Family Committee: Fitzpatrick (1998), 222; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 536; Bradbury to Teller, Mar. 3, 1950, no. 125511, CIC/DOE.
92. Rhodes (1995), 419.
93. George test: Fitzpatrick (1998), 141–42; Rhodes (1995), 456–57.
94. Teller to Bradbury, July 28, 1950, no. 1452, CIC/DOE; Wheeler (1998), 206–7.
95. De Hoffmann: Ulam (1991), 211; Wheeler (1998), 191; Fitzpatrick (1998), 148–49.
96. Borden to file, Mar. 2, 1950; Teller to Borden, Mar. 8, 1950; Teller to Borden, Mar. 15, 1950, series 2, Oppenheimer file, JCAE.
97. Edward Teller, “Back to the Laboratories,” Scientific American, Mar. 1950. Teller told Borden he was “shocked at the icyness [sic]” with which young physicists rejected his appeal. Fitzpatrick (1998), 273.
98. “I can not in good conscience work on this weapon,” Bethe informed Bradbury. However, Bethe changed his mind following the Communist invasion of South Korea that June; like Fermi, he would spend summers at the lab. Bethe to Bradbury, Feb. 14, 1950, no. 125241, CIC/DOE.
99. Telegram, Teller to JRO, Feb. 17, 1950, box 71, JRO.
100. Blumberg and Owens (1976), 239. Teller reportedly rejected suggestions coming from scientists at the lab whom he considered pro-Oppenheimer, fearing sabotage. Borden to files, Feb. 9, 1951, no. CCLXXXIII, JCAE; Blumberg and Owens (1976), 257.
101. Teller to Borden, Apr. 13, 1950, no. 7201, JCAE.
102. Bergman to Borden, May 7, 1950, no. 1531, JCAE.
13: Nuclear Plenty
1. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 443.
2. Manleys to Oppenheimer, box 50; and Conant to Oppenheimer, July 25, 1950, box 27, and Wilson to Oppenheimer, box 77, JRO; Anders (1987), 75–76. Isidor Rabi suspected that Conant’s absences at the GAC were not all on account of illness: “He saw which side was stronger.” Rabi interview (1984).
3. Oppenheimer was not the only one eager to cover up his past. “Before the State Department…,” n.d., Chevalier papers.
4. “I still had my theory about him that I had conceived several years before, and this fiction that he was putting forward was presumably necessary for his protection in the carrying out of an ideal purpose which I had no doubt he was pursuing.” Chevalier (1965), 84.
