by Gregg Herken
5. Ibid. The FBI continued to track Chevalier’s movements in Paris, evidently through his calls to Barbara at Stinson Beach. San Francisco field report, Oct. 5, 1953, Chevalier FBI file, box 1, JRO/AEC.
6. Crouch had testified before HUAC about the alleged meeting the previous year but did not mention Oppenheimer on that occasion. U.S. Congress, HUAC, Hearings Regarding Clarence Hiskey Including Testimony of Paul Crouch, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., May 24, 1949, 399–408.
7. The purpose of the alleged meeting was to brief professional section members on the change in the party line since the German invasion.
8. Combs’s search was not random; he took Crouch to homes whose owners had subscribed to the Daily Worker during the 1940s. San Francisco field report, Nov. 18, 1952, sec. 14, JRO/FBI; Paul Crouch, “Broken Chains,” chap. 20, unpublished memoir, box 17, Paul Crouch papers, Hoover Institution Library, Stanford, Calif.
9. “Woman Witness Says She Saw Nuclear Expert at Session,” Oakland Tribune, May 9, 1950.
10. Newark field report, May 5, 1950, sec. 8, JRO/FBI; “Statement by J. Robert Oppenheimer,” May 9, 1950, “Weinberg Perjury Trial, 1953” folder, box 237, JRO; Bernstein (1990), 1411–13.
11. Groves to Oppenheimer, May 18, 1950, box 36, JRO. Groves was evidently unaware of the role that Oppenheimer had played in ousting him from his posts on the Air Force Special Weapons Project and the Military Liaison Committee, leading to his retirement from the army. Hershberg (1993), 357.
12. Crouch had spent two years in Alcatraz in the mid-1920s for trying to recruit party members while in the army. Crouch, “Broken Chains,” chap. 27, Crouch papers.
13. Kenilworth Court incident: Letter and telegrams, “Financial: Real Estate” folder, box 232, JRO; Albuquerque field report, July 10, 1952, sec. 13; and San Francisco field report, Nov. 18, 1952, JRO/FBI.
14. Bacher to Oppenheimer, May 25, 1950, and Oppenheimer to Bacher, May 23, 1950, box 18, and Groves to Oppenheimer, May 18, 1950, box 36, and Conant to Oppenheimer, May 15, 1950, box 27, JRO.
15. Oppenheimer’s candidates for replacements on the GAC included von Neumann, Bethe, and Bacher. Borden to McMahon, May 11, 1950, no. 1516, JCAE; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 486.
16. ITMOJRO, 83. FBI director Hoover had reportedly been assured by the White House in July that Oppie would not be reappointed GAC chairman. Bernstein (1990), 1421.
17. S. Allison to Oppenheimer, various letters, box 15, and Wilson to Oppenheimer, n.d., box 77, JRO.
18. Waters to Strauss, May 12, 1954, miscellaneous correspondence, 1953–54, AEC/NARA.
19. Acheson had summoned Lawrence, among others, to advise on the review of U.S. nuclear policy occasioned by the H-bomb decision. FRUS: 1950, vol. 1, 200–201.
20. Minutes, GAC no. 20, Apr. 1, 1950, no. 30335, CIC/DOE.
21. Oppenheimer to Dean, May 11, 1951, no. 2098, JCAE.
22. Minutes, AEC meeting no. 471, Sept. 20, 1950, AEC/NARA.
23. Oppenheimer to Dean, Sept. 13, 1950, AEC/NARA; Oppenheimer to Dean, Nov. 1, 1950, no. 1757, JCAE; Bradbury to Tyler, Nov. 17, 1950, no. 71710, CIC/DOE.
24. “Military Objectives in the Use of Atomic Energy,” Dec. 29, 1950, attached to Lovett to McMahon, June 28, 1951, no. CCCLV, JCAE.
25. Ibid.
26. Ivan Getting, All in a Lifetime: Science in the Defense of Democracy (Vantage Press, 1989), 238–39; ITMOJRO, 57–8, 684; Ridenour to Saville, Mar. 6, 1951, no. 360.8, series 10, USAF/NARA.
27. MTA and Livermore: Pike to F. Matthews, Mar. 14, 1950, series 11, AEC/NARA; transcript of Larry Crooks interview, LLNL; “Site Selection Report MTA Project,” Mar. 15, 1950, Box 48–1, Contract 48 records, SBFRC.
28. Mansfield to files, June 15, 1951, no. 2141, JCAE.
29. Lawrence’s choice prompted Panofsky to write a poem about Livermore, inspired by Poe’s “The Raven.” Wolfgang Panofsky, Aug. 3, 1993, personal communication.
30. Choice of Livermore: Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (Freeman, 1976), 121–26; Childs (1968), 418.
31. Minutes, June 3, 1950, GAC no. 21, AEC/NARA.
32. MTA: Heilbron, Seidel, and Wheaton (1981), 64–69.
33. Two-thirds of the MTA’s annual operating budget of $14 million would go to pay for electricity. Lawrence to Pitzer, Aug. 24, 1950, and “Reports—MTA Mark III,” box 12, LBL.
34. In executive session, Ernest told the Joint Committee that the MTA could be used to produce radiological agents in the event of a wartime emergency. “Production Particle Accelerators,” Apr. 11, 1950, no. 2041, JCAE.
35. John Derry, Mar. 15, 1999, personal communication; Cook to Derry, May 1, 1951, AEC general correspondence, 1951 folder, general administrative files, LBL.
36. Mark I: Various documents, folder 11, carton 33, EOL; Hamilton and Mansfield to Borden, July 26, 1950, no. CLXXXXI, JCAE.
37. Author interview with Hugh Bradner, La Jolla, Calif., Aug. 10, 1992; Alvarez (1987), 173–75.
38. Undeterred, Ernest had already proposed a Mark III to the commission. Lawrence to Pitzer, Nov. 20, 1950; Reynolds to Pitzer, Nov. 22, 1950, “Proposal for MTA Mark III” folder, box 8, LBL.
39. Panofsky: Nov. 2, 1950, memos, Sproul papers; Panofsky interview (1993).
40. Serber to Oppenheimer, Feb. 21, 1950, box 66, JRO.
41. Dec. 22, 1950, memos, Sproul papers.
42. Segrè, (1993), 237.
43. “Case History of a Failure: What the Loyalty Oath Did to the University of California,” Look, Jan. 29, 1952; “Loyalty Oaths and Academic Freedom: Address of John Francis Neylan before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco,” Nov. 23, 1951, folder 44a, carton 13, EOL.
44. Bradner interview (1992).
45. Ulam later explained his idea in a Mar. 16, 1962, letter to Seaborg, which is attached to Bradbury to Anderson, Mar. 22, 1962, no. 125261, CIC/DOE.
46. Wheeler (1998), 211; author interview with Carson Mark, Los Alamos, N. Mex., May 30, 1991.
47. F. Ulam to Manley, Aug. 10, 1988, folder 6, box 15, Manley papers, LANL.
48. Rhodes (1995), 462–67.
49. Teller-Ulam idea: According to Fitzpatrick, the term radiation implosion was first used by Teller in Family Committee meetings on the design of George. Fitzpatrick (1998), 161–62. Teller confirmed in a 1993 interview that he discouraged talk of compression until Ulam’s invention, not believing the compression obtained by mechanical shock alone would be enough to make a difference. Teller interview (1993).
50. Oppenheimer to Conant, June 8, 1951, box 27, JRO.
51. H-bomb Chronology, 62, JCAE.
52. Galison (1997), 726.
53. Teller suggested a further improvement in the H-bomb—a fission “sparkplug” inside the thermonuclear fuel—a few weeks later. Rhodes (1995), 472–73. Comparing the relative contributions of Teller and Ulam, Bethe thought Teller deserved “90 percent” of the credit for invention of the superbomb. Bethe interview (1988). As recently as 2001, Teller disputed the importance of Ulam’s contribution. “Who Built the H-Bomb?: Debate Revives,” New York Times, Apr. 24, 2001; Teller (2001), 316.
54. George test: U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, “Operation Greenhouse, 1951” (U.S. Government Printing office, 1983); Hansen (1988), 46–54; Teller and Brown (1962), 49–52; personal communications: Edward Teller, Feb. 26, 1999, and Louis Rosen, Mar. 3, 1999.
55. Louis Rosen, Mar. 3, 1999, personal communication. My thanks to Professor Rosen for a copy of his personal account of George.
56. Teller’s memory is that Lawrence was in the jeep; Rosen believes the rendezvous was at the airstrip. Teller (2001), 323–24.
14: A Bad Business Now Threatening
1. Minutes, May 10, 1951, GAC no. 26, no. 79443, CIC/DOE.
2. Princeton meeting: Anders (1987), 143–44; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 542; ITMOJRO, 84; H-bomb Chronology, 65, JCAE; Teller (2001), 325–26.
3. May 31, 1951, Dean diary, Gordon Dean papers, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
4. Mike was meant
to be a proof-of-principle test of radiation implosion and not a deliverable bomb. Housed in a six-story building, it weighed more than 80 tons. Mike: Hansen (1988), 54–55; Rhodes (1995), 490–96.
5. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 542; ITMOJRO, 305; Rhodes (1995), 477.
6. DeHoffmann called back a few days later to say that Teller was rethinking his decision. Anders (1987), 161.
7. Mansfield to file, “Los Alamos Opinions of Dr. Edward Teller,” Aug. 29, 1951, no. 2330, JCAE.
8. Theoretical Megaton Group: Fitzpatrick (1998), 313; Rhodes (1995), 482–87.
9. “H-bomb Status Report,” Sept. 28, 1951, no. CDXVIII, and Walker to file, Nov. 13, 1951, no. CDXXXI, JCAE; “Who Built the H-Bomb? Debate Revives,” New York Times, Apr. 24, 2001.
10. Teller (2001), 327; Bradbury to McCormack, Mar. 31, 1951, no. 71793, CIC/DOE.
11. “It was a painful decision for me to leave Los Alamos,” Teller later wrote Strauss. “One of the most powerful reasons why I did so was the conviction that I could not decently argue for a second laboratory while staying at Los Alamos.” Teller to Strauss, Mar. 5, 1956, Teller folder, LLS/HHPL.
12. Walker to file, Oct. 3, 1951, no. 2398, JCAE; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 556; Mansfield to file, Oct. 2, 1951, no. 2389, JCAE.
13. “Hal” to “Bill,” May 9, 1950, no. 1532, JCAE.
14. Hamilton to files, June 29, 1950, no. 1572, JCAE.
15. Borden to file, Mar. 10, 1950, no. 1429, and Hamilton to file, June 29, 1950, no. 1572, and Borden to file, Nov. 28, 1950, no. CCXLI, JCAE.
16. Pfau (1984), 129.
17. Entry, Aug. 6, 1950, Glennan diary, Keith Glennan papers, AEC/NARA.
18. Bernstein (1990), 1414 fn; Anders (1987), 117–18.
19. Oppenheimer to Dean, Oct. 13, 1951, no. 74703; minutes, GAC no. 27, Oct. 13, 1951, no. 74703, CIC/DOE.
20. Thomas Murray: Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 466; Thomas E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace (World Publishing, 1960), 15–17, and The Predicament of Our Age: The Impact of the Atom on the Relationship Between Man and the World in which He Lives (n.p., 1955). The author thanks Bradley Murray for a copy of his father’s privately published book of speeches, and Jack Crawford for access to Thomas Murray’s personal papers.
21. Teller and Brown (1962), 53.
22. “From the looks of the faces around me, one would think I had exploded such a device in the conference room,” Murray wrote in his diary. Diary of Thomas E. Murray (TEM diary), vol. 2, pt. 1, 4, Thomas Murray papers, Rockville, Md. (private collection).
23. Ibid., vol. 2, pt. 2, 7–8.
24. Murray to Dean, June 21, 1951, AEC/NARA; TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 12.
25. Smyth et al. to Dean, Aug. 15, 1951, no. 74410, and Dean to Snapp, Aug. 28, 1951, no. 74407, and “Status Report,” n.d., no. 74402, CIC/DOE; TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 23–24.
26. That fall, McMahon shepherded through the Senate a nonbinding resolution to “go all-out in atomic development and production.” “Biography,” McMahon papers; Dean to Lawrence, Sept. 19, 1951, folder 32, carton 30, EOL.
27. “The Deterrent Value of Atoms,” May 20, 1952, no. 2812, JCAE.
28. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 1, 8.
29. Joe-2 was the first indigenous Soviet design and was similar to the Mark IV implosion bomb exploded by the United States in the 1948 Sandstone tests. Joe-3 was the Russians’ first composite core—utilizing enriched uranium and plutonium—and had twice the yield of the Nagasaki bomb. “H-bomb Status Report,” Sept. 28, 1951, no. CDXVIII, JCAE. Joe-2 and Joe-3: Rhodes (1995), 482 fn.; Holloway (1994), 219; “Preliminary Analysis…,” Nov. 27, 1951, series 26, USAF/NARA.
30. McMahon to Dean, Oct. 5, 1951, no. 2392, JCAE; TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 27; “Meeting with the President,” Oct. 5, 1951, Murray papers.
31. Anders (1987), 176.
32. Minutes, Dec. 14, 1951, GAC no. 28, no. 73278, CIC/DOE; Teller and Brown (1962), 59.
33. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 41–43. Oppenheimer’s summary of the meeting neglected even to mention the second lab discussion. Oppenheimer to Dean, Dec. 14, 1952, no. 74702, CIC/DOE.
34. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 43–44.
35. Minutes of meeting, June 30, 1951, folder 15, carton 33, EOL; transcript of interview with Cliff Bacigalupi, LLNL.
36. Walker to files, Nov. 19, 1951, no. 2472, JCAE.
37. Mansfield to files, June 15, 1951, no. 2141, JCAE.
38. Asked if he would be willing to personally lead the effort for six months to a year, Lawrence “offered no strenuous objection.” TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 45.
39. Minutes, Dec. 14, 1951, folder 3, box 171, Neylan papers.
40. Neylan interview, May 6, 1960, box 2, Childs papers.
41. Oppenheimer once compared the university’s administering of a weapons laboratory to the monastic orders that made a profit from the manufacture of liqueurs. Daniel Kevles, “Cold War and Hot Physics: Science, Security, and the American State, 1945–56,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 20, no. 2 (1990), 243.
42. Herbert York, “The Origins of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory,” 17, May 1975, unpublished manuscript, Herbert York papers, Special Collections, University of California, San Diego (La Jolla), Calif.; York (1987), 62–64.
43. York added research on fusion as a source of energy—an area which many physicists, including Teller, regarded as promising—to his list as a recruiting tactic. Untitled document, n.d., “Herb York: Personnel Notes on Establishing LLNL” folder, box 184, LLNL; Childs (1968), 443.
44. Teller (2001), 337. Lawrence told Duane Sewell that the laboratory he envisioned would not be building bombs. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 582; interviews: Fidler (1992), Sewell (1993), and Teller (July 30, 1993).
45. Teller to Lawrence, Feb. 7, 1952, folder 9, carton 17, EOL; Teller to Murray, Feb. 7, 1952, Murray papers.
46. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 52.
47. Minutes, AEC no. 639, Dec. 19, 1951, AEC/NARA.
48. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 47–53; H-bomb Chronology, 74, and “Status of Hydrogen Project,” Feb. 21, 1952, no. CDLXIX, with attachments, JCAE.
49. H-bomb Chronology, 71–72, JCAE.
50. Walker to Borden, Feb. 21, 1952, no. 2665, JCAE.
51. Griggs: Ivan Getting and John Christie, “David Tressel Griggs, 1911–1974” (National Academy Press, 1994); author interview with Ivan Getting, La Jolla, Calif., Mar. 13, 1997.
52. Polonium airplane: Walker to file, May 28, 1952, no. DXIII, and June 19, 1952, no. 2890, JCAE.
53. “Mr. X loses his job if the fact of the interview … becomes known,” Borden cautioned McMahon. Walker and Borden to McMahon, Apr. 4, 1952, no. CDXCIX, JCAE.
54. Griggs notes, n.d., file 360.11, series 10, USAF/NARA.
55. Teller (2001), 336–37; Teller and Brown (1962), 59; Walkowicz to Assistant Chief of Staff, Aug. 3, 1951, file 334.5, series 10, USAF/NARA.
56. Lovett to McMahon, Mar. 9, 1952, no. CDLXII, JCAE.
57. Teller briefing: Mansfield to file, Feb. 12, 1953, no. DXCIII, JCAE; Griggs notes, n.d., file 360.11, series 10, USAF/NARA; RAND R-237, “Implications of Large-Yield Nuclear Weapons,” July 10, 1952, 1952 file, box 3, Fred Kaplan donation, National Security Archives, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
58. RAND R-237, Kaplan donation, National Security Archives; Teller and Brown (1962), 60–61.
59. “Memorandum for the Record,” Mar. 11, 1952, folder 3, series 18; and Griggs’s notes, n.d., file 360.11, series 10, USAF/NARA.
60. Lovett’s memo was drafted by Griggs. Alexander et al. to Lovett, Mar. 27, 1952; and Foster to Acheson, Mar. 28, 1952, Thermonuclear Weapons Program file, series 184, OSD/NARA.
61. Dean wrote in his diary: “Teller has end-runned it again. He is taking the occasion to go off on the second lab question again. These poor guys topside … don’t know what it is all about. I live with it every day and I think I do know.” Anders (1987), 204.
62. Ibid., 204.
63. Ibid., 206�
�9.
64. Author interview with Ernie Plesset, Woodside, Calif., May 14, 1988; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 582.
65. Anders (1987), 210.
66. Griggs to Finletter, n.d. [Mar., 1952], file 360.11, series 10, USAF/NARA.
67. It was also unclear whether the air force had the legal authority to establish a nuclear weapons lab. Griggs asked Pentagon lawyers to look into the matter. T. R. Hogness to Griggs, Mar. 26, 1952, and “Summary,” n.d., file 360.11, series 10, USAF/NARA.
68. Griggs’s notes, Mar. 20, 1952, file 360.11, series 10, USAF/NARA; Borden to Sheehy, Feb. 9, 1952, no. 2622, JCAE.
69. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 55–56; “Meeting with Dr. E. O. Lawrence,” Mar. 4, 1952, TEM papers.
70. The proposed extension had been for four years; Lawrence, however, urged that it be for five. Minutes of meeting, Jan. 24, 1952, folder 6, box 172, Neylan papers.
71. Libby had recently informed Ernest that the commission wished to wait another six months before making a decision on whether to fund the Mark II.
72. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 62.
73. Ibid., 64–65; Walker to file, Apr. 17, 1952, no. 2753, JCAE.
74. Teller was “somewhat discouraged,” the staffer wrote, “because he stressed that he had been trying to keep out of people’s way, and that he was following the course of merely obeying orders and not taking the initiative in anything.” Walker to Borden, Apr. 3, 1952, no. 2739, JCAE.
75. Walker and Borden to McMahon, Apr. 4, 1952, no. CDXCIX, JCAE.
76. Hayward interview (1996).
77. Minutes, GAC no. 30, Apr. 30, 1952, no. 74700, CIC/DOE; TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 69.
78. Murray’s battle with Dean had become increasingly personal. Borden to files, Mar. 12, 1952, no. 2688, JCAE; TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 57.
79. ITMOJRO, 755.
80. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 2, 72.
81. “The hint was pointedly dropped that Admiral Strauss would be a most useful man in this struggle,” the staffer wrote. Walker to Borden, Apr. 7, 1952, no. 2738, JCAE.
82. Walker and Borden to McMahon, Apr. 4, 1952. no. CDXCIX, JCAE.
83. “Meeting with Dr. E. O. Lawrence,” Mar. 4, 1952, Murray papers.
