Brotherhood of the Bomb

by Gregg Herken

84. DuBridge to Pitzer, Mar. 18, 1952, box 168.3, DuBridge papers; Borden to file, Mar. 22, 1952, no. 2704, JCAE; San Francisco special agent-in-charge to Hoover. Apr. 5, 1952, JRO/FBI.

  85. Albuquerque special agent-in-charge to Hoover, May 27, 1952; and Branigan to Belmont, June 10, 1952, JRO/FBI.

  86. Walker to file, Oct. 3, 1952, no. 3049, JCAE.

  87. May 19, 1952, Dean diary, Dean papers.

  88. Hoover sent this latest file to Truman’s second attorney general, Howard McGrath, possibly in the hope that McGrath might do what Tom Clark would not: indict Oppenheimer for violation of the espionage laws. Hoover to Souers, May 19, 1952, JRO/FBI.

  89. McCabe to Hoover, June 12, 1952, JRO/FBI.

  90. Walker to file, May 28, 1952, no. DXIII, JCAE.

  91. McMahon asked Truman to burn the letter after reading it, since he had “to live with” the atomic scientists. McMahon to Truman, May 21, 1952, J. K. Mansfield papers, Washington, D.C. The author thanks Jane Mansfield for access to her late husband’s papers.

  92. McMahon was “fearful of the influence this might have on other scientists in the event there is an open rupture,” an aide informed Hoover. Nichols to Tolman, May 19, 1952, JRO/FBI.

  93. David Teeple, the former army CIC agent who worked for Hickenlooper, told the FBI early in 1952 that he feared Oppie might defect to Russia, taking atomic secrets with him. Bernstein (1990), 1417.

  94. Jeffery Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919–1945 (Naval Institute Press, 1983), 3–6. Because of Strauss’s experience with wiretaps and bugs, he and Borden routinely used code names in telephone conversations and correspondence. Borden’s code name for Strauss was Luigi. Borden to file, Aug. 13, 1951, no. 3464, JCAE; Ken Mansfield, Oct. 22, 1997, personal communication.

  95. Two years earlier, Conant had been a target of both Latimer and Pitzer, who helped block his nomination as president of the National Academy of Sciences. Hershberg (1993), 485–86.

  96. May 9, 1952, Conant diary, box 11, James Conant papers, Pusey Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

  97. Waters to Boyer, May 15, 1952, box 2, JRO/AEC; Bernstein (1990), 1425. “Oppenheimer is going to have to be a witness in this, and we may well turn out to be the defendant in the public eye,” Dean wrote in his diary that fall. Nov. 24, 1952, Dean diary, Dean papers.

  98. “Did Oppie answer the ‘64 dollar question’ as to whether he was ever a Commie?” Dean said he asked the AEC’s head of security. Marks to Oppenheimer, Dec. 2, 1952, “Weinberg Perjury Trial” folder, box 237, JRO; San Francisco FBI field report, Nov. 18, 1952, box 2, JRO/AEC.

  99. Nichols to Tolson, May 29, 1952, JRO/FBI.

  100. There is some suggestion of a tie-in between Oppenheimer’s leaving the GAC and the Weinberg indictment. Assistant Attorney General James McInerney—whom Dean had gotten to know during the Rosenberg trial—promised he would withhold a decision on whether to mention the Kenilworth Court incident until after he had talked to Brien McMahon and Paul Crouch. On May 29, 1952, McMahon told FBI agent Louis Nichols that he had “worked out a plan whereby Oppenheimer would take the initiative and decline to serve another term [on the GAC] by an exchange of letters and everybody will be happy.” June 13, 1952, Dean diary; and Dean to Oppenheimer, June 14, 1952, Dean papers. Murray, too, would later take credit for getting Oppenheimer off the GAC.

  101. June 14, 1952, Conant diary, box 11, Conant papers.

  102. R. Oppenheimer to F. Oppenheimer, July 12, 1952, “Weinberg Perjury Trial, 1953” folder, box 237, JRO.

  15: Descent into the Maelstrom

  1. June 27, 1952, Dean diary, Dean papers.

  2. The project was carried out at Pasadena’s Vista del Arroyo Hotel during the spring and summer of 1951; DuBridge was the group’s chairman. Project Vista: David Elliot, “Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” International Security, summer 1986, 163–83.

  3. G. Norton to Finletter, July 1, 1952, entry 63, box 4, AEC/NARA; G. Norton to Burden, Nov. 15, 1951, general (TS) file, entry 4, records of the secretary of the air force, RG 340, National Archives.

  4. Transmittal letter, “Project Vista: A Study of Ground and Air Tactical Warfare,” Feb. 4, 1952. The author thanks David Elliott for a copy of the Vista report.

  5. Oppenheimer and Vista: DuBridge to Eisenhower, Dec. 21, 1952, box 32, JRO; ITMOJRO, 757; “Notes of Conference,” Jan. 19, 1954, box 202, JRO. The author thanks Carrie Allen for a copy of the notes found in the Oppenheimer papers.

  6. By the time that DuBridge briefed the Pentagon on Vista, many of the report’s most controversial recommendations had been amended or deleted altogether. Walker to file, n.d. [Dec. 1952], no. DLXXXVII, JCAE.

  7. Walker to file, July 2, 1952, no. 2925; and Walker to file, n.d. [Dec. 1952], no. DLXXXVII, JCAE; Stern (1969), 190–91.

  8. Walker to file, May 28, 1952, no. DXIII, and Borden to McMahon, May 28, 1952, no. 3831, JCAE; Rabi to Lauritsen, n.d. [May–June 1951], folder 14, box 3, Charles Lauritsen papers, Caltech archives.

  9. Minutes, “Panel of Consultants on Arms and Policy,” May 16–18, 1952, “Disarmament Panel, Misc.” folder, box 191, JRO.

  10. Standstill: Minutes, “Disarmament Panel, Misc.” folder, box 191, JRO; Walker to file, n.d. [Dec. 1951], no. DLXXXVII, JCAE.

  11. FRUS: 1952–54, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1001; ITMOJRO, 248.

  12. Arneson to Acheson, Sept. 29, 1952, FRUS: 1952–54, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1017–25.

  13. FRUS: 1952–54, vol. 2, pt. 2, 994–1008; Barton Bernstein, “Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-bomb?” International Security, fall 1989, 143.

  14. “I did nothing whatever about it,” Oppenheimer would later testify. ITMOJRO, 247.

  15. GAC swan song: Anders (1987), 224; Walker and Hamilton to file, July 1, 1952, no. 2914, JCAE; Oppenheimer to Truman, June 14, 1952, no. 74674, CIC/DOE.

  16. Hershberg (1993), 603.

  17. LeBaron had heard that the panel would urge “that all U.S. thermonuclear efforts cease.” Walker to file, n.d. [Dec. 1952], no. DLXXXVII, JCAE.

  18. McMahon’s illness did not extinguish his hopes of becoming his party’s vice presidential nominee. He died on July 28, 1952.

  19. Cooksey to A. Loomis, May 6 and 10, 1952, folder 10, carton 46, EOL.

  20. The AEC approved “early participation of [the Rad Lab] in the diagnostic measurements field, and later along such additional lines as may be determined by the Commission.” Dean to Regents, June 9, 1952, AEC/NARA.

  21. Dean agreed to add a phrase to his letter to the regents: “the Commission hopes that the group at UCRL will eventually suggest broader programs of thermonuclear research.” But Murray complained that the AEC chairman’s letter made it “clear that at least in Dean’s mind this action with regard to Berkeley did not constitute the establishment of a second laboratory strictly speaking.” TEM diary, vol. 1., pt. 1, 18; Jacobvitz to Brinck, Apr. 29, 1954, no. 79166, CIC/DOE.

  22. York to Bradbury, June 3, 1952, no. 125187, and Bradbury, “Observations on the Livermore Laboratory Proposal,” May 21, 1952, no. 125188, CIC/DOE.

  23. Sybil Francis, Warhead Politics: Livermore and the Competitive System of Nuclear Weapon Design (University Microfilms, 1996), 58.

  24. York interview (1997).

  25. Walker to Borden, Apr. 7, 1952, no. 2738, JCAE.

  26. Hayward to “all concerned,” July 23, 1952, AEC/NARA.

  27. LeBaron had evidently tried to reconcile the two warring parties at breakfast that morning, without success: “Gradually, as time passed, Teller, as he had with Bradbury, began to usurp Lawrence’s role. No one had ever challenged his authority before. It was not an experience he enjoyed. In his own way, he let Teller feel his displeasure.” Transcript of interview by Lin Root, n.d., folder 4, box 1, LeBaron papers.

  28. Walker to file, Nov. 10, 1952, no. DCVII, JCAE. Dean to Lawrence, July 17, 1952, folder 18, carton 33, EOL. “Tell Teller he can blow up anything he wants,” Dean reportedly told Hayward. H
ayward interview (1996).

  29. Underhill to Dean, July 1, 1952, AEC no. 425/21, AEC/NARA.

  30. TEM diary, vol. 2, pt. 1, 19.

  31. Walker and Hamilton to file, July 1, 1952, no. 2914, JCAE.

  32. Teller’s confidant was journalist Stephen White. Rabi interview (1982). Although Teller subsequently denied making the comment to White, he wrote of his decision to go to Livermore: “I turned away from my original choice—to work on pure science—with my eyes open.” Teller (1987), 122.

  33. AEC no. 295/60, Oct. 10, 1952, AEC/NARA.

  34. Bevatron: Childs (1968), 446; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 500–501.

  35. Alvarez (1987), 176–77.

  36. Dean to Lay, Oct. 30, 1952, AEC/NARA. Had the bomb been tested earlier, as Teller had urged, the AEC concluded that a failure was likely. Rhodes (1995), 487.

  37. Bethe had written to Dean that fall, urging that the test be delayed until mid-November—“to give the smoke of battle time to dissipate.” Bethe to Dean, Sept. 9, 1952, no. 73974, CIC/DOE.

  38. Nov. 21, 1952, Dean diary, Dean papers.

  39. Anders (1987), 226–27.

  40. Dean to AEC directors, Oct. 30, 1952, no. 102137, CIC/DOE; Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 592.

  41. Mike test: Rhodes (1995), 509; Hansen (1988), 56–57.

  42. Murray (1960), 20–21.

  43. Teller (2001), 351; York interview (1997); transcript of Bradbury interview, Bancroft Library.

  44. The resignation letter, drafted by DuBridge, was never sent. SAC/ODM: Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI (Oxford University Press, 1992), 54–58; draft letter, “Nov. 1952,” folder 9, box 186, DuBridge papers.

  45. Princeton meeting: Various letters, box 189, JRO; Hershberg (1993), 569.

  46. Walker to file, July 2, 1952, no. 2925, JCAE.

  47. That fall, Borden sent the Joint Committee chairman a sixty-four page “working paper” that detailed the charges against Oppenheimer. Borden to Cole, Nov. 3, 1952, no. DCXXXV, JCAE.

  48. Walker: Author interview with J. K. Mansfield, Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 1993; transcript of John Walker interview by Jack Holl, June 18, 1976. The author thanks Ken Mansfield for a copy of the Walker interview. Cotter: Frank Cotter, Oct. 21, 1997, personal communication.

  49. “The Scale and Scope of Atomic Production: A Chronology of Leading Events” (A-bomb Chronology), Jan. 30, 1952, “Atomic Program Chronology” folder, series 2, JCAE.

  50. McMahon to Dean, May 7, 1952, no. DCCIX, JCAE.

  51. Anders (1987), 211.

  52. Walker to file, Oct. 3, 1952, no. 3049, JCAE; Bethe, “Memorandum on the History of the Thermonuclear Program,” May 28, 1952, box 4930, AEC/NARA; Walker to file, June 25, 1952, no. DXXXVI, JCAE.

  53. There “may yet be another Fuchs in the project,” the committee’s intelligence expert warned Borden. JCAE, Soviet Atomic Espionage, (U.S. Government Printing office, 1951); Sheehy to Borden, Mar. 20, 1951, no. 2036, JCAE.

  54. Mansfield to Borden, May 28, 1951, no. CCCXXXI, JCAE.

  55. Second Fuchs: Minutes, Apr. 14, 1953, no. DCLXII, JCAE; Walker to Borden, Apr. 3, 1952, no. 2742; Fields to Borden, May 5, 1952, no. 2773; and Mansfield to file, May 28, 1952, no. DLVI, JCAE.

  56. The president was told about the document by the Joint Committee’s acting chairman, Congressman Carl Durham, the day following the inauguration; Ike asked to see a copy a few days later. Eisenhower did not acknowledge receipt of the chronology until Feb. 14, 1953. Richard Hewlett and Jack Holl, Atoms for War and Peace, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (University of California Press, 1989), 34.

  57. Borden and Walker contemptuously dismissed Bethe’s counterchronology as a “whitewash”; the Cornell physicist had not even been at the 1946 conference, they pointed out. Walker to files, Oct. 3, 1952, no. 3049, JCAE.

  58. Walker to Borden, July 16, 1952, no. 3098, JCAE.

  59. Pike to McMahon, June 12, 1950, AEC/NARA; 1950 Fuchs interview: Robert Lamphere to Hoover, June 6, 1950, serial 1412, Klaus Fuchs file, no. 65–58805, FBI.

  60. “Committee Business,” Feb. 18, 1953, no. 3281, JCAE.

  61. Cotter to Borden, Jan. 27, 1953, no. 3217, and Dean to Cole, Apr. 9, 1953, no. DCXV, JCAE; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 38. A subsequent “damage assessment” done for the AEC by Bethe, Teller, and others—based on the documents that Walker sent Wheeler—concluded that it “clearly reveals the idea of the radiation implosion” as well as “construction elements” of Mike. In his memoirs, Wheeler misremembered what was in the lost document. Wheeler and Ford (1998), 285.

  62. Wheeler incident: “Committee Business,” Feb. 18, 1953, no. 3281, and Cotter to file, Mar. 25, 1953, no. 3389, JCAE.

  63. “Meeting with President Eisenhower and NSC,” Feb. 16, 1953, Mansfield papers. The unknown author writes of Ike’s reaction: “I never saw anyone more excited and concerned. I remember [Eisenhower] saying that if this had happened in the Army the man would have been shot.”

  64. Dean diary, Feb. 17, 1953, Dean papers.

  65. Borden interview (1981).

  66. Borden tried, unsuccessfully, to distract attention from the incident. Borden to Cole, Apr. 15, 1953, no. DCXVII, JCAE.

  67. Fidler interview (1998); Hayward interview (1996).

  68. Livermore origins: “Resumé of Meeting,” Aug. 19, 1952, LBL archives; Preparing for the 21st Century: 40 Years of Excellence, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL, 1998), 5–10; Phil Scheidermayer, “Recollections, Reminiscences, Reflections,” UCRL-AR-125101, July 1996, and various interviews, LLNL archives.

  69. Even at this late date, Lawrence “said it was not intended that Livermore should become the second major weapons laboratory.” Minutes, AEC no. 744, Sept. 8, 1952, AEC/NARA. Ramrod: Livermore interviews. As its name implied, Ramrod showed Teller’s belated appreciation of the importance of compression in igniting the Super.

  70. Project Whitney, named by York, was evidently inspired by Wheeler’s Project Matterhorn at Princeton. The AEC had originally hoped to keep the weapons work at Livermore a secret. AEC to Cooksey, Feb. 25, 1953, LBL.

  71. Responsibility for the new Alarm Clock was transferred from Los Alamos to Livermore that summer. AEC no. 425/24, Aug. 18, 1952, AEC/NARA.

  72. Francis (1996), 67.

  73. Daring and bold did not always mean practical. Transcript of Arthur Hudgins interview, LLNL archives.

  74. Hydride bomb: “Procurement of Deuterated Polyethylene,” Oct. 17 and 24, 1952, LBL; author interview with Wallace Decker, Livermore, Calif., June 11, 1997, and Street interview (1997).

  75. Chromatics: Various correspondence, folder 3, carton 4, EOL; Childs (1968), 420–26; transcript of interviews with Alvarez and Gaither, box 1, Childs papers; Crawford Cooley, May 29, 1997, personal communication.

  76. Neylan intervened with the regents to ensure that Lawrence retained sole patent rights on the tube.

  77. “If you guys are going to do this kind of business, you are going to have to learn to put out a better looking product,” a Los Alamos physicist scolded his Livermore counterpart. Ruth test: Hansen (1988), 39 fn.; transcript of Wallace Decker interview, LLNL archives; Francis (1996), 68.

  78. Eisenhower briefing: Hewlett and Holl (1989), 3–5; Anders (1987), 286.

  79. Murray to Truman, Jan. 6, 1953, Murray papers.

  80. Disarmament panel’s report: FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1106–14, 1169–74.

  81. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 51.

  82. Ibid., 45.

  83. Eisenhower was also reportedly concerned that he might be criticized for having too few Jews in his administration. Pfau (1984), 137.

  84. After his meeting with Borden, Strauss spoke by telephone with Lawrence, Alvarez, and Pitzer. All knew of the 1942 Berkeley meeting and had been outspoken in their criticism of Oppie. Telegram, Borden to Lawrence, Dec. 23, 1952, and reply; Borden to Lawrence, Jan. 19, 1953, folder 25, carton 32, EOL.

  85. Murphy’s pr
incipal source for the article had been Teddy Walkowicz, head of the air force’s Special Study Group, but Strauss reviewed the draft and evidently suggested changes. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 57; interview with Charles Murphy, June 12, 1954, sec. 42, JRO/FBI.

  86. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 57.

  87. Belmont to Ladd, May 23, 1952, sec. 12, JRO/FBI. Until a week before the verdict, Oppenheimer had expected to be called to the witness stand. Oppenheimer to Ruth Tolman, Feb. 27, 1953, box 72, JRO; Feb. 25, 1953, Dean diary, Dean papers.

  88. “Weinberg Freed,” Kansas City Star, Mar. 5, 1953. Taking no chances, Weinberg’s defense attorney had filed a motion to suppress any evidence gathered by electronic means. Criminal docket, United States vs. Joseph W. Weinberg, May–June, 1953, U.S. District Court records, Washington, D.C. My thanks to Jim David for the records of the Weinberg trial.

  89. Borden and McMahon had been Rickover’s ally in his protracted battles with the navy’s “battleship admirals.” Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, Rickover: Controversy and Genius (Touchstone, 1982), 198; Pfau (1984), 150.

  90. Allardice had been recommended to the Joint Committee by Strauss. Allardice: “Committee Business,” May 12, 1953, no. 3470, JCAE.

  91. Previously, Borden had gone to the FBI for Oppenheimer’s security dossier. He was reluctant to go to the AEC for the file, Borden told the bureau, “as this might stir up some speculation.” Tolson to Nichols, Mar. 28, 1952, JRO/FBI. AEC records indicate that Borden returned the file on Aug. 18, 1953; Strauss checked it out the next day. Waters to Strauss, May 12, 1954, Mansfield papers.

  92. Borden to Allardice, May 29, 1953, 1953 correspondence, JCAE. Hoover and CIA director Allen Dulles turned down the Joint Committee’s request to interview Fuchs. Cole to Hoover, July 14, 1953, no. DCLXXI, and Hoover to Cole, July 16, 1953, no. DCLXXXI, and Dulles to Cole, July 23, 1953, no. DCLXXXIX, JCAE.

  93. “Questions raised in my mind by JRO file—WLB,” May 29, 1953, no. DCXXXVIII, and Borden to Allardice, June 1, 1953, no. DCXXXIX, JCAE.

  94. Borden told the author that he had hoped to be the prosecutor in a trial of Oppenheimer for treason. Borden interview (1981).

  16: Not Much More than a Kangaroo Court