Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

  To help him in this aim, Hitler had his Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) naval forces, Grand Admiral Erich Räder. A career officer, formerly captain of Kaiser Wilhem II’s private yacht in the run-up to the First World War, Räder had fought in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 and had remained a naval officer in the lean, inter-war years. He had risen to Rear Admiral in 1922 and become C-in-C of the Weimar Republic Navy in 1928, then building the Kriegsmarine for the new Chancellor. He had at his disposal cruisers and ultra modern battleships, including Bismark, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, his U-boat fleet under the command of Admiral Karl Dönitz, and long-distance Focke Wulf 200 “Condor” bombers, plus surface torpedo boats, raiders and mine layers.

  With the Luftwaffe, Hitler also planned attacks on all the principal ports in England, by bombing and mining. And, with the fall of France, the Germans had moved into Channel and Atlantic ports and airfields. Medium-range aircraft, fast motor torpedo boats, called E-boats by the British and S-boats by the Germans (S for schnell – as in fast), destroyers and even the long-range artillery in the Pas de Calais region could all take part.

  Whatever the form of attack which comprised the Battle of Britain, for the British, it was a defensive battle that they could not afford to lose. Britain had to survive, in order then to rebuild her offensive strength and take the fight to the enemy. Whether she could avoid losing would depend, the British Service Chiefs thought, on three things. The first two were: “whether the morale of our people will withstand the strain of air bombardment”; and Britain’s ability “to import the absolute essential minimum of commodities necessary to sustain life and to keep our war industries in action”. Last, and by inference least, was the “capacity to resist invasion”.9

  Given that their report was written before the fall of France, it was remarkably prescient. Just over a month later, Colonel General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operation Staff of the German Armed Forces Supreme Command (OKW), came to the same conclusions in his own report labelled: “The continuation of the war against England”. This document had him declaring: “If political measures do not succeed, England’s will to resist will have to be broken by force”, whence he then listed the three forceful options: “siege – this includes war on the high sea and from the air against all shipments to and from England, the first against the English Airforce and all economic resources important to her war effort; terror attacks against English centres of population; and a landing of troops with the objective of occupying England”.

  “Germany’s final victory over England is only a question of time”, Jodl then wrote. “Hostile operational attacks of great strength are no longer possible. Germany, therefore, can choose a form of warfare which husbands her own strength and avoids risks”. “Together with propaganda and temporary terror attacks – said to be reprisal actions – this increasing weakening of English food supply will paralyse the will of her people to resist and finally break it, and thus force the government to capitulate”, Jodl added, then going on to consider a landing in England. This could only be contemplated, he wrote, after Germany has gained control of the air:

  A landing in England, therefore, should not have as its objective the military conquest of the island an objective which can be obtained by the Luftwaffe and the German Navy. Its sole purpose should be to provide the coup de grace, if it should still be necessary, to a country whose war economy is already paralyzed and whose air force is no longer capable of action.

  This situation, Jodl considered, would not occur before the end of August or the beginning of September. He anticipated having to deal with an opposition of about twenty English divisions so that at least thirty German divisions would have to be embarked. The invasion nevertheless must be prepared in all details as a last resort.10

  Thus, with uncanny symmetry, at the highest levels in the opposing militaries, the invasion was seen as the least favourable option, and by Jodl as the last resort. That qualification was constantly to recur but, through the course of the battle to come, Germans sought to implement all three options. Most times it was “pick and mix”. Their problem – and possibly even the reason for their downfall – was that they failed to concentrate forces on any one. At times, it seems as if they themselves did not know precisely what they were intending. Different parts of their famed – but actually quite chaotic – war machine were at odds with each other. Even at this early stage of the war, military (to say nothing of political) incompetence was by no means the exclusive provenance of the British.

  Nevertheless, Jodl did not confine himself to military issues. “Since England can no longer fight for victory but only for the preservation of its possessions and its world prestige”, he argued, “she should according to all predictions, be inclined to make peace when she learns that she can still get it now at relatively little cost.” There was as strong a hint as could be made that Britain might be disposed to a peace deal, with a warning: “Against a complete destruction, England would fight to the bitter end”.

  On the other side of the fence, when it came to evaluating the battle to come, the British Chiefs’ 25 May report was not their last word. A day later, they had produced another report, this one addressing the very specific question of whether the Navy and Air Force could resist an invasion. The short answer was “yes”, but with caveats. If Germany gained complete air superiority, they thought the Navy could hold out, “but not for an indefinite period”. Should German tanks and infantry gain a firm footing on our shores, British land forces would be “insufficient”.11

  But, echoing the findings of their earlier report, the Chiefs argued that if Germany attained air superiority she might attempt to subjugate Britain by air attack alone. An invasion would not be necessary. They then shifted their ground to discuss the importance of air attacks on aircraft factories, made “by day or by night”. By day, the Chiefs thought we could prevent serious damage. But, they said, “We cannot be sure of protecting the large industrial centres … from serious material damage by night attack”. Further, whether the attacks succeeded would depend “not only on the material damage by bombs but on the moral effect on the workpeople and their determination to carry on in the face of wholesale havoc and destruction”. This was back to square one. The “real test” was “whether the morale of our fighting personnel and civil population will counterbalance the numerical and material advantages which Germany enjoys”.

  Whether a blockade could succeed would depend whether ships could be sunk, at a rate faster than they could be replaced. Hampering port operations and goods distribution was also part of the plan, slowing the turnaround of ships and the arrival of goods at their final destinations. Where air activity was involved, this would mostly take the form of daylight precision bombing.

  As to the battlefield, the images of convoys, U-boats and escorts are all associated with the desperate Battle of the Atlantic, but they belong as much to the Battle of Britain. But the battlefield was cast much more widely than the ocean. The blockade was not only countered by military action but with the ration book, recycling and voluntary abstention. There was also the expansion of the agricultural system. From 1939 in the British Isles, the area under cultivation was to increase from just short of thirteen million acres to over nineteen by 1945, while the number of tractors on farms from 1940 to 1943 increased from 1.5 to 1.9 million. Yield per harvested acre rose by thirteen percent between 1940 and 1942 and by the same amount again by 1945. These changes were the result of an intensive programme of agricultural development which was every bit as much part of the war as running convoys across the Atlantic.12

  A ship’s worth of cargo saved was a ship that did not have to be fought through to a British port. And, to that extent, the people were as much part of the war as were the armed services and the merchant marine.

  Turning to the invasion – this was perhaps the purest part of the battle, in the military sense, with the least direct civilian involvement. It comprised four components: the preliminary battle for the control of the
air and sea; the assembly of an invasion fleet (including parachute aircraft and gliders); transport to the landing areas and the beach assaults; and the land battles by the invading forces. Only the first two components would be attempted.

  The preliminary battle for control of air and sea would be fought on the German side mainly by the application of air power, involving the targeting of airfields, port installations, communications, warships and shore defences, all to pave the way for the landings. This would require daylight bombing, affording the accuracy needed to guarantee the destruction of specific targets.

  During the day, however, British fighters could operate freely. They had to be engaged and defeated, their bases attacked and destroyed, in order to allow the bombers to do their work. One crucial tactic would be to use the bombers as bait, forcing the defending fighters up, allowing them to be shot down by the escorts. Then, immediately preceding the landings, the cities would be bombed to provoke terror and mass flight. The idea was to block the roads and railways, hampering the mobility of the defending forces, as had happened during the invasion of France. That terror bombing could be achieved by day or night, but was time-critical and dependent on shock. To have its effect, it had to be carried out only hours before an invasion.

  The “Blitz” would also rely on “terror bombing”, but over a longer time-span, aimed at convincing people that they should give up the fight. This was indiscriminate bombing, carried out during daylight or, if losses were too high, under the cover of darkness. With then current technology, which was beginning to master the day bomber – thus confounding Baldwin – the night bomber was unstoppable. A parallel part of this strategy, though, was continuous diplomatic pressure. The Nazis constantly tested the water to see whether the other side had had enough, constantly offering an easy way out with attractive peace terms, adjusting the military effort in an attempt to gain a political result. In psychological warfare, the Nazis, and Hitler in particular, excelled. Using such tactics, they had walked into Czechoslovakia, subdued Poland with minimal force and quelled France. Victorious troops had marched into Paris without a shot being fired. Now they were ready to take on England.13

  However, this was by no means the full extent of this complex battle. There were two other elements. The first of these was propaganda. As well as stiffening domestic morale, this was crucial for Churchill’s long-term war aim. While Hitler’s was merely to neutralize Britain, his was to crush Germany. For that, he needed the USA, and not only its financial and material support, but its active participation as a fully-fledged military partner. Bringing the USA into the war would require Britain to put on “a good show”. The airmen would become a vitally important part of that. Additionally, they would have a specific, short-term role in reassuring the American public and president that Britain was not about to collapse, with the risk of aid finding its way into German hands, as had happened with US materiel delivered to France.

  The second of these additional elements was the domestic politics of Britain. In 1940, this was a country riven with dissent, a huge divide between the upper and lower strata of society, with what was seen as a decadent ruling class holding the line against an emerging and increasingly powerful labour movement, which was by no means enthusiastic about the war. The unions, with over five million members, represented a powerful and vocal political faction. In the context of a coalition government, they often performed the role of an extra-parliamentary opposition, and had to be kept on side.14

  At this stage, the war was expected to be over by 1942, and Churchill, the party politician, was looking at the post-war political settlement. The labour movement was seeking to use the war as an opportunity to impose a new order, a bloodless revolution, while Churchill was seeking to maintain the status quo built on the foundations of empire, king and country.

  This internal conflict not only shaped the Battle of Britain, the battle itself became a tool to demonstrate Churchill’s prowess as war leader, to strengthen his leadership and to help reinforce his view of how the war – and the peace – should be managed and won. This made it as much a political as a military event. In this, there was never any sense from Churchill and those close to him that the outcome of the battle was ever seriously in doubt. But there was real uncertainty about the outcome of the peace. Arguably, therefore, greater stakes were being played for in the battle to shape the post-war Britain – and Empire. Albeit in a different form, that same battle continues to this day. Our politics are still being shaped by those same forces which shaped the Battle of Britain, which is why it is perhaps as relevant today as it was then.

  2.

  Let battle begin

  The avowed object of the enemy was to obtain a quick decision and to end the war by the autumn or early winter of 1940. To achieve this, an invasion of Britain was evidently thought to be essential.

  The Battle of Britain, HMSO 1941

  In the very first instance, there was no invasion. Outline plans were drawn up by the German Naval Staff in November 1939 and presented to Hitler on 31 May 1940. At that time, still embroiled in the subjugation of France, Hitler and the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) – the Army Chiefs of Staff – had rejected them.1

  However, there was no shortage of threats. Hitler’s air force chief, Hermann Göring, had offered on 30 December 1939 the New Year’s message to the semi-official newspaper Völksicher Beobachter that: “The German Air Force will strike at Britain with an onslaught such as has never been known in the history of the world”. Then there was Dr Paul Josef Göbbels, Germany’s Minister for Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, in full, triumphal flow: “If England will have it no other way, then she must be beaten to her knees”, he wrote.2 That had been on 25 June 1940, the day the armistice between France and Germany came into effect and fifteen days before the official start of the Battle of Britain.

  Nothing is ever quite what it seems, though. Many students of the Nazis – such as the CBS Radio correspondent in Berlin, William L. Shirer – attested that they were capable of dissembling to a most extraordinary degree.3 They lied and deceived, in the latter case not only the world but themselves. Variously, they believed their own propaganda, or some of it, which made it all the more credible to outside observers and unwary historians. But, if one can take Göbbels’ words at face value, the battle was not inevitable. The Führer “would be agreeable to peace”, he had added. “Negotiations are already under way on these issues, via Sweden for example.” He then observed: “No one knows yet whether they will be successful,” concluding, “We must wait”.4

  Five days later, on 30 June, Göring issued a General Directive for the “Operation of the Luftwaffe against England”. He told his airmen “to seize every possible opportunity by day and by night for attacks on hostile air units while airborne or on missions”. According to this directive, “So long as the enemy air force remains in being, the supreme principle of warfare must be to attack it at every possible opportunity by day and by night, in the air and on the ground”.5 That looked firm enough and it certainly led to hostile air action being taken against Britain, including the attack on the anti-aircraft ship HMS Foyle Bank, stationed in Portland Harbour. Following a Stuka attack on 4 July, it was sunk with the loss of 176 lives and earned Royal Navy gunner Jack Foreman Mantle a posthumous Victoria Cross. The RAF had failed to intervene.6

  Two days after Göring’s directive, on 2 July, Hitler’s most senior soldier, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, C-in-C of the German Armed Forces (OKW), issued a Supreme Command Directive. It was headed: “Prosecution of the war against England”, the first paragraph declaring:

  Invasion of England is quite possible under certain conditions of which the most important is the gaining of air superiority. For the present, therefore, the time at which it will take place remains an open question.

  Preparations were to begin immediately, although the invasion was only a “possible event” so they had to be “theoretical”. The planning circle, Keitel instructed, “will be as re
stricted as possible”.

  On 7 July 1940, Hitler was visited by Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, son-in-law of the dictator Benito Mussolini. During discussions about the next phase of the war, the Führer professed himself “rather inclined” to “unleash a storm of wrath and steel upon the English”. But Ciano was not convinced that Hitler was committed to this course of action. In his diary, he noted that “the final decision has not been reached”. He was delaying an address to the Reichstag, “of which, as he himself puts it, he wants to weigh every word”.7

  From the British perspective, on the day before the official start of the Battle of Britain, Churchill was confident that the Fleet should be able to deal with what was left of the German navy – heavily damaged during the invasion of Norway two months previously – if it attempted to escort an invading force. Unescorted convoys could be dealt with by small craft. And in any event, he felt, there was little chance of an invasion being launched from the French coast.8

  DAY 1 – WEDNESDAY 10 JULY 1940

  On the actual start date of the battle, it nevertheless looked as if the decks might have been cleared for war. The sign came from Signor Virginio Gayda, a close confident of Mussolini and editor of the influential Giornale d’Italia. In his newspaper he had written:

  Italy and Germany have agreed on a threefold attack against Britain. Italy’s part against the British Empire will consist in immobilising in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, a large part of the British Fleet, as well as large land forces in Egypt. The Axis Powers are determined to blockade the British Isles and to break Britain’s Empire contacts. She will be defeated at home, in her imperial territories and on the sea.

  Thus, the official version of history would have it that a great battle was about to begin. But the inside word was that it was to be a blockade, while peace feelers were already in progress. There were even numerous reports to that effect in the American media. United Press reported that Germany might embark on a “peace offensive”, while conveying a report that the RAF had found little along Norwegian, Dutch Belgian and French coasts to indicate any unusual troops or transport concentration such as would be needed for an attempted invasion. The British aviators, therefore, were actually set to fight off an invasion that had no formal or physical existence. Success was thereby assured, but only in the same sense that Lambeth Council had succeeded in keeping rogue elephants off its High Street.