Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

The AP reported a statement by “authoritative Vatican quarters”, saying the Pope had abandoned any hope of a settlement between Britain and the Axis powers, following the British Government’s response to Hitler. Feelers made through the Vatican had been “negative”. The Pope was expected to deliver a homily of sorrow and to ask the faithful throughout the world to pray for peace.26

  Pam Ashworth, a Mass Observation correspondent, had a different “take”. The wireless had reported the absence of raids overnight, the first time for more than a month. Conversation in her office elicited the view that, “Hitler wants to give us another chance to do the right thing”.27

  Shirer, meanwhile, wrote of receiving “a first glimpse” of Hitler’s “new order”, with details given by Walther Funk following the meeting of the 22 July, setting out the goals for the new European economy.28 These had been delivered in a speech, which had had a “sensational effect”, a kind of distillation of long deliberations on the economic reorganization of Europe. It was regarded as a kind of semi-official blueprint for all the occupied countries.29

  The German Naval Staff, meanwhile, was beginning to assemble shipping for the invasion. Suitable ships were “limited” and had been reduced even further by the Norwegian operation. There were about 1.2 million tons available to German industry. Coal and ore traffic absorbed about 800,000 tons. The rest was coastal traffic. Diverting these ships would hurt the German economy, especially if they were kept for a long time. Furthermore, although ships from defeated countries could be used, they needed German crews. German ships would have to be laid up to release sailors. As for the inland waterway fleet, about a third of the German fleet would be needed. The effect on the supply of coal, ore and food would be “considerable”.

  The requirement for tugs could be met only if every single tug over 250 horsepower was withdrawn and all trawlers being used for deep sea and coastal fishing were requisitioned. This, said the Staff, “would practically stop the supply of fish”. The motorboat quota could only be met by requisitioning craft from inland waterways. Most of these were unseaworthy.30

  Meanwhile, ploughing down the coast of Kent was a 21-ship convoy designated CW8. As it rounded the North Foreland, the two columns or “divisions” turned towards the Channel, picking up a “snooper” in the form of a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft. There followed a series of fighter sweeps over the Channel towards Dover in what turned out to be a ploy to clear the way for the Stukas. Instead of flying high, the Me 109s came in at sea level, forcing defending Spitfires down to meet them. Hurricanes from Biggin Hill joined in. Past midday as the fight developed, eleven Hurricanes came in to assist in the dogfight with fifty Me 109s. Short of fuel, the Messerschmitts disengaged and the British fighters withdrew.

  It was now the turn of the ships. Away to port, merchant navy gunner John Gallagher on the collier Tamworth spotted “a swarm of bees”. He was witnessing the start of a mass attack by over sixty Stukas. Spitfires, answering a frantic call for help, engaged the fighter escort. Meanwhile, the Stukas sunk three steamers, killing eight seamen. Another ship was sunk two miles off Folkestone, with the loss of one crewman. Another was sunk off Dungeness. Five more ships were damaged.

  Three E-boats then slipped out of Calais to attack the remnants of the convoy. It was now late afternoon. Two destroyers, HMS Boreas and Brilliant, and two Norwegian motor torpedo boats (MTBs), steamed from Dover to meet them. At 35 knots, their sterns sunk low in the water and their stern-waves streaming higher than their decks, the destroyers engaged. The Germans drove though the fire but were then seen to retire at speed.

  The Allied warships were now in mid-channel in broad daylight, far from the cover of Dover anti-aircraft guns. Retribution was closer. Stukas hit the Boreas twice on her bridge. An officer and sixteen ratings were killed outright and another five died of wounds. Twenty-five were wounded. Brilliant was also badly damaged, with two bomb hits to her stern. Both destroyers were towed into Dover and, with them out of the way, the German boats returned. In quick order, three steamers were sunk, with the loss of six seamen. The Germans now had virtual control of the Channel at its narrowest point.31

  Fighter Command flew 641 sorties on the day, initially claiming thirty-nine confirmed and unconfirmed “kills”, including one unknown aircraft type. This was initially recorded as a Chance Vought V 156, one of a formation pounced upon by Spitfires. Intelligence officers suggested that the Germans were so short of aircraft that they were resorting to captured French machines. The truth emerged when the Royal Navy reported the loss of a Blackburn Skua.

  The revised figures had sixteen Luftwaffe aircraft downed, as against seven RAF fighters. Bomber and Coastal Command between them had lost eleven aircraft, at a cost of twenty-eight lives. The final score, therefore, was Luftwaffe sixteen, RAF eighteen, plus the Skua, bringing total British losses to nineteen. Five fighter pilots from each side were killed. But, while the balance of advantage went to the Germans, life went on regardless.

  The Yorkshire Post reported how the miners of Grimethorpe Colliery had returned to work after a week-long lighting strike. The paper also reported the particularly tragic loss of the trawler Campina, impressed by the Navy. It had been blown apart by a mine as it had entered harbour, killing all its eleven crew – an event witnessed by two young wives of the crewmen who had been invited to join their husbands for a holiday.

  DAY 17 – FRIDAY 26 JULY

  Such had been the expectation of an invasion that there was now international media speculation about the lack of action. AP journalist, Kirke L. Simpson, in a widely syndicated piece for the US press, explored the continuing delay. “This cannot be ignored”, he wrote. “Whatever the explanation, it is daily becoming an increasing threat to Hitler’s prestige.”

  One very obvious explanation for the delay was the simple fact that the Germans were not ready. Alan Brooke, now safely installed as C-in-C Home Command, expressed his pessimism “as to our powers of meeting an invasion”. But there was still no certainty that he would have to meet one. Even now, an invasion attempt was not a foregone conclusion. The apparent finality of the German responses to the Halifax speech was not what it seemed. The political correspondent of the Glasgow Herald was writing that “Hitler’s so-called peace offer remains open because of his refusal to take Lord Halifax’s ‘No’ for an answer”.

  Colville seemed aware of this. “There is some agitation for an authoritative reply to Hitler’s speech, and I think Winston should make one, stating our terms and our aims subtly and clearly”, he wrote. Captain M. M. Corpening, the current Berlin correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, confirmed that something was afoot. He had obtained details of peace terms handed to the King of Sweden by the German Government for onwards transmission to Great Britain. His dispatch was printed in his and many other leading American newspapers the following day.

  The Express resumed its attack on Duff Cooper, having learned that the Ministry of Information was employing researchers to test public opinion and report back on morale. This, the newspaper held, was the job of MPs. Cooper was trying to bypass parliament. The Ministry of Information “began as a joke. It has always been a joke. Now it is getting beyond a joke”, said the paper, dubbing its officials, “Cooper’s snoopers”.32

  At the War Cabinet, Cooper was mainly concerned with his paper on post-war Europe. He had, since submitting it, become aware of General Smuts’ telegram which had suggested that a “brains trust” be set up to work out an alternative plan for countering Hitler’s peace movement. Churchill, however, refused to give Cooper his head. He had earlier suggested a loose free-trade arrangement with the USA and now suggested that the matter “required further study by various groups of Ministers”. Cooper was asked to submit a scheme for further examination.33

  In media terms, the war was on hold while headlines were given over to the events of 17 June and sinking of the Lancastria in the worst shipping disaster of the war. Then, the 16,243-ton Cunard liner, packed with an estimated 5,800 Bri
tish soldiers evacuating from the port of St Nazaire, had come under attack from German aircraft. She had taken three bombs and within twenty minutes had sunk, with an estimated 4,000 drowned. This had been more lives lost than in the Titanic and Lusitania combined. It was also the largest single loss of life for British forces in the whole of the Second World War.34

  The disaster had happened over a month previously, and the survivors had been landed at Falmouth, from where considerable rumours had been spread as to the number of casualties. British censors had forbidden any mention of it. It had taken an American newspaper to release details and only once they emerged had the British Government made a statement.

  Churchill had personally blocked the news, saying at the time: “The newspapers have got enough disaster for today at least”. In his book published in 1949, he claimed he had intended to release the news a few days later. But with the pressure of events, he “forgot to lift the ban”. It had then been “some years before the knowledge of this horror became public”.35 The news, though, had actually broken in less than six weeks. On 3 August, the Illustrated London News published many photographs of the incident.36 The curious assertion by Churchill simply did not accord with the facts.

  Home Intelligence found the public unimpressed. The long-delayed announcement, it said, “has had a bad effect on morale”. The loss had been generally known in certain districts and the news had been broadcast on German radio. The lack of adequate explanation for the delay “had produced criticism and general suspicion. People wondered what else is being kept back”.

  Back in the war, low, dark cloud and heavy rain over Britain made flying even more difficult and dangerous than usual. But still the Luftwaffe came. Shipping south of the Isle of Wight provided the targets. Hurricanes shot down two bombers, at a cost of one of their own. SS Haytor was sunk by a mine in the North Sea, where a Fokker seaplane operated by a Dutch crew was also lost.

  Hastings suffered its first air raid when a single aircraft dropped eleven bombs. Some fell on the cricket ground. Others wrecked buildings.37 In the early evening Weymouth and Bristol were hit. Aberdeen was raided but with no serious damage this time. Gradually, though, the Luftwaffe was moving inland. In the north-east of London, an estimated 120 bombs fell, as well as incendiaries. A number of civilians were killed. Overnight, there was minelaying in the Thames Estuary, Norfolk and the Bristol Channel.

  On the day, RAF Fighter Command mounted 581 sorties, despite the bad weather. It lost five aircraft. In addition to the Fokker, a Whitley was lost, bringing the RAF total to seven. With the Luftwaffe losing only two aircraft, the odds on the day again favoured the Germans. And the Admiralty decided that it could no longer take the risk of escorting ships through the Dover Straits in daylight.

  DAY 18 – SATURDAY 27 JULY 1940

  Luftwaffe operations started just before ten. Again shipping was the target, with an attack on a convoy off Swanage, Dorset. Simultaneously, two convoys off the estuary were bombed. From Harwich emerged a group comprising six minesweeping trawlers, with anti-aircraft protection from the destroyers Wren and Montrose. HMS Wren came under heavy and sustained bombing from fifteen Heinkels. She was holed below the waterline and sank with the loss of thirty-seven crewmen. Montrose then had her bows blown off and other major damage. Amazingly, she remained afloat and was towed back to Harwich.

  Further south, in Dover Harbour, the destroyer Codrington was alongside the depot ship Sandhurst in the submarine basin. A bomb fell close to her, breaking her back and she sank in two pieces. The destroyer HMS Walpole, also alongside Sandhurst, was badly damaged as was the depot ship itself. She was to be further damaged in a raid on 29 July. The action was notable for being the first time Me 109s had carried bombs. This changed the tactical equation. Fighters could no longer be ignored while the RAF went after the bombers.

  None of these events were made public at the time. The loss of the Codrington was not officially released until 18 May 1945. Moreover, there were other shipping losses attributable to the Luftwaffe. SS Salvestria, an 11,938-ton whale factory ship, while approaching Rosyth in Scotland, activated an acoustic mine. The Durdham Sand Dredger was sunk by a mine in the mouth of the Severn. HM Salvage Vessel Tedworth was bombed and slightly damaged off North Foreland; a convoy was bombed off the Humber; and the SS Westavon, in a convoy about forty miles off Orfordness, was disabled by a near miss from a bomb.

  With news that the Germans were about to install heavy guns at Cap Griz Nez, the Admiralty decided to pull its warships out of the port of Dover. This was another significant victory for the Germans. They knew it – their reconnaissance photographs showed the empty berths. But the British public were not allowed to know. Censorship kept information from the public, not the enemy. Convoys would now be run as “combined naval and air operations”, the number of vessels limited to twenty-five. A mobile balloon barrage was to be provided for each convoy. With such complications, it would take time to arrange the next sailing.

  On this day, RAF Fighter Command lost three aircraft in 496 sorties, the RAF total reaching four when a Battle bomber exploded after a bomb fell on to the ground while it was being loaded, killing six men. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, lost five aircraft. Meanwhile at Wolverhampton, William John Robson, an Air Ministry technical instructor, was fined £15 with 12s costs for “despondency” talk. Robson had said he admired Germany, that he had shaken hands with Hitler and that British troops had run away at Dunkirk.38

  Across the Atlantic, in a widely syndicated news piece, Russian-born American aviator Major Alexander de Seversky questioned the likelihood of a German invasion of Britain.39 Unless Germany possesses a huge secret armada of new types of fighting aircraft, of which the world has no inkling, it was not possible. “There is a great gulf between the political logic of the Führer’s threats and the tactical realities of the situation”, he wrote. “If victory has gone to Hitler’s head and he overrides the objections of the strategists in this connection, then Germany is heading for a terrific failure.” Given that, there was “room for suspicion”, de Seversky thought, that the deliberate German ballyhoo was a stratagem to compel Britain to keep its men and machines at home.

  DAY 19 – SUNDAY 28 JULY 1940

  The correspondent for the Chicago Tribune was expelled from Berlin for breaking the story about Germany’s peace terms. That story was even reported in the Observer. London denied receiving any such terms. Berlin’s correspondent of the Stockholm newspaper, Tidninger, claimed that the German Government “fully realized” that the main obstacle to the British willingness to negotiate was disbelief in any German promises or assurances. To counter this, Germany was willing to make “concrete” guarantees. Coming from Berlin, that was felt to be “a remarkable German admission”.

  Otto D. Tolischus, Pulitzer prize-winner and Berlin correspondent for the New York Times until he had been expelled in March, was now writing for the paper from Stockholm. The German peace offensive was being driven home with a worldwide drumbeat of totalitarian propaganda, he observed. But, inasmuch as Churchill had already anticipated Hitler’s “peace” offer with a categorical “no” and Lord Halifax had repeated it after the offer had been made, foreign observers (in Stockholm) were puzzling over why the Germans were persisting with it. Tolischus explained:

  First, if it fails, it is designed to undermine British fighting morale, as did Hitler’s constant “peace” offers to France and his insistence that he did not want to fight France undermined French morale. Second, if it succeeds, it has assured a German “political” victory over Britain. There is no doubt here that Hitler would prefer the latter result. The latest private advices from Berlin, coming through several sources, insist that the oft heralded German blitz invasion of England has been called off or indefinitely postponed, because the entire military staff is against it and only Joachim von Ribbentrop and Heinrich Himmler are for it.

  Tolischus thereby, in a few deft sentences, clarified what has since evaded generations of histo
rians. The Germans were using diplomacy as a weapon of war – it was an integral part of the battle. As to the invasion, “The military staff are reported to be against it,” Tolischus said, “because it would be very costly and the result is highly uncertain.” Yet George Axelsson, his replacement in Berlin thought that the process of “softening up” Britain had begun in earnest. After an order in France freezing road and rail traffic, a landing attempt, he said, “may be a matter of days if not hours”. Confusingly, the same newspaper cited the Italian Telegrafo. It claimed that the systematic bombing of British harbours, railway centres and war plants was a “new tactic” that was aimed at “starving the British”, and in particular isolating the seven million people of London from their food supplies.

  London-based “aeronautical experts” cited by the Australian newspaper, the Age, seemed to agree with the Telegrafo. In order to starve Britain, they said, Hitler must prevent ships from the Atlantic using four great waterways: Southampton water; Bristol water; the Mersey; and the Clyde. Heavy attacks on ships at sea and approaching the two southerly ports was probably Hitler’s immediate plan. The second stage would be to demoralize the half-starved civilian population by a general and intense bombing. The third would be the final blow, landing troops at several points, hoping that the confusion throughout the country would enable success.

  In Britain, the morning saw attacks in Cornwall, Cardiff and Newport. In the early afternoon, a sizeable force of forty bombers escorted by Me 109s headed for Dover. Aircraft from four squadrons broke up the raid. There was also a raid in Newcastle, Twenty-five high explosive bombs were dropped almost in a straight line across the city. There was considerable damage, three women were killed, one woman and two men were injured. The Newcastle Evening Chronicle the next day was not allowed to reveal the location of events on its own doorstep, having to write about “a town in north-east”.