Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

  The same issue of the Pictorial had contained a leading article making a “scurrilous attack” on several members of the government, and obviously seeking to undermine confidence in it. Halifax was singled out as “the quintessence of everything that an Englishman should not be”. Churchill even objected to the attack on Attlee and Bevin that morning, with the Mirror’s complaint that they were not doing enough to make this a war fought “for the people by the people”.

  To Churchill, the immediate purpose of these articles seemed to be to affect the discipline of the Army, to attempt to shake the stability of the government and to make trouble between the government and organized labour. But, “in his considered judgment”, he told the War Cabinet, there was far more behind them: “They stood for something most dangerous and sinister, namely, an attempt to bring about a situation in which the country would be ready for a surrender peace”. Said Churchill: “It was intolerable that any newspaper should indulge in criticism and abuse, far beyond what was tolerated in times of acute Party strife, in a time of great national peril”.4

  To his evident dismay, however, the Donald Somervell, the Attorney-General and John Anderson, as Lord President of the Council, advised against criminal prosecution. It might do more harm than good. Beaverbrook offered a possible way out, through the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association, which had “considerable disciplinary powers”. The matter was adjourned.5

  Trouble for Churchill was also brewing on the diplomatic front. US Ambassador Joseph Kennedy was asking Washington to send another “rescue ship” to remove Americans from “embattled Britain”. Negotiations were “understood” to be in progress between Kennedy and Washington, the main question hinging on whether Germany and Britain would give safe passage to such a ship.6

  Kennedy was not the only one contemplating getting out of London. Announced by Health Minister Malcolm McDonald was an inspired scheme for evacuating all mothers and children of school-age or under. They were offered guaranteed transport out of the capital. Billets would be found and lodging paid. Those wishing to make their own arrangements were being offered travel warrants and lodging allowances. There were to be no bureaucratic obstacles.

  In the event, only around 10,000 women and children took advantage of the scheme. But the offer had been made. Those who stayed put were “volunteers” for whatever was to come. This would defuse much of the local criticism and remove those most likely to destabilize morale.7

  Meanwhile, the air war went on. The Luftwaffe sent an almost continuous stream of fighter-bombers over Kent through the morning, leaving the RAF hard-pressed to deal with them. A raid on the Westland Aircraft factory in Yeovil left more than a hundred casualties as a shelter took a direct hit. Fighter Command losses on the day amounted to fifteen write-offs. Bomber Command brought the total loss to nineteen, only one short of the Luftwaffe’s twenty aircraft downed.

  DAY 91 – TUESDAY 8 OCTOBER 1940

  That morning, 150 German aircraft crossed the coast and headed towards London, mostly high-flying jabos, with top cover flying as high as 32,000 ft. Bombs were scattered over a number of areas, including central London. Several raids developed in the afternoon, again involving substantial numbers high-flying fighter bombers. The tactic gave Park considerable problems, even if the bombing damage was relatively slight.

  In the Daily Mirror, the first day of the TUC annual congress was reported. Demands had been heard for better air-raid shelters, the homeless dealt with and an end to profiteering. The shelter problem was “not insoluble and its remedy is overdue”, and the homeless should get “immediate and comprehensive compensation”, to enable them to “restore their shattered homes”. On profiteers, TUC President William Holmes declared that the government “must restrain them and make it impossible for anybody to slink away at the end of the war richer than he entered it”.8

  Doubtless, delegates had been fortified by copies of a leaflet produced by the National Union of Railwaymen. Featuring the General Secretary John Marchbank, it bore the legend in large capitals, “This is the PEOPLE’S WAR”. The text opened with an unequivocal declaration: “This is our war – the people’s war. If there were ever any doubts about it, the tragic events of the last months have brought the truth home to working people”. It is our war, the text continued, on the second of the densely printed pages:

  because the risks and responsibilities of national defence have fallen on us. The men of the Home Guard, the ARP workers, the auxiliary firemen, the ambulance units, every section of the civil defence organisation form part of our mobilised nation. We are in arms as a people, to repel any invasion of our soil and preserve our homes.

  The concluding message was equally uncompromising: “It is our war, the people’s war, because the people are fighting to secure a rebirth of freedom, so that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth”. This was Churchill’s opposition, openly pronouncing the message he had to beat if he was to retain political control of the post-war nation.9

  Of more immediate concern, Beaverbrook submitted two memoranda to the War Cabinet, equally stark and uncompromising. “The country waits on a declaration now in terms that will persuade the men to stay at their benches”, the first one said. The second: “The siren is still the signal for laying down tools in most places. The issue involved is bigger than any other domestic question and requires immediate and vigorous treatment”.

  In his second memorandum, the two occupying less than one page, the Minister for Aircraft Production spelt out the losses for the week ending 28 September. Airspeed had lost one-third of their total working time; Bristol one-sixth; De Havilland were out more than half of their working time; Fairey, Hayes, out about half total time; Hawker, Kingston, where the Hurricane was built, also half total time. The Supermarine works, where the Spitfires were built, were out over one-third of their time. The accessories factories, equally important, showed the same unsatisfactory condition.10

  The event of the day though was Churchill addressing the Commons for his monthly report.11 Curiously, having ignored it at the time, he made a reference to Hitler’s speech of 4 September, noting that the Führer had then said “he would raze our cities to the ground”. Since then, the Prime Minister observed, “he has been trying to carry out his fell purpose”.

  In a strongly analytical speech, he observed that 400 German bombers on average had visited the UK every 24 hours. It was doubtful whether “this rate of sustained attack could be greatly exceeded”. He looked at the weight of explosives dropped, some 22,000 tons by 23 September, and then at the weight the previous Thursday week, 251 tons on London in one night. That was “only a few tons less than the total dropped on the whole country throughout the last war”. That night, there had been 180 killed – one ton of bombs per three quarters of a person. In the last war, one ton had killed ten people in built-up areas. Approximately, mortality was less than one-tenth of that rate.

  The expectation had been up to 3,000 killed and 12,000 wounded, night after night. Hospitals had been geared up for a quarter of a million casualties “merely as a first provision”. But, up to the previous Saturday, figures stood at 8,500 killed and 13,000 wounded. Furthermore, since the heavy raiding had begun, the casualty rate had declined steadily. From over 6,000 in the first week, it had dropped to just under 5,000 in the second, to about 4,000 in the third week and to under 3,000 in the last of the four weeks. The arithmetic was clear. In Greater London and its population of 8,000,000 spread over 700 square miles, it was beyond the resources of the Luftwaffe to inflict terminal damage.

  As the speech developed, a two-stage strategy became apparent. Having talked down the bombing threat, Churchill then talked up the invasion. “Do not let us be lured into supposing that the danger is past.” In a fine burst of rhetoric, he told the House:

  On the contrary, unwearying vigilance and the swift and steady strengthening of our Forces by land, sea and air which is in progress must be at all costs maintaine
d. Now that we are in October, however, the weather becomes very uncertain, and there are not many lucid intervals of two or three days together in which river barges can cross the narrow seas and land upon our beaches. Still, those intervals may occur. Fogs may aid the foe.

  Our Armies, which are growing continually in numbers, equipment, mobility and training, must be maintained all through the winter, not only along the beaches but in reserve, as the majority are, like leopards crouching to spring at the invader’s throat. The enemy has certainly got prepared enough shipping and barges to throw half a million men in a single night on to salt water – or into it.

  Then there was the hugely embarrassing failure of the Dakar expedition to deal with. It was another to add to the list of his many failures. Churchill needed good news, a victory to counterbalance the humiliation. For that he offered “the succession of 297 brilliant victories gained by our fighter aircraft, and gained by them over the largely superior numbers which the enemy have launched against us”. He added:

  The three great days of 15th August, 15th September and 27th September have proved to all the world that here at home over our own Island we have the mastery of the air. That is a tremendous fact.

  The response came from the acting leader of the opposition, Labour MP Hastings Lees-Smith. A strong personal supporter of Churchill, he spoke of Dakar: “after an episode like that, the country may, for a moment, lose its sense of proportion”, he declared. It may “not realise that victory in the Battle of Britain is, in its final effect, more important than anything which happens elsewhere, even at Dakar”. The one trumped the other. Never mind the failure, look at the victory. But short-term political expediency was creating a long-term legend. Meanwhile, the US press was reporting that rumours of another Axis peace offensive were circulating Europe – the same, presumably, that had been picked up by the Sunday Express over the weekend.

  And the air war continued, this day costing Fighter Command five aircraft. Eight were lost by other Commands, including two reconnaissance Spitfires. The thirteen losses compared with the twelve sustained by the Luftwaffe.

  DAY 92 – WEDNESDAY 9 OCTOBER 1940

  The RAF had despatched thirty bombers to Berlin overnight. The Germans claimed they had driven them off. By contrast, it had been a rough night for London – one of the worst since 7 September. Ninety-four locations had been bombed. An air-raid shelter harbouring 150 people, including children, had been hit. At least 8 had been killed, some poisoned after a gas mains fracture. Many more were injured. East Ham Memorial Hospital was badly damaged by a land mine. Three complete floors had been wrecked, destroying wards housing 108 elderly men and women, killing more than fifty. In the morning, as the rescuers were reaching the trapped and injured, another aircraft dropped incendiaries. Horrified rescuers scrabbled through the wreckage to put a small fire out and assist the injured.12

  Many of the newspapers out on the streets had taken the cue from Churchill and proclaimed that the invasion threat was not over. Few seemed to have understood the point he was making about the casualties. The media analysis generally was poor. That said, lower down the front page in the Express was a small article, clearly seen as important enough to have such a prominent spot, but hardly given the attention it deserved. Under the heading, “It’s not a blitzkrieg any more”, a high German Air Force officer at a press conference in Berlin had announced the “lightning war” abandoned. The Germans had decided to go in for “hammering and destruction”.

  For the people at the receiving end, life was already miserable. And there were fears that it was about to get a great deal worse. Aware that coal stocks had not built up at the rate necessary to keep London supplied through the winter, and conscious of the effect of enemy bombing on transport facilities, the Cabinet Civil Defence Committee raised the alarm. This brought the War Cabinet into play, which then asked the new Lord President, John Anderson, to look at what was needed to ensure that coal supplies were maintained.13

  A concern of the War Cabinet, however, remained the “subversive articles” in the Mirror and Sunday Pictorial. Churchill argued that the articles constituted, “a serious danger to this country”. These newspapers were trying to ‘’rock the boat’’ and to shake the confidence of the country in Ministers. They were attempting to weaken discipline in the Army and were trying to poison relations between members of the government. “It was intolerable that those bearing the burden of supreme responsibility at this time should be subject to attacks of this kind.”14

  Churchill declared that he was determined to put a stop to these attacks and to obtain protection for the War Cabinet. “It would be quite wrong that two members of the War Cabinet should be in the position of asking favours of the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association.” The War Cabinet agreed that the articles in question were highly objectionable, and that, while no one objected to fair criticism, a continuance of such articles could not be tolerated.15

  Tucked away in the War Cabinet minutes, however, was another important item, a request for a study on possible German intentions in the Middle East. Details of the Brenner Pass meeting had now reached the Cabinet, via the embassy in Madrid. This brought confirmation that the invasion of Britain had been abandoned, and of the Axis moves towards the Balkans. It was thought that this was another way of putting pressure on British Middle East possessions – with no suspicions that the intention was to clear the way for the invasion of Russia. The point, though, was that the threat to Britain was demonstrably weaker.

  Oblivious to these developments, in the House of Commons, some MPs seemed at last to realize the extent of the humanitarian crisis caused by the bombing. In a long debate, notes were exchanged about the multiple and continuing failures of the authorities charged with bringing relief.

  Charles Key, representing the East London constituency of Poplar, Bow and Bromley, complained of the parsimony of the Ministry of Health in equipping rest centres for the bombed-out homeless. There were no mattresses and only a very limited number of blankets. As for food, there was a store of dry biscuits and very little else – no provision for hot meals and no opportunity at all for providing hot drinks. There was no method of getting kettles boiled, and nobody had thought of providing stoves. Official indifference was rife, complained Kilmarnock MP, Kenneth Lindsay: “If it had not been for the Salvation Army, the Quakers, the WVS and the people who brought in blankets, nothing would have been done, because it is nobody’s business”.16

  The Mirror picked up grief of a different sort, reporting on the latest Admiralty communiqué, one of the very few newspapers to do so, with a headline: “U-boats – 15 ships in a week”. Ten British ships, total tonnage 55,927, four Allied ships, 12,119 tons, and one neutral ship, 4,291 tons, had been sunk during the week ended 29–30 September. The week before, said the newspaper, we lost twenty ships, totalling 134,975 tons. By contrast, total RAF aircraft losses on the day were nine, against the Luftwaffe’s eleven.

  DAY 93 – THURSDAY 10 OCTOBER 1940

  Churchill this day assumed leadership of the Conservative Party, succeeding Chamberlain. This news competed for space with reports of the TUC Conference, which had been addressed by Ernest Bevin. He had appealed for “the last ounce of energy” to build up “overwhelming forces” to defeat Hitler. He was not to get it. Strikes were to proliferate and, by the following year miners’ strikes had become endemic.17

  Appropriately, in view of Bevin’s message, the War Cabinet had before them the two memoranda from Beaverbrook about the working time lost through air-raid warnings. But, as reference was made to a strike which had been in progress at Coventry for more than a fortnight, with public feeling said to be running high against the strikers, discussion was adjourned until the Minister of Labour and National Service could be present.18 It was to be raised again on 14 October.

  Meanwhile, the bombing had almost become routine, “dulled by familiarity and resignation”, as London-based journalist Maggie Joy Blunt later put it.19 The media was struggli
ng to show any interest. The overnight raids, nevertheless, managed to maintain their quotas of horror, this particular night marked by an attack in Hackney, which wrecked the Anderson shelters in the gardens of Mapledene Road.20 That did not prevent Herbert Morrison, in his maiden speech to the Commons as Home Security Minister, singing the praises of the shelter. He did, nevertheless, order additional Tube provision in the East End of London to be opened to the public.21

  The Ministry of Home Security, Morrison’s new home, produced its periodic summary of Civil Defence activities, this report covering the period from 1 to 29 September – the start of the Blitz. Of the attacks on 7 September, it noted that “[a]part from attempting to lower public morale, the main objectives appear to have been docks, railways and public utilities”.22 Maggie Joy Blunt, gave adequate testimony to the failure to lower public morale, but the very declaration in the report indicated that British officialdom was very well aware of the German objective.

  And while the attempt was most powerfully focused on night attacks, German daylight tactics were also achieving little, other than causing a nuisance and tiring out British pilots. The word “attrition” was finding its way into more reports, although the Germans still seemed to believe a rapid decision was possible. Reich Propaganda Minister Göbbels noted that the Luftwaffe was attacking London “without pause day and night. And to considerable effect … Just now there are dramatic reports of this from London. If these are true, all hell must be loose over there”.23