Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

  34 A 46-page analysis was published in 1997 under the title: “Deflating British radar myths of World War II” by Maj Gregory C. Clark, for the Air Command and Staff College Maxwell AFB. Available online: http://www.radarpages.co.uk/download/AUACSC0609F97-3.pdf

  35 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Bentley_Priory

  36 As with the First World War, there were civilian deaths from anti-aircraft fire. Levine (2006), p. 319, describes Theresa Bothwell recalling how a shell had fallen on a church hall in Birmingham, where there was a wedding reception, killing the groom and amputating the bride’s legs. Thomas Parkinson describes how an unexploded shell penetrated a domestic kitchen in Kentish Town, killing a young girl.

  37 The invaluable Donnelly, op cit, with his daily narrative and his account of losses, provides details here.

  38 Launched in his own newspaper on 10 July, the campaign had been quietly forgotten by September, long after a scrap dealer had sent Beaverbrook a telegram stating: “Cannot understand your appeal for aluminium scrap. All scrap merchants have large supplies for which there is no demand”. The story was summarized in Private Eye, 5 October 1962.

  39 Details collated from contemporary news reports. A summary is published in Time magazine, 29 July 1940. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,764264,00.html

  40 Central to Nazi rhetoric was the concept of the war being “for the unity and freedom of Europe”. In September 1939, the Reich Foreign Minister was being presented with schemes for European unity, declaring the war aims to be the bringing about and guaranteeing of “lasting peace for the European countries. Security against economic strangulation and interference by outside powers”. The initial stages involved the creation of a four-year plan, the plenipotentiary for which was Göring. See: Lipgens (1985), pp. 55–6.

  41 Hitler’s economic plans had been rehearsed widely in the British press, as had the role of Göring who, on the front page of the Daily Express of 24 January 1938, was being referred to as “economic dictator”.

  42 War Cabinet: WP (40) 270. National Archives. The correspondence is bundled, under the one reference, dated 19 July 1940.

  43 War Cabinet: WP (G)(40) 153. ‘Hitler interview.’ National Archives.

  44 Dairy and Letters (op cit), p. 101.

  45 An extraordinarily detailed account of events in the north-east, on which this narrative is based, is available at: http://www.ne-diary.bpears.org.uk/Inc/Dindex.html

  46 Film footage of the aftermath has been preserved by the National Library of Scotland, available online: http://www.ne-diary.bpears.org.uk/Inc/Dindex.html

  47 The weekly editions are held in the National Archives, but are now available online. The official Battle of Britain period is covered by 19 editions, numbered 44–61.

  48 Diary references to Alan Brooke, throughout, are taken from Danchev and Todman (2001).

  49 References to Colville are taken from Volume 1 of his published diaries.

  50 War Cabinet: WP (40) 264, op cit.

  51 Ansel, op cit, refers, marking this as the formal start of the operation, born in “deep pessimism”. The report opens: ‘Die Landung ist schwierig’ (The landing will be hard).

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 3

  1 Churchill Centre website: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/126-war-of-the-unknown-warriors

  2 Such was the fevered atmosphere that, on 10 July, Sir Edward Grigg, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the War Office, rebuked the House of Commons for sitting until 11.30 p.m., telling them: “At this moment it may be that bombers are over many or our towns. Tonight thousands of our soldiers will be on the alert waiting for an attack which may come”. Daily Express 11 July 1940.

  3 Texts of non-parliamentary speeches are taken from the website of the Churchill Centre and Museum.

  4 Texts taken from Hansen (2008).

  5 Reported in the Irish Times, 16 July 1940.

  6 References to Shirer, throughout, rely on his Berlin Diary (1984).

  7 Cited in Lawlor (1994), p. 62.

  8 Comment recorded by Assmann, op cit. Ansel cites comment suggesting that Hitler had made the lead-in time short in the hope that the services would find it impossible to meet.

  9 War Cabinet: WP (40) 264, op cit.

  10 Cumming (2010), p. 150. In total, 30,248 lost their lives during the entire war, of 185,000 who served, a death rate higher proportionately than in any of the armed forces.

  11 A comprehensive analysis (179 pages) of the German ir-sea rescue services has been written by Lieutenant Colonel Carl Hess, and published by the US Air Force. It is available online: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/AAFHS-168.pdf

  12 See: Mitchell (1945), pp. 98–9. The basic story was augmented by a series of detailed telephone discussions with staff of the Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovil, and the New Zealand High Commission.

  13 Trevor-Roper, op cit.

  14 By far the best technical appraisal of the maritime equipment comes in Schenk (1990). For details of barge conversions, see: pp. 65–94, illustrated by a substantial number of photographs.

  15 It is extremely doubtful whether a significant airborne assault could have been mounted. During the invasion of France and the Low Countries, the Germans had lost 475 transport aircraft. On 10 May alone, they lost 157 Junkers Ju 52 transports, mainly in Holland. This was the only aircraft equipped for delivering paratroops and more than a year’s production. It would be May 1941 before sufficient aircraft could be assembled for a major assault (Crete). See: Robinson (2005), pp. 115–17.

  16 Dairies and Letters, op cit, pp. 102–3.

  17 Wheatley, op cit, p. 29.

  18 Assmann, op cit, p. 8. See also: Ansel, op cit, p. 160.

  19 Shirer, op cit.

  20 National Archives: FO 371/24407/92. Roberts, incidentally, had been peripherally involved in the 1939 Dahlerus Mission.

  21 Churchill, op cit, p. 508.

  22 Apart from Mason (1990), plus Wood with Dempster (1969), who give a good account of this action, some of the background to the politics of the Defiant is given in Dixon, op cit.

  23 See: Lukacs (1990), p. 188–90.

  24 The full text of the speech is in Domarus (1990), pp. 2042–63.

  25 See: Roberts (1991), a useful text on the role of Halifax.

  26 During a telephone conversation on 22 July, Lothian told Halifax: “We ought to find out what Hitler means before condemning the world to 1,000,000 casualties”. For context and primary sources, see: David Reynolds (1983), Lord Lothian and Anglo-American Relations, 1939–1940. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, vol. 73, no. 2. Possibly, far too much is made of this. Had either wished to discover their nature, the essence had been published in the Frankfurter Zeitung that day. It is unlikely that the published terms would have been materially different from anything Lothian would have been able to discover.

  27 See also: Lukacs, op cit, pp. 194–5.

  28 Ansel, op cit, pp. 161–2.

  29 Assmann, op cit, p. 10.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 4

  1 War Cabinet: WP (40) 275. ‘Propaganda for the future.’ National Archives.

  2 His fine was later reduced to £2, on the recommendation of the Home Secretary. Sunday Express, 28 July 1940, p. 1.

  3 Sunday Express, p. 6: “The Nosey Parkers are having a fine time”.

  4 Cited in Wheatley, op cit, p. 22.

  5 Details of the meetings, see: Wheatley, pp. 30–1. Ansel, op cit, pp. 162–6 also refers. Assmann deals with it on pp. 14–19. Clearly, this was one of the pivotal meetings of the entire planning sequence.

  6 Cited in Daily Express 22 July 1940.

  7 Hanson, op cit, pp. 224–8.

  8 Chester Wilmot (1952) notes that Hitler forbade the launching of an air offensive against British ports and cities, “so anxious was he to encourage compromise by maintaining the pretence that he had no quarrel with Britain”.

  9 Ciano, op cit, p. 372.

  10 The
reference to Sweden is Churchill’s own. It is not known whether any initiative was linked with the Swede Birger Dahlerus, and through him Hermann Göring, although the timing is such that Göring may well have been involved (see: note XX, p. XX).

  11 Cited at length in the Yorkshire Post, 22 July 1940, p. 3.

  12 See: Lipgens, op cit, p. 61.

  13 Glasgow Herald, 23 July 1940, p. 3.

  14 The old term for the Soviet secret police.

  15 Reported in the Daily Express, 22 July 1940. It was called the “Rout the rumour rally”.

  16 Assmann, op cit, p. 16.

  17 The date is asserted by the website World War II Today: http://ww2today.com/25th-october-1940-u-boats-now-operate-from-france. Elsewhere, it is claimed that Lorient was first used by a U-boat on 7 July. http://www.uboat.net/flotillas/bases/lorient.htm

  18 Berlin Diary, op cit, p. 459.

  19 Kubizek (1955).

  20 Daily Mirror, 23 July 1940, p. 12; Daily Express, 23 July 1940, p. 6.

  21 HC Deb 23 July 1940 vol. 363 cc.597–9.

  22 Thompson (1966). See: pp. 148–53.

  23 Details in Ansel (1960), who provides the fullest account of the initiative, having interviewed Plesman. There is also a reference to a Dutch peace plan being denied by President Roosevelt in a press conference on 28 July (AP). At the same time, London denies receiving a peace document “via Stockholm”. Further details come from the KLM corporate history and the Dutch wittebrugpark history project website. The latter records that, in May 1941, the Gestapo found out about Plesman’s initiative, and that Göring was freelancing. Heydrich was briefed and Göring was confronted with the file. To cover his tracks, he ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Plesman.

  24 The front page of the Daily Mirror bore the headline: “How your tax will be stopped off pay”. Standard rate of income tax was raised to 8s 6d in the pound.

  25 HC Deb 25 July 1940 vol. 363 cc.983–4

  26 The initiative came from the Vatican, via Cardinal Maglione, the Vatican Secretary of State. Communications had been sent to Rome and Berlin, and to London via the Apostolic Delegate, urging the three powers to negotiate. Maglione was still attempting to bring the parties together on 26 July and did not abandon that endeavour until 2 August. See: Chadwick (1987). There was also an earlier approach from the Papal Nuncio in Berne, which was rejected by Halifax on the direct instructions of Churchill – the minute dated 28 June 1940. See: Wilmot (1952), p. 24, and Churchill, op cit, p. 151.

  27 Garfield (2005), p. 316.

  28 Berlin Diary, op cit, p. 461.

  29 Lipgens, op cit, pp. 65–71.

  30 Wheatley, op cit, p. 31.

  31 Air action, see: Mason op cit and Wood with Dempster, op cit. The naval action is described, at length, by McKee (1957), pp. 9–15 (paperback edition).

  32 Although the attacks on Cooper came from across the political spectrum and from most of the newspapers, the Daily Express was especially persistent. Lady Diana, writing to her son the day previously (25 July) wrote of the personal animosity of the newspaper’s proprietor, Lord Beaverbook, noting claims that he had declared he “was not going to stop until he got Papa … out of office”. The other target of Beaverbrook’s ire was Archie Sinclair. See: Charmley (1986).

  33 War Cabinet: (40) 213. ‘Conclusions of meeting, Minute No. 12.’ National Archives.

  34 Roskill (1954), p. 235.

  35 Churchill (1947), op cit, p. 168–9.

  36 The next day (4 August 1940) the Sunday Express ran a report under a front-page headline “Last moments of the greatest sea tragedy of all time”. It had a picture of the capsized ship, the upturned hull silhouetted with men. The sea was dotted with the heads of men near two upended lifeboats. The report detailed how “the sea at the time was covered with oil which made swimming almost impossible”.

  37 See: http://victoriaseymour.com/ww2/index.html – another example of websites filling in local detail left out in the grand narratives.

  38 Daily Mirror, 27 July 1940.

  39 A contemporary of Douhet and Billy Mitchell, and strong advocate of strategic bombing – he recognized that the Luftwaffe air fleet was not sufficient to break down British resistance.

  40 Hanson, op cit, pp. 228–31.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 5

  1 Churchill, op cit, pp. 218–19.

  2 War Cabinet: (40) 216. National Archives.

  3 Wheatley, op cit.

  4 This was the yacht in which the Duke and Duchess of Windsor had cruised in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1938. It had been converted into an auxiliary patrol vessel after war had broken out. The loss was reported in the Daily Mirror on 31 July 1940, but no location was specified, thereby maintaining the fiction that the raid on Dover Harbour had been unsuccessful.

  5 Kent History Forum: http://www.kenthistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=6801.0

  6 Supplement to the London Gazette 5768, 30 September 1940: http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/34956/supplements/5768 Photographs of the burning ship are published in the Kent History Forum: http://www.kenthistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=6801.0 None of these were published in the contemporary press. The attack on this day was officially confirmed in War Cabinet: WP (R)(40) 185. ‘Civil Defence Report No. 20.’ National Archives. Only there is it acknowledged that one of the ships was saved by the fire services.

  7 http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-10DD-19D-Delight.htm

  8 Between April and December 1940, mines destroyed 151 ships accounting for 342,000 tons – 10 per cent of the total losses. See: naval-history.net website.

  9 Wheatley, op cit, p. 33; Ansel, op cit, pp. 178–81.

  10 According to General de Flieger Josef Kammhuber, then on the Luftwaffe General Staff, Göring was unenthusiastic in his response – which may have reflected the fact that he was still pursuing freelance peace initiatives. Kammhuber maintained that Hitler himself never intended the air war against England to be anything other than a gambit to force her to negotiate for peace. It was never intended as “a decisive test of strength”. In Kammhuber’s opinion, Göring was aware of the coming conflict with the Soviet Union and its implications for the Luftwaffe. See: Suchenwirth, op cit, pp. 64 and 134.

  11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_Blitz

  12 Gilbert (1997), p. 595.

  13 See: Ansel, op cit, pp. 182–6, for the background to the discussion.

  14 Wheatley, op cit, p. 34; Assmann, op cit, pp. 22–5.

  15 http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember.nsf/pages/NT000011C2

  16 Page 11. “MPs attack research nosey parkers”.

  17 HC Deb 31 July 1940 vol. 363 cc.1218–20. See also: Churchill, op cit, p. 169.

  18 Page 3. “Lancastria: Mr Cooper explains”.

  19 Calder (1969), pp. 103–4.

  20 There is no evidence to support claims that the Duke of Windsor was prepared actively to support Hitler, although he had been cautioned by Churchill about taking a view about the Germans or Hitlerism “which is different from that adopted by the British nation or Parliament”. However, there is credible evidence to suggest that, at some stage, Hitler believed the Duke could be suborned, and thus provide the nucleus of a plot to oust the Churchill Government. It is not unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that the Duke’s action on this day, in sailing to the Bahamas, may have influenced the timing of Directive No. 17.

  21 Trevor-Roper, op cit, pp. 79–80.

  22 Ansel, op cit, pp. 194–7.

  23 Overy (1984) argues that Göring’s peace initiatives via Dahlerus in 1939 were simply a ploy to detach Britain from France. Irving’s far more detailed account (and the Nuremberg transcripts) suggests that the initiative came from Dahlerus. Interestingly, neither author mentions Göring’s initiative in July 1940, when it would be hard to dismiss German peace attempts as a “ploy”. The evidence suggests that Göring and Hitler genuinely wanted peace, if they could have it on their terms.

  24 Taylor, op cit, p. 250.

  25 Diaries and Letters, op cit
, p. 104.

  26 The reference is in Churchill’s second volume on the history of the Second World War: Their Finest Hour. This, and a brief mention of the Papal Nuncio’s attempt, are the only references in the entire book to peace feelers. It is perhaps his reluctance to discuss such matters, matched by similar reticence on the part of his official biographer, Martin Gilbert, that lends weight to diverse conspiracy theories.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 6

  1 Churchill (1949), p. 474.

  2 See: p. 306.

  3 Battle of Britain London Memorial website: http://www.bbm.org.uk/BrittonHWA.htm

  4 Ansel, op cit, p. 199.

  5 Excerpts from the broadcasts can be found on diverse websites. One useful site is: http://www.war44.com/secret-war-resistance-espionage-during-wwii/346-william-joyce-treason.html Audio files are also available: http://www.archive.org/details/LordHawHaw-WilliamJoyce-GermanyCalling17-23of23

  6 Simpson’s work was widely syndicated, often in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal – archives of which are protected by a paywall. However, they were also published in provincial journals, this one in the Lewiston Daily Sun, is freely accessible via Google: http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=NcE0AAAAIBAJ&sjid=jmgFAAAAIBAJ&pg=962,2793419&dq=barges+invasion&hl=en

  7 Taylor, op cit, p. 226.

  8 Assmann, op cit, p. 25. Wheatley offers a detailed account: op cit, pp. 44–5.

  9 A remarkable online database, recording details of the convoys run can be found on Convoy Web: http://www.convoyweb.org.uk

  10 Roskill (1954), p. 141; Daily Express, 11 October 1940, p. 4: “Let’s talk about the weather”.

  11 Deighton (1977), p. 147.

  12 There is no single source for what amounts to another untold story of the Battle of Britain. Statistics and a narrative covering wartime adjustment were issued by the British Railways’ press office in 1943, now online: http://freespace.virgin.net/neil.worthington/jx/1943.htm. For obvious reasons, details of wartime transport movements and difficulties were secret, and therefore press coverage was limited. However, the transport issue was rehearsed many times in parliament, from which debates, some of the detail is drawn. As the transport crisis developed, in October and December, Sir John Anderson, then Lord President of the Council, produced two secret and highly detailed reports for the War Cabinet: WP (G)(40) 269 and WP (G)(40) 328, concerning the transport of coal . These reports make very clear the extent of the crisis, which was then discussed several times by the War Cabinet, for instance on 27 December 1940: War Cabinet: 310 (40). Documents from the National Archives.