Broken Lives

by Konrad H Jarausch

  The next stage after completing RAD duty was conscription into the regular army. An ominous draft notice, or Gestellungsbefehl, ordered recruits to report to a military district office on a certain date in order to register. “There were no excuses or possibilities of refusal,” recalled Karl Härtel; because this was a legal obligation “everyone had to obey this command.” Without any provision for conscientious objection, even youths who were opposed to war were forced to serve in the military. Fritz Klein noted that noncompliance was severely punished, that “compulsion was all powerful.” During the last week of August 1939, Paul Frenzel’s RAD group was officially transformed into a “construction battalion” of the army and shipped out to the Polish frontier. Similarly, Heinz Schultheis’s labor camp was “moved to the West Wall and there attached to the Wehrmacht.”13 While the younger adolescents received a reprieve, for those born in 1920 or earlier, labor service and conscription led directly into the war.

  Because they could not imagine the horrors that would await them, a surprising number of young men, such as Joachim Fest, ignored their fathers’ insistent warning and volunteered for military service. Nazi propaganda played a considerable role by stressing the expectation that all young men should serve. Peer pressure also motivated skeptics such as Fritz Klein, who “did not want to lag behind the endless numbers of contemporaries, especially those one knew and who were friends.” Later on victory announcements made soldiering sound like a heroic adventure, creating concern among recruits that the war would be over before they could participate. For Erich Helmer, who liked to fly, “that was unthinkable.” Appeals to masculinity were powerful arguments for overcoming hesitations. Robert Neumaier worried that “after the war I would be called a shirker and [people] would point fingers at me and say ‘that is a coward.’”14 Even most Nazi opponents were therefore ready to do their patriotic duty.

  Practical reasons also impelled many young men to come forth on their own without waiting to be drafted, in order to “make the inescapable somewhat less unpleasant.” Some, like Hellmut Raschdorff, volunteered so as to escape a conflict at home or at work. Others, such as Hans Queiser, signed up so that they could escape the mindless preliminary grind of the Reich Labor Service. Also quite persuasive was the prospect of being able to choose one’s branch of military service. Few youths wanted to slog through the mud as foot soldiers in the army. “At that time volunteers only signed up with the air force or navy because of the pretty uniforms or since flying was attractive.” As combat in the air retained some of the earlier allure of chivalry, former members of the air Hitler Youth such as Horst Grothus and Erich Helmer were rather eager to take flight in the new shiny planes.15 Because the physical requirements for pilot training were quite high, however, most were disappointed to end up in ground support.

  The real Nazi fanatics volunteered directly for the Waffen SS, the most dedicated and toughest form of the military. Compared with the plebeian brawlers of the SA, the black-shirted SS projected a more elitist image as the best fighting arm of the regime. It was only logical for gung-ho HJ leaders such as Rolf Bulwin to want to join that select group. But because he was not yet old enough, he had “to forge the signature of his mother” in order to be accepted. Similarly, for the Ukrainian Wilhelm Kolesnyk, “volunteering meant, of course, enlisting in the Waffen SS.” Although he was an HJ leader, he could not join the Wehrmacht, as he was not a German citizen. But “the Waffen SS accepted everyone”; in fact, seventeen of its twenty-five divisions consisted of volunteers from foreign countries. Kolesnyk “went there especially because it was the elite-guard of our Führer.” Though an SS veteran acquaintance’s loss of eyesight ought to have given him pause, Kolesnyk decided that if he was going to do it, he might as well go all the way.16

  The letdown began with the army physical, a demeaning and arbitrary procedure that decided the life and death of a hapless recruit. “Get undressed! Drop your pants!—Here is a bottle to pee into,” wrote Erich Helmer of an inspection process that treated youths as if they were slaughter animals. “Listening [to the lung], checking eyes and ears” were the next steps. Then, “Bend down and pull your buttocks apart!” A medic grumbled, “This man has not only flat feet but also hemorrhoids, with that we can’t win a war! Where shall he be assigned?” The answer was “to the air force, sir.” The chief doctor agreed: “For that [purpose] this is enough, [he is] ready to serve.” The “kv” (kriegsverwendungsfähig) classification indicating that a young man was capable of doing his military duty was a crucial decision about his future.17 In the early years, the standards were high, giving preference to healthy and athletic youths, but with mounting losses later in the war, more and more marginal recruits were selected and convalescents sent back to the front.

  More fortunate youths could hope to be spared by being judged physically unfit or indispensable for the war effort. Although girls might sneer at boys who had a medical condition such as tuberculosis, the afflicted could stay at home and serve in nonlethal or civilian capacities. As a result, faking a disease such as asthma or getting a certificate from a sympathetic physician became a way to avoid the draft. Götz Fehr’s polio handicap worked to his advantage and kept him out of combat. However, military doctors chose to ignore such conditions when the army was in desperate need of fresh manpower. Another escape route was the classification “uk” (unabkömmlich), indicating that a candidate was essential for winning the war at home. Since he was preparing to be an electrical engineer, Karl Härtel was allowed to continue his studies longer than his friends who had already been sent to the front. Similarly Friedrich Flessa was requisitioned as essential by his Nuremberg factory, since he was involved in developing a new kind of cold steel that proved superior to traditional methods of weapons production.18

  The reality of induction into the military soon disillusioned even the most eager volunteers and recruits. For Hans Queiser, the terrible condition of his Labor Service barracks raised a first doubt. (“This is how we want to win the war?”) Then came the shedding of regular clothes, cutting of hair, and donning of uniforms that transformed self-willed civilians into docile soldiers who had to follow their superiors’ commands. The rite of passage culminated in a solemn swearing-in ceremony. Gerhardt Thamm describes how “six soldiers grasped the saber’s cold steel” while “the flag bearer respectfully lowered his staff.” Then “all recruits raised their right arms high” and deep voices intoned: “I swear by God this holy oath, that I will render unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, leader of the German nation and people [as well as] supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and that I am ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.” Even if they had sworn allegiance under duress, the majority of German soldiers considered this oath morally binding.19

  The first weeks of basic training were tough. Inductees were mercilessly “ground to the bone.” Horst Johannsen recalled that his nasty noncom, called Spieß in German, did not act like “the mother of the company” but rather as a sadist who enjoyed his absolute power over his charges. Officially the purpose of the exercise was to get the recruits ready for the front as quickly as possible, but often hazing went far beyond that. One method of breaking the will and instilling discipline was to issue difficult orders and punish offenders for not executing them properly. Part of the training also aimed to submerge the individual into the collective, allowing the group to pick on its weakest members with pranks. Barking their commands, sergeants used incentives such as weekend passes to motivate compliance. But if someone like Fritz Klein fell asleep during his watch, all hope of being recommended for officer training vanished. The hated basic training was therefore an amalgam of Prussian militarism and Nazi torture.20

  In practice, the “severe military drill” consisted of an endless amount of “stupid busy work” to inculcate obedience. Robert Neumaier remembered the harassment of “sweeping barracks, checking uniforms, and scrutinizing the rooms.” When a bedsheet was out of line, the noncom would shout,
“What a pigsty!” and order latrine cleaning. In the barracks yard, there were hours of monotonous marching, standing to attention, presenting arms, and running with gas masks. Little better were actual field exercises such as crawling through the mud, hiking long distances, orienteering with compass and maps, and playing war games. After instruction in cleaning weapons, there was actual target practice in which a good shot could get extra time off. In the rare leisure moments, Gerhard Krapf remembered, “old front hands” shared a few tricks of the trade to facilitate survival.21 Largely common to all armies, such basic training was particularly tough in the Wehrmacht, since its soldiers were drilled not for defense but for attack.

  Inductees found the training more bearable as soon as they were instructed in special skills that made them feel like real soldiers rather than automatons. Fritz Klein was pleased to be trained as a radio operator for communication duty. Gerhard Baucke was glad to learn how to drive big trucks and half-tracks for the transport corps, because “not [having] to move on foot was very good.” Similarly, Hermann Debus had to get a license for all sorts of motor vehicles, finding motorcycle training that required driving off-road up and down the walls of a former gravel pit the most exciting. To toughen up future parachutists, Rudolf Harbig, a world champion middle-distance runner, drove recruits like Robert Neumaier until they collapsed. In contrast to “mostly humdrum training,” Gerhard Krapf “really liked the riding lessons” for his future artillery assignment, becoming “a pretty good horseman” after being thrown the first time.22 Anything that broke the routine of drilling and offered actual combat skills was welcome.

  The most popular branch of service was the air force due to its technical novelty and the romantic aura of gentlemanly duels in the sky. Believing “it must be wonderful to rise up into the air,” Horst Grothus had joined the air HJ and then the Nazi Flyer corps, learning how to soar with glider planes. When he was finally old enough to join the air force, he graduated to regular motorcraft, passing all of his flying tests in the hope “of becoming a fighter pilot.” But just as he completed the elaborate training, the vaunted Luftwaffe ran out of fuel and lost the command of the skies so that he could no longer realize his dream. Other volunteers for the air force who failed to meet the physical requirements, such as Karl Härtel, or who possessed special skills as engineers, were assigned to ground personnel. This “most probably saved [them] from a hero’s death,” since the mortality rate of pilots was extraordinarily high. Starting as a radio operator, Hans Queiser actually flew a few times as a tail-gunner when he became a war reporter. And the pacifist Erich Helmer became a night interceptor pilot.23

  Most new soldiers just accepted the inevitable military service and tried to survive it as best as they could. The demanding basic training quickly dispelled “the unconditional enthusiasm” for the war inspired by initial victories. According to Hans Queiser, the cynical effort to turn civilians into real fighting men led to “the rapid dissipation of the idealist fervor which many young soldiers brought into the barracks from the HJ.” As Gerhard Joachim was to find out, open criticism of the war, attempts at sabotage, or desertion were ruthlessly suppressed by disciplinary measures ranging from a few days of detention to long imprisonment or assignment to punitive battalions for especially dangerous missions. As a result, most soldiers developed a passive attitude of “accepting the inescapable—if there is no way around it.” They learned “never to draw the attention of superiors—not even positively.” The lucky ones found a desk job as Paul Frenzel did or were wounded like Rolf Bulwin, after which they were consigned to garrison duty.24

  The young recruits who “did not relish the notion of killing” assuaged their consciences with a mixture of patriotic and pragmatic arguments. For instance, Gerhard Krapf reasoned that “shielding my family and my homeland, the country of Bach and Goethe, from the Bolshevik horror” outweighed Hitler’s responsibility for starting the war. Once in combat, the survival instinct took over, with the alternative of “the simple ‘either him or me.’” Pacifist passivity would quickly get one shot. Moreover, industrial warfare made gunning down any attacking enemies, “even from as short a distance as 30 meters … more impersonal, hence less revolting than, say, shooting one at close range or bayonetting him.” Finally, comradeship demanded resolute action because “any hesitation and/or failure to act in this business of infantry warfare not only endangered yourself but every one of your outfit.” While some soldiers also fought for Nazi living space, most believed they were defending their fatherland against mortal danger.25

  During the initial stages of the war, this mental and physical preparation of youths provided an important advantage to the Wehrmacht. Touched by the verses of the British war poets or the antiwar propaganda of the French popular front, many young men in the West were pacifists or at least civilians who did not want to die in another war. By contrast, many young Germans were indoctrinated by the Hitler Youth in a romantic militarism that prized a hero’s death as a necessary sacrifice for the fatherland. Moreover, Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda efforts to celebrate the Führer’s diplomatic breakthroughs and military successes justified the war as a necessary means to restore Germany’s greatness, trampled at Versailles. At the same time, the constant physical exercises in schools and HJ had toughened up youths through paramilitary training that facilitated their transition to the military. “Trusting in the Führer and the victory of our just cause,” most young Germans were therefore able and willing to fight.26

  WEHRMACHT VICTORIES

  Initially a stream of victory announcements helped dispel any remaining doubts about the necessity of the war. Introduced by a martial fanfare, special news bulletins would interrupt the regular broadcasts of the national radio network: “Attention, attention, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht announces” that German troops had conquered yet another enemy position. Even critical adults were amazed by “the newsreels [showing] the overwhelming victories on all fronts. What was happening no longer had anything to do with what our fathers had told us about the First World War,” observed Wilhelm Kolesnyk. “Everything went incredibly smoothly and precisely as if it were a maneuver or a marching exercise.” Teenage boys were glued to the radio at home and marked the progress of German forces on the map with pins in school. Even many soldiers could not quite believe that they were part of what friend and foe considered “the world’s best and most powerful fighting machine.”27

  12. Triumphant SS trainees. Source: Ruth Bulwin, Spätes Echo.

  The speed and extent of the triumph over Poland strengthened the Nazi sense of superiority. Since the media had claimed for weeks “that the German minorities living in Poland were being mistreated, beaten, even killed,” Gerhardt Thamm believed that “Germany had to act to save fellow Germans.” While many people expected a victory “in three-quarters of a year or so,” Wilhelm Kolesnyk remembered “how impressive it was when this occurred in eighteen days.” In biblical language, Joseph Goebbels crowed, “In eighteen days the Lord has vanquished them.” Public opinion failed to notice the part played by the Soviet attack from the rear thanks to the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939. Gerhard Baucke recalled the rubble of Warsaw: “Poland—Poland no longer existed. Stalin and Hitler had divided it between them.” Most people were convinced that “we Germans were in truth the chosen people, the greatest in every respect, that we were destined to play the leading role in the world and would actually achieve it.”28 Impromptu pictures show SS trainees like Rolf Bulwin having a good time (image 12).

  The victories in the West during the spring and summer of 1940 “reinforced this delusion even more strongly.” While the invasion of Denmark and Norway seemed “a foolish thing,” it was explained as an effort “to beat the Britishers to the punch by mere hours.” The triumph over France was even more spectacular: it went far beyond the gains of the First World War. Wilhelm Kolesnyk marveled, “Holland conquered in five days, Belgium in twelve and the hereditary enemy France in 49 days in spite of its Mag
inot line.” Gerhardt Thamm’s father was part of the assault on the impregnable French defensive system, where “the Führer wanted to demonstrate to the world that ‘for a German soldier nothing is impossible.’” Moving in behind the front, Hans Queiser found “a country in defeat,” with some buildings destroyed, long columns of POWs, and panic-stricken civilians in full flight. Horst Grothus noted, “We are enthused by our victories and proud of our soldiers who are the best in the world.”29

  By contrast, the importance of losing the air battle over Britain was hardly understood. Grandiloquently Hermann Göring had promised that his Luftwaffe “would beat England into submission.” Technically the Messerschmitt 109 fighter was the superior plane, but the Spitfires proved more agile, making the Heinkel 111 bomber a sitting duck. Though German tactics of “free hunt” claimed many British planes, in the long run the use of radar, the rescue of downed pilots, and the location of airfields in the north proved more important. While the initial Luftwaffe attacks on air bases, industrial sites, and supply lines caused considerable damage, the later shift to targeting cities such as Coventry and London in retaliation for British raids proved disastrous. The collateral “killing of ‘civilians’ by their bombs only troubled a few” airmen, who told themselves “that they were just paying like with like.” In spite of relentless attacks, the Germans lost even more planes and failed to achieve the control of airspace that was necessary for an invasion.30