Out of the Mountains

by David Kilcullen

  33.Neil Gaiman and Terry Pratchett, Good Omens (London: Gollancz, 1990), 146.

  34.Jacques Attali, A Brief History of the Future: A Brave and Controversial Look at the Twenty-First Century, trans. Jeremy Leggatt (New York: Arcade, 2011), 132.

  35.Richard Dobbs, Jeremy Oppenheim, Fraser Thompson, Marcel Brinkman, and Marc Zornes, Resource Revolution: Meeting the World’s Energy, Materials, Food, and Water Needs (Washington, DC: McKinsey Global Institute, November 2011), 2.

  36.See Witold Rybczynski, “The Green Case for Cities,” Atlantic, October 2009; Robert Bryce, “Get Dense,” City Journal 22, no. 1 (Winter 2012).

  37.Bryce, “Get Dense.”

  38.Zolli and Healy, Resilience, 98.

  39.See, for example, Charles Murray’s argument in Coming Apart: The State of White America 1960–2010 (New York: Crown Forum, 2012).

  40.Zolli and Healy, Resilience.

  41.See Kylin Navarro, “Liberian Women Act to End Civil War, 2003,” case study at Swarthmore College Global Nonviolent Action Database, October 2010, online at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/liberian-women-act-end-civil-war-2003.

  42.Ibid.

  43.United States Institute of Peace, Women’s Role in Liberia’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2007).

  44.The Yemeni journalist Tawakkol Karman was separately honored with a Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for her part in the peaceful overthrow of President Ali Abdullah Saleh during Yemen’s 2011 uprising, mentioned briefly in Chapter 4.

  45.For a description of Gbowee’s experience, including her mentoring by Doe and Ekiyor and the support of external organizations and expertise, see her memoir: Leymah Gbowee and Carol Mithers, Mighty Be Our Powers (New York: Beast Books, 2011).

  46.Ibid.

  47.For a description of JTF Liberia, see Blair A. Ross, “The U.S. Joint Task Force Experience in Liberia,” Military Review, May-June 2005, 60–67; for the UN peacekeeping mission, see http://unmil.unmissions.org.

  48.For a street-level description of this program, see Beth Cohen, “On the Street with Violence Interrupters,” Pop!Tech, June 7, 2010, online at http://poptech.org/blog/on_the_street_with_violence_interrupters.

  49.Alex Kotlowitz, “Blocking the Transmission of Violence,” New York Times Magazine, May 4, 2008.

  50.Ibid.

  51.See Cure Violence’s website at http://cureviolence.org for details of the program.

  52.Gary Slutkin biography at Cure Violence website, online at http://cureviolence.org/staff-member/gary-slutkin.

  Appendix

  1.John Paul Vann, quoted in Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), 67.

  2.See Bruce Elleman, Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007).

  3.See United States, Government Accountability Office, “State Department: The July 2006 Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon,” memo dated July 7, 2007, online at www.gao.gov/new.items/d07893r.pdf.

  4.See “France Confirms Failed Somalia Hostage Rescue Attempt,” Al Jazeera, January 13, 2013.

  5.As we noted in Chapter 4, there have been instances where nonstate armed groups, attacked by powerful expeditionary militaries, have mounted retaliatory attacks against those forces’ homelands. The Pakistani Taliban-sponsored attempt to bomb Times Square in New York City is one such example; the London bombing of July 7, 2005, shows a similar pattern, in that three of the four bombers were of Pakistani immigrant descent (the fourth was a Jamaican immigrant) and their expressed motivation was retaliation for Western (including British) support of actions—including expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan—they deemed as “anti-Islamic.”

  6.See Charles Krulak, “The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas,” Vital Speeches of the Day 64, no. 5 (December 15, 1997): 139–41; Charles Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marine Corps Gazette 83, no. 1 (January 1999): 18–23.

  7.See, for example, Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, “Fatally Flawed: The Rise and Demise of the ‘Three-Block War’ Concept in Canada,” International Journal 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 967–78, and Hans de Marie Hengoup, “Tactique et stratégie dans la guerre nouvelle: place du caporal stratégique,” Revue Défense National (Paris) 128 (2011): 1–5.

  8.Dorn and Varey, “Fatally Flawed.”

  9.See the Cartography of the Anthropocene images by Felix Pharand-Deschenes at Globaia, online at http://globaia.org/en/anthropocene/#Maps.

  10.Author’s interview with Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe, commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, Colombo, June 2, 2011.

  11.Ibid.

  12.Author’s interview with officers of the 4th Fast Attack Flotilla, Sri Lanka, Colombo, June 1, 2011.

  13.Public Radio International, “Maritime Immigrant, Drug Smuggling Picking Up Along California Coast,” January 18, 2013.

  14.Author’s interview with John P. Sullivan, Los Angeles, November 9, 2012.

  15.Tom Phillips, “Brazil Creating Anti-Pirate Force After Spate of Attacks on Amazon Riverboats,” Guardian, June 17, 2011.

  16.Ibid.

  17.United States Special Operations Command, U.S. SOCOM Factbook 2012 (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2012), 28.

  18.See Louis Hansen, “New Riverine Force Will Take Fight Upriver in Iraq,” Virginian-Pilot, April 10, 2006, and Erik Sofge, “Behind the Scenes with a Special Operations Boat Crew,” Popular Mechanics, October 1, 2009,

  19.Interviews with SWCC crews, SEAL officers, and navy intelligence support team, Baghdad, June 3, 2007.

  20.See the official Royal Navy unit Web page at www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/The-Royal-Marines/3-Commando-Brigade/539-Assault-Squadron.

  21.Information on the Stridsbåt 90H is at www.soldf.com/strb90h.html.

  22.For a detailed timeline and description of the disaster, see Ingrid Eckerman, The Bhopal Saga—Causes and Consequences of the World’s Largest Industrial Disaster (New Delhi: Universities Press, 2005).

  23.Ibid.

  24.For the company’s version, see Union Carbide, “Statement of Union Carbide Corporation Regarding the Bhopal Tragedy,” 2012, online at www.bhopal.com/~/media/Files/Bhopal/ucs_2012.pdf.

  25.For an account of the Halifax disaster, see David Flemming, Explosion in Halifax Harbour: The Illustrated Account of a Disaster That Shook the World (Halifax, NS: Formac, 2004). For a description of the Texas City explosion, see Hugh Stephens, The Texas City Disaster, 1947 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997).

  26.U.S. Department of Defense, Amphibious Operations, JP 3–02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2009), I-2.

  27.See Russell Stolfi, “A Critique of Pure Success: Inchon Revisited, Revised, and Contrasted,” Journal of Military History 68, no. 2 (April 2004): 505–25.

  28.United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future (London: DCCS, 2003), 11.

  29.Ibid., 11–13.

  30.Ibid., 13.

  31.U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, JP 3–18 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012).

  32.Department of Defense, Amphibious Operations, IV-1.

  33.Department of Defense, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

  34.See United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 1–0 (Washington, DC: HQ Marine Corps, 2011), I-15.

  35.See United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 1–0 (Washington, DC: HQ Marine Corps, 2001), 2–15ff.

  36.Ibid., 5–23ff.

  37.United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Concept Paper: Seabased Logistics, n.d., online at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/docs/sbl.htm.

  38.Wit
h the retirement from service in 2005 of the Navy’s Sacramento-class fast combat supply ships (AOEs) and the decommissioning in 2004 of the remaining Supply-class fast combat supply ships (T-AOEs) and their transfer to Military Sealift Command (MSC), the principal supply vessel for afloat replenishment and support of amphibious operations is now the Lewis and Clark–class (T-AKE) dry cargo ship operated by the civilian-crewed Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force of MSC, of which only the last three ships (USNS William McLean, Medgar Evers, and Cesar Chavez) have a selective-offload capability allowing them to support amphibious operations using the sea-based logistics model.

  39.See United States Marine Corps, Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: Headquarters USMC, 2010), and Department of Defense, Operational Energy Strategy Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012).

  40.See U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Experimental Forward Operating Base, online at www.mcwl.marines.mil/Divisions/Experiment/ExFOB.aspx.

  41.For Burke’s work on natural resource security and energy policy, see U.S. Department of Defense, “Sharon E. Burke: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Oeprational Energy Plans and Programs,” www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=259, and Center for a New American Security, “Sharon E. Burke,” http://cnas.org/node/64.

  42.U.S. Army, The Modular Force, FMI3–0.1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), vii.

  43.For a detailed discussion of Commando 21, see Major H. J. White RM, “Future War: Commando 21, an Increase in Combat Power and Flexibility,” master’s thesis, U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, Q uantico, VA, May 5, 2002.

  44.Ibid.

  45.Ibid.

  46.Ibid.

  47.For a description of these initiatives, see Mark Unewisse, Land NCW: An Australian Perspective (Adelaide: Defence Science and Technology Organisation, 2010).

  48.See Steven Kornguth, Rebecca Steinberg, and Michael D. Matthews, eds., Neurocognitive and Physiological Factors During High-Tempo Operations (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Human Performance Enhancement for NATO Military Operations (Science, Technology and Ethics), 2009.

  49.See E. Williams et al., Human Performance (McLean, VA: Mitre Corporation, JASON, 2008).

  50.For an assessment of the last two operations, see Daniel Helmer, “Not Q uite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for US Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” Australian Army Journal 5, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 117–28.

  51.Organizations such as the U.S. Marine Corps Force Headquarters Group or the U.S. Army’s 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) would seem ideally suited to this role, provided they were given appropriate command authority and resources. For descriptions of these organizations, see U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne),” www.soc.mil/Assorted%20pages/95th%20CAB.html, and U.S. Marine Corps, “Force Headquarters Group,” www.marforres.marines.mil/MajorSubordinateCommands/ForceHeadquartersGroup.aspx.

  52.Author’s interviews with civil affairs, commanders and planning staff, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Djibouti, May-June 2011.

  53.For a description of the IDG, established in 2004, see Australian Federal Police, “International Deployment Group,” www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-deployment-group.aspx.

  54.Author’s interview with commanders and staff, COESPU, Vicenza, November 2012.

  55.For a description of the Israeli system, see Israel Defense Forces, “Trophy,” www.idf.il/1557-en/Dover.aspx.

  56.For a description of AMAP-ADS, see ADS, “AMAP-ADS: The Active Defence System,” http://ads-protection.org/amap-ads/active-defence-system.

  57.Mike Davis, Buda’s Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb (London: Verso, 2007).

  58.U.S. Government, Joint IED Defeat Organization, JIEDDO Annual Report 2010, 8, online at https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/JIEDDO_2010_Annual_Report_U.pdf.

  59.U.S. Government, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Plan 2012–2016, 2, online at https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20120116_JIEDDOC-IEDStrategicPlan_MEDprint.pdf.

  60.Ibid.

  61.See Michael Petit, Peacekeepers at War: A Marine’s Account of the Beirut Catastrophe (New York: Faber and Faber, 1986).

  62.See David Kuhn and Robert Bunker, “Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #15: IED Recovered from Trunk of Car by Police Station in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas (January 2012),” Small Wars Journal, January 14, 2013.

  63.U.S. Government, White House, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices, February 26, 2013, online at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cied_1.pdf.

  64.See “Bombs Behaving Oddly,” Strategy Page, August 24, 2011, online at https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htweap/articles/20110824.aspx.