A Memoir- the Testament

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A Memoir- the Testament Page 69

by Jean Meslier


  “The Being who is by itself,” he continues, “is by itself all that it can be, and it can never be either more or less, than the way it is.” This is true in one sense, but untrue in another. That which is by itself, is by itself, substantially and really, as to Being, all that it can be; it cannot be either more or less the Being that it is. Matter, for example, which is Being in general, can’t be either more or less matter than it is. Extent, similarly, which is, again, in its totality, Being in general, can’t be, in its totality, either more or less extended than it is; it is presently all that it can be. That is true in that sense, but it is no less true that Being in general is always presently all that it can be, with respect to its form and its modification, i.e., with respect to its way of being, because it does not currently have all ways of being that it can have, since it can truly change its way of being and be, sometimes one way, sometimes another. This is evident in matter, which, although it can’t be either more or less matter than it is in itself, nevertheless does not presently have all the ways of being that it can have, and it isn’t even possible that it can have them all together, since there are many ways of being that are incompatible and would necessarily negate each other.

  “To be like this,” says Mr. de Cambrai, “i.e., to be by oneself, and to be by oneself all that one might be, is,” he says, “to exist in the supreme degree of beings, and consequently,” he concludes, “at the highest degree of truth and perfection.” This conclusion is patently false. All matter is presently by itself at the highest degree of being, i.e., it can’t be more matter than it is, or exist more truly than it exists, because it presently exists as much as it can exist, and it is presently as much matter as it can ever be, and yet, all matter is not to the highest degree of perfection, since it’s obvious that this matter doesn’t have all possible perfection, and that it can’t even have them all presently at the same time, or even any of them to an infinite degree of perfection; and consequently, it is no less true to say that that which exists by itself, and that which exists to the highest degree of being, or by that to the highest degree of perfection. And it’s an illusion for Mr. de Cambrai, as well as the author of the Recherche de la vérité[835], to imagine, as they do, that the highest degree of perfection and that the infinite being are the same as the infinitely perfect being; it is, I say, an illusion for them to imagine that, and it’s clearly an illusion for them to conclude, as they do, in favor of the existence of an infinitely perfect God from the existence of a Being which would be at the highest degree of being, and which would only be infinite in extent. But all their arguments, more or less, pivot on this error, and on this illusion, and thus it is easy to see the weakness and vanity of all their reasoning.

  Taking the strongest of all their arguments, or at least the one that seems strongest, for at bottom, it doesn’t seem stronger than the rest to me. This argument is the one they take, as I’ve said, from the greatness, the excellence, the beauty, the order, the regularity, the organization, and the amazing interconnectedness they find in all natural things. “I can’t,” says, Mr. de Cambrai[836], “open my eyes without admiring the artistry which shines forth in all nature; the slightest glance,” he says, “is enough to perceive the hand that makes everything.” And the great Mirmadolin, St. Paul, says that the visible things of this world make visible to men what is invisible in God, that is, His eternal power and His divinity, so that those who know Him not are left without excuse[837]. Thus, all our God-cultists claim, that a wholly divine Spirit was required, i.e., an all-powerful, infinitely good, and infinitely wise Spirit was required to make so many amazing things, which infinitely surpass all the genius and power of the finest minds in the world. They claim that all of nature shows the infinite artistry of its author, and that the whole universe bears the stamp and character of an infinitely powerful and industrious cause, since it’s impossible, as they see it, that chance alone, or only the blind and fortuitous coming-together of necessary and irrational causes could have produced so many beautiful and amazing things. They confirm this with the examples I shared above, and they take the structure of a beautiful house, a beautiful clock, a beautiful painting, the writing and printing of a fine book, which discusses many things in an erudite manner, and many similar examples, which could also be mentioned. And, since everyone knows perfectly well that a beautiful house, that a beautiful painting, that a beautiful clock, and that the writing and printing of a beautiful and scholarly book can never be made by themselves, and that skilled and clever workers are necessary to make such things so well and so evenly, and that it would be ridiculous and absurd to attribute their composition or construction to chance alone, or only to the concourse of various blind and irrational causes, in the same way, say our God-cultists, the amazing structure of this whole world clearly demonstrates the existence of the worker who made it, since it’s equally impossible that it made itself, or that it was only made by the concourse of various blind causes, just like it’s impossible for a beautiful house, a beautiful picture, a beautiful clock, or a beautiful and scholarly book to be made by themselves, or to have been made by some blind and irrational cause; and, just as it would be ridiculous to say that all these fine and amazing works of human industry were made by themselves, or that they were made by the fortuitous concourse of some blind cause, as much as our God-cultists claim that it’s ridiculous to attribute only to blind and causes deprived of reason and understanding, the formation, the ordering, and the arrangement of so many beautiful and admirable works, as we see in nature.

  So, let us consider whether it is actually the way our God-cultists claim; for if that’s the case, as they say, this must necessarily help their cause; but if that is not so, they must also recognize their error and their illusion here. To fully appreciate the nature and origin of all these beautiful and wonderful works, or, if you like, of all these beautiful and wonderful productions that we see in nature, we must only know their principal causes truly, which amount to three:

  1). Knowing their substantial cause, I mean the functional cause of their being, i.e., what they are all made of, irrespective of their form or their way of being.

  2). The formal cause, i.e., precisely what makes all of them specifically, or particularly, be this or that sort of way.

  3). Their efficient cause, i.e., the active or acting cause which forms them, which places them, and which arranges all of them to be the way they are. Nothing more is required to clearly see if all these fine and wonderful works of nature necessarily come from the all-powerful hand of a God and a supremely perfect intelligence, or if they might come simply from some blind cause, deprived of reason.

  Let’s consider this.

  Firstly, with regard to their substantial and functional cause of their Being; everyone agrees, and even our God-cultists agree, that matter is their substantial cause, and their substantial Being; for, since they’re all material and corporeal, matter itself must be the basis of their Being and of their substance; in a word, they are matter and matter itself, which no one doubts. But matter can never have been created or formed from nothing, by any cause whatsoever, as I have already shown quite clearly. There is no need, and it would take too long to repeat them here. But when we assume that, it’s already clear and evident that all these beautiful and wonderful works of nature cannot, as to their substance and their substantial Being, have been created and formed from nothing, by any cause whatsoever, certainly their existence or substantial Being falls far short of demonstrating and proving the need for or existence of a Creator.

  2. Their formal and specific cause, i.e., that which precisely, specifically, or especially makes them all a particular kind of being, or a particular sort of way of being, is nothing other than the configuration, or the internal and external modification of all the parts of the selfsame material they are made of, which join, bond, and unite with each other, and are modified in infinite ways in all the different beings we see, or which we don’t see. It is manifest, clear, and evident t
hat nothing other than this variable configuration, modification, and bonding of the parts of matter is required to make and form all the beautiful and wonderful works that we observe in nature. So that, even if an all-powerful artisan had purposefully formed them, He would only have formed them according to this varied configuration, bonding, and modification of the parts of matter. And similarly, the most striking works of art and human industry only take place by means of the form, arrangement, and connection that workers apply to the materials they use for their products, just as all the most beautiful and perfect works of nature are only carried out by the configuration, connections, and modification of the parts of matter. And, since we see every day, artisans making, for example, from the same base of tin, plaster, or wax, works of the size and shape of men, animals, birds, etc., and all sorts of crockery, such as dishes, spoons, plates, pots, and other such things, only by giving different forms, shapes, and connections to their materials, likewise also all the most beautiful and perfect, and the most admirable works of nature are only made, as I’ve said, by the different configurations, connections, and modifications of the parts of matter. Such that all that is fines and most admirable and perfect in nature adds nothing real to matter, but this diverse configuration, connection, combination, and modification of its parts. For, as for the essence of these alleged substantial and accidental forms, which certain peripatetic philosophers speak of, and which they say are truly particular beings which are excreted, and, as it were, engendered by the power of matter, which are only chimerical and aren’t even worth refuting, and our Cartesians are right to reject them completely, as they do. That being the case, it’s also evident that all the beauty and all the perfection we see in the works of nature, since they are truly nothing other than modifications of matter, in no way demonstrate or prove the need for or the existence of a Creator.

  We still need to examine the third cause, which is the efficient cause of all these beauties and all these wonderful perfections we see in the works of nature. What does a being require to act? After having thought it through, I find that it’s necessary and that, at the same time, it’s sufficient for it to move or to have movement; for it’s clearly conceivable that, as long as a being is in a complete and perfect state of repose, it’s not possible for it to act: idem manens idem semper facit idem. Following the true maxim that I’ve already mentioned, a thing that always remains in the same state can’t help but always be the same. The being, then, as long as it remains in a perfect state of rest, is always in a state of perfect rest and consequently doesn’t do anything, but from the moment it begins to move, it begins to act and it’s in action, and, to the extent that it moves, to the same extent it’s also in action. If it moves feebly or languidly, it acts feebly and languidly; if it moves with force and violence, it acts with force and violence; if it moves with knowledge and liberty, it acts with knowledge and liberty; if it moves blindly and necessarily, it acts blindly and necessarily; if it moves in an orderly and regular manner, it acts in an orderly and regular manner; and if instead it moves irregularly and by no rule, it also acts irregularly and chaotically; in brief, every action naturally and necessarily follows the nature of the motion of the being that’s moving. All that is clear and evident. And since, besides, all these various motions I’ve mentioned, can also be modified in an infinite variety of ways, and since all the beings that are in motion and which are the smallest parts of matter, can mix, combine, join together, unite, ally, connect and bind together, or collide with each other and separate, spread apart, be dispersed from each other in infinite sorts and ways, it is still clear and evident that all these different being, i.e., that all these various parts of matter, as blind as they are, must, by their various motions and their various combinations and connections and modifications, produce as if naturally and necessarily, infinite sorts of different effects, some beautiful or ugly, and others somewhat beautiful or ugly, some good or bad, and others indifferent, some small, others large, and others of all sorts of sizes and shapes, some hard and others soft, some fluid and liquid, others dry and arid, some bright and shining, or luminous, and others dark or obscure, some light and subtle, and others heavy and massive, some of one shape and others of another, some of one color and others of another, some animate and others inanimate, and finally, all the different parts of matter, although blind, must, as if naturally and necessarily, produce by their various motions or assemblages, and by their various unions, combinations, and modifications, produce an infinite variety of productions and effects of all manner of sizes and all kinds of shapes, of all manner of colors and all sorts of qualities and species, and this is what we see so clearly in the world. It is also clear and obvious that all these different effects, or works that we see in nature, are made by the motion of matter and by the various assemblages and unions of its parts; for it’s not possible that an infinity of beings and parts, as there is in matter, could always move in infinite sorts of ways without running into each other, without connecting, without bonding, without mixing with each other, without joining, without linking, and without hooking onto each other in some way with each other, and consequently, without making and producing all these things, which are beautiful or ugly, large or small, and finally, all these works that we see in nature; so that, if they weren’t all just as we now see them, they would be in some other way equivalent to how we now see them. And, since all these parts of matter, which were joined and linked together blindly by their motion and their chance encounters, may still, by their movement and by the motion of the other parts of matter, which crash into them and shake them at every moment, be detached and separated from each other, it necessarily follows from that that all the works which are composed of these parts of matter which are connected and bonded or arrested together, can be dissolved naturally, inasmuch as all the parts of matter which make them up can be detached and completely separated from each other, as they were before their union.

  Which disunion or dissolution of the parts, which are united in a product or a compound, occurs more or less easily, sooner or later, depending on how strongly they were united, or how strongly they were shaken by those which surround them; and this is what naturally causes the infirmities, the diseases, aging, and even death in living bodies, and decay or corruption in those without life; and this is also what happens and manifestly occurs every day in the works of nature, to the point that it’s impossible to deny all I’ve just said. However, it’s plain that all the works of nature, even the finest, most perfect, and most amazing among them, depend in their formation and dissolution depend on nothing but the union or disunion of its parts. And, since this motion of matter can come only from matter itself, as I’ve already shown, since this union or disunion of the parts of matter is only a natural consequence of its motion and of the motion, whether regular or irregular, of its parts, it follows that the very formation of all these fine and admirable works of nature in no way demonstrates or proves the need for the existence of an infinitely wise artisan, as our God-cultists claim, and therefore fail to demonstrate or prove in any way the existence of an infinitely perfect God.

  84. ALL THESE NATURAL THINGS ARE FORMED AND SHAPED OF THEMSELVES BY THE MOTION AND CONCOURSE OF VARIOUS PARTS OF MATTER; WHICH ARE CONNECTED, UNITED, AND MODIFIED IN VARIOUS WAYS IN ALL THE BODIES MADE OF THEM.

  But, God-cultists will say, at very least the motion of matter and the motion of all its parts must be guided, regulated, and directed by a supreme omnipotence and a supreme intelligence, since it’s far from possible that so many beautiful, so regularly and industriously built and composed works, could have been made and organized, as we see them, by the mere motion of a blind and fortuitous assemblage of the parts of matter that are blind and irrational.

  To this I respond: 1). That, since it’s evident that there is always an infinity of parts in matter which are in motion and which move in all directions by specific and irregular motions, at the same time as they are carried along by a general movement o
f the whole mass of a certain volume, of by a considerable extent of matter, which would have been made to move in a circular line, being unable, as I’ve already noted, to keep moving in a straight line, since all of extension is full of similar matter, which couldn’t have withdrawn elsewhere to make room for another, it’s not possible that this whole multitude of parts are also moved, without mixing and without many of them meeting up, joining, connecting, stopping, and attaching together in many kinds of ways with each other, and having thus begun to compose all these different works, which we see in nature, which have since them been perfected and strengthened by continuing the same motions which began to produce them, it being certain that things are perfected and strengthened by the continuation the same motions which began to produce them, especially when these are regular motions, which began to produce them. For it should be noted that, since there were many kinds of movements in matter, some of these are regular, which always happen in an orderly fashion of the same sort and manner, and others which are irregular, and which don’t follow each other regularly, of which sorts of motions it can be said that in both cases in all species of beings or composites as are in nature. The irregular movements of matter do not always regularly produce the same effects, or they don’t always produce them in the same way, but sometimes in one way and sometimes in another; and, as these sorts of motions are irregular or can be irregular in infinite sorts of ways, which causes so many flaws, so many defects, so much defectiveness, and so many imperfections in most of the works of nature, and so often shows us monstrous and deformed things, and others which happen against the usual course of nature. But the regular motions of the parts of matter regularly produce their usual effects; for, once the parts of matter have opened paths in certain places, which determine them to particular modifications, they tend, by themselves, to continue their motions in the same way in these places, and to be modified there in the same way; and thus they mechanically produce the same effects, in these places and occasions, without the need for any other power to move them, or any other intelligence to guide their movements. So much that, when they meet, or fortuitously meet with some impediment in their routes, which keep them from going on their way in the same manner, and which keep them from being modified there, as their previous determination suggests they should; for then they are forced to take certain detours from their paths, or certain other modifications in their assemblages. Which necessarily leads to defects, superfluities, deformities, or at least something unusual in the works they produce.

 

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