A Memoir- the Testament

by Jean Meslier

  Our Cartesians pretend, once again, to mix things up, which I’ve already pointed out, with reference to the supposed existence of their God; for, to demonstrate, as they claim to do, that He exists, they pretend to confuse an infinity in extension, in number, and in duration, which does indeed exist, with a supposed infinitely perfect being who is not, and from the evident existence of the first, they imagine they can invincibly draw a conclusion in favor of the existence of the other, on which I’ve said that they were clearly mistaken and deluded. This is what they do again, similarly, with respect to animals, which they would deprive entirely of all knowledge and all feelings; for, to demonstrate, as they claim to do, that they don’t have any, they claim to confuse the extension of the measurable extent of matter, and its external shape, with the movements and the internal modifications that it has in living bodies; and after demonstrating sufficiently that no measurable extent of matter, and that none of its external shapes can produce any thoughts, or any sensation in men or in animals, they imagine they’re demonstrating in this way that, since there is only matter in animals, they can’t have any knowledge or any feelings. But their error and their illusion are right there, since it’s not in any measurable extent, or any external shape of matter, that the knowledge and feeling of men and animals consists, but in the various movements and the various internal modifications it assumes in men and animals.

  This makes a great deal of difference between them, for it may well be said that, since thoughts and feelings are in living bodies, they are consequently in matter which is extended an shaped; but it doesn’t follow from this that thought or feelings must for that things extended in length, in size, or in depth, or that they must be round or square things, as our Cartesians say, for thought and feelings are no less in a little man, for example, than in a larger one. Neither the measurable extent of the living body, nor its external surface, have anything to contribute here. Similarly, it can definitely be said that the thoughts and sensations of living bodies are made by the internal movements and the modifications of the matter they are made from; but this doesn’t mean that these sorts of movements are made necessarily from top to bottom or from bottom to top, or that they are necessarily made in a direct or oblique line, in a circular or a spiral line, in a parabolic or elliptical line, or that the movements from bottom up or top down, in a circular or oblique line, always produce certain thoughts or feelings; that, I say, doesn’t follow in our hypothesis at all, and it would even be ridiculous to imagine that such a thing must follow; and so it is in vain for our Cartesian friends to ask whether it is conceivable that matter formed into circular, square, oval, or other shapes can ever constitute a thought, a desire, a wish etc.; and if it’s conceived that a portion of matter that’s agitated from the bottom up or from the top down, or which moves in a circular, oblique, or parabolic line can produce love, hatred, pleasure, joy, pain, or sadness, and so on; it is, I say, vain for them to ask this, since our thoughts and our sensations don’t depend on these particular features of matter, and since they aren’t produced because matter is shaped in a round or square way, etc., or precisely due to the fact that it moves from the bottom up or from the top down, or because it moves from left to right or from right to left; but rather, as I’ve said, due to the fact that it has, within living bodies, certain movements and certain internal modifications and agitations which produce the life and the feelings of the living bodies, without any need for these sorts of internal modifications to have per se any particular shape of their own, and without any need for these sorts of motions to always go from bottom to top or from top to bottom, or any need to determine whether they go from right to left or from left to right, or if it’s precisely by straight or circular lines that they are made, or if it’s by spiral, oblique, or parabolic lines; that’s not the issue, it’s enough to say that our thoughts, that our sensations are truly made in living bodies however they happen to be made, and they are made there as well as the internal modifications I’ve just mentioned.

  Now, it is certain that all modifications of matter aren’t always round or square, nor do they necessarily have any shape whatsoever; it would even be ridiculous to claim that they’re always made that way or that they ought to be. The modification, for example, of air which gives us the feeling of light and color are certainly modifications of matter; however, these kinds of changes of matter have in themselves no particular shape of their own, and it would be ridiculous to ask whether the action of the air, which gave us the feeling of the sound, was round square. Similarly, it’s certain that the health and illness of the body are modifications of matter; these kinds of modifications do not, however, have any shape of their own, and it would be ridiculous to ask whether health and illness, for example, whether fever or the plague were round or square things, and whether they could be split and cut into pieces and quarters. Likewise, the actions that a man does when he talks, when he laughs, when he cries, when he sings and dances, and when he does other things; all these actions are certainly modifications of matter, for they are certain movements of his body, or of certain parts of his body; these actions, while they are modifications of matter, don’t have any shape per se, and it would be ridiculous to ask whether it’s conceivable that these sorts of things are round or square, and whether it’s conceivable that they might be divided and cut into parts and pieces. Finally, fermentation is a modification of matter, which our Cartesians can’t deny, however, fermentation is not something that can be called round or square, and although it may be, and in fact necessarily is, in matter that is extended and measurable, and it’s necessarily in matter that can have a shape, it nevertheless cannot have any measurable extent per se, or any shape which belongs only to itself, and it would be ridiculous to ask whether it’s conceivable that matter in a round, square, oval, triangle, etc. form would be a fermentation. It would be equally ridiculous to ask whether it’s conceivable that this fermentation is something that could be measured in ells or yards, or measured in pots and pints, because fermentation doesn’t consist in any determinate extension. Similarly, it would be ridiculous to ask whether it could be weighed in a scale or a balance, since it doesn’t have any degree of weight. I would be equally ridiculous to ask whether fermentation could be divided or cut into parts and pieces, since it’s not of its nature to be divided in this way. It would be ridiculous, I say, to ask such things, because it would be ridiculous to attribute to things qualities or properties that are incompatible with their nature or their way of being; so that even if we only attribute a single and similar term to many things of diverse natures, we must necessarily understand and explain it in various senses and various meanings, because it would be ridiculous to understand only one meaning of this single term with respect to all the things it signified. A pole, for example, is called long or short, and similarly, an illness is called long or short, so the terms long and short must necessarily be taken in these different senses; because it would be ridiculous to say and think that the length or brevity of an illness was a being or something similar to the length or brevity of a pole, or that the length of a pole was something similar to the length of an illness. And why would it be ridiculous to take this term in the same sense for a pole as an illness? Because it would be ridiculous to attribute to things qualities or properties that aren’t suitable to their nature or their way of being, and it is evident that the length of a pole isn’t compatible with the nature of an illness, and that the length of an illness isn’t compatible with the nature of a pole. This is why people don’t confuse the various meanings of the term and aren’t tricked by them. Similarly, a chilly wind, when it causes freezing, is called cold, and an orator who speaks without moving and without emotion, is called cold. This term, cold, must necessarily be taken in different ways, since it would be ridiculous to say or think that the coldness of a speech or a speaker was something similar to the coldness of an icy wind, or that the coldness of a chilly wind was similar to a cold speech or a cold speaker. And why w
ould be ridiculous to say it or think this, if not because it would be ridiculous to attribute to things qualities or properties that weren’t compatible with their nature or to their way of being? It’s also obvious that the coldness of another chill wind wouldn’t be suitable to the nature of a speech, or the nature of a speaker, and that the coldness of a speech or of an orator doesn’t suit the nature of a chill wind. This is also why nobody confuses the ideas of this term and nobody is tricked by them, even though they’re applied to things of a different nature; but if by some whim, or by error and ignorance, someone thinks they should in fact confuse them, on the pretext that the same word and the same term is used to point to them, and if for this single reason they thought they should thus attribute to certain things qualities or properties that were entirely unsuited to their nature and to their way of being, absurdity would surely be the result.

  But, it’s precisely in this absurdity where our Cartesians end up when they imagine and say that animals are not capable of knowledge or feeling, on the pretext that knowledge and feeling can’t be modifications of matter, at the same time imagining that all the modifications of matter are necessarily extended things as well, that they are necessarily round or square, and can be divided and cut into pieces and smaller bits… How could anyone imagine, they say, that the mind was extended and divisible? One might, they add, cut a square into two triangles with a straight line, into two parallelograms, into two trapezoids; but by what line, they ask, can one conceive that a pleasure, a pain, a desire, etc., can be cut, and that a shape would result from this division? If it’s conceived, they continue, that from matter shaped into circles, squares, ovals, etc., could be pain, pleasure, heat, smell, sound, etc., and if it’s conceived that the matter that’s agitated from bottom to top and from top to bottom, in a line that’s circular, spiral, parabolic, or elliptical could be love, hate, joy, sadness etc., it can be said that animals are capable of feelings and knowledge and if this is not conceived, then it shouldn’t be said, unless the intention is to speak without knowing what’s being said.

  So they imagine, then, according to their own way of thinking, that if animals were capable of knowledge and feelings, the mind would be extended and divisible, and that it could be divided or cut into pieces and bits; they imagine, then, that a thought, a pleasure, a desire, hatred or love, joy and sadness would be round or square, triangular or pointed, or some other shape, and things that can be split, divided, or cut into pieces and quarters, and that new shapes must result from this division; and they can’t accept that animals can have knowledge and feelings, unless they imagine that. Here they look ridiculous. What! Just because a thought and a desire or a feeling of pain or pleasure can’t be divided or cut like a square into two triangles, into two parallelograms, into two trapezoids, our Cartesians refuse to accept that knowledge or the feeling of pain or of pleasure are modifications of matter; and for this reason, they refuse to accept that animals are capable of knowledge or feeling? Can anyone help laughing at such nonsense? Spectatum hic admissi risum teneatis amici. When they say that the proper temperament of the humors is what gives life and health to living bodies, are they claiming that this proper temperament is something round or square? And that it’s something that can be divided or cut, like a square, into two triangles, into two parallelograms, into two trapezoids? And that some new shape would result from this division? What fools! They argue about the thoughts and desires, all the sensations, passions, and affections of the soul or the mind, as if they were substances, individual and absolute beings; and they fail to notice that they aren’t substances, individual and absolute beings, but only modifications and a vital action of beings. Thought, for example, isn’t an individual and absolute being, it’s only an action, a modification and a vital action of the being who thinks. A desire, a love, a hatred, a joy, a sadness, a pleasure, a pain, a fear, a hope, etc., are not substances and individual and absolute beings; they are only modifications and vital actions of the being who desires, who loves, who fears, who hopes, etc., or who feels good and bad things. Certain people are said to have intelligence, skill, learning, talent, and merit, while others have none; by this nobody is saying that these people have beings and substances that are only theirs; which the rest lack; and it would be ridiculous to ask whether the skill, learning, talents, and merit of these people are round or square, and by what sort of line they could be divided or cut into pieces, and what shape would result from this division; it would be, I say, ridiculous to ask this, because the skill, learning, talents, and merits of people aren’t individual and particular beings, or absolute beings, but only modes or modifications of the being and the ways of acting, reasoning, and speaking with greater liberty and facility than others, which ways of thinking and speaking are certainly not real and absolute beings, but only, as I’ve said, modifications of the being that acts and thinks. The same thing applies to thought and intelligence, knowledge and will, judgment and feeling, as well as to skill, learning, talent, and personal merit. Life, thought are not absolute beings, individual and particular beings, but only modifications of the being who lives and thinks, which modifications consist in a facility or a faculty that certain beings, which are alive, have of thinking and reasoning, which facility and faculty is greater, i.e., more detached and freer in some than others. And although it is greater in some than in others, and although some illnesses are longer or shorter than others, this doesn’t mean that it can be said, or even that we should think that the faculty of thinking and reasoning is therefore round or square, or that its shape is better formed in some than others, or that illnesses are therefore round or square things, and that they are capable of being divided or cut into pieces and bits, because it would be ridiculous, as I’ve said, to attribute qualities and properties to things which are completely incompatible with their nature, or their particular way of being. Thus, although the quantity of the faculties of thinking and reasoning are compatible with the nature of the mind, and the length or shortness is compatible with the nature of an illness, physical shape is still completely incompatible with the nature of the mind, or the nature of an illness, which are only modifications of the being, this is why it would be ridiculous to say and to think that these sorts of things must be round or square, on the pretext that they are larger or smaller, longer or shorter than each other.

  The same thing applies to corporeal life, whether human life, animal life, or plant life; their life is only a kind of modification or continual fermentation of their being, i.e., of their constituent matter, and all the knowledge, thoughts, and sensations they can have are only diverse other particular and transitory modifications of this modification or of this continual fermentation, which produces their life. The Cartesians can’t deny that this fermentation is a modification of matter; nor can they deny that this is what gives life to the bodies. However, they can’t say that this fermentation is round or square, or that it necessarily has any other shape; nor can they say either by why line it could be split or cut; they look ridiculous if they imagine that it must be round square, or that it must be of some other shape, and that it must be capable of being split and divided into pieces and bits, on the pretext of its being a modification of matter; therefore, it is clear and evident that all the modifications of matter are necessarily round or square things; or that they have any other shape, as our Cartesians assert, and consequently they are ridiculous to deprive animals of knowledge and feelings, on the pretext that knowledge and feelings can’t be modifications of matter, because they can’t be round or square, or otherwise shaped things.

  Besides, even if they agreed with us, that thought and feeling are indeed only modifications of matter, it wouldn’t be, for all that, matter that thinks and feels, but it would be the individual man or the animal which is made of matter, that would think, that would know, or that would feel in the same way; although health and sickness are only modifications of matter, it wouldn’t, however, be matter that would be healthy or sick, it wouldn�
�t be capable of that, but it would be the man or the animal, made of matter, who would be healthy or who would be sick; just as, again, it wouldn’t be matter that would see or hear, or that would be hungry or thirsty, but it would be the person or the animal that would see or hear, or that would be hungry or thirsty. And although fire, for example, and wine are only matter, nevertheless, it isn’t matter, properly speaking, that burns, or matter that intoxicates, but properly speaking it’s fire that burns and wine that intoxicates; for, according to the maxim of the Philosophers, the actions and the denomination of things is properly attributed only to the suppositions and not to the matter they are made of. Actiones et denominationes sunt supositorum. As absurd, then, as it would be to say that the life and fermentation of bodies wouldn’t be modifications of matter, on the pretext that they aren’t round or square, it is just as ridiculous to say that thought and feeling aren’t modifications of matter in living bodies, on the pretext that their thoughts and feelings aren’t round or square things. And, as absurd, then, as it would be to say that animals aren’t alive, on the pretext that their lives weren’t round or square, it’s no less absurd to say that they don’t have knowledge or feelings, on the pretext that their knowledge and their feelings aren’t round or square; and thus our Cartesians look ridiculous when, on such a vain pretext and on such a vain argument, they say that animals eat without pleasure, that they screech without pain, that they know nothing, that they desire nothing, and that they fear nothing. The opposite is evident in all cases. We see that nature has given them feet to walk and they walk, that it has given them eyes to guide them and they are guided. Would it have given them these eyes to guide themselves and to see nothing? Ears to hear and to hear nothing? A mouth to eat and to taste nothing? A brain with fibers and animal spirits to think and no nothing? What manner of illusion is this? And finally, a living flesh to feel nothing? What a bizarre fantasy! What an illusion! What folly! To imagine and believe everything on such vain grounds.